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1
Linking markets for Chinese 
growth
Ross Garnaut
The world s n ts fifth year of extraordnarly strong economc growth and 
chnese economc growth s at ts centre. strong growth wth low to moderate 
nflaton and hstorcally low real nterest rates s the global norm n 2007. 
The lnkng of markets has been a key to accelerated and sustaned growth 
n chna and ts transmsson to the global economy. The begnnngs of the use 
of markets at the dawn of chnese reform 29 years ago trggered what turned out 
to be a long-term lft n the rate of economc growth. The span of tme jonng the 
present to the decsve poltcal events that set reform and openng to the outsde 
world n moton n december 1978 s now as long as the whole lfe of maost 
central plannng. snce the late 1970s, chnese domestc markets for goods, 
servces, captal and labour have been lnked more and more closely, under the 
pressures of market opportunty that have been created by expanded reform. 
chnese economc nteracton wth the global communty proceeded alongsde 
the expanson of domestc markets, helpng to drve the domestc processes. 
chnese entry nto the World Trade organzaton (WTo) n November 2001 
helped—most mportantly through the changes n domestc polces and atttudes 
that accompaned t—to mantan momentum n nternatonal ntegraton.  
chnese nternatonal trade and captal flows have grown more rapdly than 
domestc output or expendture throughout the reform era. Ths has had large 
effects on economc development far beyond chna’s borders. drven by relentless 
expanson of chnese demand, global commodty prces—the export manstays 
of the poorer developng economes—have reached and remaned at levels n 
real terms that are hgher than they have ever been for comparably long perods, 
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wthout upsettng the strong trajectory of non-nflatonary growth n chna or 
the rest of the world (Garnaut and song 2006). The flow of captal from chna 
has helped to hold real nterest rates at hstorcally low levels all over the world, 
despte unprecedentedly hgh budget deficts n the Unted states. Ths has been 
mportant n reconclng hgh levels of nvestment and growth wth moderate 
nflaton through a perod of exceptonally strong global expanson. 
Wthn chna—supported by the beneficent nternatonal envronment, and 
drvng t—growth n the past year has lfted a notch, and wth t nvestment, 
real ncomes of most workers and most people, and domestc asset values. 
The wdenng reach of markets and the assocated rapd growth has forced 
structural change n establshed nsttutons and patterns of producton, resource 
allocaton and ncome dstrbuton throughout the chnese economy. inevtably, 
ths has been assocated wth poltcal tensons; however, the sustaned strong 
growth so far has been less and less problematc as the years have passed. 
Wse observers contnue to note that chna wll face challenges n adaptng 
ts poltcal superstructure to the changes n socety that accompany sustaned 
rapd growth. The wsest note that for the tme beng the growth n ncomes and 
wealth s a salve for many wounds, and that eventual change mght not necessarly 
take forms that are famlar n detal to ctzens of ndustralsed countres. 
The most challengng questons about the sustanablty of growth today 
come from chna’s relatons wth the nternatonal economy. The combnaton 
of the emergence of chna as a large economy on a world scale and deepenng 
market lnkages to the global economy means that change n chna s felt as 
pressure on resources and pressure for structural change n the rest of the 
world. Ths has made the nsttutons and polces through whch chna nteracts 
wth the global economy a matter of ntense nterest for people everywhere. 
The sharpest pont of contenton n chna’s external economc relatons 
at present s the foregn exchange value of the renmnb.1 exchange rate 
apprecaton accelerated n early 2007 aganst the Us dollar, but remaned 
gradual to the pont of exasperaton to those who looked for ths to be the 
mechansm for correcton of payments surpluses. exports contnue to grow 
strongly—and mports moderately—as productvty growth outweghs the 
effects on nternatonal compettveness of rsng labour costs and currency 
apprecaton. Ths rased tensons wth the Unted states. less obvous to those 
n the nternatonal communty who regret the scale of chnese current surpluses 
are the massve purchases of Western financal nstruments, especally Us 
offical securtes, whch underpn contemporary global stablty and growth by 
keepng real nterest rates well below what they would otherwse be. Woo and 
Xao (chapter 4) cauton about the consequences of Us polcymakers gettng 
what they wsh for n the way of large reductons n the chnese trade and current 
account surpluses. Any fracture n chna’s trade or payments relatons wth 
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the nternatonal system that emerged from ndustralsed countres’ poltcal 
responses to chnese surpluses would threaten prosperty through ths financal 
as well as real economy mechansms.
A rapdly emergng pont of contenton s chna’s contrbuton to the global 
warmng problem. chna s stll a relatvely small contrbutor to the accumulaton 
of greenhouse gases n the atmosphere, whch began wth the acceleraton of 
human use of fossl fuels accompanyng the emergence of modern ndustral 
actvty 200 years ago. The problem has crept up on the world—wthout market 
processes automatcally generatng a correctve response—because the costs 
of greenhouse gas emssons are external to the calculatons of any firm or 
household undertakng actvtes that release them nto the atmosphere. stern 
(2007) has commented that ths represents the most mportant market falure 
n human hstory. The nternatonal nature of the greenhouse gas externaltes 
makes ths a partcularly dauntng challenge.
chna s not a major part of the reason why the world faces large problems 
of anthropogenc warmng at ths tme. The arrval of sustaned rapd growth 
n chna, however, fuelled to an unusual extent by coal—the most emssons-
ntensve of major energy sources—s acceleratng the world’s movement 
towards crtcal ponts. in 2006, chna overtook the Unted states as the largest 
current emtter of greenhouse gases (song and sheng, chapter 12). Ths 
concded wth ncreasng awareness throughout the nternatonal communty—
ncludng n chna and the Unted states, followng europe and Japan some 
tme ago—that anthropogenc global warmng s a problem of large dmenson, 
requrng a strong response from the nternatonal communty. 
The contrbuton of chnese growth to global warmng rases the most crtcal 
and dfficult questons about the sustanablty of the contemporary pattern of 
chnese economc growth. Ths potental threat to future global prosperty s n 
some ways the other sde of the con to the exceptonal prosperty that chnese 
growth has conferred on the world, and especally to resource-rch countres 
such as Australa and some of ts developng-country neghbours. The answers 
le n creatng new markets—nsde chna and nternatonally—to enhance the 
socal and economc efficency of all of the other markets whose deepenng and 
mprovement have generated the current chnese and global prosperty.
The chapters n ths book dscuss recent developments n nternatonal 
markets n chna, n ways that llumnate the man contemporary challenges 
to chnese growth: the lnkages that shape the terms of captal flows n chna 
and wth the nternatonal economy; the lnkages that frame the natonal labour 
market durng the hstorc transton, whch was descrbed last year and snce 
as the ‘turnng pont n chna’s economc development’ (Garnaut and huang 
2006); the qualty of markets for goods and servces wthn chna and ther 
connectons wth the rest of the world; and the global market falures assocated 
4
China—Linking Markets for Growth
wth the global warmng problem. The chnese exchange rate ssue s mportant 
n dscusson of captal flows and trade, and s covered n greatest detal when 
t first arses n relaton to captal movements.
Linking capital markets and the role of the exchange rate
The deepenng ntegraton of domestc captal markets and ncreasng nternatonal 
captal flows are dscussed n almost half of the chapters n ths volume. Garnaut 
and huang (chapter 2) show that the rapd expanson of chnese foregn 
trade contnued n 2006 and early 2007. The ncrease n the trade surplus has 
accelerated, as have the current account surplus and growth n foregn reserves. 
The accumulated deprecaton of the renmnb exchange rate snce the loosenng 
of the te to the Us dollar n 2005 has been too small to affect sgnficantly ether 
real economc transactons or the poltcs of external economc relatons.
Woo and Xao (chapter 4) delve further nto these ssues, and analyse the 
debate n the Unted states on the defict wth chna. it makes sense for chna 
to contrbute to reducton of the payments surplus, but effectve adjustment 
would requre use of a wder range of chnese polcy nstruments than those 
that feature n the Amercan dscusson, and also polcy adjustment n the 
Unted states. There are rsks that msjudgement on two sdes of the Pacfic 
could be damagng to both.  
ma and mccauley (chapter 14) note the extraordnary ntensficaton of 
lnks wth global captal markets reflected n growth of gross captal flows 
to the extent that they now exceed annual gross domestc product (GdP). 
Ths has wdened opportuntes for avodng offical controls. Nevertheless, 
nterest rates contnue to move wth global rates only partally (adjusted for 
expected exchange rate movements), ndcatng that controls contnue to have 
notceable effects. mckay (chapter 15) notes the consequences of the payments 
surplus and ncreasng nternatonal financal ntegraton for monetary polcy. 
he observes that the chnese authortes have been able to sterlse much of 
the domestc monetary consequences of foregn exchange reserves recently 
growng at a rate that has no precedent anywhere. domestc polcy wll need 
support from exchange rate flexblty, but successful lberalsaton wll requre 
careful management—and mckay suggests a process for effectve change.
Golley and Tyers (chapter 16) look over the current powerful tendences to 
payments surplus, and examne long-term nfluences on the exchange rate. They 
argue that not all the long-term pressures wll be supportve of apprecaton. 
sun and Zhang (chapter 17) pont out lnks between the payments surplus 
and the apprecaton of real estate asset values that were recently a powerful 
factor n chnese development. The moderaton of rsks assocated wth real 
estate bubbles wll requre acton across a wde range of nstruments, ncludng 
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n exchange rate and fiscal polcy. rule (chapter 13) tells a fascnatng story of 
the growth and nternatonalsaton of chnese equty markets—to the pont 
where market nfluence now goes from chna to the world’s major markets, as 
well as n the opposte drecton.
Zhang (chapter 19) descrbes how, from 1984, the specal economc Zones 
played a major but transtonal role n chna’s ntegraton nto the nternatonal 
economy. They were a place for expermentaton wth reform, and ther success 
encouraged more general openng of the economy. snce about 2003, ther 
proportonate role has declned.
chen (chapter 11) descrbes the broader hstory of drect foregn nvestment. 
The early years of reform nvolved slow progress n changng the regulatory, 
nsttutonal and polcy frameworks for drect foregn nvestment. maturaton 
of ths process led to a hgh tde of nvestment from 1991 to 2001, wth the 
proportonate role of new drect foregn nvestment peakng at the end of ths 
perod. Far-reachng lberalsaton of drect foregn nvestment after WTo entry 
has nevertheless been mportant. 
Linking labour markets and the turning point in economic 
development
snce the publcaton of The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development a 
year ago (Garnaut and song 2006), there has been much dscusson and new 
research wthn chna on the rsng cost of labour n chna and the mplcatons 
of ths for the natonal economy.
Wu (2007) recently revewed some of the materal. he records the results of 
research for the development research center of the state councl, based on a 
survey of almost 3,000 vllages n 17 provnces. The results of the survey ndcate 
that 74 per cent of the vllages no longer have any surplus labour avalable for 
employment n dstant ctes. The ‘labour shortage’ began n coastal areas but 
has now spread through the nland.
Wu also draws attenton to the Green Paper on Population and Labour 
publshed by the chnese Academy of socal scences (cAss) n June 2007. 
The paper argues that chna s now approachng a ‘lewsan turnng pont’ 
(compare ths wth the smlar analytcal framework appled n Garnaut 2006 
and Garnaut and huang 2006). it notes that labour wll be ‘short’ throughout 
chna by 2009—n rural as well as urban areas. it descrbes an acceleraton 
n rates of ncrease n wages of rural mgrant workers—from 2.8 per cent n 
2004 to 6.5 per cent n 2005 and 11.5 per cent n 2006. Wu notes the concluson 
drawn by cAss scholar Wu Yaowu that reforms of the hukou system to reduce 
barrers to nternal labour mgraton are necessary n response to these large 
changes n the labour market.
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Garnaut and huang (chapter 2) present evdence of contnung strong wage 
growth, partcularly n relatvely poor nland and western provnces.
ca, du and Zhao (chapter 8) focus on the ncreasng ntegraton of the 
natonal labour market. They note that more than 100 mllon rural labourers 
have mgrated to urban jobs (and 132 mllon people from rural areas are workng 
n urban areas), alongsde the re-employment of lad-off workers from state-
owned enterprses. The restructurng of employment wthn a strongly growng 
economy has moved chna towards a hstorcal lewsan turnng pont, at whch 
surplus labour s no longer avalable to support rapd expanson of labour-
ntensve ndustry. The loomng labour shortage s generatng pressure for more 
efficent ntegraton of labour markets. reform of the hukou system—wth ts 
systematc dscrmnaton aganst mgrants from rural areas—has begun, but 
so far wth a strong bas n favour of mgrants wth relatvely hgh educaton 
and sklls. in any case, competton for labour n a post-lewsan world wll 
force deeper labour market ntegraton. it wll be accompaned by reducton 
n regonal and other wage dfferentals, and an adjustment of labour relatons 
legslaton to reduce dscrmnaton aganst labour—or else rsk labour unrest. 
They note that a tendency for wages to rse more strongly n poorer than n 
rcher regons can already be observed.
meng and Ba (chapter 9) offer a dfferent perspectve, based on detaled 
payroll data from seven labour-ntensve factores operatng n Guangdong 
Provnce between 2001 and 2004. The data have the advantage that they 
relate specfically to mgrant workers. meng and Ba found no evdence of a 
substantal tendency for ncomes of mgrant workers to rse n these factores 
n Guangdong n the early years of the twenty-first century.
Linking goods and services in China and abroad
A number of chapters document and analyse the effects of deepenng domestc 
market ntegraton, and analyse the relatonshp between domestc and 
nternatonal lnkages.
Wang, Fan and Zhu (chapter 3) apply a new ndex to measure the expandng 
role of markets n the chnese economy. The role of markets n domestc and 
nternatonal economc relatons has become large by any standards, wth the 
process of change havng been accelerated by WTo entry. Fndlay, Pangestu 
and lee (chapter 6) apply nnovatve and productve approaches to analyss 
of lberalsaton n the servces sector. The parallel analyss of agrcultural 
exchange by huang, lu, martn and rozelle (chapter 7) demonstrates that 
the chnese farm economy s more open to the nternatonal market than ths 
sector n most ndustralsed countres, and that openness has been asssted 
by WTo entry. l, song and Zhao (chapter 5) descrbe another dmenson of the 
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nternatonalsaton of the chnese economy n recent years: expanson of exports 
has been accompaned by huge growth n components mports from other east 
Asan companes, allowng chna and ts neghbours to specalse more and more 
finely n producton and trade accordng to comparatve advantage. 
Two chapters look more broadly at the relatonshp between domestc and 
nternatonal market ntegraton. Golley and Groenewold (chapter 10) note 
that lnkages across markets n chna are less mpressve than lnks to the 
nternatonal economy. The better-developed economes are more closely lnked 
to overseas than nternal markets. chen, Gu, lu and chen (chapter 18) conclude 
that deeper nternatonal ntegraton tends to weaken domestc market lnkages 
for a whle, but to strengthen them at a later stage of development.  
The need for new markets for environmental amenity
chnese economc growth—lke sustaned economc growth n many 
countres—has been assocated wth pressure on the local envronment. 
chnese economc growth s now on such a prodgous scale that t s placng 
pressure on global envronmental amenty through ts contrbuton to current 
and prospectve global warmng.  
A recent report from the Netherlands envronment Assessment Agency 
(2007) on global emssons of greenhouse gases recorded that chna overtook 
the Unted states n 2006 as the country wth the hghest levels of greenhouse 
gas emssons—by a margn of 8 per cent. chna contrbuted two-fifths of the 
2.6 per cent growth n global emssons last year.  
internatonal market reform, embodyng nternalsaton of global envronmental 
externaltes, s needed f the contnuaton of strong growth s to be reconcled 
wth the conservaton of aspects of the bosphere on whch all human actvty 
depends. These dfficult but fundamentally mportant ssues are dscussed brefly 
n the concludng secton of Garnaut and huang (chapter 2). 
The chnese dmenson of the global warmng ssue has ts orgn n the 
extent and character of chnese energy use n the process of rapd economc 
growth. song and sheng (chapter 12) assess n detal the relatonshp between 
growth and energy consumpton n chna. They ntroduce recent offical 
dscusson of clmate change n chna to provde mportant nsghts nto 
chnese thnkng and possble future contrbutons to management of ths 
nternatonal ssue.  
Integrating ideas about economics
Ths volume concludes wth reflectons by ln (chapter 20) on the adequacy of 
deas from modern neoclasscal economcs n understandng growth n chna 
and other transtonal economes n the reform perod.
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one of the mpressve and nfluental processes of lnkng chnese to 
nternatonal markets n the reform era has nvolved the market for deas about 
economcs. The modern economcs professon has grown prodgously, so that 
the receved economc wsdom of the West s understood and taught wdely n 
the best unverstes and socal scence research nsttutons. ln, and the chna 
center of economc research at Pekng Unversty, whch he was nstrumental 
n establshng, s the prme locus of ths new knowledge.
one of the strengths of modern economcs as professed n chna s that t 
has been capable of crtcal rgour n applcaton of deas developed elsewhere 
to the chnese stuaton. ln analyses the sources of modern economcs’ falure 
to comprehend the falure of smple applcaton of receved doctrne n the 
former sovet Unon, and the success of departures from t n chna. he draws 
attenton to the mportance of retanng a crtcal mass of ‘vable’ enterprses, 
whch can mantan economc actvty through dsruptve structural change. 
Note
1 Throughout the followng chapters, the terms ‘renmnb’ and ‘yuan’ are used nterchangeably.
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chna’s strong and acceleratng growth, wth low nflaton and growng external 
payments surpluses, contnued n 2007. The longer that strong growth n chna 
contnues, the greater s chna’s nfluence on global outcomes. Global growth 
looks set to exceed 5 per cent n 2007 for the fourth successve year—hgher 
than the 4.9 per cent average of the ‘Golden Age’ from 1950 to 1973. chna s 
now at the centre of what could turn out to be the strongest perod of global 
economc growth the world has seen—a ‘Platnum Age’.
investment as a share of chnese output rose agan n 2007, from levels that 
many had sad could go no hgher. our concluson n the 2005 chna Update 
volume (Garnaut and song 2005)—that there was no sound bass for external 
and chnese assessments that growth based on the hgh nvestment shares 
of the early twenteth century was unsustanable—seems so far to have been 
valdated by subsequent experence. The contnued rapd ncrease n nomnal 
and real wages alongsde some (albet small) currency apprecaton confirms 
that ‘turnng-pont’ adjustments—the focus of last year’s chna Update volume 
(Garnaut and song 2006)—have begun wthout dslocaton of the growth 
process. chnese officals talk prvately of the economc system functonng 
better than at any tme for 5,000 years, and an economst wth hstorcal nterests 
can see where they are comng from. 
The two most dfficult challenges to the sustanablty of current chnese and 
global prosperty come from chna’s relatons wth the nternatonal economy. 
The external payments surpluses—the trade surplus, the current account 
surplus and the captal account surplus, addng up to an extraordnary rate of 
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ncrease n foregn exchange reserves—are stranng relatons wth the Unted 
states n partcular as never before. And sustaned, super-charged growth s 
placng unprecedented stress on the global bosphere. 
An overview of macroeconomic performance
chna’s growth reached 10.7 per cent n 2006, takng the average of the past 
three years to 10.4 per cent—almost a full percentage pont above the average 
of the first quarter-century of the reform era. Gross domestc product (GdP) 
growth accelerated further—to 11.1 per cent for the year to the first quarter of 
2007 (Fgure 2.1). inflaton also rose—to more than 3 per cent for the first tme 
n the recent perod of exceptonally strong growth. 
investment and net exports led growth, but consumpton, whle growng 
strongly by the standards of other countres, lagged behnd. external account 
surpluses surged, causng concerns at home and abroad. in 2006, nvestment 
contrbuted 55 per cent and net exports 29 per cent to GdP growth (Fgure 2.2).
The nvestment share of GdP rose from 35.3 per cent n 2000 to 42.7 per 
cent n 2006, and the net exports share rose from 2.4 per cent to 7.3 per cent n 
the same perod (Fgure 2.3). meanwhle, household consumpton as a share 
of GdP dropped by 10 percentage ponts n the sx years, from 46.4 per cent 
to 36.4 per cent.
Fgure 2.1 Quarterly real GDP growth and CPI inflation in China, 
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Source: ceic data company and Natonal statstcs Bureau of chna.
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Whle we have challenged for several years the conventonal wsdom of the 
early twenteth century that the nvestment share of chnese producton was 
already unsustanable and had to fall, we have acknowledged the arthmetc 
realty that the share could not ncrease wthout lmt (Garnaut and huang 
2005). There was, therefore, comfort n the sgns of fallng rates of growth n 
nvestment and rsng consumpton growth rates through 2006. Fxed-asset 
nvestment growth moderated to about 25 per cent from close to 30 per cent. 
retal sales growth pcked up from 13–14 per cent early n 2006 to more than 15 
per cent through the first half of 2007 (Fgure 2.4). Fxed-asset nvestment has, 
however, re-accelerated through the early months of 2007. The overall result 
has been an acceleraton n growth momentum wthout sgnficant rebalancng 
of the sources of growth so far n 2007. 
The near consensus two years ago that the nvestment rate was too hgh 
and that ts reducton would requre a fall n the rate of growth s now less 
wdely held. Weakenng, too, are some analysts’ expectatons of a hard landng 
for the chnese economy on the bass that nput prces—wages and costs 
of materals—are growng much faster than output prces n most chnese 
ndustres. Ths had been expected by some to lead to narrowng profit margns, 
declnng nvestment and ncreasng non-performng assets n the financal 
system. None of these events have occurred. strong productvty growth helped 
chnese ndustry to absorb the cost pressure and supported profit growth. 
Accordng to growth accountng analyss by Bosworth and collns (2007), total 
factor productvty growth contrbuted about 55 per cent of output growth n 
the manufacturng sector n chna n 1995–2004. Total profits of the ndustral 
sector have contnued to grow at about 30 per cent annually n recent years. 
earnngs of lsted chnese companes ncreased by 46 per cent n 2006. 
inflaton rates for non-food prces were generally well behaved. energy prces 
have gven way to food prces as the man drver of headlne nflaton. Between 
march and may, headlne consumer prce ndex (cPi) ncreases rose above 3 
per cent, breachng an nformal target set by the People’s Bank of chna. Food 
prces, whch account for about one-thrd of the basket, ncreased sgnficantly, 
affected by bad weather across the country. 
in the first half of 2006, pork prces jumped by close to 50 per cent year-
on-year, exacerbated by a number of pg dsease ncdents n southern chna. 
Purchasers from southern chna, ncludng hong kong, went as far away as 
northeast chna to buy pork, pushng up natonal prces. 
Whle food prces could reman volatle—especally wth recent floods n 
parts of the country—the fact that non-food nflaton has been stable at about 
1 per cent (Fgure 2.5) suggests that headlne nflaton could stablse at about 
3 per cent relatvely soon. 
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Fgure 2.4 Growth of retail sales and fixed asset investment in China, 
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recent spkes n cPi nflaton have already nvted the concern of monetary 
polcymakers. The People’s Bank of chna has related ts general goal of holdng 
cPi ncreases wthn 3 per cent specfically to the outcome for 2007. snce the 
begnnng of 2007, the central bank has rased the reserve requrement three 
tmes and hked depost and lendng rates three tmes. on 18 may, the People’s 
Bank of chna announced three polcy measures at once: t ncreased the 
reserve requrement rato by half a percentage pont; t rased base depost 
rates by 27 bass ponts and lendng rates by 18 bass ponts; and t wdened 
the tradng band of the exchange rate to 0.5 per cent from 0.3 per cent.
These were modest adjustments. The current offical reserve requrement 
rato—11.5 per cent—remans way below the real reserves that commercal 
banks depost wth the central bank, whch are close to 13 per cent of total 
commercal banks’ deposts. Whle depost and lendng rates ncreased by 81 
and 72 bass ponts respectvely n the first half of 2006, ths was sgnficantly 
less than the ncrease n the cPi. real nterest rates, from ths perspectve, 
declned. ctgroup’s monetary condtons ndex—whch s a weghted 
average of real nterest rates, real effectve exchange rates and real credt 
growth—suggests that monetary condtons n chna showed lttle tghtenng 
(Fgure 2.6). 
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Polcymakers have not tghtened monetary polcy much because they thnk 
that overall macroeconomc condtons reman healthy. Wth GdP growth more 
than 10 per cent and cPi nflaton well below 5 per cent, some officals argue 
prvately that the chnese economy s probably n ts best state for 5,000 years. 
They also recognse lmts on the extent to whch monetary tghtenng can be 
effectve wth a fixed exchange rate.
increasng ncome nequalty
Unequal ncome dstrbuton affects consumer spendng, especally spendng of 
low-ncome households. What focuses the mnds of officals s that t can lead 
to socal and poltcal tenson. There has been a rapd ncrease n ncdents of 
socal unrest. most of these problems have been caused by local ssues, such 
as corrupton of local officals, land compensaton for property development 
projects and uncvlsed mplementaton of famly plannng polces. Unrest 
would be harder to manage f local concerns were joned by tensons over 
systemc ncreases n nequalty.
Asset prce bubbles
Wth regard to asset prce bubbles, a few years back the authortes were 
worred about the housng market. in shangha and Bejng, prces of luxurous 
propertes doubled every three to four years, and there was a strong ncrease 
n property prces more generally. Ths rased two types of concerns among 
polcymakers: damage to housng affordablty of ordnary households and 
potental mplcatons for qualty of financal assets f the bubble were to 
burst. 
From 2004, the natonal government started to ntroduce a number of 
measures to cool the property markets around the country, ncludng a hgher 
requrement of equty for property development loans, tghter controls on 
land supply, hgher nterest rates for second mortgage loans and regulated 
proportons of small apartments n new housng developments. local 
governments n most areas were ntally resstant to the restrctve measures. 
some local authortes, however, later supplemented the natonal polces wth 
specfic measures, such as bannng constructon of vllas, prohbtng sales 
off the plan and levyng captal taxes. After mplementaton of these polces, 
property markets n large ctes such as shangha and Bejng showed sgns 
of stablsaton; however, housng prces n many second-ter ctes contnued 
to show double-dgt growth.
From early 2006, concerns about asset bubbles shfted to the stockmarkets. 
By the end of 2005, chna’s domestc A-shares had experenced a mult-year 
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bear market. The domestc stockmarkets, however, experenced a sgnficant 
turn around n 2006. By early 2007, A-share prces had rsen by 180 per cent 
year-on-year (Fgure 2.7). some securty market partcpants and regulators 
argue that the fundamentals support a long bull market n chna. chna n 
recent years has mplemented a number of equty-market reforms, ncludng 
reform of non-tradable shares (98 per cent completed), the establshment of 
ncentve structures for lsted companes, the development of nsttutonal 
nvestors, the ntroducton of the Qualfied Foregn insttutonal investor (QFii) 
plan and reform of the ntal publc offerng (iPo) process. many government 
officals argue that today’s stockmarkets are already fundamentally dfferent 
from those of a few years ago, justfyng hgher values.
corporate earnngs and lqudty condtons also support a strong market. 
earnngs were strong even n labour-ntensve sectors such as clothng (see 
Fgure 2.8). domestc lqudty remans abundant. Bank deposts, for nstance, 
are almost 200 per cent of GdP and more than double the stockmarket 
captalsaton.
so why do so many government officals worry about the rsk of stockmarket 
bubbles? manly because of the ncreasng role played by retal nvestors, and 
the resultng poltcal senstvty of any crash. The amount of retal nvestment 
s already double that of nsttutonal funds. The number of nvestment accounts 
was growng by one mllon every three days n the second quarter of 2007. 
The market has contnuously gnored polcy messages durng the past 
years—share prces kept rsng after the varous tghtenng announcements 
by the People’s Bank of chna. What eventually caused a short-lved correcton 
was the ncrease n stamp duty on stock tradng from 0.1 per cent to 0.3 per cent 
n the nght of 29 may. on 30 may, the A-share ndex declned by 6.5 per cent. 
Ths caused wdespread market shudders, ncludng n indonesa, hong kong, 
inda, Tawan and Australa and on the major world exchanges. internatonal 
markets quckly stablsed, as they refocused on the fundamental strengths of 
the chnese economy. The domestc market remaned volatle n the followng 
weeks, but then recovered ts losses and stablsed. 
Whle the stockmarket seems lkely to lft further after a perod of 
stablsaton, t s worth analysng, by way of rsk analyss, what would follow f 
there were, say, a 30 per cent declne n A-share prces. The first pont to note 
s that the market has rsen by more than 100 per cent durng the 12 months to 
md 2007, so the hypothetcal correcton would leave prces way above the levels 
of a few months earler. hgh-level nspecton of the hstorcal data reveals no 
clear general relatonshp between A-share prces and GdP. durng the past 
15 years, stockmarkets had roller-coaster varablty, whle GdP growth was 
strong and stable. Any effects of a major correcton would be n three man 
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areas—consumpton through the wealth effect, non-performng loans n the 
bankng sector and socal nstablty.
in 2002, stocks accounted for only 10 per cent of households’ total financal 
assets. Ths proporton has ncreased, but t would stll be low. Total stockmarket 
captalsaton stll accounts for only 20 per cent of chna’s financal assets. 
Applyng the hstorcal monthly share prce and retal sales data between 1994 
and 2006, we estmate the elastcty of retal sales wth regard to share prces 
at 0.1. in other words, a 10 per cent declne n the A-share ndex tended to be 
assocated wth a 1 per cent slow-down n retal sales.
Ths means that f the A-share ndex declned by 30 per cent, retal sales 
growth could fall by 3 percentage ponts below what t would otherwse have 
been. A hypothetcal sustaned fall by 30 per cent could brng down retal sales 
growth from a recent 15 per cent to about 12 per cent. Ths would be notceable, 
but not devastatng. it mght translate nto a sngle percentage pont slow-
down n GdP growth, n the absence of countervalng adjustments n fiscal 
or monetary polcy.
Gven that most nvestors do not borrow from banks for stockmarket 
nvestment and there are no margn accounts, the mpact of a potental equty-
market correcton on loan qualty should be lmted. in fact, a sgnficant fall 
n the stockmarket could result n the wthdrawal of funds from that market 
and flows nto the property markets and bank deposts. A rebound of property 
prces could result. Ths would modfy the wealth effect on consumpton. 
The authortes would seek especally to avod a major stockmarket fall 
n the year of a new round of leadershp change, wth the five-yearly Party 
congress late ths year. many nvestors would blame the government for a 
large correcton—as they have done many tmes durng the past 10 years. 
The poltcal reacton would be more sgnficant ths tme, wth the number of 
actve nvestment accounts rapdly approachng 30 mllon. Ths s an mportant 
constrant on any aggressve polcy actons to prck the bubble.
Growing external imbalances and conflict with the United States
exports now account for 36 per cent of GdP (natonal accounts measure) and 
are stll growng at a rate of more than 20 per cent. export growth has helped 
to absorb the ncrease n productve capacty each year. Ths s one reason why 
the Natonal development and reform commsson’s consstent warnngs n 
the past 10 years about an over-nvestment problem have not been reflected 
n developments n the real economy.
The expanson of chna’s external account surpluses has accelerated snce 
ts accesson to the World Trade organzaton (WTo) n late 2001 (Fgure 2.9). 
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chna’s mports grew rapdly, but ts exports grew more rapdly stll. chna’s 
trade surplus surged from Us$23.1 bllon n 2001 to Us$177.5 bllon n 2006, 
and ts current account surplus jumped from 1.5 per cent of GdP to 9 per cent 
of GdP durng the same perod. The largest ncreases n the trade surplus 
occurred durng 2005 (211 per cent) and 2006 (74 per cent). durng the first five 
months of 2007, the surplus rose agan by 87 per cent from the same perod n 
the prevous year. Part of ths ncrease has come from slower growth n chna’s 
defict wth—or, n the case of the Assocaton of southeast Asan Natons 
(AseAN), a real declne n—blateral trade deficts wth these countres. Ths 
reflects the shft of more and more components supply nto chna (Fgure 
2.9), drven by ncreasng chnese compettveness wth the world as a whole. 
increasng self-sufficency n components strengthens chnese enterprses’ 
poston to meet rules of orgn of blateral preferental trade agreements as 
they become more mportant through the Asa Pacfic regon.
The blateral trade mbalances wth the Unted states and the euro area 
have been contentous. Untl 2006, chna’s blateral trade surpluses wth the 
Unted states were often sgnficantly greater than ts overall surpluses. chna 
had trade deficts wth other tradng partners consdered together. Athukorala 
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(2005) has descrbed how ths has reflected the movement of final assembly of 
many manufactured goods nto chna for supply to North Amerca and europe, 
by firms that drew components from a range of Asan economes accordng to 
comparatve advantage. Between 2001 and 2004, chna’s overall trade surpluses 
were relatvely stable at about Us$30 bllon a year, despte changes n blateral 
mbalances.
Ths pattern, however, started to change n 2005. chna’s trade deficts 
wth Japan and AseAN economes have recently stagnated or fallen, whle ts 
surpluses wth the Unted states and europe have contnued to rse rapdly. in 
fact, the only major tradng partners that stll enjoy rapdly growng blateral 
trade surpluses are korea and Tawan. such developments reduce the benefit 
of chna’s rapd growth to the rest of Asa, and are lkely to make chna’s 
mbalances more wdely contentous.
current account surpluses have also ncreased rapdly (Fgure 2.10). The 
sum of gross domestc nvestment and net exports—that s, chna’s natonal 
savngs rate—s now more than half of GdP. Ths s hgh by the standards of 
other east Asan economes through ther perods of strongest growth.
large and ncreasng external surpluses pose two types of rsks for chna. 
Frst, there s nternatonal resstance to absorpton of ncreasng values of 
Fgure 2.10 China’s current account and trade balances, 1989–2008 (per 
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chnese exports, especally when external payments are n large surplus. 
second, escalatng external surpluses threaten monetary stablty.
chnese growth has become more susceptble to fluctuatons n the global 
economy. exports already account for 36 per cent of GdP, of whch about 22 per 
cent goes to the Unted states. Ths mples that exports to the Unted states are 
equvalent to 8 per cent of GdP. Analyses applyng the oxford macroeconomc 
forecastng model suggest that a declne of the Us economy by 1 per cent 
slows chnese growth by 1.3 percentage ponts. chna could mantan 10 per 
cent growth f external demand softens temporarly through domestc demand 
expanson, especally through fiscal polcy. Any serous slow-down n external 
demand would, however, challenge the momentum of chnese growth. No such 
general slow-down s currently wthn sght.
internatonal poltcs also set mportant constrants for chna’s export-
led growth. chna already accounts for 8 per cent of world exports. Growth 
n chnese exports above 20 per cent year after year requres sgnficant 
structural adjustment n the rest of the world. Whle expanson of chnese 
exports s a result of market forces and benefits consumers world-wde, the 
adjustment costs caused by ths expanson generate poltcal tensons n some 
other countres. Ths s most obvous n the Unted states and europe, where 
blateral trade deficts wth chna have been largest. Already, the Unted states 
has mposed countervalng dutes on mports of chnese coated paper and 
lodged three complants wth the WTo about ntellectual property rghts and 
ncome tax subsdes. if chna does not respond quckly, new waves of trade 
protectonsm could swell n and beyond the Unted states.
Polcymakers n both countres recognse the mportance of mantanng 
smooth trade and economc relatons. The sem-annual chna–Us strategc 
economc dalogue s fundamentally mportant to mature poltcal and 
economc relatons between two of the world’s largest economes. Wth lttle 
demonstrable change n the exchange rate or the overall trade surplus, however, 
calls for more substantal polcy changes are rsng wthn the Us congress. The 
internatonal monetary Fund’s multlateral consultaton on Global imbalances 
has not generated mmedate economc effects.
The rsks of trade protectonsm n the Unted states have ncreased 
sgnficantly snce November 2006, when the democrats won control of congress. 
recently, two new blls were put forward n congress: one by senators dodd and 
shelby and another by senators Baucus, Grassley, schumer and Graham. Both 
am to lmt the scope for executve dscreton n judgng exchange rates and 
to prescrbe explct sanctons f manpulaton or fundamental msalgnment s 
found. The upcomng presdental electon could push the polcy debate further 
n that drecton, especally n relaton to chna.
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As a matter of domestc polcy, large current account surpluses and captal 
nflows on the back of a rgd exchange rate regme also hurt domestc monetary 
polcy autonomy. massve foregn reserves and excess domestc lqudty are 
two obvous outcomes (Fgure 2.11). The central bank s forced to buy as 
much foregn exchange as the market offers at the controlled rate, n order to 
mantan exchange rate stablty. Ths njects local currency lqudty nto the 
domestc system. in order to reduce the nflatonary consequences, the central 
bank engages n sterlsaton. For the past years, however, the People’s Bank 
of chna has found sterlsaton ncreasngly dfficult. domestc commercal 
banks have become ncreasngly reluctant to purchase central bank paper 
gven the very low returns on these assets. The scale of the outstandng 
central bank paper makes rollover pressure heavy. in response, durng the 
past year, the central bank has focused more on reserve requrements as a 
way to tghten lqudty.
in march 2007, the Natonal People’s congress approved the establshment 
of a new Natonal Foregn exchange investment corporaton, whch s mandated 
ntally to manage about Us$200 bllon of the foregn reserves. The mnstry 
of Fnance wll ssue specal T-bonds to commercal banks and exchange the 
revenue for foregn reserves from the central bank. meanwhle, by ssung 
longer-term bonds to the financal sector, the mnstry of Fnance wll share 
responsblty for sterlsaton. Gven that Us$200 bllon wll be about 10 per 
cent of chnese GdP and one thrd of the exstng stock of treasury bonds, ths 
Fgure 2.11 China’s monthly increase in foreign reserves and sum of FDI 
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s lkely to ncrease yelds sgnficantly. indeed, domestc bond yelds jumped 
by between 25 and 50 bass ponts n late June 2007.
The chnese government has dentfied contanng the trade surplus as a 
top polcy prorty n 2007. it has recently taken a number of polcy decsons 
that could have some modest effect on the growth n exports and the trade 
surplus.
Frst, t announced the unficaton of the corporate ncome tax, effectve 
January 2008. Prevously, corporate ncome tax rates were 15 per cent for 
foregn-nvested firms and 33 per cent for domestc enterprses. As foregn-
funded companes contrbute 60 per cent of chnese exports, ths preferental 
tax treatment has been seen as effectvely boostng the export sector. in march 
of ths year, the Natonal People’s congress approved unficaton of corporate 
ncome tax rates to 25 per cent for all types of enterprses. Ths measure was 
also requred by chna’s WTo entry commtment to treat natonal and foregn 
enterprses n smlar ways, but t could have some dampenng effect on export 
growth.
second, the government has cut export tax rebates. The mnstry of Fnance 
adjusted value-added tax (VAT) rebates on export goods n the steel ndustry on 
10 Aprl. of 159 tax categores for steel products, 83 wll enjoy no VAT rebates 
and 76 wll have rebates cut from 8 per cent to 5 per cent. snce Aprl 2005, 
chna has nullfied a 13 per cent export tax rebate on steel bllets. on 20 June, 
the mnstry of Fnance announced another package of massve reducton of 
export tax rebates, especally for resource-based products and goods wth low 
margns but assocated wth hgh trade frcton.
Thrd, the government has mposed new export taxes. on 21 may, the 
mnstry of Fnance decded to mpose export tarffs on 142 goods, effectve 
1 June. Approxmately 80 steel products (ncludng steel wre, rods and plates) 
wll face 5–10 per cent export tarffs.
Fourth, t has wdened the daly tradng band of the exchange rate. The 
People’s Bank of chna decded to wden the daly tradng band for the yuan–Us 
dollar rate to 0.5 per cent from 0.3 per cent, effectve 21 may. Ths mght not 
affect near-term currency apprecaton, but t has been nterpreted by some as 
rasng the potental for future revaluaton.
Ffth, the government has ntroduced and ncreased a number of taxes and 
controls to mprove energy efficency and promote envronmentally frendly 
technology, whch are lkely to have a dampenng effect on the export of some 
manufactured goods. 
At the centre of the nternatonal polcy dalogue s the renmnb exchange 
rate polcy. on 21 July 2005, chna abandoned ts de facto peg of the renmnb 
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to the Us dollar and ntroduced a ‘managed float’ system wth reference to a 
basket of currences. snce then, the renmnb has rsen by 7.6 per cent aganst 
the dollar, but by only 4.3 per cent n real effectve exchange terms (reer) (see 
Fgure 2.12). Ths apprecaton has been small compared wth the demands of 
promnent Us analysts. What matters economcally s chna’s nternatonal 
compettveness, takng account of chnese—relatve to nternatonal—cost and 
productvty ncreases, as well as the nomnal exchange rate. The apprecaton 
n ths wder context has been too small so far to reduce sgnficantly chnese 
export or ncrease mport growth. 
ratonal economc analyses suggest that even a large apprecaton of the 
renmnb would do lttle to ncrease manufacturng employment n the Unted 
states or to solve Amerca’s current defict problem. Nevertheless, the realty s 
that chna’s current expanson of external account surpluses cannot contnue 
for long. Whle currency apprecaton alone would not remove current tensons 
between chna and ts major tradng partners, exchange rate polcy needs to 
be a part of any effectve adjustment package.
Recent evidence about the turning point in the labour market
last year’s book n ths seres, The Turning Point in China’s Economic 
Development, trggered consderable dscusson n chna about whether chna 
was ndeed approachng the pont n economc development at whch labour 
supply to modern sector actvtes becomes scarce and ncreasngly expensve, 
forcng structural changes of many knds (Garnaut and song 2006; Garnaut 
and huang 2006). Among other thngs, t was followed by substantal research 
efforts on ths subject for the chnese Academy of socal scences and the 
development research centre of the state councl (see chapter 1, ths volume, 
for reference to these studes).
The labour market data at a natonal level reveal that wages and related costs 
have been rsng strongly (Fgure 2.13). regonal (Table 2.1) and sectoral (Table 
2.2) wage data ndcate acceleraton n wage ncreases n recent tmes. 
The lft n real wage growth n 2006 concded wth a rse n the rates of 
domestc nflaton and nomnal apprecaton aganst the Us dollar. it therefore 
understates the labour cost adjustment relatve to other countres. The rate 
of wage ncrease remans well behnd the prodgous ncrease n labour 
productvty, a fact that goes a long way towards explanng the absence of 
general nflatonary pressures, and the strength of the contnung momentum 
n the growth of exports and the trade and payments surpluses. rsng labour 
costs wll have been placng pressure on the profitablty of labour-ntensve 
actvtes usng standard technologes. These parts of the economy—havng 
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Fgure 2.12 Renminbi exchange rates: bilateral rates and real effective 
exchange rate, 2005–2007
Source: ctgroup estmates.
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played useful roles n past growth—are beng forced to change nto new types 
of specalsaton or to shrnk rapdly.  
one nterestng feature of the regonal data s the marked acceleraton of 
wage ncreases n a number of poorer provnces: hube n the central regon 
and Nngxa n the west. There was a deceleraton n the hgh-ncome coastal 
provnces of Zhejang and Guangdong whch have long been the locus of the 
strongest nternatonally orented growth. The opportunty cost of labour from 
backward nland areas has been rsng rapdly.
Unsurprsngly, wages have been rsng more rapdly n mnng than n other 
sectors. chnese mnng has been partcpatng n the global resources boom 
and mnng-related sklls are n hgh demand. The rate of wage ncreases has 
been hgh n all sectors, ncludng wholesale and retal trade, wth ther ntensve 
utlsaton of less-sklled labour. The rate of ncrease n wages n agrculture 
remans below that n other ndustres.
China and global environmental problems
local envronmental problems have been accumulatng through the years of 
market reforms and rapd growth. Government commtment to acton has been 
strengthenng n response to them, although real polcy measures so far have 
Table 2.1 Wages by province, 1999–2006 (yuan constant 1999 prces and 
per cent per annum ncrease)
 Bejng laonng    shangha Zhejang hube Guangdong schuan Nngxa
1999 14,572 7,780 16,588 11,074 6,766 12,108 7,134 7,226
2000 16,994 8,738 18,298 12,931 7,304 13,701 8,267 8,541
2001 20,011 10,233 21,098 16,279 8,524 15,828 9,936 10,250
2002 23,666 11,662 23,363 19,008 9,522 18,167 11,152 11,515
2003 25,626 13,226 25,614 22,065 10,696 20,618 12,580 13,741
2004 29,400 15,128 27,756 25,987 11,818 23,179 14,003 14,265
2005 33,764 17,231 31,875 28,723 13,766 25,183 15,968 16,924
2006e 39,597 19,496 37,649 30,563 15,948 26,831 17,888 20,187
Growth 
1999–2006 15.4 14.0 12.4 15.6 13.0 12.0 14.0 15.8 
2005–2006 17.3 13.2 18.1 6.4 15.9 6.5 12.0 19.3
Note: Bejng, shangha, Guangdong and Zhejang are from the dynamc coastal regon; 
laonng from the old ndustral Northeast; hube from central chna; and schuan and 
Nngxa from the southwest and West respectvely. 
Source: ceic data company.
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been small n ther effects. Awareness of the external envronmental costs of 
establshed growth patterns has been heghtened n the past year by growng 
apprecaton that chna s at once a vctm and an ncreasngly mportant cause 
of human-nduced global warmng.
The envronmental costs of establshed growth patterns were recognsed 
first as dark skes and ar that was unpleasant to breathe, and n the obvous 
health problems assocated wth these condtons; as posoned water n rvers 
and lakes that humans had used for centures; and as sols that requred 
ncreasng applcatons of chemcal fertlsers to mantan yelds. in recent 
Table 2.2 Average annual wage rates for agriculture, manufacturing, 
construction and finance, 1978–2005 (yuan, constant 1999 
prces and per cent per annum ncrease)
 Agrculture mnng manufacture constructon Wholesale Fnance
      and retal
1985 878 1,324 1,112 1,362 1,007 1,154
1986 1,048 1,569 1,275 1,536 1,148 1,353
1987 1,143 1,663 1,418 1,684 1,270 1,458
1988 1,280 1,964 1,710 1,959 1,556 1,739
1989 1,389 2,378 1,900 2,166 1,660 1,867
1990 1,541 2,718 2,073 2,384 1,818 2,097
1991 1,652 2,942 2,289 2,649 1,981 2,255
1992 1,828 3,209 2,635 3,066 2,204 2,829
1993 2,042 3,711 3,348 3,779 2,679 3,740
1994 2,819 4,679 4,283 4,894 3,537 6,712
1995 3,522 5,757 5,169 5,785 4,248 7,376
1996 4,050 6,482 5,642 6,249 4,661 8,406
1997 4,311 6,833 5,933 6,655 4,845 9,734
1998 4,528 7,242 7,064 7,456 5,865 10,633
1999 4,832 7,521 7,794 7,982 6,417 12,046
2000 5,184 8,340 8,750 8,735 7,190 13,478
2001 5,741 9,586 9,774 9,484 8,192 16,277
2002 6,398 11,017 11,001 10,279 9,398 19,135
2003 6,969 13,682 12,496 11,478 10,939 22,457
2004 7,611 16,874 14,033 12,770 12,923 26,982
2005 8,309 20,626 15,757 14,338 15,241 32,228
Average growth (per cent)     
2000–2005 9.9 19.9 12.5 10.4 16.2 19.1 
2004–2005 9.2 22.2 12.3 12.3 17.9 19.4
Source: ceic data company.
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years, attenton has been drawn more dramatcally to the lnks between health 
and exposure to the atmosphere of chna’s most vbrant ctes; chnese meda 
attracted the attenton of ctzens wth reports that the lfe expectancy of 
traffic polce n major ctes—exposed constantly to extremes of atmospherc 
polluton—was 49 years, compared wth a natonal average of 73 years. 
An ncomplete estmate by the Natonal Bureau of statstcs and the Natonal 
envronmental Protecton Agency put envronmental costs not measured n the 
natonal accounts at 3.5 per cent of GdP n 2004. 
For some tme, commentators have drawn comfort from the ‘envronmental 
kuznets curve’: the observed tendency for countres to make envronmental 
amenty a major objectve when average ncomes exceed a threshold level—
above those n chna today. Publc concern and offical polcy acton have 
begun n chna at an ncome level below that suggested by the experence of 
other countres.
There are mportant reasons why chna needs to take decsve acton now, n 
advance of ts envronmental kuznets poston. The concentraton of economc 
actvty on an mmense scale n small areas n coastal chna creates rsks 
beyond those seen n other countres at comparable stages of development. 
And the scale and tmng of chna’s extraordnary growth s concdng wth the 
crystallsaton of the long-heralded problem of global warmng. 
The nteracton of local envronmental pressures wth global warmng has 
the potental to be severely dsruptve. chnese scentsts are drawng attenton 
to the lkelhood that ths nteracton s behnd the severe water problems n 
northern chna and the floods n the south. one response to water shortages n 
the north has been the launchng of three massve projects to transport water 
by ppelne from the south. scentsts are, however, notng the vulnerablty of 
the sources of these southern rvers to global warmng, as evdence mounts 
of shrnkng ce coverage and changng patterns of meltng on the Tbetan 
Plateau—source of the Yangtse, Yellow and other rvers.
These were all matters of ncreasngly common dscusson when news 
came through n June 2007 that chna had overtaken the Unted states as the 
world’s largest source of greenhouse gas emssons (see song and sheng, 
chapter 12).
chna’s prosperty s at the core of the emergng Platnum Age of global 
economc growth. But the economc growth that makes up the Platnum 
Age—first of all but not only n chna—f left unmodfied by major acton 
to change radcally the relatonshp between economc growth and the 
emsson of greenhouse gases, could be so dsruptve to economc and 
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poltcal arrangements everywhere that t gradually ntroduces problems for 
nternatonal development that severely damage growth opportuntes n chna 
and elsewhere.
chnese officals and prvate ctzens have now entered the search for a means 
of reconclng contnued strong growth wth avodance of macroeconomc 
dsrupton on a massve scale. A satsfactory outcome wll requre effectve 
cooperaton across natonal borders, whch has so far eluded the nternatonal 
communty n other spheres. 
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3
Marketisation in China
Progress and contrbuton to growth
Xiaolu Wang, Gang Fan and Hengpeng Zhu
chna has persevered n ts market-orented economc reform for nearly 30 
years. Guded by a reform strategy of ‘gropng for stones to cross the rver’, 
chna managed to avod major economc declne and the crses that occurred 
n other transtonal economes such as russa and eastern european countres. 
it successfully transformed the prevously centrally planned economy nto a 
manly market-orented economy wth contnued rapd growth, although there 
are stll many conflcts between the new and the old systems. 
Progress in marketisation
As ndcated n the NERI Index of Marketisation for China’s Provinces, newly 
publshed by the Natonal economc research insttute (Neri) (Fan et al. 2007), 
chna has acheved sgnficant marketsaton snce ts WTo accesson n 2001. 
measured by a zero to 10 score system for the base year (2001), the average 
score for marketsaton of chna’s 31 provnces (ncludng five autonomous 
mnorty ethnc regons and three muncpaltes drectly under the control of 
the central admnstraton) ncreased 1.88 n the four years from 2002–05, to 
reach 6.52 n 2005. Thrty provnces out of the total of 31 made postve progress 
(Fgure 3.1). in comparson, the average score of marketsaton ncreased only 
0.61 n the prevous four years from 1998–2001.
The Neri ndex s an assessment system for relatve progress n marketsaton 
for chna’s provnces usng a comparatve method. marketsaton s assessed 
n five fields by a total of 23 basc ndcators. data are ether from statstcs 
or enterprse and household surveys. The Neri ndex s now avalable for the 
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Fgure 3.1  NERI index for progress in marketisation in China’s 
provinces, 2001 and 2005


































Source: Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, h., 2007. NERI Index of Marketisation for China’s Provinces: 
2006 report (n chnese), economc scence Press, Bejng.
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years from 1997 to 2005. Four reports have been publshed (Fan and Wang 2001; 
Fan et al. 2003, 2004, 2007). A map of chna shows the relatve achevements 
of chna’s provnces n marketsaton n 2005 (Fgure 3.2). 
in ths ndex system, each of the 23 ndcators s normalsed nto a basc 
ndex wth a zero–10 relatve score system at the base year. For data shown n 
Fgure 3.1, the base year s 2001. The best and worst performng provnces n a 
partcular ndcator receve scores of 10 and zero, respectvely. other provnces 
receve scores n between, accordng to ther performance n ths ndcator 
relatve to the best and worst performng provnces. For a postvely related 
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ndcator, for nstance, the score of a basc ndex j for provnce i, noted as Sij, 









After postve or negatve varatons over years, a basc ndex allows a 
provnce to have scores above 10 or below zero, so that ts progress over tme 
can be measured.
For a certan field—for nstance, development of the non-state enterprse 
sector—a field ndex s consttuted usng a few basc ndces. A total of five 
field ndces consttute the overall marketsaton ndex. All the field ndces 
are weghted equally n the overall ndex, as are the basc ndces n each field 
ndex.1 
The next secton revews progress n marketsaton n chna n the five fields 
as classfied n the Neri index of marketsaton usng manly drect statstcal 
and survey data other than the scores of the ndex.
Government and market relatons
We measure the level of resource allocaton by governments and the market 
usng the share of government budgetary expenses n gross domestc product 
(GdP). in ths measure, the government share was lowered sgnficantly durng 
the reform perod, whle the market played ncreasngly mportant roles n 
resource allocaton. At the natonal level, the share was 30.8 per cent n 1978 (the 
first year of economc reform), decreasng to 18.5 per cent n 2005 (the lowest 
rato durng ths perod was 11.2 per cent n 1995 and 1996) (Natonal Bureau of 
statstcs varous years). There were slght decreases n ths share durng the 
perod 2001–05. The budgetary share n GdP s certanly not a lnear ndcator 
for marketsaton; t wll become stable at a certan level after the transtonal 
perod. We have found, however, that changes n ths share n the past generally 
related to market-orented nsttutonal reforms, and provnces wth relatvely 
low shares were generally more marketsed n dfferent aspects. it s, therefore, 
stll a good ndcator, for the tme beng, to reflect relatve changes n the role 
of governments and the market n resource allocaton. 
Nevertheless, ths s not a full pcture for resource allocaton between 
governments and the market, because there s a large amount of non-tax 
financal collecton by dfferent levels of government, whch s used outsde the 
budget. Two addtonal ndcators are helpful for these ssues. one s the non-tax 
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financal burden of enterprses as a proporton of ther total sales (data are from 
enterprse surveys coverng about 4,000 enterprses). As a provncal average, 
the burden fell from 2.8 per cent n 2001 to 1.6 per cent n 2005. Another ndcator 
s farmers’ tax and non-tax burdens as a proporton of ther per capta ncome. 
Ths fell from 3.6 per cent n 2001 to 0.4 per cent n 2005. Both ndcators show 
mprovement n the past four years. in partcular, the reducton n the latter 
share s remarkable, and t resulted manly from abolton of the agrcultural 
tax and non-tax collectons n rural areas. 
it s also mportant to examne the level of government nterventon n 
enterprses. Ths can be ndcated by the survey data on the proporton of 
entrepreneurs’ workng tme spent dealng wth varous government departments 
and ther officals (survey data from more than 4,000 enterprses, by Neri). it fell 
slghtly from an average of 18 per cent to 17.2 per cent n the four years covered, 
but the level of government nterventon remans hgh (Fan et al. 2007). 
one ndcator shows a worsenng stuaton: the sze of government (number 
of employees) as a share of the total populaton. At the natonal level, t ncreased 
from 0.86 per cent n 2001 to 0.95 per cent n 2005 (Natonal Bureau of statstcs 
varous years).2
The above ndcators generally show progress n government–market 
relatons, although they also show that further reform of the government 
sector s needed, especally to reduce the sze of government and to reduce 
unnecessary government nterventon n enterprses. 
development of the non-state enterprse sector
The non-state enterprse sector s bascally the prvate enterprse sector, whch 
conssts manly of prvate enterprses, foregn-funded enterprses, shareholdng 
companes and a small number of collectvely owned enterprses (n the pre-
reform perod, t conssted entrely of collectvely owned enterprses). 
development of non-state enterprses made the most remarkable progress 
among the five fields of marketsaton. in the ndustral sector n the pre-reform 
perod, state-owned enterprses held a domnant poston. The non-state share 
n gross output value was only 22.4 per cent n 1978, the first year of economc 
reform. Ths share ncreased to 69.2 per cent n 2005. The share of state-owned 
enterprses shrank from 77.6 per cent to 30.8 per cent durng ths perod (Natonal 
Bureau of statstcs varous years). 
in the four years between 2001 and 2005, the non-state share n the ndustral 
sector ncreased by five percentage ponts. meanwhle, the non-state share 
n total nvestment n fixed assets ncreased by 13 percentage ponts, from 
52.6 to 65.6 per cent; and the share of the urban non-state sector n urban 
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employment ncreased by eght percentage ponts, from 68.1 to 76.3 per cent 
(Fan et al. 2007). 
data for the non-state share n the servces sector are unavalable. The share 
could be lower than the share n ndustry, because a few sectors n servces are 
state domnated, ncludng bankng, nsurance, telecommuncatons, ralways 
and avaton. Nevertheless, some other servces—such as retal sales, caterng, 
road transport and varous personal/resdental servces—are nearly fully 
prvatsed. The non-state shares n total nvestment and urban employment 
ndcate a general stuaton of non-state domnaton of the economy. 
development of the commodty market
in the pre-reform perod, prces of most products were controlled by the state. 
in 2001, the share of prces determned n commodty markets acheved 92 per 
cent, rsng to 92.8 per cent n 2004 (Fan et al. 2007). 
durng the reform perod, most non-tarff trade barrers were removed. The 
general tarff level reduced substantally before and after WTo accesson, from 
16.4 per cent n 2000 to 9.8 per cent n 2007 (China Securities Newspaper, 27 
december 2006). 
local trade protecton was also reduced. The Neri ndex uses enterprse 
survey data to show that the score for reducng local trade protecton—as an 
average of the 31 provnces—ncreased from 6.5 to 9.7 n the 2001–05 perod, 
meanng there was a remarkable reducton n local trade barrers (Fan et al. 
2007). 
development of factor markets
Although the development of factor markets lagged behnd that of the 
commodty market, varous ndcators show mprovement n factor markets 
n recent years. 
For labour market development, the share of rural workers n total urban 
employment, as a provncal average, ncreased from 8.1 per cent n 2001 to 11.9 
per cent n 2004 (Natonal Bureau of statstcs varous years), whch ndcates 
ncreases n labour moblty and reductons n nsttutonal barrers n the 
labour market. These statstcs are lkely to be understated due to ncomplete 
data. some wdely accepted estmates suggest that about 100–120 mllon rural 
workers work n ctes and towns, and possbly 60–100 mllon work n rural 
non-agrcultural sectors. The next thng to be done s polcy restructurng to 
enable rural mgrants to settle n ctes and to be treated equally by the urban 
socal welfare systems. 
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For development of the financal market, two ndcators are mportant. one s 
the level of deposts n non-state financal nsttutons as a share of total deposts 
n the bankng sector, whch ncreased gradually from 32.2 to 36.4 per cent n 
the four years untl 2005. Ths ndcates reductons n the share of state-owned 
banks, although they reman n a domnant poston. Another ndcator s the 
share of bank loans credted to non-state enterprses, whch ncreased from 
55.7 to 70.2 per cent durng the same perod—the latter bascally consstent 
wth non-state shares n the ndustral sector. Ths shows sgnficant progress 
n the commercalsaton of the bankng sector. state-owned enterprses no 
longer enjoy the favourable poston n obtanng bank loans that they dd n 
the earler perod (Fan et al. 2007). 
To ndcate development of the technology market, the market transacton 
value of technologes ncreased from 2,566 yuan to 4,848 yuan per capta 
techncal personnel durng the perod from 2001 to 2005. Nevertheless, the 
latter figure s stll low n ts absolute value (Fan et al. 2007).
one worsenng ndcator n ths field s foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) as 
a rato of GdP. As a provncal average, ths rato decreased from 30.7 to 20.5 
(mllon Us dollars per bllon yuan of GdP, both n current prces) durng the 
perod from 2001 to 2005. Ths s because GdP s growng faster than Fdi, 
although total Fdi s stll large. in 2005, Fdi was Us$60 bllon, but there have 
been large regonal varatons. Whle Fdi n the tradtonal major recpent 
regon, Guangdong Provnce, s declnng, t ncreased rapdly n the Yangz 
rver delta regon—that s, n Jangsu, Zhejang and shangha—and a few 
other provnces n the coastal and central areas (Fan et al. 2007). 
market ntermedares and the legal envronment for the market
To measure development of market ntermedares, one should consder 
numbers of ndependent accountants, lawyers, consultants, chambers of 
commerce, and other professonals. however, data are avalable only for 
ndependent accountants and lawyers. These two ndcators, together as a 
share n total populaton, ncreased slghtly durng 2001–05. Ths reflects market 
development n the current stage because there were no lawyers n the pre-
reform perod, and accountants were not ndependent. 
To measure the legal envronment for busnesses, an avalable ndcator 
s 4,000 company leaders’ judgments collected from enterprse surveys. The 
average score at the provncal level n the Neri ndex s generally low, and 
shows slght deteroraton n the legal envronment n 2005 from that n 2001 
(2.85 for 2005 and 2.88 for 2001).
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To measure protecton of ntellectual property rghts, the only avalable 
nformaton s patent applcatons and grants per techncal personnel. These 
data nearly doubled durng the perod, showng a rapd mprovement. 
A general assessment of marketsaton n chna
A basc market framework has been establshed n chna. marketsaton 
has made progress n nearly all fields n recent years. The most remarkable 
achevement s development of the non-state enterprse sector, whch has 
held the domnant poston n the chnese economy. development of the 
commodty market has been relatvely rapd, and market competton s now 
playng a domnant role n ndustry and trade. Factor markets developed more 
slowly n general, although they have been makng sgnficant progress n 
recent years. 
There are also bottlenecks n market-orented transformaton. most 
mportantly, nsttutonal and legal frameworks are ncomplete and, to some 
extent, conflct wth the market mechansm. There are stll unnecessary 
government nterventons, unregulated fnancal collectons and low 
transparency n admnstraton. The sze of government s nflatng. The legal 
envronment for the market s stll undesrable. These all ndcate a need for 
further nsttutonal change and publc sector reform. 
At the sector level, the manufacturng sector s now nearly fully market-
orented, whereas marketsaton n the financal sector s laggng. A few 
servce sectors are stll low n efficency and lack market competton. market 
ntermedares are underdeveloped. 
in terms of regonal development, the process of marketsaton s uneven. 
Whle the eastern coastal areas are more marketsed than other regons, the 
achevement of marketsaton n some central and western provnces s relatvely 
low. The non-state enterprse sector s underdeveloped n these provnces, and 
the busness clmate there s less desrable than elsewhere. in spte of ths, 
the encouragng news s that most provnces made remarkable progress n 
marketsaton n recent years (see Fgure 3.1). 
Does marketisation contribute to economic growth?
in ths secton, we test emprcally whether marketsaton contrbutes to chna’s 
economc growth at the provncal level, usng the Neri index of marketsaton 
and a panel data growth model. The Neri ndex was first establshed n 2001, 
and has been updated four tmes (Fan and Wang 2001; Fan et al. 2003, 2004, 
2007). it ams to assess relatve achevements n marketsaton n chna’s 31 
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provnces. it has so far covered nne years, from 1997 to 2005. Wthn each of 
four sub-perods, the scores for each provnce are comparable not only wth 
other provnces, but over years, so progress n marketsaton n each provnce 
can be traced. due to changes n some statstcal ndcators, however, and 
modficaton of the ndex system, scores were not comparable between dfferent 
sub-perods. 
in ths chapter, we convert all the ndces nto a consstent style: that s, 
we make all the scores comparable for the whole perod from 1997 to 2005 
(see Table A3.1 for a consstent verson of the Neri index of marketsaton and 
Table A3.2 for the whole structure of the Neri ndex system). Ths enables 
us to carry out a panel data analyss to test the contrbuton of marketsaton 
to chna’s economc growth. A solow-type growth model wth modficaton 
to nclude a human captal varable (see solow 1956; lucas 1988) and a few 
structural varables—that s, the marketsaton ndex, trade dependency rato 
and a regonal dummy—s specfied as follows 
lnYit=C+a1lnKit+a2lnLit+a3Eit+a4Mit+a5Rit+a6Dit (1)
where Y s provncal GdP n constant prces for year 1990; K s provncal 
captal stock n 1990 prces; L s provncal employment; E s the average year 
of schoolng of the provncal populaton; M s the marketsaton ndex; R s the 
trade dependency rato (sum of the mport and export value as a proporton of 
GdP) for possble growth effects of economc openness; D s a dummy varable 
for the coastal areas to catch the geographc dfferences n ntal levels of log 
GdP (D=1 for coastal provnces and zero otherwse); and C s the ntercept 
term. The subscrpts i ( i= 1…31) and t ( t=1997…2005) represent provnces and 
years, respectvely.
An earler verson of the model also ncludes a varable for urbansaton, 
whch s represented by urban share n total employment. A non-postve and 
nsgnficant result was derved, probably due to low accuracy of the data 
(statstcal data for rural–urban mgrant workers are ncomplete). it s therefore 
omtted from the model.
data are calculated manly from provncal statstcs from 1997 to 2005 
(Natonal Bureau of statstcs 2005b), except the marketsaton ndex. GdP s 
deflated usng the mpled GdP deflators from the Natonal Bureau of statstcs. 
captal stock s calculated from provncal nvestment n fixed assets durng the 
1952–2005 perod, usng a perpetual nventory method, and s deflated usng 
the prce ndex for nvestment n fixed assets.3 The average year of schoolng s 
calculated from the grouped data for the populaton at sx years old and above 
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wth the followng assumptons: sx years of schoolng for prmary educaton, 
nne years for junor secondary educaton, 12 years for senor secondary 
educaton and 16 years for tertary and postgraduate educaton. export and 
mport values are converted nto yuan usng average exchange rates for the 
correspondng year. The dummy varable for coastal areas covers the followng 
provnces: laonng, Bejng, Tanjn, hebe, shandong, shangha, Jangsu, 
Zhejang, Fujan, Guangdong and hanan. Guangx s excluded because t 
does not have a major port, and t s customarly not classfied as a coastal 
provnce. 
The model s estmated usng fixed-effect and random-effect generalsed 
least squares Gls regressons. The two results are very smlar, and the 
hausman Test accepts the random-effect regresson. The results of the 
unrestrcted model show a nearly perfect nature of constant returns to captal 
and labour—very close to that of the restrcted model. Wth ncluson of the 
educaton varable, the economy shows an ncreasng return to scale technology, 
thus ndcatng a sgnficant contrbuton of human captal to economc growth 
(Table 3.1). Ths could nclude ts drect contrbuton to growth and possbly a 
spllover effect. 
The marketsaton ndex s postve and sgnficant, ndcatng an mportant 
effect on economc growth (Table 3.1). The trade dependency rato has a 
postve, although nsgnficant, estmate. The growth effect of economc 
openness s therefore unconfirmed. 
in Table 3.2, the contrbuton of factors to economc growth s calculated 
based on the estmates of the unrestrcted model n Table 3.1. statstcal data for 
nputs and output are of provncal averages, dvded nto two sub-perods—that 
s, 1998–2001 and 2002–05. The table shows that captal growth made a major 
contrbuton to economc growth. educaton made a 1.3 percentage pont 
contrbuton to the economc growth rate n the first sub-perod, but contrbuted 
only 0.4 percentage ponts n the second sub-perod. marketsaton contrbuted 
0.8 percentage pont to growth n the first sub-perod, but 2.4 percentage ponts 
n the second sub-perod. Ths s clear evdence that marketsaton has made 
an mportant contrbuton to chna’s economc growth. The marketsaton 
process was accelerated after chna’s WTo accesson, and has led to sgnficant 
ncreases n ts contrbuton to economc growth.
Conclusions
We have shown that marketsaton n chna accelerated durng the perod 
from 2001 to 2005—that s, the perod after chna’s WTo accesson. The basc 
framework of a market economy has been establshed, although there are stll 
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Table 3.2  Growth accounting: factor contribution to economic growth
 GDP Capital Labour Education Marketisation
Coefficient  0.590  0.419  0.078  0.050 
Annual input–output growth   
1998–2001 (per cent) 9.8 11.3 –0.2 0.161 0.153
2002–05  (per cent) 12.5 14.5 1.9 0.048 0.471
Contribution to growth rate  
  (percentage points) 
1998–2001  6.7 –0.1 1.3 0.8
2002–05  8.6 0.8 0.4 2.4
Share of contribution  
  (growth rate=100 per cent) 
1998–2001 (per cent)  67.8 –1.0 12.8 7.8
2002–05 (per cent)  68.5 6.2 3.0 18.9
Notes: Education is measured by annual changes in years of schooling, and marketisation is 
measured by annual changes in the scores of the NERI Index of Marketisation. Statistics for 
the GDP growth rate at the provincial level, on average, are higher than at the national level. 
Sources: Table 3.1 and Table A3.1; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), various years. China 
Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Press, Beijing. 
Table 3.1 Estimation results
 Restricted model Restricted model Unrestricted model 
 (fixed effect) (random effect) (random effect)
lnK 0.5790 0.5843 0.5900
 (20.33*) (25.70*) (21.49*)
lnL 0.4210 0.4157 0.4195
   (16.70*)
E (year of schooling) 0.0819 0.0798 0.0782
 (5.31*) (6.26*) (5.80*)
M (marketisation) 0.0529 0.0518 0.0501
 (6.54*) (7.61*) (6.08*)
R (trade/GDP) 0.0153 0.0229 0.0263
 (0.34) (0.57) (0.64)
D (coastal dummy) (dropped) 0.1193 0.1179
  (2.58*) (2.58*)
C (constant) –1.1942 –1.2199 –1.2716
 (10.70*) (–13.06*) (–7.40*)
R2: within 0.9593 0.9498 0.9590
Between 0.9882 0.9624 0.9899
Overall 0.9850 0.9602 0.9878





bottlenecks n further development of market mechansms, due manly to lack 
of government sector reform and an undesrable legal envronment for a market 
economy. Ths ndcates a need for further nsttutonal reforms.
Usng the Neri index of marketsaton as a bass for emprcal study, ths 
chapter finds that marketsaton made a sgnficant contrbuton to economc 
growth durng the perod from 1997 to 2005, especally n recent years. 
Notes
1 in our earler reports, we used the Prncpal component Analyss method (PcAm) for weght 
determnaton. We found, however, that the PcAm and an equal-weghtng method produce 
very smlar results. in addton, the PcAm leads to ncomparablty of scores over tme due 
to changes n weghts, whereas an equal-weghtng method has an advantage n provdng 
consstent scores over tme. 
2 The sze of government s ndcated approxmately by employment n publc management 
and socal organsatons, whch ncludes employment n poltcal partes and other socal 
organsatons, however, employment n the government and the rulng party accounted for 
the greatest part. 
3 The ntal natonal total captal stock n 1952 s assumed to be 69 bllon yuan n 1952 prces, 
based on the estmate of chow (1993); also see Wang (2006). Wth an assumpton of equal 
captal–output rato, the ntal captal stock s dstrbuted to each provnce based on the 
provncal share n GdP n 1952. The deprecaton rate s set at 5 per cent for the pre-reform 
perod, and gradually ncreased to 9.2 per cent from 1979 to 1992. 
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Table A3.1   NERI index of marketisation for China’s provinces, 1997–2005
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Bejng 4.786  4.550  4.567  4.886  6.171  6.917  7.498  8.188  8.619 
Tanjn 4.795  5.204  5.432  5.846  6.589  6.732  7.027  7.863  8.342 
hebe 4.507  4.714  4.733  4.777  4.926  5.288  5.585  6.048  6.405 
shanx 2.855  3.078  3.044  3.058  3.402  3.928  4.626  5.130  5.262 
inner mongola 3.048  3.499  3.223  3.318  3.531  3.998  4.389  5.119  5.521 
laonng 4.941  5.002  4.708  4.956  5.473  6.064  6.605  7.365  7.835 
Jln 3.665  3.728  3.672  3.752  3.999  4.579  4.691  5.493  5.890 
helongjang 2.876  3.486  3.266  3.472  3.734  4.089  4.451  5.046  5.263 
shangha 5.847  5.897  6.011  6.627  7.616  8.344  9.355  9.808  10.407 
Jangsu 6.227  6.385  6.516  6.611  6.829  7.396  7.966  8.625  9.065 
Zhejang 6.619  6.879  6.904  7.203  7.643  8.373  9.100  9.772  9.896 
Anhu 4.734  4.698  4.509  4.554  4.750  4.951  5.370  5.992  6.556 
Fujan 6.642  6.973  6.943  7.156  7.393  7.632  7.972  8.330  8.624 
Jangx 3.733  4.189  3.800  3.914  4.003  4.634  5.059  5.758  6.225 
shandong 5.182  5.597  5.237  5.355  5.661  6.229  6.812  7.522  8.210 
henan 4.025  4.254  3.893  3.986  4.136  4.300  4.889  5.638  6.198 
hube 3.718  4.107  3.783  3.892  4.248  4.654  5.468  6.105  6.652 
hunan 3.709  3.991  3.658  3.703  3.939  4.407  5.032  6.113  6.546 
Guangdong 7.255  7.456  7.491  7.774  8.183  8.627  8.992  9.361  10.057 
Guangx 3.960  4.021  3.862  3.854  3.934  4.750  5.000  5.415  5.818 
hanan 5.423  5.311  5.192  5.215  5.664  5.094  5.032  5.411  5.542 
chongqng 4.616  4.741  4.693  4.789  5.202  5.706  6.469  7.196  7.234 
schuan 4.525  4.670  4.406  4.542  4.999  5.346  5.855  6.383  6.860 
Guzhou 2.740  3.032  2.855  2.954  2.947  3.044  3.667  4.171  4.572 
Yunnan 3.636  3.894  3.561  3.688  3.823  3.797  4.231  4.813  5.153 
Tbet 0.100  0.150  0.200  0.250  0.325  0.625  0.792  1.555  2.500 
shaanx 2.792  3.179  3.220  3.347  3.369  3.905  4.109  4.457  4.797 
Gansu 2.832  3.160  2.951  2.920  3.044  3.054  3.323  3.949  4.445 
Qngha 1.547  1.785  1.866  2.168  2.375  2.446  2.596  3.099  3.838 
Nngxa 1.990  2.367  2.473  2.558  2.696  3.238  4.238  4.564  4.850 
Xnjang 1.474  1.662  1.879  2.526  3.183  3.409  4.264  4.762  5.024 
Average 4.026  4.247  4.147  4.311  4.638  5.018  5.499  6.098  6.523 
Note: The orgnal data are comparable only wthn each of the four sub-perods (that s, 1997–99, 
1999–2000, 2000–02, 2001–05), due to changes n statstcal definton, modficaton of the ndex 
system and changes n base years. Because each sub-perod’s first year overlaps wth the last 
year of the prevous sub-perod, ths enables us to calculate the converson factors for scores 
n every adjacent two sub-perods, and then recalculate the scores n all the earler sub-perods 
usng a nestng method. data n ths table are therefore comparable over the entre perod from 
1997 to 2005. 
Source: calculated from the Neri index of marketsaton: Fan, G. and Wang, X., 2001. NERI Index 
of Marketisation for China’s Provinces: 2000 report (n chnese), economc scence Press, Bejng; 
Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, h., 2003. NERI Index of Marketisation for China’s Provinces: 2001 report 
(n chnese), economc scence Press, Bejng; Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, h., 2004. NERI Index 
of Marketisation for China’s Provinces: 2004 report (n chnese), economc scence Press, Bejng; 
Fan, G., Wang, X. and Zhu, h., 2007. NERI Index of Marketisation for China’s Provinces: 2006 report 
(n chnese), economc scence Press, Bejng.
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Table A3.2 The structure of the NERI Index of Marketisation
Ttle of the ndces sequence number of  
 basc ndces
The overall ndex of marketsaton 
I    Government–market relatons 
I-1  Government allocaton of resources n GdP 1
I-2  Tax and non-tax burden of farmers 2
I-3  Government nterventon n enterprses 3
I-4  Non-tax burden on enterprses 4
I-5  sze of government  5
II   development of the non-state enterprse sector 
II-1  Non-state share n ndustral output 6
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Facing protectionism generated 
by trade disputes
chna’s post WTo blues
Wing Thye Woo and Geng Xiao
The escalation of friction between China and its trading partners
chna’s current account n the balance of payments has been n surplus snce 
1994 and t has shown a clear upward trend, reachng Us$184 bllon n 2006, or 
9 per cent of gross domestc product (GdP). As chna’s captal account s also 
n persstent surplus because of the large nflows of foregn drect nvestment 
(Fdi) and captal controls on outflows, ts foregn exchange reserves reached 
Us$1.07 trllon n 2006—the largest n the world. chna also became the second-
largest holder of Us Treasury securtes, holdng as much as Us$353.6 bllon, 
tralng only Japan, whch holds Us$648.8 bllon.
At the tme of wrtng (June 2007), chna’s overall trade surplus, the chna–Us 
trade surplus and the chna–eU trade surplus contnued to soar,1 causng a 
marked escalaton n concern about chna’s unfar tradng practces and the gross 
undervaluaton of the renmnb. in February 2007, the Us Trade representatve 
(UsTr) had filed a case wth the World Trade organzaton (WTo) aganst 
prohbted subsdes n chna. Ths acton was followed by two more WTo cases 
aganst chna n Aprl 2007—challengng market access restrctons on products 
of copyrght-ntensve ndustres and challengng weaknesses n the legal regme 
for protecton and enforcement of copyrghts and trademarks.2
in order to apprecate adequately the hgh ntensty of the sound and the fury 
of the ant-chna rhetorc—and the global character of these crtcsms—t s 
worthwhle to quote a number of news reports from the barrage of press artcles 
on the trade mbalance ssue that appeared on 13 June 2007.3
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The Financial Times (2007a) reported
Peter mandelson, the eU trade commssoner…called varous aspects of 
chna’s trade polcy ‘llogcal, ndefensble’ and ‘unacceptable and accused 
[chna] of dong nothng to ren n rampant counterfetng…mr mandelson 
also refused to grant chna market economy status…[because t had] fulfilled 
[only] one of five crtera.4
The Straits Times (2007) of sngapore reported
Peter mandelson proclamed that the…[eU] trade defict wth chna was no 
longer ‘tolerable’ and warned that relatons wth Bejng were now at a ‘cross-
roads’…[Trade s] so skewed that the eU now exports more to swtzerland…
than to the entre chnese market.
USA Today (2007) reported that
[a]fter years of nconclusve skrmshng, trade tensons between the Unted 
states and chna are about to ntensfy. ‘We are competng not only wth a 
country wth low wages but wth very hgh and heavy subsdes and a rggng 
of ther currency,’ says rep. sander levn, d-mch., charman of the house 
trade subcommttee. ‘i hate the term trade war because t s always used 
when you try to get a far break…sometmes pressure works.’
in confirmaton of the growng percepton of—and deepenng dssatsfacton 
about—unfar chnese tradng practces, the meda on 13 June 2007 also 
contaned reports on the actons beng undertaken by the Bush admnstraton 
and the chnese government to forestall protectonsm. 
The Standard (2007) of hong kong reported
Us lawmakers plan to ntroduce legslaton today seekng to pressure 
chna to rase the value of the yuan to stem a balloonng trade mbalance… 
sponsored by democratc senator charles schumer, the bll wll lay out 
the Us response whenever countres ‘unfarly undervalue ther currency’. 
currently, there are half a dozen measures before the Us congress amed 
at chna, ncludng proposals to apply sanctons unless t allows the yuan to 
apprecate by at least 10 per cent.
The Wall Street Journal (2007b) reported
[t]urnng asde growng congressonal anger over the Us trade defict wth 
chna, Presdent George Bush’s admnstraton today wll reject demands 
that t formally accuse Bejng of ‘manpulatng’ ts currency to gve chnese 
companes an edge over Amercan busnesses. ‘There mght be an ntal sgh 
of relef n the markets that the Treasury has not taken a more confrontatonal 
lne, but protectonst pressures are only lkely to buld’, Julan Jessop, chef 
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nternatonal economst at captal economcs n london, warned clents n 
a note yesterday. meanwhle Bejng took steps yesterday apparently amed, 
at least n part, at defusng Us concerns. chnese authortes permtted an 
unusually large rse n ts tghtly controlled currency.
The International Herald Tribune (2007) reported that ‘the yuan had the bggest 
gan snce the end of a dollar lnk n July 2005. The yuan rose 0.26 per cent to 
7.6436 aganst the dollar…[yeldng a cumulatve gan of] 8.3 per cent snce…July 
2005.’
events then moved quckly. on 14 June 2007, senators max Baucus 
(democrat from montana), charles e. Grassley (republcan from iowa), charles 
e. schumer (democrat from New York) and lndsey Graham (republcan from 
south carolna) ntroduced legslaton ‘to punsh chna f t dd not change ts 
polcy of ntervenng n currency markets to keep the exchange value of the 
currency, the yuan, low’ (New York Times 2007). 
on 19 June 2007, the internatonal monetary Fund (imF) adopted a new 
country survellance framework that set out
…a catch-all oblgaton on countres not to adopt polces that undermne the 
stablty of the nternatonal system, and lsts a set of objectve crtera that 
wll be used to ndcate whether a country s complyng wth ts commtments. 
Warnng lghts wll nclude large-scale currency nterventon, the 
accumulaton of reserves and ‘fundamental exchange rate msalgnment’—a 
term that mrrors language n a bll before the Us congress that would 
mpose penaltes on natons that fal to correct such msalgnments. rodrgo 
rato, managng drector of the imF, sad: ‘Ths decson s good news for the 
imF reform programme and good news for the cause of multlateralsm…
[because ths new framework] gves clear gudance to our members on how 
they should run ther exchange rate polces, on what s acceptable to the 
nternatonal communty and what s not’ (Financial Times 2007b).
The above developments were warnngs that chna, europe and the Unted 
states could be marchng towards a trade war. in ths chapter, we examne the 
reasons for the trade frcton wth chna and propose polces to reduce that 
frcton. our dscusson wll focus on four questons
1 What are the problems caused by trade mbalances?
2 What are the problems revealed by the appearance of trade mbalances?
3 is a large yuan apprecaton the best cure for trade frcton?
4 What s to be done?
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What are the problems caused by trade imbalances?
it s not uncommon to encounter allegatons that the Us–chna trade defict 
represents the export of unemployment from chna to the Unted states. A 
recent study by robert scott (2007), of the economc Polcy insttute, used 
an nput–output model to arrve at the clam that the blateral trade defict of 
Us$49.5 bllon n 1997 caused the loss of 597,300 jobs that year and the 2006 
blateral trade defict of Us$235.4 bllon caused the loss of 2,763,400 jobs—and 
that every state had suffered a net loss of jobs from the rse n the blateral trade 
defict durng 1997–2006. The alleged job losses n 2006 from the blateral trade 
defict mpled that the 2006 unemployment rate was 1.21 percentage ponts 
hgher than f the blateral trade balance had been zero.5 
There are two major problems wth the scott (2007) study. Frst, the overall 
unemployment rate n the Unted states dd not grow n lne ether wth the 
wdenng overall Us trade defict or wth the wdenng Us–chna trade defict. 
The average unemployment rate of 4.9 per cent n the 1998–2006 perod was 
lower than the average unemployment rates n the prevous perods of 1980–88 
and 1989–97, whch were 7.5 per cent and 6 per cent respectvely. in realty, the 
Us economy was a hghly successful job-creaton machne n the 1997–2006 
perod. 
second, n the face of the strong demand for labour n the Us economy 
durng the perod of growng trade defict, a substantal amount of the so-called 
job losses could have been voluntary departures by workers—rather than 
nvoluntary dsplacement of workers—from mport-competng ndustres that 
pad low wages or had potentally low wage growth n the future.
The more sophstcated complant aganst the growng trade defict s that 
the dsplacement of workers adds to the downward pressure on Us wages 
created by globalsaton. Ths downward wage pressure comes from the post 
1990 ntegraton of the labour force n the former sovet Unon, inda and 
chna nto the nternatonal dvson of labour. The number of workers already 
engaged n the nternatonal dvson of labour was 1.08 bllon n 1990, and the 
combned labour force of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna was 1.23 
bllon (Table 1). The dvson of labour n 1990 was certanly an unnatural one 
because half of the world’s workforce had been kept out of t voluntarly by the 
autarkc polces of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna. 
The economc solaton of the sovet bloc started crumblng when the 
new non-communst soldarty government of Poland began marketsaton 
and nternatonalsaton of ts economy on 1 January 1990. The economc 
transton and poltcal dsntegraton of the sovet bloc became rreversble 
when Presdent Bors Yeltsn replaced mkhal Gorbachev as the unambguous 
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leader of russa n August 1991 and mplemented market-orented reforms n 
January 1992.6
For the chnese élte, the events n the sovet Unon confirmed that there dd 
not exst a thrd way n the captalsm versus socalsm debate. in early 1992, 
deng Xaopng led a successful campagn to put chna firmly on the path of 
convergence to a prvate market economy (sachs and Woo 2000, 2003). Today, 
under the headng of a socalst market economy wth chnese characterstcs, 
the chnese consttuton gves prvate property the same legal status as publc 
property, and the chnese communst Party accepts captalsts as members.
in 1991, inda faced a balance-of-payments crss, and t responded by gong 
well beyond admnstraton of the standard correctve macroeconomc medcne 
of fiscal monetary tghtenng and exchange-rate devaluaton nto comprehensve 
adjustments of mcroeconomc ncentves. The trade regme was deregulated 
sgnficantly, restrctons on foregn nvestment were relaxed, reform of the 
bankng sector and the captal markets was ntated, and dvestment of publc 
enterprses and tax reforms were announced (Acharya 2004).
A decade after the start of nternatonalsaton, the number of workers 
nvolved n the nternatonal economc system had ncreased to 2.67 bllon n 
2000 (wth 1.36 bllon workers from the former sovet Unon, inda and chna) 
(Table 4.1). The heckscher-ohln model would predct that ths doublng of world 
labour—acheved by brngng n cheaper labour from the former sovet Unon, 
inda and chna—would lower the relatve prce of labour-ntensve goods and 
hence reduce real wages n ndustralsed economes.7 
The fact that Us captal could now move abroad to set up producton facltes 
n the economes of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna to servce the 
Table 4.1  The distribution of the global labour force, 1990 and 2000 
(mllon persons)
 Non-sica countres sic countres 
 Total industralsed  developng  chna inda sovet bloc 
  economes economes
1990 2,315 403 680 687 332 213
2000 2,672 438 851 764 405 214
a sic— former sovet Unon, inda and chna. 
Source: Freeman, r., 2004. doublng the global work force: the challenge of ntegratng chna, 
inda, and the former sovet Bloc nto the world economy, harvard Unversty, 8 November 
(unpublshed). our figure for ‘total’ n 2002 s dfferent from that n Freeman (2004).
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Us market provded another channel (besdes the cross-border movement of 
goods) for globalsaton to depress Us wage rates. it s mportant to note that 
the mposton of a very hgh Us tarff would not only drastcally curb mports 
from the former sovet Unon, inda and chna, t would also radcally reduce 
ths type of Fdi flow from the Unted states to the former sovet Unon, inda 
and chna. 
The nconvenent fact s, however, that the Us real wage has not fallen. 
one possble explanaton to reconcle the theoretcal predcton wth the 
real outcome s the remarkably hgh Us productvty growth snce the late 
1980s, perhaps enabled n large part by the nformaton and communcatons 
technology revoluton. Ths productvty growth was hgh enough to prevent 
the real wage from declnng but not enough to keep t growng at the same 
rate as GdP growth—and the economc mpact of globalsaton s manfested 
n a dmnshed labour share of GdP.
Whle the heckscher-ohln model does provde a coherent mechansm 
for globalsaton to lower the labour share of Us ncome and to wden the 
dstrbuton of Us wages, the nconvenent truth s that chna cannot be blamed 
as the most nfluental factor n these two wage outcomes, even though chna 
accounted for 764 mllon of the combned labour force of the former sovet 
Unon, inda and chna of 1.38 bllon n 2000. chna s not the man culprt 
because there have been three other, ndependent developments that have 
had mportant consequences for Us wages. 
Frst, there have been technologcal nnovatons that have substtuted captal 
for labour—for example, fewer secretares are needed because answerng 
machnes can now convert messages nto voce files and emal them to the 
travellng professonals. Technologcal nnovatons have also transformed 
many of what were tradtonally non-tradable servces nto tradable servces, 
allowng jobs to be outsourced to foregn servce provders. For example, the 
nformaton and communcatons technology revoluton has allowed offshore 
call centres to handle questons from Us customers, offshore accountants to 
process Us-based transactons and offshore medcal techncans to read the 
X-rays of Us patents.8 
second, there have been nsttutonal changes that attenuated the labour 
share of ncome. Unon membershp has declned, reducng the barganng 
power of labour. There has also been an upward shft n the compensaton 
norms for hgh-level executves, often usng vehcles such as stock optons, 
whch n effect make them co-owners of the company. Ths could reflect a 
combnaton of a shft n socal atttudnal norms and more colluson between 
managers and ther boards.9
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Thrd, there was ncreased mmgraton nto the Unted states (before 2001), 
especally a dsproportonate nward mmgraton of low-sklled labour.10
Based on a partal revew of the lterature, our assessment s that the 
pressure that s preventng Us wages (especally of unsklled labour) from 
rsng n lne wth GdP growth can be roughly decomposed among the varous 
factors as follows
• 70–80 per cent of the downward wage pressure s from labour-substtutng 
technologcal nnovatons, and wage-weakenng nsttutonal changes
• 5–10 per cent of the downward wage pressure s from nward 
mmgraton
• 15–20 per cent of the downward pressure s from mport competton 
and the relocaton of manufacturng actvtes abroad.
in short, the popular outcry n the Unted states and the european Unon 
aganst chna’s trade surpluses s msplaced. even f chna’s trade balance were 
zero, the pans of structural adjustment and ncome redstrbuton caused by 
technologcal nnovatons, nsttutonal changes, globalsaton and mmgraton 
would stll be there. The addtonal pan from the ncremental structural 
adjustment caused by the wdenng trade defict s mnor n comparson. 
What are the problems revealed by the appearance of trade 
imbalances?
Before dscussng the economc problems n chna and the Unted states that 
generated the trade mbalances, we should menton a troublng basc data 
ssue: there s strong dsagreement about the sze of the Us–chna trade defict. 
Fgure 4.1 shows that the chnese figure for the blateral defict n 2006 (Us$145 
bllon) was only 57.7 per cent of the Us figure (Us$251 bllon).11 The huge gap 
between these two estmates n 2006 was a huge mprovement n accuracy 
from the past n two ways. Frst, the gap was usually much larger n prevous 
years: for example, the 1993 chnese estmate of the trade defict was only 25.6 
per cent of the Us estmate. second, the recent perod s one n whch the two 
countres could agree whether the blateral balance was n surplus or n defict! 
Throughout the 1983–92 perod, the chnese data showed chna to be runnng 
a defict n ts trade wth the Us but the Us data showed a surplus.  
Gven these wldly dfferent measures of the sze of the blateral trade 
mbalance, t s only to be expected that each sde would regard the blateral 
trade mbalance wth a dfferent degree of concern. The prmary reason for the 
dscrepancy between the chnese and Us estmates s the dfferent natonal 
treatment of Us–chna trade that goes through hong kong.12 drawng on the 
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work of Feenstra et al. (1999) for the analyss n ths chapter, we wll measure 
the Us–chna trade balance as the smple average between the Us estmate 
and the chnese estmate, as reported n the imF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
database.13
Fgure 4.2 dsplays three tems: chna’s overall trade balance, the chna–Us 
trade balance and the chna–eU trade balance. chna has been runnng a 
surplus on ts Us trade snce 1986, a surplus on ts eU trade snce 1997 and a 
surplus on ts overall trade snce 1994. snce 1986—except for the four years 
assocated wth an economc downturn n chna (1990, 1991, 1997 and 1998)—the 
blateral surplus wth the Unted states exceeded chna’s overall trade surplus, 
meanng that chna was runnng massve deficts n ts trade wth some of ts 
other tradng partners. 
The changng configuraton of chna’s blateral trade balances reflects 
manly the steady expanson of producton networks nto chna. in ths new 
geographcal dvson of the producton of components and of the producton 
stages n manufacturng, chna usually makes the cheaper components 
and assembles the final products by combnng the domestcally produced 
components wth mported components. The fast transfer of manufacturng and 
assembly operatons to chna from Japan, Tawan and south korea translates 
drectly nto hgh growth n the chna–Us trade surplus because ths transfer 
reduces the Japan–Us trade surplus and the south korean–Us trade surplus 
correspondngly. in short, the chna–Us trade defict could be reduced by 
transferrng the assembly operatons of korean, Tawanese, Japanese and 
european producton networks to Vetnam, but the Vetnam–Us trade defict 
would then ncrease, leavng the overall Us trade balance unchanged.
chna’s chronc and growng overall trade surplus reveals a deep-seated 
problem n ts economy: ts dysfunctonal financal system. Ths problem s 
revealed by the aggregate-level accountng dentty that the overall current 
account balance (of whch, n chna, the overall trade account s the bggest 
part) s determned by the fiscal poston of the government, and by the savngs-
nvestment decsons of the state-controlled enterprse (sce) sector and the 
prvate sector.14 specfically,
CA = (T – G) + (SSCE – ISCE) + (Sprivate – Iprivate) (1)
where cA s the current account n the balance of payments.
CA = (X – M) + R (2)
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Fgure 4.1  US–China trade deficit: discrepancy between US and 










































Official US estimate Official Chinese estimate
Source: internatonal monetary Fund (imF), 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics, 9 may, statstcs 
department, internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc.
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Source: internatonal monetary Fund (imF), 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics, 9 may, statstcs 
department, internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc.
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where X s the export of goods and non-factor servces, M s the mport of 
goods and non-factor servces, R s the net factor earnngs from abroad (that s, 
export of factor servces), T s state revenue, G s state expendture (ncludng 
state nvestment), SSCE are the savngs of the sces, ISCE s nvestment of 
the sces, Sprivate s savngs of the prvate sector and Iprivate s prvate-sector 
nvestment.
The chnese fiscal poston (T–G) has for the past decade been a small defict, 
so t was not the cause for the swellng current account surpluses n the 2000s. 
The current account surplus exsts because the sum of savngs by sces and the 
prvate sector exceeds the sum of ther nvestment expendtures. The current 
account surplus has expanded steadly because the non-government savngs 
rate has been rsng steadly. We wll argue later that there s a lnk between the 
exstence of the current account surplus and the growth of the surplus. 
Why has chna’s fnancal system faled to translate the savngs nto 
nvestments? such an outcome was not always the case. Before 1994, the 
voracous absorpton of bank loans by sces to nvest recklessly kept the current 
account mostly negatve and the creaton of non-performng loans hgh. When 
the government mplemented strcter controls on the state-owned banks from 
1994 onwards (for example, by removng top bank officals whenever ther bank 
lent more than ts credt quota or allowed the non-performng loan rato to 
ncrease too rapdly), the state-owned banks slowed the growth of loans to sces. 
Ths cut-back created an excess of savngs because the state-owned bank-
domnated financal sector dd not then channel the released savngs (whch 
were also ncreasng) to finance the nvestment of the prvate sector. Ths falure 
n financal ntermedaton by the state-owned banks s qute understandable. 
Frstly, the legal status of prvate enterprses was, untl recently, lower than that 
of state-owned enterprses; and, secondly, there was no relable way to assess 
the balance sheets of the prvate enterprses, whch were naturally eager to 
escape taxaton. The upshot was that the resdual excess savngs leaked abroad 
n the form of the current account surplus. inadequate financal ntermedaton 
has made developng chna a captal-exportng country!
Ths perverse current account outcome s not new. Tawan had exactly ths 
problem untl the md 1980s when all Tawanese banks were state owned and 
were operated accordng to the cvl servce regulaton that the loan officer had 
to repay any bad loan that he had approved. The result was a massve falure 
n financal ntermedaton, whch caused Tawan’s current account surplus to 
be 21 per cent of GdP n 1986. The reason why chna has not been producng 
the gargantuan current account surpluses seen n Tawan n the md 1980s s 
because of the large amount of sce nvestments.
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Why s the savngs rate of the non-government sector rsng? The combned 
savngs of the state-owned enterprse and non-state-owned enterprse sector 
rose from 20 per cent n 1978 to 30 per cent n 1987, and then went above 45 per 
cent after 2004. in dscussons on the rse of the savngs rate, a common vew 
s that the rse reflects the uncertanty about the future that many state-owned 
enterprse workers feel n the face of wdespread prvatsaton of loss-makng 
state-owned enterprses. We find ths explanaton ncomplete because t seems 
that there has also been a rse n the rural savngs rate even though rural 
resdents have lttle to fear about the loss of jobs n the state-owned enterprse 
sector because none of them are employed there.15
We see two general changes that have caused urban and rural savngs rates 
to rse sgnficantly. The first s ncreased worres about the future. The steady 
declne n state subsdes to medcal care, housng, loss-makng enterprses 
and educaton, and msmanagement of penson funds by the state, have led 
people to save more to nsure aganst future bad luck (for example, sckness, 
job loss), to buy ther own lodgng, buld up nest eggs for retrement and nvest 
n ther chldren.
The second change s the secular mprovement n the offical chnese 
atttude towards market captalsm. Gven the hgh rate of return to captal, ths 
ncreasngly busness-frendly atttude of the communst Party of chna has 
no doubt encouraged rural and urban resdents to save for nvestment: that s, 
greater optmsm about the future has spawned nvestment-motvated savng.16 
our nvestment-motvated savngs hypothess s not new. Accordng to Jeffrey 
Wllamson (1988), the hstorcal record of Western europe and North Amerca 
shows that ‘nvestment demand seems to have been the drvng force behnd 
prvate savng and accumulaton, past and present’. 
in our explanatons for the exstence and the growth of the current account 
surpluses, there s a common element: chna’s financal system. The fact s that 
savngs behavour s not ndependent of the sophstcaton of the financal system. 
An advanced financal system wll have a varety of financal nsttutons that 
enable poolng of rsks by provdng medcal nsurance, penson nsurance and 
unemployment nsurance; and transform savngs nto educaton loans, housng 
loans and other types of nvestment loans to the prvate sector. Ceteris paribus, the 
more sophstcated a financal system, the lower the savngs rate—a proposton 
that finds formal statstcal support n lu and Woo (1994) and Woo and lu (1995). 
chna generates the current account surplus because of nadequate financal 
ntermedaton, and the surplus grows over tme because the dysfunctonal 
financal system fals to pool rsks to reduce uncertanty-nduced savngs and 
fals to provde loans to reduce nvestment-motvated savng (Fgure 4.2).
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The overall Us trade balance has been n defict at least snce 1980, and t 
has always been much bgger than the Us–chna trade balance (Fgure 4.3). 
Ths pattern of mbalances suggests three conclusons. Frst, the Us–chna 
trade defict s only 22.4 per cent of the overall Us trade defict, so even f the 
blateral trade balance were brought to zero by tarffs amed at chna, the overall 
trade defict would stll be large. second, the blateral trade defict surplus s 
created by the same factors that are causng the overall trade defict: the large 
annual budget defict created by the tax cuts enacted by the Bush admnstraton 
n 2001 and the post 2001 growth n defence expendture. Thrd, the hghly 
sophstcated Us financal system (whch poneered the sub-prme mortgage 
market and corporate junk bonds to enable consumpton and nvestment) has 
lowered the Us prvate savngs rate.
clearly, the sustaned nature of the overall Us trade defict was possble only 
because foregn lenders had fath n the growth prospects of the Us economy, 
and because the east Asan central banks were wllng to hold an ncreasng 
amount of Us financal nstruments. The paradox s why the Us congress s 
so concerned about trade deficts when foregners have such confidence n the 
economc future of the Unted states. Both groups cannot be rght.
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Source: internatonal monetary Fund (imF), 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics, 9 may, statstcs 
department, internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc.
57
Facing protectionism generated by trade disputes
Is a large yuan appreciation the cure for trade friction?
chna has been under foregn pressure at least snce 2002 to apprecate the yuan 
sgnficantly. in december 2002, haruhko kuroda and masahro kawa (2002) 
from Japan’s mnstry of Fnance called for a yuan apprecaton n order to stop 
chna exportng ts prce deflaton to the rest of the world. in september 2003, 
Us Treasury secretary, John snow, declared that chna should apprecate the 
yuan as part of ts nternatonal responsblty to elmnate mbalances n the 
global balance of payments.17 in september 2003, morrs Goldsten and Ncholas 
lardy (2003) of the insttute for internatonal economcs n Washngton, dc, 
clamed that an mmedate yuan apprecaton of 15–25 per cent would benefit 
chna because t would remove ‘the ncentve for further speculatve captal 
nflow and reserve accumulaton. No longer would the foregn component of 
the money supply be workng at cross-purposes wth the needs of domestc 
stablzaton.’
in march 2007, Goldsten (2007) offered the opnon to the Us congress 
that the 
…renmnb (rmB) s now grossly undervalued—on the order of 30 percent 
or more aganst an average of chna’s tradng partners and 40 percent or 
more aganst the Us dollar…[The] Us Treasury has refused to label chna 
as a ‘currency manpulator’ despte overwhelmng evdence to the contrary 
and the managng drector of the internatonal monetary Fund contnues to 
reject the role of global umpre for exchange rate polces that was lad out for 
the Fund n ts charter. chna should delver rght away a meanngful ‘down 
payment’ of a 10–15 per cent apprecaton of the rmB from ts current level. 
Falure by chna to drastcally reduce ts large-scale, one-way nterventon n 
the exchange market should result n a findng of ‘currency manpulaton’ n 
the Treasury’s may 2007 report to the Us congress…Fnally, the imF should 
return to ts roots by takng up n earnest the role that ts founders set out for 
t as the global umpre for exchange rate polces.
We wll use the format of queston and answer to analyse the queston posed 
n the ttle of ths part of the paper and to assess the valdty of the above 
assertons.
dd chna export deflaton, as kuroda and kawa (2003) clamed? 
The fundamental problem wth kuroda and kawa’s clam s that t s mpossble 
to blame Japan’s deflaton on chna’s deflaton because the tmng s wrong. 
Japan’s deflaton started wth the burstng of the stock market cum real estate 
bubble n 1992, whch was well before chna’s trade account surpluses started to 
soar n the 2000s. if anythng, trade wth chna snce 2003 has been an mportant 
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stmulus to Japanese economc recovery. sustaned hgh chnese nvestment 
spendng has sucked n large amounts of ntermedate nputs, machnery and 
captal equpment from Japan.
Would a yuan apprecaton reduce global mbalances, as Bergsten 
(2007) clamed?
There s lttle doubt that a large apprecaton of the yuan aganst the Us 
dollar—say, 40 per cent, as suggested by Goldsten (2007)—could elmnate the 
Us–chna trade defict as well as chna’s overall trade surplus. But ths move 
would only hurt chna and would not ‘save’ the world. Ceteris paribus, n the 
aftermath of a 40 per cent yuan apprecaton, foregn companes producng n 
chna for the G7 markets would move ther operatons to other Asan economes 
(such as Vetnam and Thaland) and export from there, and G7 mporters would 
start mportng the same goods from other Asan countres nstead. in the 
absence of a collectve apprecaton of all Asan currences, a yuan apprecaton 
would only reconfigure the geographcal dstrbuton of the global mbalances, 
not elmnate them.
how could a collectve regonal apprecaton aganst the Us dollar be 
acheved?
it would be nave to assume that Asan currences tend to move closely together 
when one of them moves a large amount, such as 40 per cent. The last tme 
the Asan currences moved together by a large amount was durng the Asan 
financal crss of 1997–98, and chna dd not jon n despte many predctons to 
the contrary. should the Us government now expand ts currency apprecaton 
campagn serally to other east Asan countres and undertake a ‘surge’ n 
exchange rate actvsm on any country that pushes back? For many reasons, 
ths would not be a desrable nternatonal economc strategy for the Unted 
states.18
Would a large, smultaneous collectve apprecaton of the Asan 
currences be an unambguous gan for the Unted states?
We are not sure. immedate cessaton of the foregn financng of the Us savngs 
gap would translate nto an mmedate zero current account balance, and 
ths would requre an mmedate ncrease n Us exports and/or an mmedate 
decrease n Us mports. exports would ncrease quckly only f there were 
substantal excess producton capacty or f there were a substantal drop n 
domestc demand that freed up the domestc goods for sale abroad. imports 
59
Facing protectionism generated by trade disputes
would decrease quckly only f there were excess producton capacty (to 
enable replacement of mports) or f there were a substantal drop n domestc 
demand that reduced the use of consumer goods and nputs. snce there s no 
substantal excess producton capacty n the Us economy today, the mmedate 
elmnaton of the current account defict would requre a huge drop n domestc 
demand, whch would have ts orgn n a large negatve wealth shock, possbly 
n the form of a stock market collapse or an nflatonary spke.19 
Would the absence of a yuan apprecaton cause hgh nflaton n 
chna, as Goldsten and lardy (2003) clamed?
The growth of chnese money supply has not slowed drastcally despte the 
heghtenng of ant-nflaton rhetorc by the chnese government n response 
to the contnued hgh growth of nvestment expendture. has the chnese 
government lost control of ts money supply, as a number of analysts have 
warned? Not at all. The speculatve nflows and growth n foregn exchange 
reserves cannot expand the money supply wthout the agreement of the People’s 
Bank of chna (PBc). As well as sterlsaton through open-market operatons, 
chna has the use of credt quotas on bank lendng. The fact s that all chnese 
banks are state controlled, and ther hgh-rankng executves are apponted by 
the state. Gven the choce between maxmsng bank profits or heedng orders 
from the prme mnster’s office, the bank chefs can always be counted on to 
choose the latter. There s no queston about the communst Party of chna 
losng control of the money supply snce 2002.
money supply growth n 2005–07 dd not slow markedly because chna chose 
not to enforce the credt quotas strngently. Frst, the nflaton rate, although 
rsng, s stll low. second, t s good poltcs to have a boomng economy n the 
perod leadng up to the mportant seventeenth Party congress n November 
2007, whch wll ratfy mportant personnel appontments for the next five 
years.
What s the correct level for the exchange rate?
The Economist magazne constructs a purchasng power party (PPP) exchange 
rate based on the prces of Bg mac hamburgers sold n dfferent countres. 
in 2006, t cost 10.4 yuan to buy a Bg mac n chna and Us$3.15 n the Unted 
states, so the PPP exchange rate was 3.3 yuan per Us dollar n 2006, compared 
wth the actual (nomnal) exchange rate of 8 yuan per Us dollar. is t, therefore, 
meanngful to say that the chnese exchange rate was undervalued by almost 
60 per cent n 2006? The answer s no, because the prces of the hamburgers 
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ncluded non-tradable nputs, and the prces of non-tradables were lower n 
chna than n the Unted states. in general, the prces of non-tradables are lower 
n developng economes than n ndustralsed economes because labour costs 
are lower n the former. Wth economc development, the prces of non-tradables 
n the developng economes wll rse to brng the prce rato of non-tradables 
to tradables closer to the prce rato n the ndustralsed economy.
To see that the gap between the usual PPP exchange rate and the actual 
exchange rate reflects the development gap between the two countres, we 
first make the followng defintons
a) definng the consumer prce ndex n chna and the Unted states
     cPi of chna, cPic = (1-a) PcT + a P
c
N  
     cPi of the Unted states, cPiU = (1-a) PUT + a P
U
N (3)
 where cPi s the consumer prce ndex, c s chna, U s the Unted states, 
PT s the prce of the tradable good n country ‘’, P

N s the prce of the 
non-tradable good n country ‘’, and ‘a’ s the weght of non-tradable 
goods n the prce ndex.
b) definng the PPP exchange rate
      ePPP = cPic / cPiU  (4)
We next state the equlbrum condtons.
a) Goods arbtrage
      PcT = e
actual PUT  (5)
 where eactual s the actual (nomnal) exchange rate expressed as the 
number of yuan per Us dollar.
b) relatonshp between prces of tradables and non-tradables wthn each 
country
 for developng chna, PcT = d P
c
N
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c) The dfference between the ndustralsed and the developng economy 
s that the relatve prce of non-tradables s hgher n the former. 
      d > f > 0 (7)
We can now derve the followng relatonshp between the PPP exchange rate 
and the actual exchange rate
ePPP = cPic / cPiU 
ePPP = [(1-a+af)/(1-a+ad)] eactual
ePPP < eactual (8)
The above exercse shows that t s conceptually dfficult to determne the 
‘correctness’ of a country’s exchange rate on the bass of PPP exchange rates. 
The actual (nomnal) exchange rate of a developng economy wll always be 
undervalued n relaton to the PPP exchange rate, and t s ludcrous to demand 
that the government of the developng economy set ts exchange rate equal to 
the PPP exchange rate (because ths s not a sustanable polcy). 
one meanngful definton of the ‘correct exchange rate’ s that t s the 
‘market-clearng exchange rate’: the exchange rate that s generated by the 
foregn exchange markets n the absence of nterventon by any central bank. 
The fact that the People’s Bank of chna has been accumulatng foregn 
reserves durng every perod means that the yuan s undervalued accordng to 
ths definton. What would happen, however, f chna were to go further n ts 
marketsaton of foregn exchange transactons by removng ts captal controls? 
dversficaton of asset portfolos by prvate chnese agents would surely result 
n a great outflow of funds, possbly causng the yuan to deprecate. in such a 
case, the present exchange rate of 8 yuan per Us dollar would be overvalued 
compared wth the ‘complete free-market exchange rate’. of course, no one 
knows whether the complete free-market exchange rate would be hgher or 
lower than 8 yuan per Us dollar.
suppose the value of the complete free-market exchange rate was 6.5 yuan 
per Us dollar and the market-clearng exchange rate wth controls on captal 
outflows was 4.5 yuan per Us dollar—and suppose the government stops 
nterventon mmedately and then removes captal controls a few years later, 
after t has strengthened the supervson, management and techncal capablty 
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of the domestc financal nsttutons. one plausble result of ths partcular two-
step market lberalsaton (whch we call opton A) would be apprecaton to 4.5 
yuan per dollar on cessaton of foregn exchange market nterventon followed 
by deprecaton to 6.5 yuan per dollar on removal of the captal controls. 
suppose chna adopts another form of two-step lberalsaton (opton 
B), ncremental apprecaton of the yuan and removal of the captal controls 
after a few years. opton B s better than opton A because the exchange 
rate overshootng n opton A creates an unnecessary to-and-fro movement 
n resources. As mentoned, the removal of captal controls could very well 
cause the yuan to deprecate past 8 yuan per dollar, say, to 9.5 yuan per dollar, 
meanng that opton A would result n very severe exchange rate overshootng 
compared to opton B.
in effect, the chnese government has been mplementng a form of opton 
B snce July 2005. in our opnon, the chnese government has chosen a speed 
of exchange rate adjustment that s too slow, causng the yuan to deprecate 
sgnficantly aganst the euro. We recommend that the chnese government 
ncreases the speed of the yuan apprecaton, but not n the form of an mmedate 
dscrete 10–15 per cent apprecaton as advocated by Goldsten (2007).20
in our opnon, the nstnctve calls by some economsts for the use of the 
exchange-rate mechansm to solve chna’s external mbalance s only partally 
correct. Gven chna’s captal controls, a freely floatng currency regme could 
mean a value for the yuan that would be greatly over-apprecated compared 
wth what ts value would be under free captal flows, and could therefore 
reduce economc growth sgnficantly.21 Freeng captal flows s not, however, 
an opton at ths tme. Gven the weakness of the balance sheets of chna’s 
state-owned banks and the consderable embezzlement of state assets that 
has occurred—and the experence of the east Asan financal crss—we advse 
aganst allowng the free movement of captal n the short term.
The correct way to thnk about exchange-rate management s to analyse 
the ssue wthn the context of overall macroeconomc management and not 
just n regard to ts mpact on the balance of payments. it s lkely that there are 
alternatve combnatons of macroeconomc polces that would produce results 
superor to the one generated by apprecatng the yuan alone. The general pont 
s that because the balance of payments s only one of the man outcomes of 
concern22 and the exchange rate s only one of the ways to affect the balance 
of payments,23 t s seldom the optmum to concentrate exclusvely on one 
polcy target (whch does not domnate the other polcy targets n mportance) 
and then to employ only one polcy tool (whch s chosen dosyncratcally) to 
acheve that target. 
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What is to be done?
The real source of the anxetes that have gven rse to the present Us obsesson 
wth yuan apprecaton s not the large trade mbalances but the large amount 
of structural adjustment necesstated by the acceleraton of globalsaton and 
of labour-savng technologcal progress. dollar deprecaton and trade barrers 
wll slow the process of structural adjustment but wll not stop t because 
the man drver of structural adjustment n the Unted states s technologcal 
progress. The optmal soluton s a polcy package that emphasses multlateral 
acton to acheve several mportant objectves. it s bad economcs and bad 
poltcs to dwell on just one regon (chna alone must change), to dwell on just 
one nstrument (yuan apprecaton alone) and to dwell entrely on one target 
(external mbalance).
We start by statng what should be done n the Unted states. congress 
should qucken the reducton n fiscal mbalance, and expand trade adjustment 
programs, especally those that upgrade the sklls of younger workers. The 
Trade Adjustment Assstance (TAA) program stll functons nadequately after 
ts overhaul n 2002. lael Branard (2007) reported that
[p]artcpaton has remaned surprsngly low, thanks n part to confusng 
department of labor nterpretatons and practces that ultmately deny 
benefits to roughly three-quarters of workers who are certfied as elgble 
for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000 new workers per year, whle 
denyng more than 40 per cent of all employers’ pettons. And remarkably, 
the department of labor has nterpreted the TAA statute as excludng the 
growng number of servces workers dsplaced by trade. Between 2001 and 
2004, an average of only 64 per cent of partcpants found jobs whle they 
partcpated n TAA. And earnngs on the new job were more than 20 per cent 
below those pror to dsplacement.
The TAA program s n clear need of further mprovement. Branard’s (2007) 
proposal for the establshment of wage nsurance s an excellent way to brng 
the Us socal safety net more n lne wth the type of structural adjustments 
drven by globalsaton and technologcal changes.
What s to be done n chna? The obvous short-term polcy package has 
three components. Frst, the steady process of yuan apprecaton begun n July 
2005 should be quckened—and should be used more aggressvely as an ant-
nflaton nstrument. second, mport lberalsaton should be accelerated (for 
example, commtments made n negotatons for WTo membershp, such as 
ntellectual property rghts protecton, should be mplemented) and expanded 
beyond WTo specficatons. 
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The thrd component of the short-term polcy package s to have an 
expansonary fiscal polcy (such as rural nfrastructure nvestments) to soak up 
excess savngs, wth an emphass on mport-ntensve nvestments (for example, 
buyng aeroplanes and sendng students abroad). There must be tme lmts put 
on the expanded publc works and sce nvestments because, n the long term, 
ncreased publc nvestments could follow an ncreasngly rent-seekng path 
that s wasteful (for example, buldng a second bg brdge to a low-populated 
sland to benefit a poltcally connected constructon company, as happened 
n Japan), and the ncreased sce nvestments could convert themselves nto 
non-performng loans at the state-owned banks.
it s now common to hear calls for chna to rebalance ts growth path 
by reducng savngs to ncrease consumpton. Ths advce on ncreasng 
consumpton cannot be wrong, however, consumpton n chna today s largely 
under the control of ndvdual famles and firms. They have probably already 
tred ther best to optmse ther consumpton gven all the constrants they 
face, and are unlkely to welcome the government tellng them how to spend 
ther money.
snce the health nsurance and socal securty networks n chna are n 
ther nfancy, many chnese people are choosng to save a great deal of money 
as a hedge aganst severe llness. in the absence of student-loan programs, 
famles are also choosng to save a great deal for ther chldren’s educaton. 
many mddle-class chnese famles have bought property n antcpaton of 
captal gans but have refraned from movng nto the new property because 
roads, subways and schools for many newly developed resdental communtes 
are underdeveloped. These are ther best choces gven the structural and 
economc constrants on chnese socety. As a result, the consumpton of 
chnese households remans low and savngs rates reman hgh. All of these 
factors beg the queston, ‘how can chna ncrease domestc consumpton?’.
in the context of the above examples, the answers are qute straghtforward: 
buld an ntegrated health nsurance system; create student-loan and scholarshp 
programs; and buld more roads, subways and schools.24 The optmal soluton 
to the problem of excess savng s not, however, for the government to absorb 
t by ncreasng ts budget defict but to establsh an mproved mechansm 
for coordnatng prvate savngs and prvate nvestments. establshment of a 
modern financal system wll not only acheve ths objectve, t wll enhance 
welfare and lower the savngs rate by poolng rsks through vehcles such as 
medcal and penson nsurance. in a nutshell, chna’s man challenge today 
s to develop smoothly functonng financal, plannng and regulatory systems 
that can employ the remanng rural surplus labour (as ndcated by an average 
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wage of about Us$120 per month for 480 mllon rural and mgrant workers) 
and surplus captal, whch now shows up n chna’s sustaned current account 
surplus and rsng foregn exchange reserves.
The most mportant prorty for financal-sector development s the appearance 
and growth of compettve domestc prvate banks. As chna s requred by ts 
WTo accesson agreement to allow foregn banks to compete aganst ts state-
owned banks on an equal bass by 2007, t would be akn to self-loathng not to 
allow the formaton of truly prvate banks of domestc orgn. There s no reason to 
favour foregn prvate banks over domestc prvate banks, and there s no reason 
why chna should not allow ts best financal mnds to compete wth—and acheve 
the same glorous success as—the best foregn financal mnds. 
We therefore recommend that after the recaptalsaton of the bg four state 
banks, at least two of them should be broken nto several regonal banks, and 
the majorty of these regonal banks should be prvatsed. At the same tme, 
laws on the establshment of new banks should be loosened, and nterest rates 
deregulated. it s crucal, however, that financal-sector lberalsaton proceeds 
no faster than the development of the financal regulatory ablty of the state. 
even then, the danger of substtutng a financal crash for financal represson 
s real. A modern financal system requres a modern system of supervson 
and prudental regulaton for ts proper functonng.
it would be a good dea to sell a few of the regonal state banks to foregn 
banks. Ths would facltate the transfer of modern bankng technology to 
chnese banks. The more local staff the foregn bankers tran, the larger s the 
pool of future managers for chnese-owned banks. An accelerated process 
of promotng the growth of sound domestc prvate financal nsttutons and 
allowng the entry of foregn financal nsttutons would shorten the tme 
needed for shangha to assume ts rghtful place among the major nternatonal 
financal centres, and to contrbute to more efficent ntermedaton of the 
world’s savngs. 
An mportant part of financal reform should be promoton of the development 
of sound rural financal nsttutons. The government can usefully draw on the 
wealth of nternatonal experence wth varous schemes n developng economes 
to drect nvestment credt to rural areas. in partcular, we wsh to draw attenton 
to the successful indonesan experence of establshng a self-sustanng and 
profitable bankng system (the ‘Unt desa’ system) n the countrysde to provde 
a startng pont for dscussng how to accelerate financal development n rural 
chna.25 chna should allow the appearance of new small-scale rural financal 
nsttutons that wll moblse local savngs to finance local nvestments as quckly 
as adequate prudental supervson can be put nto place. 
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The wdespread nternatonal attenton on the value of the yuan s possbly 
the first tme n nternatonal monetary hstory that the value of the currency 
of a developng economy has so greatly exercsed the finance mnstres and 
central banks of the largest ndustralsed economes for such a sustaned 
perod. Ths anomalous stuaton reveals two noteworthy ponts about chna’s 
return to the nternatonal stage: t shows the sgnficant economc mpact 
that chna s already havng on the world; and t portends that the antcpated 
contnued fast growth of chna n the next two decades wll not only force 
more structural adjustments n other countres, t wll requre chna to assume 
a broader ‘global system’ perspectve n resolvng dsputes caused by cross-
border spllovers from ts polces. The most mportant and obvous area for 
collaboraton between chna and ndustralsed economes at ths pont s 
workng together to further lberalse the multlateral free-trade system, and, 
at the mnmum, to prevent t beng eroded.
As chna contnues to grow rapdly, there s the unfortunate possblty that 
the range of nternatonal dsputes could expand—possbly n the medum 
term—to nclude nternatonal concerns about chna’s publc health readness 
and envronmental protecton. hopefully, the world wll be more multlateral n 
ts approach to the soluton of these ssues rather than nsstng on a unlateral 
soluton by chna, as n the present case of the yuan.
Notes
1 At the end of may, the Natonal development and reform commsson predcted that ‘chna’s 
trade surplus wll swell to between Us$250 bllon to Us$300 bllon ths year, drven by prce 
compettveness and strong external demand. The surplus for the first four months of ths year 
totaled Us$63.3 bllon, up 88% from the same perod of last year’ (Wall Street Journal 2007a). 
in md June, t was revealed that chna’s overall trade surplus had wdened to Us$22.45 bllon 
n may 2007, whch was a 33 per cent gan on Aprl’s figure (Standard 2007).
2 detals of these three WTo cases are found n UsTr 2007a, 2007b and 2007c.
3 Nether the date nor the sample of newspapers was selected randomly. These were the 
newspapers that were on the sngapore Arlnes flght from sngapore to san Francsco (va 
hong kong) on the day of our travel.
4 The artcle also reported that Peter mandelson ‘wants greater access for european companes 
to chna and a crackdown on pracy—threatenng extra tarffs or mport quotas f not. he also 
wants the renmnb pegged to a basket of currences.’
5 The Us cvlan labour force n 2006 was 151.4 mllon (Unted states Presdent 2007:Table 
B-35).
6 For detals and analyss of the economc transton n the former sovet bloc and chna, see 
the papers n Woo et al. 1997.
7 more accurately, the wage of the formerly solated worker n the former sovet Unon, inda and 
chna would rse whle the wage for the worker n the ndustralsed economy would fall.
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8 There s a large emprcal lterature on the relatve mpact of technologcal changes and 
globalsaton on the Us wage rate; notable contrbutons nclude sachs and shatz (1994) and 
Feenstra and hanson (1996 and 1998). 
9 Akerlof (2007) s a recent dscusson on ‘norms’ and ther economc consequences.
10 Borjas (1994) and ottavano and Per (2005) are good dscussons of ths topc.
11 The data are from the Direction of Trade Statistics database mantaned by the internatonal 
monetary Fund (imF 2007).
12 see Feenstra et al. 1999 for the detals of the dfferent natonal treatments. Ths study re-
estmated the export and mport data of chna–Us trade, and reduced the gap between the 
two estmates: for example, the Us$29 bllon gap between the two offical figures n 1996 
was reduced to Us$5 bllon after revson of the data.
13 The smple average of the Direction of Trade Statistics data was closer than the smple average 
of the offical data to the smple average of the revsed data of Feenstra et al. (1999); the latter 
two are reported n Feenstra et al. (1999:Table 1).
14 The sce category covers companes that are classfied as state-owned companes and jont 
ventures and jont-stock companes that are controlled by thrd partes (for example, legal 
persons), who are answerable to the state.
15 The economst intellgence Unt (2004:23) reported that ‘farmers’ propensty to save seems 
to have ncreased’.
16 lu and Woo (1994) and Woo and lu (1995) contan formal modellng and econometrc support 
for the nvestment-motvated savng hypothess.
17 see, for example, Financial Times (2003). 
18 For one thng, seral exchange-rate actvsm and the surge of t are unlkely to be more 
successful than the expanson of the war from Afghanstan to iraq and the surge of Us mltary 
effort n iraq n 2007.
19 consderatons lke ths mght be the reason why Goldsten and lardy (2003) and Goldsten 
(2007) advocated a two-step strategy of yuan apprecaton: a modest apprecaton followed 
by ncremental apprecaton.
20 our analyss therefore leads us to agree wth the three recent polcy postons of the Us 
Treasury: that chna must ncrease the pace of reform n financal servces market (Paulson 
2007), that chna has not engaged n currency manpulaton, and that chna should ncrease 
the rate of yuan apprecaton.
21 in robert mundell’s opnon, ‘chna’s growth rate could fall by half and foregn drect nvestment 
(Fdi) could slow to a crawl f the country were to abandon ts long-standng support of peggng 
the currency’ (quoted n South China Morning Post 2003). 
22 The nflaton rate and unemployment would be among the other key concerns.
23 other ways nclude monetary and fiscal polces.
24 Xao (forthcomng) dscusses ths ssue more fully and emphasses the problem of 
dstngushng productve nvestments from non-productve nvestments.
25 indonesa s smlar to chna n key economc and nsttutonal features: a geographcally 
vast and heavly populated economy, and a rural financal system domnated by branches of 
a state bank (Bank rakyat indonesa and Agrcultural Bank of chna respectvely). see Woo 
(2005).
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5
Component trade and China’s 
global economic integration
Kunwang Li, Ligang Song and Xingjun Zhao
A symbol of chna’s economc ntegraton nto the global economy s ts 
progressve engagement n nternatonal commodty trade, wth an ncreasng 
scale and ntensty. From 1992 to 2005, the average growth rate of chna’s 
total trade was 18.5 per cent per annum—twce as hgh as the growth of gross 
domestc product (GdP) n the same perod. chna’s total trade reached Us$1.76 
trllon n 2006, wth a trade dependency rato (defined as the rato of total trade 
over ts GdP) rsng to about 68 per cent by the natonal account measures 
(UNcTAd 2006). Among ths ncreasng trade, chna’s engagement n the 
so-called nternatonal fragmentaton of producton—namely, ‘cross-border 
dsperson of component producton/assembly wthn vertcally ntegrated 
manufacturng ndustres’ (Feenstra 1998; Jones and kerzkowsk 2005)—has 
become an ncreasngly mportant form of ts economc ntegraton nto the 
regonal as well as the global economy. 
The development of component trade s sgnfcant for the followng 
reasons (Jones, kerzkowsk and chen 2005). Frst, t has exhbted a dynamsm 
exceedng that of trade n final goods, as breakng down the ntegrated process 
nto separate stages of producton opens up new possbltes for explotng 
gans from specalsaton (Jones and kerzkowsk 2001). second, despte t beng 
a type of trade ncreasngly paramount n advanced stages of globalsaton, 
t opens up an mportant role for developng economes (unlke ntra-ndustry 
trade, whch has been conducted manly among ndustralsed countres). Thrd, 
t s more closely related to the development and lberalsaton of the servces 
sector than final good trade s partcularly wth respect to transportaton, 
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communcaton, bankng and nsurance, and other connectng servce lnks. 
Ths s because ncreasng returns to scales tend to be assocated wth the 
development of these servce sectors, whch could n turn reduce the costs 
assocated wth the fragmentaton process.
The global total trade n parts and components ncreased from Us$400 
bllon n 1992 to Us$1.25 trllon n 2005. The share of components trade n 
the total trade of manufacturng goods ncreased from 21 per cent to 26 per 
cent. such a trend s especally pronounced n the east Asan regon, whch 
has accounted for more than half of the trade n parts and components. east 
Asa s progressvely replacng the Unted states and the european Unon as 
the world’s largest regon for trade n parts and components, formng a large 
ntegrated network for producton (Athukorala 2006). chna has been playng 
an ncreasngly mportant role n ths development.
Ths chapter presents the recent trend of trade n parts and components 
between chna and ts man tradng partners. it explores how chna’s pattern 
of trade n parts and components s beng determned n terms of the shares of 
ths trade n ts total exports and mports, and ther respectve shares n total 
manufacturng trade. The analytcal approach adopted s an adjusted gravty 
modellng method ncorporatng relatve labour costs, foregn drect nvestment 
(Fdi) and telecommuncatons n estmatng the regresson models. Polcy 
mplcatons wth respect to the role of technology, labour productvty, further 
development and lberalsaton of the servces sectors are then dscussed.
China’s increasing trade in parts and components
The rse of chna’s trade has been an mportant part of the changng pattern 
of nternatonal producton segmentaton n east Asa. on the mport sde, the 
share of parts and components had already accounted for more than two-thrds 
of the total mports n chna n 2002. Among the ntermedate goods trade, 
mports of parts and components ncreased more sgnficantly than any other 
ntermedate goods and the share of parts and components n total mports 
ncreased from 19 per cent n 1997 to 27 per cent n 2002. on the exportaton 
sde, final goods played a domnant part n total exports—accountng for more 
than 60 per cent of the total n 2002. meanwhle, chna’s ntermedate goods 
trade has been concentrated manly n Asa: more than 80 per cent comes from 
Asa and more than 60 per cent of exports of parts and components goes to 
other Asan economes (Gauler et al. 2005). in general, mportng ntermedate 
goods, then processng and exportng the final goods characterses chna’s 
tradng relatons wth ts man tradng partners. 
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To analyse chna’s trade n parts and components wth ts man tradng 
partners, we select 219 knds of parts and components taken from the Unted 
Natons’ standard internatonal Trade classficaton (siTc Verson 3) numbers 
siTc-7 and siTc-8, consstng of 2,800 commodtes, followng Yeats (2001) and 
Athukorala (2006).1 Altogether, there are 25 tradng partners: the Unted states, 
canada, mexco, the Unted kngdom, France, Germany, italy, Australa, Japan, 
korea, hong kong, sngapore, malaysa, the Phlppnes, Thaland, indonesa, 
Vetnam, myanmar, camboda, Brune, laos, inda, Brazl, Pakstan and south 
Afrca.2
snce the early 1990s, trade n parts and components between chna and 
ts tradng partners has been ncreasng rapdly. in 1992, chna’s mports and 
exports of parts and components were worth Us$12.1 bllon and Us$4.3 bllon 
respectvely (Fgures 5.1 and 5.2). By 2005, chna’s mports and exports of parts 
and components ncreased to Us$176 bllon and Us$110 bllon—15 tmes and 
26 tmes those n 1992 respectvely (Fgure 5.1). Growth of mports of parts and 
components s contnung to outpace that of exports.
At the same tme, the share of mports of parts and components n total 
manufacturng mports ncreased dramatcally from 16 per cent n 1992 to 35 
per cent n 2005 (Fgure 5.2). The fact that component trade accounted for more 
than one-thrd of total manufacturng mports llustrates chna’s ncreasng role 
n nternatonal fragmentaton of producton. 
To further analyse the ncreasng trend of trade n parts and components, 
one needs to look at the dstrbuton of component trade by sector as well as 
by destnaton. The former tells how component trade concentrates on certan 
sectors and the latter shows wth whom chna has engaged n developng 
component trade.  
The pattern of component trade by sectors
in 1992, chna’s exports of parts and components for machnery and 
transportaton (siTc-7) were worth Us$3.4 bllon, whch accounted for 80 
per cent of the total exports of parts and components and 5.1 per cent of 
manufacturng exports (Table 5.1). in the same year, ts exports of parts and 
components for other manufacturng goods were worth Us$800 mllon, 
accountng for 19 per cent of total exports of parts and components and 1.2 per 
cent of manufacturng exports. exports of parts and components accounted 
for 6.3 per cent of total manufacturng exports. 
in 2004, chna’s exports of parts and components for machnery and 
transportaton were worth Us$87.5 bllon, accountng for 94 per cent of the 
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Fgure 5.2  Share of parts and components trade in manufacturing 












































Source: calculated usng the data from UN comTrAde, 2006.
















































Source: calculated usng the data from UN comTrAde, 2006.
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total exports of parts and components and 15.9 per cent of total manufacturng 
exports. its exports of parts and components for other manufacturng goods 
were worth Us$5.5 bllon, accountng for 5.8 per cent of the total exports of parts 
and components and 1 per cent of manufacturng exports. Total exports of parts 
and components accounted for 16.9 per cent of total manufacturng exports. 
The annual growth rate of exports of parts and components for machnery and 
transport n ths perod was 31 per cent, whle that of other manufacturng was 
17.1 per cent. The annual growth rate of total exports of parts and components 
was 29.3 per cent. 
chna’s mports of parts and components for machnery and transportaton 
were worth Us$10 bllon n 1992, accountng for 87 per cent of total mports of 
parts and components and 15.8 per cent of total manufacturng mports (Table 
5.1). chna’s mports of parts and components for other manufacturng goods 
were worth Us$1.6 bllon, accountng for 13 per cent of total mports of parts 
and components and 2.4 per cent of total manufacturng mports n the same 
year. Total mports of parts and components accounted for 18.2 per cent of 
total mports of manufactured products. 
in 2004, chna’s mports of parts and components for machnery and 
transportaton ncreased to Us$148 bllon, accountng for 97 per cent of total 
Table 5.1  China’s trade in parts and components, 1992–2004
 siTc-7 siTc-8
 Value  share n share n Value share n share n
  P&c manufacturng    P&c manufacturng 
 (Us$ bllon) (per cent) (per cent) (Us$ bllon) (per cent) (per cent) 
exports      
1992  3.4 80 5.1 0.8 19.1 1.2
1996  10 87 7.8 1.5 13.2 1.2
2000  28 92 12.4 2.4 8.0 1.1
2004  87 94 15.9 5.5 5.8 1.0
      
imports      
1992  10 87 15.8 1.6 13.1 2.4
1996  20 92 17.7 1.7 8.1 1.1
2000  51 96 29.1 2.1 4.0 1.2
2004  148 97 33.4 4.1 2.7 1.0
Note: siTc-7 denotes parts and components for machnery and transport equpment, and 
siTc-8 represents mscellaneous manufacturng commodtes. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons based on Unted Natons conference on Trade and development 
(UNcTAd), 2006. Trade and Development Report, Unted Natons, New York and Geneva.
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mports of parts and components and 33.4 per cent of total manufacturng 
mports. chna’s mports of other parts and components clmbed to Us$4.1 
bllon, accountng for 2.7 per cent of total mports of parts and components 
and 1 per cent of total manufacturng mports. Total mports of parts and 
components accounted for 34.3 per cent of manufacturng product mports. The 
annual growth rate of mports of machnery and transportaton products was, 
on average, 24.7 per cent and that of mports n other parts and components 
was 8.2 per cent n ths perod. The annual growth rate of total mports n parts 
and components was 23.4 per cent, on average, n ths perod. 
machnery and transportaton products ncreased more quckly than other 
products n component trade. in partcular, office machnery and equpment 
(siTc-75), telecommuncatons and recordng equpment (siTc-76) and electrcal 
machnery and parts (siTc-77) played domnant roles, accountng for nearly 80 
per cent of the total component trade. As a result, the share of machnery and 
transportaton n the total trade of parts and components s ncreasng whle 
that of other manufacturng products s decreasng over tme. Ths findng 
s consstent wth the fact that the composton of chna’s exports has been 
movng quckly towards those captal and technology-ntensve products n 
recent years. 
chna has been runnng component-trade deficts, caused manly by rapd 
ncreases n ts mportaton of parts and components for machnery and 
transportaton products. Ths trade gap tends to ncrease further as chna’s 
capacty for producng these products ncreases, so chna wll contnue to 
rely heavly on mported parts and components. on the other hand, chna has 
become a net exporter of parts and components relatng to labour-ntensve 
manufacturng products snce 2000. 
The growth rates of chna’s component trade have been hgher than the 
growth rates of manufacturng sectors as well as the growth rates of total 
trade. Ths suggests that the pattern of the nternatonal dvson of labour n 
whch chna has partcpated has been deepened to cover finer nternatonal 
fragmentaton of producton. The further development of such patterns means 
that countres nvolved wll gan from trade n parts and components rather than 
from trade n final goods. such development wll cement even closer tradng 
relatonshps among countres nvolved n such a network of producton. Ths 
pont can be llustrated by lookng at chna’s trade n parts and components 
by partners.
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chna’s trade n parts and components by partners
Although the regonal dstrbuton of chna’s mports of parts and components 
vares over tme, the man sources of chna’s mports of parts and components 
seem to concentrate n Northeast Asa, whch accounted for more than 50 per 
cent of chna’s total mports of components (Table 5.2). Japan’s share was 
ncreasng between 1992 and 1997, but started to fall after 1998, due possbly 
to the mpact of the east Asan financal crss. Japan, however, together wth 
korea (whose share ncreased rapdly throughout the perod), ranked the 
hghest n terms of ther shares of chna’s mports of components. The shares 
of the Unted states and canada reached ther peak about 2000 and started 
to declne thereafter. hong kong’s share decreased from 38.7 per cent to 2.15 
Table 5.2  Shares of component imports trade in China, by region,  
1992–2005 (per cent)
regon/country 1992  1993  1996 1997 2000 2001 2004 2005
World 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100
NAFTAa members 10.1  10.7 10.7 11.9 10.7  11.4 7.0 6.5
 Unted states 9.6 10.3 9.8 10.9 8.5 9.4 5.8 5.5
 canada 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.4
 mexco - - - 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6
european Unon (4) 13.9 13.7 10.2 10.8  10.9 11.2 7.6 6.1
 Germany 8.2 8.7 6.4 6.3 5.7 6.4 5.2 3.7
 France 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.8  2.7 2.3 1.2 1.2
 Unted kngdom  1.3 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 0.6 0.6
 italy 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5
Northeast Asa 61.5  54.5 58.8 57.6 52.7 51.1 52.9 53.4
 hong kong 38.7 16.2 9.5 7.6  5.4  5.1 2.6 2.1
 Japan 20.2 32.1 35.1 32.3 25.9 24.2 20.8 17.9
 korea 1.8 3.9 7.5 8.4 9.3 8.4 12.6 15.3
AseAN (5) 0.8 2.2 6.7 9.3 12.1 13.4 16.8 18.0
 indonesa  - - 0.1 0.2  0.4 0.5  0.5 0.4
 malaysa  0.1 0.3 1.5 2.1 4.5 5.4 6.6 6.9
 Phlppnes  - - 0.3 0.2 1.9 2.2 4.4 5.2
 sngapore 0.6 1.6 3.7 5.4  2.8 2.7  3.1 3.4 
 Thaland 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.4  2.4 2.6 2.2 2.1
Australa 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
other 14.2 20.9 19.3 19.4 25.3  25.8 32.1 33.7
a North Amercan Free Trade Agreement 
Source: Authors’ calculatons based on Unted Natons conference on Trade and development 
(UNcTAd), 2006. Trade and Development Report, Unted Natons, New York and Geneva.
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per cent, reflectng the fact that t was no longer a major suppler of parts and 
components to chna. The shares from four eU countres (Germany, France, the 
Unted kngdom and italy) also decreased to low levels n 2005. imports of parts 
and components from five Assocaton of south-east Asan Natons (AseAN) 
countres (malaysa, the Phlppnes, indonesa, sngapore and Thaland) 
ncreased rapdly from less than 1 per cent n 1992 to 18 per cent n 2005. 
The data show that chna has been relyng less and less on the major 
ndustralsed countres n europe and North Amerca to provde parts and 
components for ts part n the nternatonal fragmentaton of producton. in 
contrast, the newly ndustralsed economes and AseAN countres have 
become mportant sources of chna’s mports of parts and components. There 
s also a strong tendency for korea and large AseAN countres to replace 
Japan and hong kong n provdng chna wth parts and components. The 
rapd development of component trade between chna and ts neghbourng 
economes n east and southeast Asa ndcates that these regonal economes 
have become ncreasngly ntegrated through the nternatonal fragmentaton 
of producton. 
Total exports of parts and components from chna to ndustralsed countres 
have been ncreasng steadly, whle those to east Asa—n partcular, to hong 
kong and Japan—have been fallng (Table 5.3). despte ths trend, east Asa’s 
average share of chna’s exports to the world was about 55 per cent compared 
wth 17 per cent for the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
countres and 7 per cent for the european Unon n 2005. exports to korea have 
ncreased from 1.3 per cent to 5 per cent and those to sx AseAN countres 
(sngapore, Phlppnes, indonesa, malaysa, Thaland and Vetnam) have also 
ncreased—from 4.1 per cent n 1992 to 12 per cent n 2005. 
korea, Japan and the sx AseAN countres have become mportant sources 
of chna’s mports of parts and components, accountng for more than 50 per 
cent of chna’s total mports of these products (Table 5.3). As those of Japan 
and hong kong are decreasng, the shares of korea and AseAN countres have 
been ncreasng. Ths mples that there have been some substtuton effects 
between Japan, hong kong and other Asan countres n provdng parts and 
components to chna. despte ths substtuton effect, chna’s contnung strong 
demand for parts and components from the regon wll be conducve to the 
economc growth of regonal economes.  
About 55 per cent of chna’s exports of parts and components have been 
to Northeast and southeast Asa, wth chna’s major exportng markets beng 
hong kong, Japan, korea, sngapore, malaysa and Thaland. Ths trend s 
lkely to be strengthened further. At the same tme, chna’s export shares to 
North Amerca and europe have been steadly ncreasng over tme. overall, 
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chna’s relatvely hgh export and mport shares of parts and components to 
east Asa supports the vew that chna has engaged more deeply wth east 
Asan economes n forgng ths new type of nternatonal specalsaton n 
producton. chna’s export shares of parts and components to Australa have 
been generally hgher than ts mport shares, but both shares have been 
relatvely low compared wth east Asan economes.
Determinants of China’s component trade 
in explanng the phenomenon of component trade or nternatonal 
fragmentaton of producton, Jones (2007) postulates the followng theores. 
The first s a rcardan one, whch says that workers have dfferent sklls across 
Table 5.3  Share of exports of parts and components from China, by 
region, 1992–2005 (per cent)
regon/country 1992  1993  1996 1997 2000 2001 2004 2005
World 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
NAFTA members 7.2 17.2 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.6 17.2 17.2
 Unted states 6.8 16.1 15.2 15.0 14.4 14.9 15.5 15.4
 canada 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7
 mexco 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
european Unon (4) 2.2 9.1 5.8 6.2 7.4 6.6 7.1 7.1
 Germany 1.0 4.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.6 3.2 3.7
 France 0.3 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9
 Unted kngdom 0.7 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9
 italy 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Northeast Asa 77.1 56.7 63.6 62.5 59.5 59.6 57.4 55.7
 hong kong 62.3 30.1 26.7 26.4 26.6 27.0 28.0 28.4
 Japan 9.1 17.4 20.5 19.6 15.4 15.0 11.7 10.5
 korea 1.2 2.4 5.5 4.9 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.9
AseAN (5) 4.1 6.4 10.7 11.2 12.4 12.7 12.3 11.8
 indonesa  0.6 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9
 malaysa  0.8 1.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 3.4 3.3 3.2
 Phlppnes  0.3 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.2
 sngapore 1.9 2.6 5.1 4.9 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.8
 Thaland 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4
Australa 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
other 14.2  20.9  19.3  19.4  25.3  25.8  32.1 33.7
Source: Authors’ calculatons based on Unted Natons conference on Trade and development 
(UNcTAd), 2006. Trade and Development Report, Unted Natons, New York and Geneva.
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dfferent areas of a country, and when the sklls requred n each producton 
block (fragments) dffer, then a dsperson of actvty accordng to comparatve 
advantage could lower margnal producton costs. The second theory s a 
heckscher-ohln type of dfference, namely the producton blocks dffer from 
each other n the proportons of dfferent factors that are requred. Ths suggests 
that labour-ntensve producton blocks would better be located n regons n 
whch labour s relatvely nexpensve compared wth productvty. 
The thrd theory s that fragmentaton ntroduces new costs, namely the 
costs of connectng the two or more producton blocks by servce lnks such 
as transportaton and communcaton. Therefore, ‘the movement towards 
deregulaton, especally of servces, and the technologcal changes that have 
drastcally reduced the costs of communcaton as well as makng transportaton 
less expensve have all encouraged a fragmentaton of prevously vertcally 
ntegrated producton processes’ (Jones and marjt 2001:365). Furthermore, t 
s argued that the optmal degree of fragmentaton depends on the sze of the 
market, so economc growth n general encourages fragmentaton and trade 
n parts and components (Jone, kerzkowsk and chen 2005). We examne n 
ths secton the man determnants of chna’s trade n parts and components 
based on these theores.
The theory of comparatve advantage has been consstent wth chna’s 
tradng pattern: chna produces and exports a large range of manly labour-
ntensve goods, such as textles and clothng, shoes, toys, travel goods and 
furnture.
The queston s whether the theory of comparatve advantage can be 
appled also n analysng ntra-product trade based on vertcal specalsaton 
of producton such as component trade. chna tends to focus on producng 
parts and components relatng to labour-ntensve products due to ts abundant 
supply of labour. For example, the producton of personal computers requres 
a lot of components, ncludng central processng unts, manboards, sound 
cards, dsplay cards, screens and so on. Although chna has no comparatve 
advantage n producng some of the key components, t can assemble and 
export a large quantty of personal computers snce t has low-cost producton 
for the assembly of those components. 
one way to examne the relatonshp between comparatve advantage and 
the producton and trade of parts and components s to compare labour-cost 
dfferences across dfferent countres. Wages are a good ndex as they reflect 
the supply and demand of the labour market as well as the qualty of labour. 
When a country’s wage levels are relatvely low, t could ndcate that the country 
has comparatve advantage n producng labour-ntensve products, ncludng 
parts and components.
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in the perod 1992–2004, labour costs n chna were far lower than those 
n most ndustralsed countres, ncludng  the Unted states, Japan, canada, 
Germany and the Unted kngdom (Table 5.4). They were also relatvely lower 
than many developng economes n Asa such as korea, hong kong, sngapore, 
malaysa and Thaland.
Wth respect to the mpact of economy of scale on component trade, t 
s usually the case that rapd economc growth requres a large market to 
accommodate the products beng produced. The process of trade lberalsaton 
n the past few decades—enhanced through multlateral, blateral or unlateral 
means—provdes chna wth an external envronment n whch rsng trade 
from chna has been accommodated rather smoothly. The enlarged markets 
for products made n chna have created an enormous economy of scale n 
producton. it s known that the degree of specalsaton of producton tends to 
be ntensfied when there are economes of scale n producton. As economy 
of scale s enlarged, the producton and trade of parts and components wthn 
and across dfferent countres tend to be enhanced. 
on the other hand, chna has a large domestc market, mplyng that there 
s a relatve thckness n the market n those compettve sectors (meanng 
that there are relatvely more supplers of ntermedate goods for a gven 
sector). Ths s especally true n those sectors such as textles and clothng, 
shoes, computers and automobles. As Grossman and helpman (2003) note, 
ths characterstc reduces the search costs for multnatonal companes 
nvestng n overseas markets. At the same tme, contnung domestc reforms 
n chna provded an mproved legal and regulatory envronment n whch 
foregn nvestments have flourshed, deepenng the process of nternatonal 
specalsaton n producton. 
chna’s transportaton and telecommuncatons ndustres have experenced 
rapd growth snce the 1990s, provdng the necessary nfrastructure for chna’s 
partcpaton n nternatonal specalsaton. Fgures 5.3 and 5.4 show the recent 
development of chna’s transportaton ndustry. The number of cvl avaton 
arlne routes ncreased from 287 n 1986 to 1,257 n 2005—ncreasng by 3.4 
tmes—and nternatonal arlne routes also ncreased, from 108,000 klometres 
to 856,000 klometres. The capacty of seaports also ncreased—from 300 mllon 
tonnes n 1985 to 2.9 bllon tonnes n 2005.
chna’s telecommuncatons ndustry has developed rapdly. The number of 
fixed lnes per 1,000 people ncreased from less than 10, on average, n 1992 to 
241 n 2004 (Fgure 5.5). Along wth the development of the telecommuncatons 
ndustry, call fees are declnng. For example, n 1997, the average cost of callng 
the Unted states was Us$6.70, but ths reduced to Us$2.90 n 2004. meanwhle, 
the number of moble phones n chna has reached 480 mllon by march 
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Component trade and China’s global economic integration
2007—makng t the largest moble-phone market n the world—and the number 
of people accessng the nternet reached 144 mllon by march 2007, makng 
chna the second largest nternet-usng country after the Unted states.3 
These facts suggest that the rapd development of chna’s transportaton and 
telecommuncaton ndustres could be another factor nfluencng the pace and 
depth of chna’s partcpaton n nternatonal fragmentaton of producton. Ths 
s manly because the developments n these servce lnks tend to reduce the 
costs of transactons wth consderable benefits from the economes of scale 
assocated wth such developments.
Fdi has been consdered an mportant determnant of trade n parts and 
components n the lterature because multnatonal corporatons are an 
mportant channel for conductng trade n ntermedate goods through ntra-
firm trade. multnatonal firms can choose to nvest n host countres and make 
use of the local comparatve advantage to produce ther ntermedate goods. 
For example, kamnsk and smarzynska (2001) studed the mpact of Fdi on 
Poland’s nternatonalsaton process and found that the large Fdi nflow helped 
Poland access nternatonal specalsaton and ncreased the country’s trade. 
cheng et al. (2001) studed the relatonshp between Fdi and nternatonal 
specalsaton by usng a partal equlbrum model to examne trade between 
hong kong and Guangdong Provnce, ncorporatng Fdi. They found that Fdi 
was an mportant factor for producton specalsaton and trade n parts and 
components n chna. 
chna has absorbed a large amount of Fdi snce the 1990s and has now 
become the leadng country n the world for the recept of Fdi nflows (Fgure 
5.6). The rapd ncrease of Fdi nflows nto chna promotes the development of 
processng trades (spencer 2005). The share of the Fdi-related manufacturng 
sector n the total manufacturng sector has been ncreasng rapdly, and the 
share of total processng trade ncreased from 35 per cent n 1988 to 57 per 
cent n 2003, surpassng the share of ordnary trade.
Based on the theores surveyed and the background nformaton, we adopted 
an adjusted gravty model to examne the determnants of trade n parts and 
components between chna and ts tradng partners. The basc formula s 
ntroduced by egger and egger (2005) as follows
 
. . 0 1 . . 2 . .
3 . . 4 . . . .
j China t j China t j China t
j China t j china t j China t
  LnPC C LnAGDP LnDIST
LnRWAGE LnFDI LnTeleline
α         α




where PC represents ether the exportaton or mportaton of parts and 
components between chna and ts tradng partners, AGDP s the average real 
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Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs (NBs), 2006. China Statistical Yearbook, chna statstcal 
Press, Bejng.
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Source: World Bank, 2006. World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washngton, dc.









































Source: chna economc informaton Network, 2007. Avalable from http://www.ce.gov.cn
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GdP of chna and ts tradng partners, DIST s the economc dstance between 
chna and ts tradng partners, RWAGE s the relatve labour cost of chna and 
ts tradng partners, FDI s the foregn drect nvestment, and Teleline s the 
average number of fixed telephones n chna and ts tradng partners. 
Accordng to Jones and kerzkowsk (2005), these factors can affect the 
trade n parts and components as well as the final goods. Thus, equaton 1 
can be revsed as follows
 
. . 0 1 . . 2 . .
3 . . 4 . . . .
j China t j China t j China t
j China t j china t j China t
LnSPC C LnAGDP LnDIST
LnRWAGE LnFDI LnTeleline
α         α
α             α
= + +
+ + +LLLLLL  
(2)
where SPC s the share of exports of parts and components n the total trade 
n manufactured products. A fixed effect s ntroduced n both equatons whle 
conductng the panel data regressons. 
The varables used n the regressons are defined as follows: to capture the 









For the dstance varable, we use the weghted-average economc dstance 















To reflect the mpact of comparatve advantage, we use the relatve wage 




Chinaj hour per labour unit of cost Average




in order to examne the mpact of Fdi on trade n parts and components, 
we smply use the share of Fdi over that of GdP. To capture the mpact of 
telecommuncatons, we use the number of telephone lnes per 1,000 people 
to represent the ndex for telephone lnes.
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The data on trade n parts and components between chna and ts tradng 
partners are taken from UNcTAd (2006), coverng 219 products. The tme perod 
runs from 1992 to 2004 and the sample comprses 20 countres, as ntroduced 
n the last secton. GdP for each country s taken from the Penn World Table 
6.2. The ndexes we have chosen are ‘cGdP’ and ‘PoP’ and ther products are 
used as the GdP varable. The data of Fdi are taken from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks for 1993–2005 (NBs varous ssues). The data for economc dstance 
are taken from haveman (2004). The data of telephone lnes per 1,000 people 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006). The data of 
average labour unt costs per hour are taken from EIU Country Data (economst 
intellgence Unt 2007).
The emprcal results are reported n Tables 5.5 and 5.6, showng the 
determnants of chna’s mports and exports of parts and components 
respectvely. in each table, there are two groups of results: one contans no 
varable of LNTELELINE and the other contans ths varable . Both results show 
good fitness of our model specficaton, snce the r-squares for the two model 
estmatons are 0.7 and 0.8 respectvely. 
The results show that the coefficents of LNAGDP n all regressons are 
postve and statstcally sgnficant at the 1 per cent level, mplyng that chna’s 
sze and economes of scale and ts tradng partners has a postve mpact on 
chna’s mports of parts and components. That s, the larger the economes 
of  scale, the greater trade n parts and components wll be. Furthermore, 
comparng ths result wth that from the regresson usng equaton 2, we found 
that the mpact of economes of scale on trade n parts and components was 
larger than that of final goods. Ths s consstent wth findngs obtaned n 
Jones and kerzkowsk (2005). 
The coefficents of LNDIST—as the measurement of the mpact of transport 
and other costs on blateral trade flows—are negatve and statstcally 
sgnfcant, as expected. despte the fact that the rapd development of 
telecommuncatons technques leads to the ‘death of dstance’ (carncross 
1997), the estmated coefficent of economc dstance s stll negatve and 
statstcally sgnficant. Ths mples that trade n parts and components n chna 
relatve to ts tradng partners s stll senstve to the changes n transportaton 
costs and the physcal dstance between them. 
As expected, Fdi has a postve mpact on chna’s mports and exports of 
parts and components and t s statstcally sgnficant at the 1 per cent level. 
The regresson results show that the mpact of Fdi on exports of parts and 
components s smlar to that of mports and the magntudes of the estmated 
coefficent are wthn the range of 0.2–0.3. Ths findng mples that a 1 per cent 
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ncrease n Fdi could lead to a 0.2–0.3 per cent ncrease n chna’s exports of 
parts and components. The purpose of Fdi s twofold: one s to sell products to 
chna’s domestc market and the other s to make use of chna’s comparatve 
advantage of low-cost labour. Both motves could lead to ncreased trade n 
parts and components. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 also show the results when LNTELELINE s ncorporated as 
the measurement to capture the mpact of telecommuncatons on component 
trade. As s expected, the telecommuncatons servce and ts coverage have 
a sgnficant postve mpact on nternatonal specalsaton through trade n 
parts and components.
The results of LNRWAGE show sgnfcant dfferences between the 
regressons of mports of parts and components, whch s consstent wth 
what the theory of comparatve advantage would predct. For chna’s mports 
of parts and components, The coefficents of foregn countres’ labour costs 
are postve and statstcally sgnficant at the 5 per cent level (Table 5.5). 
The results mply that the relatvely low cost of labour n chna s one of the 
most mportant determnants of the rapd development of trade n parts 
and components between chna and ts tradng partners—snce chna’s 
comparatve advantage n labour costs attracts greater mports of parts and 
components for assembly. 
The estmated results show, however, that there s no sgnficant dfference 
for the varable of LNRWAGE (Table 5.6) n determnng chna’s exports of 
parts and components. The nsenstvty of wage dfferentals n determnng 
chna’s exports of parts and components remans a puzzle, whch requres 
further study. 
snce all the factors ncluded n the regressons would have smlar effects on 
trade n final products, we can also run the regresson wth the share of trade n 
parts and components n total manufacturng trade as the dependent varable 
n both equatons. The estmaton results are reported n Table 5.7. comparson 
wth the prevous results shows that economes of scale have a sgnficantly 
postve mpact on trade n parts and components, whle transportaton costs 
have a sgnficantly negatve mpact. The findngs are consstent wth those 
reported n Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Furthermore, the mpact of Fdi on exports n 
parts and components s not statstcally sgnficant compared wth the results 
n Table 5.6. 
The mpact of labour costs s sgnficantly negatve n the export shares n 
total manufacturng exports, whch s n contrast wth the findng of postve 
correlaton n chna’s mports of parts and component (Table 5.5). Ths 
suggests that the theory of comparatve labour cost apples more to chna’s 
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Table 5.5  Estimation results of Equation 1: imports 
 LNIMPORT
Varable (1) (2) 
C –83.84*** –57.32*** –85.10*** –43.69***
 (–14.27) (–12.51) (–15.45) (–5.72)
LNAGDP 4.83*** 3.53*** 4.70*** 2.76***
 (16.42) (15.51) (16.31) (6.59)
LNDIST –0.96*** –0.74*** –0.90*** –0.58***
 (–11.75) (–11.12) (–10.69) (–5.84)
LNFDI 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.28***
 (3.85) 6.60 (3.43) (7.16)
LNRWAGE 0.71*** 0.64*** 0.31** 0.32**
 (5.39) 4.98 (2.36) (2.17)
LNTELELINE   0.99*** 0.55*
   (3.88) (2.40)
Fxed effect Yes No Yes No
Adjusted r2 0.74 0.73 0.76  0.74
se 1.14 1.13 1.10 1.12
F-statstc 36.73 147.32  38.15  122.31
Number of observatons 221 221 221 221
Note: *** 1 per cent sgnficant level, ** 5 per cent sgnficant level, * 10 per cent sgnficant 
level. T-statstcs are n parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
Table 5.6  Estimation results of Equation 1: exports
 LNEXPORT
Varable (1) (2) 
C –70.70*** –47.49*** –71.42*** –41.76***
 (–9.79) (–15.42) (–8.54) (–7.45)
LNAGDP 4.19*** 3.05*** 4.12*** 2.73***
 (11.37) (18.54) (9.63) (8.71)
LNDIST –0.68*** –0.48*** –0.65*** –0.41***
 (–8.08) (–9.65) (–6.90) (–5.29)
LNFDI 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.31***
 (4.32) (7.19) (3.72) (6.66)
LNRWAGE 0.13 0.05 –0.16* –0.09
 (1.63) (0.89) (–1.71) (–0.78)
LNTELELINE   0.56*** 0.23*
   (7.56) (1.72)
Fxed effect Yes No Yes No
Adjusted r2 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.85
se 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.65
F-statstc 81.32 311.78  83.35  253.01
Number of observatons 221 221 221 221
Notes: *** 1 per cent sgnficant level, ** 5 per cent sgnficant level, * 10 per cent sgnficant 
level. T-statstcs are n parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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mports of parts and components than to ts exports of them. snce chna’s 
mports of parts and components concentrate more on captal and technology 
ntensve goods such as machnery and transportaton (Table 5.1), the findng 
of postve correlaton of labour cost dfferentals may suggest that foregn 
firms nvestng n chna are more senstve to labour cost dfferences between 
chna and elsewhere n those more sophstcated parts and components. it s 
understandable as labour costs n producng these knds of ntermedate goods 
n developed countres are much hgher than that n chna (Table 5.4), whereas 
the labour cost dfferentals between ndustralsed and developng economes 
n producng less sophstcated ntermedate goods tend to be narrower. 
snce chna’s exports of parts and components concentrate more on those 
less sophstcated labour ntensve products, both foregn firms and domestc 
firms producng such ntermedates goods tend to become less senstve to 
labour cost dfferentals. Under ths crcumstance, market sze, economes 
Table 5.7  Estimation results of Equation 2: export shares in total 
manufacturing exports
 LNSEXPORT
Varable (1) (2) 
C –19.37*** –19.00*** –19.46*** –17.14***
 (–5.97) (–10.30) (–6.16) (–9.88)
LNAGDP 1.09*** 1.07*** 1.09*** 0.97***
 (6.87) (11.93) (7.06) (11.33)
LNDIST –0.34*** –0.33*** –0.34*** –0.31***
 (–12.25) (–16.43) (–12.94) (–16.76)
LNFDI –0.02 –0.01 –0.02 0.00
 (–1.04) (–0.54) (–1.15) (–0.33)
LNRWAGE –0.12*** –0.14*** –0.15*** –0.18***
 (–4.46) (–5.11) (–6.24) (–5.85)
LNTELELINE   0.07* 0.08**
   (1.77) (2.54)
Fxed effect Yes No Yes No
Adjusted r2 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.67
s.e. 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40
F-statstc 29.44 110.79 27.69 88.81
Number of observatons 221 221 221 221
Note: *** 1 per cent sgnficant level, ** 5 per cent sgnficant level,* 10 per cent sgnficant 
level, T-statstc n parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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of scale and servce lnks rather than Fdi and labour cost dfferentals wll 
play more mportant roles n determnng the pattern of exports of parts and 
components. Fnally, consstent wth the findngs reported n Tables 5.5 and 5.6, 
the development n telecommuncatons s also correlated postvely wth the 
shares of exports of parts and components n total manufacturng exports.
Conclusion
The emprcal results reveal the followng ponts. Frst, chna’s rapd economc 
growth, ncreasng market sze and economes of scale are mportant factors n 
explanng the rapd ncrease of blateral trade n parts and components wth 
ts tradng partners. second, the spatal dstance and transportaton costs 
have sgnficant negatve mpacts on chna’s trade of parts and components. 
Ths suggests that the reducton n transportaton costs by technologcal 
nnovaton and nvestment could enhance trade n parts and components, 
and thereby deepen the process of nternatonal specalsaton nvolvng chna 
and ts man tradng partners. Thrd, Fdi has a postve mpact on chna’s 
partcpaton n nternatonal fragmentaton of producton, takng advantage of 
chna’s comparatve advantage n low labour costs n assembly of ntermedate 
goods and producng final goods for domestc sales and exports. Fnally, the 
development of the telecommuncatons and related servces sector helps 
ntensfy the degree of nternatonal specalsaton by reducng transacton 
costs, whch wll encourage more domestc and foregn firms to be nvolved 
n nternatonal fragmentaton of producton. 
Along wth the trend of globalsaton, chna has become an mportant 
player n the nternatonal producton chan through ts ncreasng share of 
trade n parts and components wth ts man tradng partners. chna has now 
been ncorporated nto the regonal producton network consstng of korea, 
Japan, hong kong, Tawan and sx AseAN countres and s engaged n tradng 
relatonshps wth North Amercan and european economes for parts and 
components. chna has acheved tremendous dynamc gans from engagng 
n trade n parts and components especally wth respect to ts ndustral 
upgradng through technologcal learnng assocated wth processng trade 
(Amghn 2004). For the east Asan economes, the accesson of chna nto such 
a regonal producton network has not only encouraged the further development 
of regonal trade lberalsaton ncludng servce trade lberalsaon, t has also 
provded an enlarged market for all the regonal economes. As a result, all 
partes nvolved wll gan from partcpatng n ths dynamc process. Gven 
the prospects of the rapd growth of the chnese economy, ts current and 
planned massve nvestments n research and development and n nfrastructure 
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ncludng transportaton and telecommuncatons, ts contnual polces n 
attractng Fdi and ts rapd move towards lberalsng ts servces sectors, 
the scope for chna and ts tradng partners to benefit from the process of 
nternatonal fragmentaton of producton s tremendous.
Notes
1 siTc Verson 3 was adopted n 1992 so the data seres used n ths chapter began n that 
year. 
2 in selectng partnerng countres, consderaton ncludes country representaton and 
avalablty of data.
3 see ‘internet n the People’s republc of chna’ on Wkpeda (avalable onlne at http://www.
wkpeda.com).
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Service sector reform options
The experence of chna
Christopher Findlay, Mari Pangestu and Roy Chun Lee
The gans from reform and lberalsaton of servces have attracted a growng 
lterature. messerln and Zedllo (2004), for example, note the effect of servce 
sector reform on competton, market scale, dversty, lower prces and 
hgher qualty, as well as the capacty to remove bottlenecks to growth n the 
nfrastructure sector. They remark on the contrbuton of servces to export 
performance, and they stress the nterests of developng economes n market 
access for servces exports.
Polcy reform n servces that delvers these benefits has a wder scope than 
reform programs n the goods sectors. There are servces polcy measures 
that apply only to foregners: for example, rules on the form n whch they can 
enter local markets. servces markets are also regulated by measures such as 
lcensng, whch affect all supplers, wherever they come from. As Whalley (2004) 
observes n hs revew of emprcal work on the effects of servces lberalsaton 
n developng economes, ‘one s talkng of domestc regulaton, entry barrers, 
portablty of provders, competton polcy regmes more so than barrers at 
natonal borders, as wth tarffs’ (Whalley 2004:1,250). The connectons between 
regulatory reform and servces trade lberalsaton are examned n detal n 
mattoo and sauve (2003).
The scope of the servces agenda also dffers from that of goods because 
of the substtutablty between the modes of supply: that s, delvery of the 
servce through establshment n the customer country, through the movement 
of people (ether consumers or provders) or through the cross-border modes 
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of supply—optons for whch are expandng through technologcal change. 
cross-border supply s the mode most smlar to trade n goods.
The archtects of the GATs recognsed the value of consderng all the 
modes of supply and all the mpedments that appled to those modes. They 
sought commtments n the GATs to open up sectors and modes of supply 
and to elmnate measures that lmt entry by all supplers and those whch 
dscrmnate aganst foregn supplers. 
studes of servces reform have examned these varous dmensons. 
some concentrate on the removal of dscrmnatory polcy n a lmted range 
of modes of supply, such as that across borders (Francos and spnanger 
2001). others stress the value of coverage of other modes of supply (Whalley 
2004; Walmsley and Wnters 2003). some examne the dfferent mpacts of the 
removal of dscrmnatory polcy (that s, mplementaton of the prncple of 
natonal treatment) compared wth reform of polcy affectng entry to markets 
by all servces supplers (n GATs language, matters of market access) (dee 
and hanslow 2000a, 2000b). 
servces sector polcymakers are confronted by questons of whch sectors 
are the prortes for reform, whch modes of supply should be ncluded and to 
what extent should commtments refer to natonal treatment and market access 
questons? more specfically, they must decde whether domestc markets 
should be deregulated before foregn supplers are allowed to enter, whether 
these reforms should be carred out smultaneously or whether foregn firms 
should be able to enter whle mpedments reman to domestc entry. 
The first step n ths chapter s to characterse optons for servces sector 
polcy change n broad terms, and to dscuss what factors determne the drecton 
of change. some of the ponts derved from the framework are llustrated by 
reference to chna’s experence n servces, whch offers many lessons. chna 
made substantal commtments to reform ts servces sector, as part of ts WTo 
accesson. mattoo (2004) revews the sgnficance of these reforms and notes 
how extensve they are compared wth the experence of even ndustralsed 
economy commtments n the WTo (see also WTo 2006:Table AiV.2, for a 
summary of chna’s accesson commtments). The commtments made are 
now beng mplemented. The constructon of the orgnal commtments and the 
pattern of ther mplementaton are a source of nsght for other polcymakers 
contendng wth a smlar task.
optons for servces sector reform are presented n the next secton. one s to 
free up entry to domestc supplers. Another s to open markets to all supplers. 
These are referred to below as ‘domestc deregulaton’ and ‘lberalsaton’ 
respectvely. There are other outcomes, called ‘foregn rent seekng’ and 
97
Service sector reform options
‘back-sldng’. some comment s offered on the welfare mplcatons of each 
of these. 
chna’s experence of servces sector reform s then reconsdered. some 
comments are offered on the relatve mportance of varous aspects of the 
polcy and poltcal economy frameworks. That dscusson ncludes reference to 
reform n the financal servces, transport, dstrbuton and telecommuncatons 
sectors. The chapter concludes wth some key ponts and a suggeston for 
further emprcal work that s relevant to these questons.
Options for reform
many mpedments to entry nto servces markets apply to domestc and foregn 
producers, and n some cases foregn producers face extra requrements. An 
ndex of polcy restrctveness has been developed to assess the mportance 
of both types of restrctons, followng the work of Warren (2000), Fndlay et al. 
(2002) and mcGure and Fndlay (2005). The ndex s a frequency measure that 
estmates the restrctveness of an economy’s tradng regme based on the 
trade barrer framework developed for the GATs. 
Under the GATs framework, trade mpedments are classfied nto two 
prmary categores.
1	 market access. The GATs dentfied four modes of supply for trade 
n servces: that s, cross-border, consumpton abroad, commercal 
presence and presence of natural person. market access represents 
the restrctons on market entry by ether of the four supply modes on 
natonal and foregn new entrants (Warren 2000).
2	 Natonal treatment. Natonal treatment oblgatons requre GATs 
members to dentfy all measures that dscrmnate aganst foregn 
servces supplers n terms of advantages gven to domestc supplers 
or extra regulatory requrements mposed on foregn supplers.  
Followng the GATs framework, the first step s to classfy trade restrctons 
nto two prmary categores.
• establshment. The ablty of servces supplers to establsh a physcal 
outlet n a terrtory and supply servces through those outlets, whch 
ncludes market entry va foregn nvestment. Ths runs parallel wth the 
mode of commercal presence n the GATs.
• contnung. The operatons of a servces suppler after t has entered 
the market, ncludng an nterconnecton regme, or ts equvalent, and 
cross-border supples. regulatory measures that foster and enhance 
competton would also be captured under ths category. 
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The second step s to reclassfy trade restrctons nto dscrmnatory and 
non-dscrmnatory categores to capture the degree of complance wth natonal 
treatment oblgatons. 
• Non-dscrmnatory. restrcton appled to domestc and foregn servces 
supplers equally.
• dscrmnatory. restrctng only foregn or only domestc servces 
supplers.
Table 6.1 provdes an example of how restrctons n telecommuncatons are 
classfied under the ndex.
The ndex value s then calculated for each economy usng a methodology 
of scores and weghts. scores are assgned for each lberalsaton ndex on the 
bass of a judgment about ts strngency. The more strngent the restrcton, 
the hgher s the score. For example, a country that restrcts the number of 
fixed-lne lcences s assgned a hgher score than an economy that ssues 
several new lcences.
The restrcton categores are then weghted together accordng to a judgment 
about ther relatve economc cost. For example, n telecommuncatons, 
restrctons on the ssuance of lcences are weghted more heavly than 
restrctons on leased-lne operatons. The weghts are chosen so that the total 
restrctveness ndex score ranges from zero to one.
An ndex score s calculated separately for domestc and foregn servces 
supplers (Fgure 6.1). A foregn ndex (F) s calculated to measure all the 
restrctons that hnder foregn firms from enterng and operatng n an economy. 
it covers dscrmnatory and non-dscrmnatory restrctons. A domestc ndex 
(d) represents restrctons that are appled to domestc firms and t generally 
Table 6.1 Examples of restriction categories of trade in 
telecommunications services
 establshment contnung operatons
Non-dscrmnatory The number of fixed-lne local Voce resale s prohbted
 servce lcences s restrcted 
dscrmnatory Foregn nvestment n fixed-lne  Voce resale s permtted  
 local servce s restrcted  only to domestc operators 
Source: mcGure, G. and Fndlay, c., 2005. ‘restrctons on trade n servces: trade 
lberalsaton strateges for APec member economes’, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 
19(1):18–41.
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covers only non-dscrmnatory restrctons. The dfference between the foregn 
and domestc ndex scores s a measure of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Ths 
classficaton of the restrctons suggests a number of paths for reform, whch can 
be specfied. For example, F and d could be reduced at the same rate, or by the 
same amounts n absolute terms, or one could be reduced faster than the other.
These optons are llustrated n Fgure 6.2. The horzontal axs represents 
the sze of the domestc ndex (d). The vertcal axs shows the sze of the gap 
between F and d—that s, the extent of dscrmnaton. The maxmum value of 
the d axs s shown as one.1 At pont o, the value of d s zero, and the maxmum 
value of (F-d) s one. There s an addtonal constrant snce the value of F s also, 
at most, equal to one. Gven any value of d, the value of (F-d) must therefore 
le on or below the lne XY: for any value of d, a pont along XY mples an ndex 
value for F of one. 
Fgure 6.1  An illustration of the results from the trade restrictiveness 
index
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Trade restrictiveness index 
The restrictiveness index measures the number and severity of restrictions on 
trade in services for foreign and domestic services suppliers. The foreign and 
domestic indices include restrictions on establishment and ongoing operations. 
Index scores generally range from 0 to 1. The higher the score the more 
restrictive an economy. 
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Source: mcGure, G., 2003. ‘methodologes for measurng restrctons on trade n servces’, 
n organsaton for economc co-operaton and development (ed.), Quantifying the Benefits 
of Liberalising Trade in Services, organsaton for economc co-operaton and development, 
Pars.
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suppose the current polcy leads to a stuaton n whch the ndex values 
of F-d and d le at pont A. in that case, there are four man optons for polcy 
change (notng that movement nto the area XYZ s not possble). 
one opton (or lberalsaton) s reform n whch d and the margn of 
dscrmnaton are reduced and pont A moves nto the space ocAB. if the rato 
of (F-d) to d s mantaned, the reducton would take place along the lne oA, 
whle above that lne the proportonate reducton n d exceeds that n (F-d).
Another opton s domestc deregulaton, n whch d s reduced but F-d 
ncreases. in ths case, A moves nto the area AcXe. The value of F does not 
necessarly ncrease but wll do so f pont A moves nto the space AhXe.
 Another opton s that pont A moves nto the space BAJY, n whch the 
extent of dscrmnaton falls but the restrctons on domestc entry rse (when d 
moves to the rght of BA). Ths case could be called foregn rent seekng, snce 
foregn supplers emerge wth a relatvely less restrcted poston compared 
wth domestc supplers. The effect of the polcy change could, however, also 
be to ncrease the value of F (the total value of the ndex confrontng foregners), 
when the pont A moves nto the space AJYG.
Fgure 6.2  Options for policy reform
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one other less lkely opton s back-sldng, n whch A shfts nto the 
regon AeJ, n whch domestc restrctons and the margn of dscrmnaton 
ncrease—along the extremes of whch d s constant (along Ae) or the extent 
of dscrmnaton s constant (along AJ).
There are some other mportant specal cases. 
• Along the lne Ac, the extent of dscrmnaton remans constant whle 
restrctons on domestc entry fall. Ths could be called market access 
reform, n terms of the language of the GATs, snce restrctons to foregn 
and domestc entry are beng decreased by the same amount (although 
F-d—that s, the margn of dscrmnaton—s constant).
• Along the lne AB, the extent of restrctons on domestc entry remans 
constant but there s a reducton n the extent of dscrmnaton. in terms 
of the language of the GATs, ths could be referred to as reform n the 
drecton of natonal treatment, snce (F-d) s beng reduced, whle other 
unversally appled mpedments to entry stay the same.
The emprcal work on the benefits of servces reform tends to focus on the 
mpact of removal of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Francos and spnanger 
(2001), for example, examned the effects of chna’s WTo accesson. Ther 
model ncluded a number of servces sectors. chna’s servces polcy was 
charactersed by mplct tarff rates derved from gravty equatons n whch 
hong kong’s relatonshps were used as the benchmarks. The gap between real 
and expected mports, accordng to ths benchmark, was used wth an estmate 
of an mport demand elastcty, to estmate a prce effect of the polcy (akn to a 
tarff that would have the same effect of reducng mports relatve to ther free 
trade level). The data were therefore based on servces that were traded across 
borders (not ncludng those delvered through commercal presence). Further, 
the measures they assessed ncluded polcy that affected foregn relatve to 
domestc supply, that s, the (F-d) margn. The modellng results, therefore, n 
terms of Fgure 6.2, refer to a movement along the AB lne, but wth respect only 
to operatons, not to establshment. The results, therefore, capture only part of 
the reforms made by chna n the context of ts GATs commtments.2
emprcal work on the effects of servces reform can solate the contrbuton 
of reform n these dfferent drectons, though so far at the expense of a narrower 
sectoral coverage. For example, dee and hanslow (2000b) provde some 
modellng results that classfy polcy measures n the manner llustrated n 
Table 6.1. They find that removng restrctons on market access causes much 
larger gans than reductons n dscrmnaton—partly, ths s because of the 
sze of the reductons n restrctons on market access. 
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The experience in China
chna had already made substantal changes to polcy n many servces 
sectors before 2001 and ts accesson to the WTo led to further development 
of that polcy. our nterest here s whether these two steps were n the same or 
dfferent drectons, and how the negotatng process has affected the drecton 
of change. chna’s servces reform commtments are revewed also by mattoo 
(2004) and Whalley (2003).  
As observed n the cases to follow, chna had n many cases already 
embarked on a reform program before the WTo accesson negotatons 
had been resolved—but were those changes n the form of lberalsaton, as 
defined n Fgure 6.2, or were they a form of domestc deregulaton? To see 
ths, we examne the stuaton n bankng, nsurance, transport, dstrbuton 
and telecommuncatons.
Telecommuncatons
dramatc changes have occurred n the telecommuncatons market, but 
the man drvers appear to have been the consequences of technologcal 
change. 
Pangestu and mrongowus (2004) revew chna’s experence n the 
telecommuncatons sector. They report sgnficant prce reductons and 
ncreases n tele-densty snce 1998. These changes obvously occurred n 
advance of WTo accesson. Pangestu and mrongowus attrbute these changes 
to competton n telecommuncatons markets, but they stress that the 
government orchestrated ths competton and prce reducton. in addton, there 
were nstances of the nfluence of technologcal advancement that overcame 
government control, such as the use of the internet for telephone calls.
Whle chna’s rate of reform n telecommuncatons has been rapd, t 
remans an outler. Fndlay et al. (2002), n a sub-sample of Asa-Pacfic economc 
cooperaton (APec) countres, find that the extent of lberalsaton n chna 
exceeds that n all other countres revewed. But they also note that despte 
the rapd change, chna’s degree of openness remans less than the sample 
average. 
Accordng to the WTo accesson commtments (revewed by Pangestu 
and mrongowus 2004), foregn nvestment was allowed to enter but ntally 
at a lower ownershp level and wth geographcal restrctons. in a certan 
perod—two years for value-added servces, five years for moble telephony and 
sx years for domestc and nternatonal servces—the geographcal restrctons 
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were to be removed. Foregn ownershp caps were to be removed gradually 
accordng to a schedule runnng through the next few years: the removal of ths 
restrcton has been accelerated, although the 50 per cent celng stll apples. 
The chnese authortes reaffirmed n 2006 ther decson to ncrease the foregn 
partcpaton cap n jont ventures for basc servces (fixed-lned and moble) to 
49 per cent by 2007, n lne wth chna’s WTo commtments (WTo 2006).
even after accesson, foregn nvestment s not ntended to hold a majorty 
n the sector, although the treatment of foregn entry s more lberal n value-
added servces than for the other two sub-sectors. Geographcal restrctons 
also contnue to apply, ncludng to some extent to domestc firms. in may 2002, 
chna Telecom—the former monopoly n fixed-lne operatons—was splt nto 
two enttes along provncal lnes, wth chna Telecom servng 21 provnces n 
the south and the newly created chna Netcom servng 10 northern provnces. 
Both operators enjoy the rght to compete n each other’s terrtores. These 
two share about 95 per cent of the market (WTo 2006). Two mnor domestc 
supplers—chna Uncom and chna TeTong—have also entered the fixed-lne 
market wth a lmted presence.3 
The major operators n basc telecommuncatons n chna are state owned, 
and ths stuaton s unlkely to change even n the short term. The man ssue, 
however, s not the presence of government ownershp but whether the few 
and predomnantly state-owned players wll be operatng n a compettve 
envronment. Ths ncreases the mportance of chna meetng ts commtments 
to establsh an ndependent regulatory body. instead of havng a separate 
regulatory agency, the mnstry of electronc industres (mii) remans as the 
polcymakng body as well as the sectoral regulator. Whle accordng to chna’s 
own statement, the mii wll act as an mpartal and ndependent regulator 
(WTo 2006:232), the Unted states Trade representatve (UsTr 2004) makes 
clear ts concerns about the agency’s regulatory practces, ncludng the 
lcensng process. other ssues have been the reclassficaton (n Aprl 2003) 
of some servces from the value-added category to basc servces, n whch the 
latter are on a slower schedule of lberalsaton and wth hgher captalsaton 
requrements. chna stll has no central pece of telecommuncatons legslaton, 
although a draft Telecommuncatons law was crculated among mnstres 
n 2004.  
The progress of reform can be summarsed n Fgure 6.3. chna moves nto 
the area ocAB after WTo accesson n late 2001, and has been progressvely 
reducng ts restrctons on foregners. Ths s captured by the change n 
score between 2004 and 2007. Ths refinement s consstent wth chna’s WTo 
commtments. on the other hand, not much mprovement was observed after 
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1998 for the elmnaton of non-dscrmnatory restrctons on market access. 
Ths s demonstrated n the movement of scores along a straght lne between 
2004 and 2007, whch reflects the fact that whle dscrmnatory treatment 
aganst foregners s reducng, domestc reforms that would benefit domestc 
and foregn supplers have been relatvely slack. detals of the scorng methods 
are n Table A6.1. 
chna’s experence can be compared wth that of Tawan. Tawan’s 
experence s a movement nto ocAB, that s, lberalsaton—and ths s the 
more common case, whch s observed also n hong kong, Japan and korea, 
for example (Fgure 6.4). Whle dscrmnatory measures persst, Tawan’s 
lberalsaton pattern s hghlghted by the non-dscrmnatory and smultaneous 
lberalsaton approach. specfically, Fgure 6.4 shows that the ndex value for 
Tawan mgrates from pont A—whch s the orgnal value n the base year—nto 
the space ocAB. it also demonstrates that the level of dscrmnaton between 
domestc and foregn supplers remans when restrctons for domestc firms 
are removed completely by 2007.
Bankng
in bankng, foregn banks contnued untl recently to be restrcted n ther 
forms of entry and operatons compared wth ther locally owned compettors. 
interestngly, one of the most mportant remanng ssues s of equal sgnficance 
to local and foregn banks.
in early 2006, busness nterests n the Unted states (overmyer 2006) 
remaned concerned about geographcal restrctons on operatons, restrctons 
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on dong busness n local currency for local ctzens and lmts on foregn 
nvestment n chnese banks (25 per cent n total and 20 per cent for any one 
nvestor). These restrctons were consstent wth the stagng process lad out 
n the GATs commtments, but t was ponted out that domestc banks dd not 
face the geographcal and customer restrctons that were faced by wholly 
foregn-owned banks. many of these restrctons were, however, to be removed 
n 2006. other ssues are ‘exorbtant captal requrements and slow lcence-
approval processes’ that lmt the growth of branch networks (delays of up to 
one year are reported and bases are evdent n the allocaton of lcences for 
nteror ctes). 
on 11 december 2006, chna dd ndeed announce that foregn banks could 
offer renmnb servces to local consumers (chna 2006). regonal restrctons 
were also removed. Foregn-owned banks would be treated the same as 
domestc banks. Foregn banks could also ncorporate a local legal entty 
from ths tme, however, the caps on ownershp n domestc banks reman: the 
ssue then becomes the rate at whch foregn entrants can establsh a branch 
network.
more mportant n the near future s lkely to be the debate about foregn 
bank access to electronc payment systems, although ths s an ssue for local 
and foregn banks. The Us coalton of servces industres (Uscsi 2007) 
reports that foregn electronc payment cards cannot be ssued by any bank, 
local or foregn, unless they are branded wth chna UnonPay, the monopoly 
domestc electronc payments processor. There s debate about whether or not 
ths requrement s consstent wth the december 2006 GATs commtments.
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insurance
changes n nsurance polces n chna are compared wth those n other 
countres for the perod 1997–2004 n Fgure 6.5, whch shows the changes n 
(rather than the levels of) (F-d) and d. Ths figure was reported by dee and 
dnh (2007), who ponted out that, for many countres, the polcy change n ths 
perod was relatvely small. chna, however, s one of the outlers, along wth 
inda. chna’s reform was drven by ts WTo accesson, but inda’s was drven 
by unlateral acton. in chna’s case, sgnficant contrbutors to reform were the 
removal of economc needs tests and quanttatve restrctons on the ssuance 
of lcences for foregn firms, a wdenng of the scope of busness that foregn 
nsurers could undertake and a gradual reducton n the proporton of busness 
that had to be rensured wth a nomnated domestc rensurer. 
The Uscsi (2007) ponts out that a number of mpedments reman n the 
nsurance sector, ncludng a dfferental approach to approvng branches for 
foregn and domestc companes, delays n approval of applcatons to convert 
foregn-owned branches to subsdares, excessve captalsaton requrements 
for new branches or subsdares, a hgh qualfyng threshold for companes 
to nvest ther foregn exchange captal n overseas funds or equtes (apples 
also to domestc firms), a rule that says provders that have held lcences for 
more than eght years (whch rules out foregn companes enterng the market 
snce WTo accesson) can set up nsurance asset management companes, 
protecton for domestc rensurers and dfferental treatment of companes that 
nvested n chna before or after ts WTo accesson. 
Transport 
in many cases, the domestc markets for road transport, nland water transport, 
forwardng, storage and warehousng and courer servces had already been 
deregulated. WTo commtments then extended that polcy to foregn entry, 
though the polcy change was not usually appled mmedately (for detals 
see luo and Fndlay 2004). it was nstead accordng to a schedule and wth 
restrctons on the form of foregn entry. Wth the exceptons of ar transport 
(whch s dscussed n more detal below) and nternal water transport, the 
mpact of the commtments at the tme of accesson and n the medum term—
as commtments to hgher levels of foregn ownershp are phased n—wll be 
sgnficant. even the relatvely closed ral sector wll be open to foregn entry 
under chna’s WTo commtments. The strategy n logstcs, n other words, 
has been first a movement to domestc deregulaton followed by a reducton 
n the dscrmnaton aganst foregners.
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luo and Fndlay (2004) stress the effect of lberalsaton on process 
nnovaton. They note that the demand for ntegrated logstcs servces—that 
s, those provded by so-called thrd-party logstcs firms—s ncreasng. These 
firms try to provde and control the whole chan of servces. They need to have 
access to all the relevant lcences, whch could nclude nternatonal freght 
forwardng, dfferent modes of transportaton (ar, nternatonal shppng, 
domestc shppng, road, ral), storage and warehousng, contaner staton and 
depot servces, as well as courer servces. The openng up of the dfferent 
sectors n logstcs, luo and Fndlay argue, would have a sgnficant mpact on 
the ablty of thrd-party logstcs firms to provde the whole chan of servces. 
some foregn and domestc firms that orgnally had restrcted access to some 
lnks of the servces (for example, nternatonal freght forwardng) wll develop 
ntegrated servces after the restrctons are lfted. 
































Source: dee, P. and dnh, h., 2007. regulatory barrers to trade n nsurance servces, The 
Australan Natonal Unversty, canberra (unpublshed).
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The commtment to allow fully foregn-owned nternatonal freght forwardng 
operatons was mplemented n rules ssued n december 2005. Accordng to 
the Uscsi, a problem remans n the applcaton of the regulatons: t says that 
ts experence has been that wholly foregn-owned firms have been unable to 
obtan a lcence that allows then to book cargo space on arlnes wthn chna 
or operatng nternatonally.
The arlne sector provdes an example of domestc deregulaton: the polcy 
on foregn entry has remaned restrctve whle restrctons on entry to domestc 
routes have been relaxed (Zhang and chen 2003).
The first steps n reform of the ar transport sector n chna nvolved the 
separaton of commercal operatons from government. Ths process began 
n 1987, when sx key state-owned arlnes were separated from regonal 
admnstraton bureaux, whle the entry of new operators was encouraged. The 
man carrers tended, however, to have a regonal specalsaton.
The only source of captal for these arlnes ntally was government fundng, 
but ths constrant was relaxed n 1993 and the sector was opened to foregn 
nvestment wth some remanng restrctons on foregn control (stll at a 
maxmum of 49 per cent) (WTo 2006:236). Prces on major routes charged by 
these busnesses remaned under government control, untl that regulaton 
was relaxed n 1997. 
A process of reorgansaton of the sector under government leadershp 
began n 2001. The arlnes then under the regulatory control of the cvl Avaton 
Admnstraton of chna (cAAc)—a total of 10—were consoldated nto three 
groups. Polcy had shfted, n other words, from a poston encouragng entry 
to one of a process of managed consoldaton. An mportant drver was the 
financal losses earned n the ndustry. Non-cAAc arlnes were not affected 
by the plans for consoldaton and a number contnued to operate. 
Whle domestc polcy moved through a cycle from state monopoly to free 
entry to managed consoldaton, nternatonal polcy remaned conservatve. 
chnese polcymakers—n the blateral negotatons on market access that 
operate n nternatonal avaton—amed to balance market shares, sought 
commercal arrangements between carrers from both ends of a route, lmted 
the number of chnese and foregn arlnes desgnated to operate on a route 
and attempted to lmt entry by thrd-country carrers. 
in July 2004, the Unted states and chna sgned a new blateral agreement, 
however, t was not the form of ‘open-skes’ agreement promoted by the Unted 
states. The agreement added substantal capacty to the routes, opened up 
more ctes for servces and ncreased the number of operators. in a speech on 
2 december 2004, Us Under-secretary of Transportaton, Jeffrey shane, sad 
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that the agreement ‘was a huge step forward but dd not remove all constrants 
and left “a lot to be desred”’—manly because of the processes used to regulate 
access to the routes by carrers from each country.4
Zhang and chen (2003) attrbute ths conservatve stance on nternatonal 
polcy to a percepton of a lack of compettveness of chnese arlnes, ncludng 
lack of management experence n competng n nternatonal markets, an 
expected mbalance between foregn arrvals (lkely to prefer ther own home-
country carrers) and chnese tourst departures, and nadequate arport 
capacty (although ths constrant s beng relaxed).
dstrbuton
dstrbuton of trade servces s composed of four man sub-sectors: commsson 
agents’ servces, wholesalng, retalng and franchsng. Prncpal actvtes 
nclude resellng merchandse, accompaned by a varety of related subordnated 
servces, such as: nventory management; assembly, sortng and gradng of bulk 
lots; breakng bulk lots and redstrbutng nto smaller lots; delvery servces; 
refrgeraton, storage, warehousng and garage servces; sales promoton, 
marketng and advertsng, nstallaton and after-sales servces, ncludng 
mantenance and repar and tranng servces. chul et al. (2003) revew chna’s 
experence n reform n ths sector.
Before the reform that began n 1978, state-owned firms or government 
bureaucraces domnated the retal and wholesale dstrbuton system and 
nearly all prces were government controlled. By 2000, n the consumer goods 
sector, state-owned firms accounted for 18.2 per cent of sales, collectvely 
owned firms for 15.6 per cent and the balance was n the hands of prvate firms 
or foregn-owned firms from hong kong, macau or Tawan (the last group 
accountng for 1.7 per cent). 
Untl 1992, foregn nvestors were prohbted from operatng jont ventures 
or wholly owned enterprses n retalng or wholesalng. in that year, however, 
new regulatons permtted jont ventures (n whch the chnese partners were 
domnant and wth some lmtatons on operatons) n retalng n selected ctes. 
After that tme, local governments also took the ntatve to approve a number of 
jont ventures, but most were not mandated by the central government and were 
set up wthout permanent establshments—for example, through management 
contracts or leasng arrangements. A new regulaton n 1998 prohbted local 
governments from offerng approvals n ths sector. Further regulatory change 
n 1999 removed the geographcal restrctons on the locaton of jont ventures 
that the central government had prevously mposed. 
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Wholesalng was opened to foregn firms (operatng as mnorty foregn 
ownershp jont ventures) wthn a year of chna’s WTo accesson. longer tme 
lmts appled to books, pharmaceutcal products, pestcdes and films (all three 
years after accesson) and fertlsers and ol products (five years), although salt 
and tobacco remaned exceptons. majorty foregn-owned jont ventures were 
permtted after two years. All geographcal restrctons on wholesalng and all 
restrctons on ownershp were to be removed wthn three years—that s, by 11 
december 2004. in retalng, caps were retaned on the number of jont ventures 
n some larger ctes and specal economc zones. Geographcal restrctons 
were removed n the case of provncal captals. The same tme lmts appled n 
retalng to the groups of products to whch schedules appled n wholesalng. 
otherwse there was no constrant on the types of products that could be sold. 
All market access lmtatons were to be removed wthn three years (varous 
restrctons remaned for longer on operatons and ownershp of some types 
of chan stores and very large department stores).
chna fell behnd schedule n the mplementaton of these commtments 
(UsTr 2004). For example, n wholesalng, partcpaton was lmted to mnorty-
owned jont ventures beyond the december 2003 deadlne for a further relaxaton 
of that rule. Also a number of qualficaton requrements were mposed (for 
example, rules on sales volumes and asset values). The schedule was renstated 
by md 2004, when a commtment was made to also meet the next mlestone of 
11 december 2004. Ths commtment was emboded n new regulatons, whch 
contnued to requre approval from the mnstry of commerce before servces 
could be provded. The UsTr (2004) remaned concerned, however, that there 
was no gudance on how the process of approvng applcatons would operate 
(the UsTr report s dated 11 december 2004). The same experence occurred n 
retal servces. By 2006, Us busnesses were referrng to dstrbuton as a ‘success 
story’ (Unted states-chna Busness councl 2006). The mnstry of commerce 
devolved the rght to grant lcences to provncal authortes and ‘the problem 
largely dsappeared’ (p.2). in some parts of dstrbuton, however, devoluton does 
not necessarly solve the problem. As the Unted states-chna Busness councl 
also ponts out (p.10), muncpal authortes can reject applcatons for new retal 
outlets on the grounds that otherwse local commerce would be ‘dsrupted’. 
strctly, ths concern apples to domestc and foregn entrants.
WTo accesson shfted the drecton of reform to removng dscrmnaton 
aganst foregners. The assessment by chul et al. (2003) s that the deregulaton 
of the 1990s had larger mpacts on dstrbuton than those expected from WTo 
accesson, at least wthn the first couple of years. many large foregn retalers 
had already entered chna and ther geographcal spread was wdenng. Foregn 
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partcpaton n ths perod had the advantage of provdng new methods 
(ncludng those related to nformaton technology) and dfferent retal formats, 
whch were examples of process nnovaton smlar to those observed n 
logstcs. reform had also contrbuted to competton, whch was assocated 
wth a fall n sales margns.
Conclusions
chna’s experence to date n financal servces, transport, dstrbuton and 
telecommuncatons servces shows the mportance of dstngushng between 
key elements of the reform process. 
The first step n chna has usually been to deregulate the domestc market. 
in some cases, restrctons on foregn partcpaton have not changed and, f 
they dd, the extent of dscrmnaton aganst foregners ncreased. in other 
cases, foregn partcpaton has been permtted, but usually wth restrctons 
on the form of establshment and the nature of operatons.
The second stage—mplemented n most cases after WTo accesson—
has been to reduce the extent of dscrmnaton aganst foregners. Ths 
stage also nvolves a schedule of steps, not an mmedate movement to full 
lberalsaton.
servces reform tends to be partal, for good publc polcy reasons. it nvolves 
a seres of steps, and n that respect chna’s experence s not unque. But the 
problem s that dfferent sequences can be followed. in one of these—more 
lkely when a process of nternatonal negotatons drves reform—foregn entry 
receves prorty whle entry by domestc firms remans regulated. Ths approach 
rsks welfare losses from rent seekng by foregn provders, who form a new set 
of poltcal nterests affectng the next steps n the reform process.
in another sequence, evdent n chna’s approach, the prorty n the first 
stages s gven to domestc deregulaton nstead of foregn entry. Ths avods 
the rsk of foregn rent seekng, but there are trade-offs. A focus on domestc 
deregulaton delays the recept of the benefits of foregn partcpaton (and, n 
the short term, dscrmnaton aganst foregn supplers could even ncrease). 
There s also a rsk that reform could stall, as ths sequence creates a new set 
of domestc nterests who oppose further reform. 
The choce among these optons hnges on the ease of management of 
the varous nterests created as a consequence of the sequencng problem—
domestc and foregn. chna’s choce clearly has been to prortse domestc 
deregulaton before a wder openng. Ths process has been effectve n the 
sectors studed here, though wth substantal progress remanng to be acheved 
n some sectors, partcularly telecommuncatons and avaton.
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WTo commtments play a key role n ether approach. even as n chna’s 
case, wth a schedule of mplementaton, they help deal wth the rsk that 
partal reform could be captured and stalled. They set up a credble set of polcy 
commtments, whch tradng partners can montor and nfluence, as llustrated 
by the annual reportng of the UsTr. Further applcaton of WTo prncples 
avods a stuaton n whch putatve foregn entrants seek a share of the market 
and then argue to hold out further entry, as mght happen as a consequence. 
Ths argument s explaned n more detal by dee and Fndlay (2007).
our nterests n ths chapter are chna’s commtments under the GATs and 
ther mplementaton. chna has, however, become an actve partcpant n 
blateral negotatons and n some of these agreements servces are ncluded. 
Antkewcz and Whalley (2005) revew chna’s negotatons n preferental tradng 
arrangements. They pont out that, at least for the negotatons wth hong kong 
and macao n 2003, elgble supplers ‘gan mproved access to chnese markets 
and sooner than those from other countres’ (p.1544). in ths case, the contnung 
mplementaton of chna’s WTo commtments could lmt the mpact of the 
preferental elements of these agreements, although firms from hong kong 
and macao have mportant ‘first-mover’ advantages. Antkewcz and Whalley 
(2005:1,544) also note the possblty that the effect of local regulatons could 
prove to be the ‘bndng restrcton’ and, n that case, commtments under the 
preferental agreements would be of lttle mportance.
The chna materal here s llustratve, but further emprcal work on the 
nature of servces sector polcy reform s valuable, ncludng work on the 
modellng of optons for reform. The calculaton of a set of ndces of servces 
polcy restrctveness n chna for a tme perod begnnng as early after the 
start of reforms as possble and contnung through to the present could be 
used to 1) confirm the mpressons of the path of reform, n partcular, ts two-
step structure; 2) test hypotheses about the dfferences between sectors n the 
degrees of restrcton and the trajectores of ther removal, ncludng the rate at 
whch the WTo commtments are mplemented; 3) extend the optons for the 
desgn of experments n polcy modellng; and 4) dentfy the factors that add 
to or amelorate the rsks of stallng reform. A further applcaton of ths materal 
s to relate the changes n the ndex values to outcomes n servces markets 
and to varous performance ndcators, such as productvty mprovements, 
prce falls, qualty ncrements, nnovaton and so on, and thereby to assess the 
contrbuton of polcy reform to these changes. 
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Notes
1 Generally, the value of d wll be less than one, snce some restrctons that apply to foregn 
entry do not apply to domestc firms. For more dscusson of the calculaton of the ndces, 
see the papers n Fndlay and Warren (2000).
2 kox and lejour (2004) revew a number of other studes that examne the effect of reform 
of cross-border trade. Whalley (2004), n hs revew of the emprcal work, hghlghts the 
complementarty of openness n factor markets wth lberalsaton of cross-border transactons 
but pays less attenton to the sequencng questons examned here. Walmsley and Wnters 
(2003) estmate the benefits of more open markets for labour.
3 For example, chna Uncom has fixed-lne operatons only n the cty of Tanjn and part of the 
provnce of schung. 
4 From Us department of state (2004). Avalable onlne at http://usnfo.state.gov/eap/
Archve/2004/dec/06-984604.html
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Table A6.1  Telecommunications index components
category weght score Polcy categores
0.3  lcensng of new fixed-network operaton lcences
 1.00 issues no new lcences
 0.75 issues 1 new lcence
 0.50 issues up to 3 new lcences
 0.25 issues more than 3 new lcences
 0.00 No lmtaton on the number of new lcences
0.3  lcensng of new moble network operaton lcences
 1.00 issues no new lcences
 0.75 issues 1 new lcence
 0.50 issues up to 3 new lcences
 0.25 issues more than 3 new lcences
 0.00 No lmtaton on the number of new lcences except for  
  techncal reasons
0.3  investment restrctons—general 
  The score s nversely proportonal to the maxmum 
  drect equty partcpaton permtted n an exstng  
  telecom operator. For example, equty partcpaton to a 
   maxmum of 75 per cent would be gven a score of 0.25a
0.1  investment restrctons—ncumbent
  The score s nversely proportonal to the maxmum 
  drect  equty partcpaton permtted n a specfic  
  domestc  telecom operator. if there s no operator- 
  specfic  restrcton, the score wll be the same as the 
  score for  general restrcton.a
a in crcumstances where no new operator s allowed, a score of one s recorded for domestc 
and foregn ndces, whereas n crcumstances where new lcences are ssued only to domestc 
new entrants, a score of one s recorded for the foregn ndex only.
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7
Integrating China’s agricultural 
economy into the global market
measurng dstortons n chna’s agrcultural sector
Jikun Huang, Yu Liu, Will Martin and Scott Rozelle
Although there has long been an nterest n the agrcultural economy, t s qute 
surprsng to many observers that chna’s agrcultural sector has a record that s 
mpressve n many dmensons. Growth rates of gross domestc product (GdP), 
agrcultural gross value added and food per capta ncreased substantally 
snce the early 1980s. indeed, agrcultural performance n the past two to three 
decades was more mpressve than n any other country n Asa. markets have 
boomed and the structure of agrculture has shfted fundamentally. despte 
havng the largest populaton n the world and hgh ncome growth (whch has 
had a wrenchng change on the naton’s consumpton bundle), chna has, snce 
the early 1980s, been a net exporter of food n all but one year.
Whle the performance of the economy s well documented, there s less 
understandng about the envronment wthn whch ths growth occurred. in 
partcular, there have not been many studes of the economc envronment that 
created some of the ncentves for producers. in the past, there has been work 
on the nature of the dstortons of chna’s agrcultural economy (for example, 
huang et al. 2004; oecd 2005; orden et al. 2007). Unfortunately, prevous studes 
have been only partal. For example, huang et al. (2004) looked only at the 
dstortons n a sngle year; orden et al. (2007) examned only sx years between 
1995 and 2001. The oecd (2005) examned only a small set of commodtes and 
made a number of smplfyng assumptons about some of the most mportant 
commodtes, such as pork meat and poultry. Perhaps because of the partal 
nature of these studes, they reached a number of dfferent conclusons. 
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The purpose of ths chapter s to examne the extent of the chnese 
agrcultural sector’s ntegraton nto the world market by estmatons of 
ndcators of drect and ndrect nterventons by the chnese government 
n agrculture from 1981 to 2005. The man part of our analyss examnes the 
dfferences between nternatonal prces and domestc wholesale prces at the 
border (nomnal rates of assstance or NrA). We also consder dstortons n 
the domestc economy by examnng the dfferences between farm-gate and 
border prces (NrAf). 
The wde scope of the objectves, as wth other studes, necesstates certan 
lmtatons. Frst, the absence of data precludes us from examnng the entre 
agrcultural sector. instead, we examne commodtes that account for nearly 
two-thrds of the gross value output n all of the study years. second, although 
we are able to judge from the prce trends and from an understandng of 
domestc marketng and prcng and trade polcy reforms the source of the 
shfts n the dstortons of the agrcultural economy, we cannot dentfy the 
exact source of changes. Also, although we use our revsed exchange rate 
seres to calculate what we beleve to be the correct values at whch we convert 
nternatonal values nto currency—whch s useful for makng comparsons 
wth prces n chna’s domestc economy—we do not analyse the effect of these 
assumptons. Ths s done elsewhere (martn et al. 2006). 
in the next secton, we dscuss our quanttatve approach and sources of 
data. The results of the dstorton analyss are presented n the thrd secton, 
whle the final secton offers conclusons. 
Methodology and data sources
We have utlsed the approach specfied n Anderson et al. (2006), whch s based 
broadly on comparsons between domestc and nternatonal prces. durng 
the reform era, these prce comparsons provded ndcators of the ncentves 
for producton, consumpton and trade, and the ncome transfers assocated 
wth nterventons. 
our approach creates essentally two measures of dstortons for each major 
commodty n the agrcultural economy. The first measures n our analyss 
are the NrA, whch are used to compare the prces of commodtes n the 
domestc economy (at the port) wth the nternatonal prces of commodtes 
at the border (that s, ‘c..f.’ n the port for mportable goods; ‘f.o.b.’ n the port 
for exportable ones). The qualty adjustments on the border prces were made 
before we estmated the NrA. conceptually, wth the NrA, we are tryng to 
measure the extent of the dstortons due to tarffs, exchange rate dstortons 
and other non-tarff barrers—at the border.
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Because of barrers wthn the domestc economy, the extent of protecton 
(or lack of protecton) that s afforded by trade polces mght not be the same as 
the real rate of protecton to farmers. snce we have ndependent observatons 
on the prces obtaned by farmers n local markets, we are able to estmate 
the nomnal rate of assstance at the farm level, takng nto account border 
dstortons and dstortons affectng farmer returns (NrAf). NrAf are calculated 
after allowng for qualty adjustment, tax or subsdes, transport, storage and 
handlng costs n movng commodtes from the farm to the wholesale level. 
dfferences between NrA and NrAf arse from subsdy or transfer payments 
that cause the prces receved by farmers to dffer from what they would receve 
under compettve nternal market condtons. 
Whle NrA (and NrAf) measure only dfferences n output prces, there 
could also be dstortons on the nput sde. To capture these, t s possble 
to provde measures to take nto account drect subsdes and dfferences 
between the nternatonal prces of nputs and the prces that farmers pay for 
these nputs. Whle these forms of protecton (or taxaton) are mportant n 
many countres—and partcularly n organsaton for economc co-operaton 
and development (oecd) countres—we find that they are generally relatvely 
small, so we focus on the NrA and NrAf measures when examnng dstortons 
to producers. 
exchange rate dstortons present partcular measurement problems and 
requre detaled analyss f prce comparson-based measures are not to be 
msleadng. The assumpton and methods that were used to generate our 
exchange rate seres are n Table A7.1. For documentaton of our complete 
domestc and nternatonal prce seres, see martn et al. (2006). 
in complng our data, we had to make choces on the coverage of the 
commodtes. We have ncluded 11 commodtes: rce, wheat, maze, soybeans, 
cotton, pork, mlk, poultry, frut (usng apples as a representatve product), 
vegetables (usng tomatoes as a representatve product) and sugar (sugar-
beet and sugar-cane). durng the study perod, these commodtes accounted 
for between 75 per cent (n the late 1980s) and 60 per cent (durng the early 
2000s) of the total value of agrcultural output n chna. Because decsons on 
producton and consumpton n chna’s domestc market prces were beng 
allowed to respond to domestc prces only gradually, and because we do not 
have access to relable data on the secondary market exchange rates before 
1988, we focus on data for the perod begnnng n 1980.
The data used n our study come from a number of sources, dependng 
on the tme perod of analyss and the commodty. commodty balance data 
(producton, utlsaton, trade and others) are from the centre for chnese 
Agrcultural Polcy’s cAPsm  database, whch are manly from the mnstry of 
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Agrculture (producton), Natonal Bureau of statstcs of chna (consumpton 
and others) and the mnstry of commerce (trade). domestc prces are from 
several dfferent mnstres. specfically, farm-gate output prces come from 
the cost-of-producton surveys conducted by the Natonal development and 
reform commsson (Ndrc). Wholesale and retal prces for most products 
are from the center for Prce montorng, the Ndrc, the mnstry of Agrculture 
(varous years [b]) and the department of rural survey under the Natonal 
Bureau of statstcs of chna. Where wholesale and retal prces for some 
commodtes n some years were not avalable, prce margns from farm-
gate to wholesale and retal were estmated. much of the data on margns, 
transportaton costs and other transacton costs are from an extensve set of 
surveys by huang and rozelle durng the 1990s and the early 2000s, whch 
served also to establsh whch commodty prce seres provded approprate 
bases for prce comparsons. some of ths was reported prevously n rozelle 
et al. (2000) and huang et al. (2004), whch provded nformaton on substantal 
qualty dfferences between some mported and domestc commodtes and 
resultng bases n prce comparsons as a measure of protecton. For more 
recent years, survey teams from the center for chnese Agrcultural Polcy 
ntervewed traders n 10 ctes throughout chna n 2006. The complete data 
seres are n the appendces of huang et al. (2007).
The nternatonal prce data (‘f.o.b.’ and ‘c..f.’) for all commodtes except mlk 
are the unt values of the exports or mports wth adjustments for qualty. These 
data are from the mnstry of commerce and chna’s customs Admnstraton. 
For the border prce of mlk, because no mport prces for mlk are avalable, 
we use the farm-gate prce of mlk n New Zealand, adjusted by nternatonal 
transportaton and nsurance rates, to create a seres for the nternatonal prce 
of mlk (c..f.), whch we refer to as the ‘reference prce’.
Results
The role of domestc prce and marketng polces
Before examnng the role of dstortons at the border, t s useful to examne 
the relatonshp between the avalable domestc prce seres for farm and 
retal prces for the major gran crops (Table 7.1). The mportance (and role) of 
chna’s domestc prce and marketng polcy for rce and wheat (two of the three 
largest crops  n chna) can be seen by comparng the state-set urban retal 
prce and the state-set rural farm-gate procurement prce wth the rural retal 
prce (a free-market prce) before 1993, when the urban gran ratonng system 
was formally abolshed. Untl 1993, urban retal gran prces were generally 
substantally below the prce on the free market n rural areas, despte the costs 
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assocated wth transferrng gran to urban areas. Ths was a consequence of a 
procurement prce system desgned to provde urban resdents wth relatvely 
nexpensve food. only urban resdents could buy gran at these low prces and 
only wth raton coupons that were avalable n lmted quanttes.
The marketng and procurement system could have been the source of 
addtonal dstortons. The relatvely low sellng prce of gran at the farm-gate 
shows that chna’s food system n the 1980s was set up to transfer ncome from 
rural to urban areas (Table 7.1, column 1). The amount that farmers receved 
for the mandatory delveres was far below the free-market prce. There s, 
however, some queston about the effects on ncentves for producton and 
consumpton gven the nfra-margnal nature of many of these transfers (scular 
1988). Ths s because after the md 1980s, farmers were able to sell addtonal 
amounts at hgher market prces once they had met ther oblgaton to delver 
a fixed-quota quantty at the low purchasng prce. if a farmer sold more gran 
than was requred by hs or her delvery quota—and the above-quota prce 
was determned by market forces—there could have been less of a dstorton. 
Ultmately, however, even such polces are not fully decoupled from ncentves, 
wth seemngly nfra-margnal transfers away from rural households, for 
nstance, gvng ther members an ncentve to move out of agrculture. These 
lnkages have been shown by Wang et al. (1999). Therefore, the dstortons 
Table 7.1  Rural retail, urban retail and farm-gate sales prices of rice 
and wheat in China, 1980–2005 (yuan per tonne n real 2005 
prces)
 1980–93 1994–2001 2002–05
rce (n mlled rce equvalent)   
Farm-gate prce 1,375 1,889 1,939
rural retal prce 2,069 2,145 2,112
Urban retal prce 989 2,144 2,112
Wheat   
Farm-gate prce 1,126 1,305 1,268
rural retal prce 1,700 1,433 1,325
Urban retal prce 920 1,433 1,325
Note: We use the years of 1993 and 2001 as tme-dvson ponts because the former s the year 
the gran raton polcy ended n urban areas and the latter s the year before chna joned the 
World Trade organzaton. 
Sources: calculated by the authors based on varous sources.
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created by domestc marketng and procurement systems could have affected 
ncentves relatve to nternatonal prces.
From 1994, however, changes to chna’s domestc marketng and 
procurement system appear to have elmnated ths addtonal layer of regulaton 
for producers of rce and wheat (Table 7.1, columns 2 and 3). in the early 1990s, 
the urban prce began to rse above the farm-gate prce; urban and rural retal 
prces also came much closer together (huang et al. 2007). Ths reflects the 
phasng out of the mplct taxaton of farmers through the gran procurement 
system. The gap between urban and rural retal prces essentally dsappeared 
after 1994 (Table 7.1), and the gap between the rural retal prce and the farm 
prce declned—possbly suggestng an mprovement n marketng efficency 
(Park et al. 2002). Wth the dsappearance of the dstortons from the marketng 
and procurement system, the remanng dstortons after the md 1990s reflect 
only trade polces and not trade and domestc polces.
Nomnal rates of assstance for chna’s man agrcultural commodtes
All NrA and NrAf are computed at adjusted exchange rates (the estmated 
equlbrum exchange rates; Table A7.1), snce we beleve ths measure s the 
rght one to use to calculate the true rate of protecton. in martn et al. (2006), 
we report how the measures of dstortons vary when usng offical and adjusted 
exchange rates. 
Distortions to the grain economy before the mid 1990s. The dstortons to 
the rce economy of chna n the 1980s and early 1990s were charactersed by 
two mportant features (Table 7.2, row 1). Frst, the NrA of rce—an exportable 
commodty—was negatve between 1980 and 1993. Averagng –23 per cent, 
the negatve NrA show that chna was hghly compettve n nternatonal 
rce markets durng these years. Trade polcy, however, kept exporters from 
shppng large quanttes of rce onto world markets and kept the free-market 
prce of rce n chna’s port ctes below the world prce. Ths demonstrates 
clearly chna’s commtment to keepng domestc prces low. even f there had 
been no other dstortons n the rce economy, producers would have faced 
prces below world market prces.
The second feature demonstrates how domestc marketng and procurement 
placed a greater tax on farmers and nsulated the domestc prce of rce from 
the world market prce even f trade polcy had been lberalsed (Table 7.2, rows 
1 and 4). Because of chna’s marketng polcy, whch lasted through the md 
1990s, the state’s artfically low procurement prce kept the prce receved by 
farmers systematcally below the free-market prce of rce, as seen by the NrAf. 
Because of ths, the tax on rce farmers averaged –42 per cent. rce producers 
124
China—Linking Markets for Growth
were among the most heavly taxed farmers n chna, gven the large share of 
the crop’s sown area and large negatve rates of protecton. importantly, our 
analyss shows how the state used trade and procurement polcy to tax ts 
rce farmers.
The NrA measures show that trade polcy offered hgh rates of protecton 
for wheat farmers n chna between 1980 and the md 1990s (Table 7.1, rows 
2 and 5). Between 1980 and 1993, the free-market prce of wheat n chna’s 
port ctes was 47 per cent hgher than the nternatonal prce (c..f., chna’s 
port ctes). Unlke rce, whch chna produced compettvely durng the 1980s, 
wheat producers—who have been shown to produce at a hgher cost than 
many producers n other countres (huang and ma 2000)—receved strong 
protecton from trade polcy. Ths polcy on ts own, unlke that for rce, would 
not be consstent wth provdng nexpensve food for consumers. it would, 
however, be consstent wth a polcy of food self-sufficency, snce t would 
encourage greater producton by keepng out mports and keepng domestc 
prces hgh.
domestc marketng polces, however, were workng n the opposte 
drecton to trade polces. The trends of the NrAf show how the forced delveres 
of wheat quotas nsulated farmers from the hgh rates of protecton (Table 7.2, 
row 5). Although there was stll postve protecton for wheat farmers n most 
years between 1980 and 1994, the rates were lower (averagng about 10 per 
cent). These figures—along wth those for rce—show that at least for chna’s 
Table 7.2  Nominal rates of assistance (NRA) and nominal rates of 
assistance for farmers (NRAf) in the cereal sector in China, 
1980–2005 (per cent)
 
 1980–93 1994–2001 2002–05
NrA   
rce –23 –4 –6
Wheat 47 25 -
maze –1 7 16
NrAf   
rce –42 –8 –9
Wheat 10 24 1
maze –28 6 11
Source: Authors’ estmatons.
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staple food crops, the government was not tryng to use prces to encourage 
food securty. 
The story of maze s a mxture of those for rce and wheat (Table 7.2, rows 
3 and 6). consderng row 3, trade polcy was provdng very lttle protecton 
for maze n the perod 1980–93, wth an average of –1 per cent. Procurement 
polcy, as n the case of rce and wheat, depressed the prce of maze for chna’s 
farmers. measured at the farm-gate level, maze farmers were taxed by 28 per 
cent n the perod 1980–93. 
Distortions to the grain economy after the mid 1990s. our dstortons analyss 
shows that, after 1994, chna’s nternatonal trade and domestc marketng 
polces changed strkngly (Table 7.2, columns 2 and 3). it s apparent from 
the way the dfferences n the estmates of NrA and NrAf narrow that chna’s 
reformers were able to elmnate the procurement polces that had been 
taxng rce, wheat and maze farmers (ether by reducng the tax mposed by 
trade polcy, as n the case of rce, or reducng protecton, as n the case of 
wheat). in another work, huang et al. (2006) show that the elmnaton of the 
procurement quota contrbuted sgnficantly to a reducton n the mplct tax 
burden shouldered by farmers. 
The lberalsaton of domestc markets n the md 1990s was accompaned by 
a lberalsaton of trade polcy—at least n the case of chna’s major food grans 
such as rce and wheat. After the md 1990s, the taxaton and subsdsaton of 
rce and wheat clearly were beng phased out, as the NrA for rce rose steadly 
(became less negatve) and those for wheat fell. lkely n part n preparaton 
for accesson to the WTo, chna’s leaders lberalsed trade for the man food 
grans to such an extent that between 1995 and 2001 most of the protecton 
for crops was elmnated. snce 2001, the NrA for rce and wheat have been 
close to zero. 
interestngly, the case of maze s a lttle dfferent than that for other crops 
(Table 7.2, row 3). Whle NrA moved towards zero n the case of maze, n a 
number of years after 2000, the NrA for maze were postve (not shown by 
the average figures n Table 7.2). Ths ndcates that at least n some years 
natonal leaders have been protectng maze producers. in part, as dscussed 
n rozelle and huang (2004), ths could be due to lobbyng from Jln Provnce, 
whch has been successful n ganng protecton for the producers of ts most 
mportant crop.
Edible oils and cotton. The bggest dfference between the analyss of 
dstortons of gran crops and cash crops (at least for soybean and cotton) s 
that domestc marketng polcy has hstorcally played less of a role n ncentve 
dstorton. Although n some countes n chna there was a procurement delvery 
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quota for soybean producers, t was not as wdespread as that for gran (n 
many countes, soybeans were not procured by the state system). in addton, 
the mplct tax on soybeans n places n whch soybean quotas were collected 
was lower than that for the staple gran crops; there s lttle dfference between 
the graphs for NrA and NrAf (huang et al. 2007). The same s true for cotton: 
except n the md 1990s, free-market procurement of cotton by prvate traders 
was not allowed. When reform finally came to the cotton ndustry n the md 
1990s, leaders dd not move to a two-ter prcng system, but nstead allowed 
for prvate and commercalsed government cotton procurement statons. As a 
result, the measures of dstorton for the NrA and NrAf of cotton are nearly the 
same (huang et al. 2007). in fact, the same s true for all the other commodtes 
(lvestock, hortculture, mlk and sugar). As a result, the dscusson n the rest 
of ths secton—for all three perods—focuses on trade polcy.
The trends n the NrA after 1995 show the strong commtment to trade 
lberalsaton for soybeans (Table 7.3, row 1). Begnnng n the late 1990s and 
contnung through to 2005, protecton for soybeans fell from about 25 per 
cent to about 10 per cent. Ths decreasng protecton should not, n fact, be 
surprsng gven the ntegraton of chna nto world soybean markets and the 
monotonc rse n mports (whch exceeded 25 mllon tonnes n 2005). The story 
of soybeans—and the fall n protecton and almost full lberalsaton—stands 
n sharp contrast wth that of maze, whch enjoyed ncreasng protecton. 
The dstorton analyss for cotton, n some senses, produces results smlar 
to that for rce (Table 7.2, row 2). The combnaton of trade and monopoly 
procurement polces kept domestc cotton prces lower than world market 
prces n the 1980s and early 1990s. it appears that chna’s planners were taxng 
cotton farmers to supply emergng textle ndustres wth relatvely nexpensve 
raw materals. it s no wonder—wth such hgh mplct taxes on cotton—that 
Table 7.3  Nominal rates of assistance for farmers (NRAf) for soybean, 
cotton and sugar crops in China, 1980–2005 (per cent)
 1980–93 1994–2001 2002–05
soybean n.a. 24 12
cotton –31 –6 –1
sugar crops 33 28 23
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the lack nterest from many supplers, and serous nsect problems, led to 
stagnaton and even decreases n the number of areas sown wth cotton n 
many regons (Natonal Bureau of statstcs varous years (a)). 
After 1994, however, wth the lberalsaton of most domestc markets and 
somewhat ncreased trade lberalsaton, there clearly was a shft n the level of 
dstortons faced by cotton producers (Table 7.2, row 2). Although there were 
years n whch there was fluctuatons, snce the md 1990s, the NrAf have been 
fallng gradually to nearly zero. in recent years, despte the fact that natonal 
leaders could mpose tarff-rate quotas on cotton after a certan volume had 
been mported, trade officals essentally left the level of mports n most years 
to be determned by the market. 
Livestock and horticultural commodities. Wth the excepton of mlk, the 
patterns of dstortons to chna’s lvestock and hortcultural sectors are qute 
smlar (Table 7.4). Between 1980 and 1993, there was heavy mplct taxaton 
on pork and vegetables. in part, as noted by huang et al. (2004), ths stuaton 
was created by chna’s gran-first polcy. Although chna can produce lvestock 
and hortcultural products compettvely, producers were encouraged nether to 
produce nor to export these commodtes on a large scale. Ths was due, n part, 
to chna’s own barrers, such as quotas on exports nto hong kong. Another 
part of the prce gap shown n these figures reflects trade barrers facng chna 
n export markets. Whle there were possbly grounds for some of the barrers 
(for example, foot and mouth dsease s wdespread n chna), even f a clam 
was blatantly false t could not be adjudcated effectvely snce chna was not 
then part of the WTo. As a consequence, chna’s lvestock and hortcultural 
producers produced commodtes far below the world market prce and were 
nether nclned nor able to ncrease exports nto global markets.  
snce the md 1990s, the gap between domestc and world prces for 
lvestock products has lessened, but the trends are not clear for the hortcultural 
sector. emergng markets and relaxaton of gran-first polces (often called 
agrcultural structural adjustment polces nsde chna) allowed producers 
to greatly expand lvestock and hortcultural producton n large part to meet 
the rsng demand nsde chna (rosen et al. 2004). At the same tme, chna’s 
accesson to the WTo and the appearance of an export-orented segment of 
the lvestock and hortcultural ndustres has ncreased the nterest n and 
feasblty of partcpatng n nternatonal markets. in response, the prce gap 
measures have been fallng. it should be noted, however, that the NrAf are all 
stll negatve. if anythng, chna’s presence n global food markets has gven 
rse to more strngent rules and regulatons on the mportaton of lvestock and 
hortcultural commodtes from chna. 
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Milk and sugar. The story for mlk and sugar s n some senses the opposte 
of that for lvestock and hortcultural commodtes. durng the 1980s and early 
1990s, the NrAf for mlk and sugar were postve and large (Table 7.3, row 3 
and Table 7.4, row 1). Those for mlk averaged 70 per cent n the perod 1980–93. 
Those for sugar were above 33 per cent n the same perod. After the md 1990s, 
protecton was lowered, and NrAf for mlk and sugar fell (to about 20–25 per 
cent n 2002–05). 
Conclusions and implications
The man findng of our chapter s that the nature of polcy nterventon n 
chna’s agrculture has changed dramatcally n the past 25 years, transformng 
the agrcultural sector from one charactersed by hgh dstortons to one that 
s relatvely lberal and more ntegrated nto the world market. in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (or the early reform perod), there were dstortons n external 
and domestc polces that solated domestc producers and consumers from 
nternatonal markets. importantly, durng the early reform perod, domestc 
marketng and prcng polces served to make the prces that domestc 
producers and consumers faced almost ndependent of the effects of trade 
polcy. Because of ths—even n the case of an exportable commodty, such 
as rce, a commodty that enjoyed lttle protecton at the border from tarffs 
(meanng that the nternatonal and the free-market prces of rce were nearly 
dentcal)—domestc prcng and marketng polces dd not allow producers 
to reap the profits from nternatonal-level prces and nstead forced farmers 
to sell much of ther surplus to the state at an artfically low prce. hence, 
domestc polces leved a tax on farmers even though there was lttle protecton 
Table 7.4  Nominal rates of assistance for farmers (NRAf) for livestock 
and horticultural sectors in China, 1980–2005 (per cent)
 1980–93 1994–2001 2002–05
mlk 73 17 24
Poultry –11 –28 –19
Pork –57 –19 –8
Vegetables –50 –22 –23
Frut –19 –29 –28
Source: Authors’ estmatons.
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at the border. smlar dynamcs charactersed mportable commodtes such as 
wheat and soybeans where, despte farly hgh rates of protecton from trade 
polces, producers were recevng much less protecton than they would have 
had there been a free domestc market for the mportable commodtes—whle 
consumers were beng taxed mplctly.
in contrast, snce the early 1990s (the late reform perod), the lberalsaton 
of domestc markets has reduced the dstortons from domestc polces (as 
the market has gradually replaced the state as the prmary mechansm for 
allocatng resources and has become the bass of farmer producton and 
marketng decsons). At the same tme—especally n the case of mportable 
commodtes—trade polcy has become more lberalsed, wth dstortons from 
border measures fallng substantally. As a result, we find that n recent years 
(that s, snce chna jonted the WTo at the end of 2001), chna’s agrculture s 
much less dstorted n two ways. Frst, the dfferences between nternatonal 
and domestc market prces have narrowed consderably for many commodtes 
due to trade polcy lberalsaton. second, the elmnaton of domestc polcy 
dstortons means that when trade lberalsaton allows for the ncreased mport 
or export of agrcultural commodtes, prces n chna’s domestc market 
change, drectly affectng farmers. 
despte the findng that consderable lberalsaton had occurred due to 
reforms n domestc and external polces, dstortons to agrculture remaned 
n the md 2000s—25 years after the begnnng of reforms. in some cases, these 
remanng dstortons arse from tarffs on mportable commodtes and the 
non-tarff trade barrers of other countres on chna’s exportable commodtes. 
Whle low n nternatonal comparsons, chna s stll provdng a degree of 
protecton for a number of mportable commodtes (for example, maze, sugar 
and mlk). 
Wth ths analyss, we have shown that chna’s agrcultural economy 
has become one of the least dstorted n the world. clearly, the combnaton 
of domestc marketng reforms and nternatonal trade lberalsaton has 
greatly freed up the decson-makng envronment for producers. in such an 
envronment, phenomena such as rapd structural change from gran to more 
labour-ntensve commodtes and the rse of a hortcultural and lvestock-
based export economy become more understandable. When farmers face 
less dstorton they tend to move nto those commodtes n whch they have 
a comparatve advantage. 
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Table A7.1  Raw numbers for exchange rate analysis, China,   
1980–2005
Year offical rate secondary  retenton  dscount to  estmated 
  market rate ratea  secondary equlbrum  
    market rate exchange rate
1980 1.50  1.95  0.20  1.95  1.95 
1981 1.71  2.05  0.20  2.05  2.80 
1982 1.89  2.27  0.20  2.27  2.80 
1983 1.98  2.39  0.20  2.39  2.80 
1984 2.33  2.69  0.20  2.69  2.80 
1985 2.94  3.05  0.25  3.05  2.95 
1986 3.45  4.03  0.25  4.03  3.81 
1987 3.72  4.40  0.44  4.40  5.29 
1988 3.72  6.50  0.44  6.50  5.79 
1989 3.77  6.60  0.44  6.60  4.94 
1990 4.78  6.60  0.44  6.60  5.44 
1991 5.32  6.60  0.80  6.60  5.84 
1992 5.52  6.92  0.80  6.92  7.12 
1993 5.76  8.28  0.80  8.28  8.41 
1994 8.62  8.70  0.80  8.70  8.69 
1995 8.35  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.35 
1996 8.31  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.31 
1997 8.29  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.29 
1998 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
1999 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2000 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2001 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2002 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2003 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2004 8.28  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.28 
2005 8.19  n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.19 
a The proporton of foregn currency sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate.  
Sources: For the offical rates, Natonal Bureau of statstcs of chna, varous years (a). 
Statistical Yearbook of China, varous ssues from 1981 to 2006, chna statstcal Press, Bejng. 
Natonal Bureau of statstcs of chna, varous years (b). China Yearbook of Agricultural Price 
Survey, varous ssues, chna statstcs Press, Bejng; For the secondary market rates, 
huang and davd 1995. For the estmated equlbrum exchange rates, on the exchange rate 
methodology, see Anderson, k., martn, W., sandr, d. and Valenzuela, e., 2006. Methodology 
for measuring distortions to agricultural incentives, Workng Paper, development research 
Group, World Bank, Washngton, dc; huang, J., lu, Y., martn, W. and rozelle, s., 2007. 
Distortions to agricultural incentives in China, 1981 to 2005, Workng Paper, World Bank, 
Washngton, dc.
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For an economy n transton, development of the market s a sgn of a 
successful transton and a premse for a sustanable form of economc growth. 
development and ntegraton of labour markets are key components that 
ndcate the move towards a market system. despte wde acknowledgment 
of success n chna’s market-orented reform, there s dsagreement about the 
effects of marketsaton, especally n regard to the level of regonal market 
ntegraton. reforms of producton factor markets, for nstance—especally n 
the labour and captal markets—have been consdered less far reachng than 
the reform efforts made n commodty markets (lardy 1994:8–14). There are 
also scholars who beleve that segmentaton of the market has become severe 
as a result of decentralsaton n the reform process. such scholars argue that 
although decentralsaton rectfied the concentraton of decson makng and 
resource allocaton, t has also generated a ‘border effect’—somethng present 
n ndependent economes and n admnstratvely dvded regons—thus 
preventng the labour markets of separate regons from ntegratng nto a 
natonal market (Poncet 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Young 2000). others suggest 
that the deepenng of the chnese reform process wll ncrease the degree of 
marketsaton n the country, ncludng the regonal ntegraton of producton 
factor markets (Fan and Wang 2001; Wang and Fan 2004; Fan et al. 2003).
labour market ntegraton s a hstorcal concept. studes n economc hstory 
show that durng the era of pre-ndustralsaton, even n now-ndustralsed 
countres, labour markets were not ntegrated due to lmted regonal moblty. 
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The process of labour market ntegraton through ndustralsaton begns n the 
local labour market and then wdens to regonal labour markets and, finally, to 
the natonal labour market (rosenbloom 1990, 1997). Ths process s ntegral 
to mprovng the market mechansm. 
in addton to spontaneous forces of marketsaton, outsde shocks can 
be sources of encouragement for labour market ntegraton. For example, 
the common market n europe promotes labour market ntegraton between 
member countres of the european Unon. Another example s the mpact that 
the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has had on ntegraton, 
brngng labour markets closer n border areas of the Unted states and mexco 
(robertson 2000).
chna’s transton from an admnstered labour system to a labour market s 
unque—not only because t s the largest economy n the world to experence 
such a process, but because t has adopted a typcally chnese style of gradual 
change. Three elements of chna’s labour market ntegraton are mportant. 
Frst, t has been carred out wth an emphass on ncremental reforms, whle 
not entrely negatng the mportance of shock reform. second, economc 
globalsaton has stmulated the process of labour market ntegraton. Fnally, 
the move towards a labour market parallels the transformaton from a dual 
economy to one that s ntegrated.
As chna’s demographcs change and the country approaches a turnng 
pont that wll lead to a labour shortage, the speed of labour market ntegraton 
has ncreased. Through ntegraton nto the global dvson of labour, chna has 
ncreased ts producton of labour-ntensve exports and accepted world-wde 
employment opportuntes. As a result, more than 100 mllon rural labourers 
have mgrated to urban jobs, and lad-off and unemployed workers have been re-
employed n an economy wth hgh growth rates. Wth economc development, 
the pattern of resource endowment n chna s beng restructured, mplyng 
the comng of a hstorcal turnng pont. 
Accordng to populaton predctons, the desrable populaton structure 
that has brought about a demographc dvdend n the past three decades wll 
dsappear wthn the next 10 years. At ths pont, the dependant populaton rato 
(the rato of the populaton aged younger than 16 and older than 64 wth respect 
to those aged between 16 and 64) wll stop decreasng and begn ncreasng. 
When comparng the growth rates of labour forces n other countres, t becomes 
clear that chna wll have no advantage n labour supply wthn two decades. 
Whle the populaton shft wll not occur overnght, t wll be necessary to drnk 
from the rver whle the water levels are hgh: labour abundance must be taken 
advantage of whle t stll exsts. in fact, the outcome of demographc changes 
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has already appeared n the labour market. The spread of labour shortages 
from coastal areas to the rest of the country not only ndcates the end of an 
era of unlmted labour supply, t marks the comng of a ‘lewsan turnng 
pont’. Ths s also a drvng force behnd labour market ntegraton, gven that 
the competton for sklled and unsklled workers has ntensfied the level of 
labour moblty.
Ths chapter seeks to demonstrate that economc reform, openng up and the 
transton from a dual economy have all encouraged ntegraton of the labour 
market. Frst, we explan how the labour market has developed and ntegrated 
wth respect to three dstnct changes n the economc order: the move from 
a planned labour system to market-based labour allocaton; the move from a 
closed economy to one that s ncreasngly globalsed; and, finally, the move 
from a dual economy charactersed by unlmted labour supply to a lewsan 
turnng pont. second, we ntroduce brefly the effects on the urban labour 
market of mgrant labour. The thrd secton demonstrates emprcally that the 
wages of mgrant workers have converged, whch s evdence of labour market 
ntegraton. 
The labour market n chna has developed n two ways. Frst, the expanson 
of the prvate sector has absorbed labourers made redundant as the planned 
system came to an end. second, there has been competton from the prvate 
sector to force state-owned enterprses to reform ther employment system 
and the state to deregulate the labour market. These aspects of reform tend 
to promote labour market ntegraton, wth an addtonal ncentve provded by 
the pressures of a comng labour shortage. By employng a statstcal method 
to household-level data, we are able to test the ponts made above. The final 
secton concludes wth some suggestons for further reform to the labour 
market.
Labour market integration as reform, opening up and growth 
move on
lke related nsttutonal arrangements n chna, labour polcy under the planned 
system resulted n two knds of nefficences. Frst, the nherent lack of labour 
supervson and lack of an ncentve mechansm n the mcro-management 
system led to low techncal efficency. second, the dstorted allocaton of labour, 
captal and other resources between regons and sectors led to low allocatve 
efficency. Accordngly, the subsequent ncentve mechansm and allocaton 
system reforms have mproved techncal and allocatve efficences, and have 
become domnant drvers of the hgh economc growth that has occurred 
durng the post-reform perod n chna. changes n labour polcy have played 
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an mportant role durng the whole process of reform—contrbutng drectly 
and ndrectly to efficency mprovements.
chna’s gradual nsttutonal changes emboded two ntatves: a ‘bottom-up’ 
ntatve and one that s ‘top-down’. in the first case, once the poltcal clmate at 
large began to change, producers who had prevously suffered under the strct 
constrants of the old system and who could see the potental gans from the 
new system actvely encouraged reform. in the second case, the government 
perceved the way n whch the old nsttutons constraned productvty, and the 
potental efficency gans of a new nsttuton, and after comparng the costs and 
benefits of an nsttutonal change, t mplemented the polcy reform on ts own 
ntatve. The formaton of labour markets n chna came about ths same way: 
the mplementaton of the household responsblty system meant that rural 
labourers were released from ther engagement n only the agrcultural sector, 
and began mgratng between vllages and towns and even provnces. When 
a large number of mgrant workers found jobs n urban sectors, competton 
began between the state-owned sector and the non-state sector, forcng the 
former to consder reform of the labour recrutment and hrng system. Partly as 
a response to ths—and partly because of the problem of low productvty—the 
government gradually relaxed ts labour polcy. snce polcymakng s, after all, 
a functon of government and snce t s a decsve force n the lberalsaton of 
a labour market, the ntenton and the extent of reforms of government labour 
allocaton polces wll determne the pace of labour market formaton.
in the process of nsttutonal change, playng the role of suppler of the 
nsttuton, government s also a ratonal agent, takng nto consderaton 
economc and poltcal aspects n ts decson makng. Whether or not to abolsh 
an old polcy whle adoptng a new one depends not only on the revealed 
efficency gans, t must be restraned by the costs and benefits of ths change. 
The terms ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ here can refer to economc and poltcal effects. 
increasngly deepened reform brngs about an expanson n the market as a 
prncple force of allocatng resources. To avert conflct between tradtonal 
government methods and market forces, the chnese government has duly 
adjusted ts polces n response to market development. labour polcy reforms 
have depended drectly on the overall extent of market maturty. Whle on the 
one hand, the development of the labour market makes up a key part of the 
economc reform as a whole, on the other, t goes only as far as the reach of 
the overall reform. 
durng the process of labour polcy reform, the chnese government 
and other players nteracted wth one another by followng the ratonale of 
poltcal economy. As part of marketsaton, the reform of labour polcy and 
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the mplementaton of other related reforms are pre-condtonal on each 
other. Followng ths framework, the deregulaton of labour moblty has been 
emboded manly n rural–urban mgraton, charactersed as gradual abolton 
of the hukou (household regstraton) system.
The gradual reform of hukou can be charactersed by a bottom-up process 
snce the begnnng of the twenty-first century: that s, relaxaton of hukou 
control began n small towns and gradually extended to medum-szed towns 
and bg ctes. Hukou reform n more than 20,000 small towns was charactersed 
by ‘mnmum crtera and complete openng-up’. After years of expermentaton 
n some regons, n 2001, the mnstry of Publc securty ntated acton to reform 
the hukou system n small towns. in most small towns, the mnmum requrement 
for recevng local hukou s that the applcants must have a permanent source 
of legal housng n the localty. Ths was consdered one of the greatest and 
most complete steps n hukou reform snce the system was formed n 1958. 
relaxaton of the hukou system n some medum-szed ctes (even n some 
larger ctes and provncal captals) s charactersed by ‘abolshng quota and 
condtoned entry’. The threshold for settlng n those ctes wth hukou status 
has been lowered substantally. Ths approach to reformng the hukou system 
meets the needs of maturng labour markets and corresponds wth gradualsm. 
Hukou relaxaton n especally large ctes such as Bejng and shangha s 
charactersed by ‘lftng up the threshold and openng the gate’. Those ctes 
have actvely encouraged the arrval of ntellectuals and professonals, whle 
mposng strct crtera of entry on ordnary mgrant workers. in short, lftng 
the threshold means narrowng the doorway. comparatvely, hukou reform n 
those ctes has not made progress.
The reforms n urban employment, socal securty and welfare provson 
have created an nsttutonal clmate for rural–urban mgraton. such reforms 
nclude the expanson of urban non-state sectors, the removal of ratonng, the 
prvatsaton of the housng dstrbuton system and changes n employment 
polces and the socal securty system. These reforms have reduced the costs 
of mgratng to, workng and lvng n ctes. in the late 1990s, whle the urban 
employment ‘ron rce bowl’ was broken, rural workers began to enter the urban 
labour market on a massve scale. it s becomng more common and much 
easer for rural labourers to seek work and lve n ctes, even though the hukou 
system stll functons. in short, labour moblty motvated by reforms of the 
hukou system and other nsttutons deterrng mgraton s not only an mportant 
part of economc development, t s a sgnficant process of the economc 
transton towards market forces. Ths transton has been pre-condtoned by 
the reforms n a much wder sphere. As the result of the reform n ths respect, 
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the allocaton of the labour force across sectors and among regons s based 
ncreasngly on market forces. The characterstcs of mgraton n transtonal 
chna reflect that of marketsaton as a whole.
in the process of demographc transton charactersed by a shft from 
a pattern of hgh death rates, hgh brth rates and hgh growth rates n the 
populaton to a pattern of low death rates, low brth rates and low growth 
rates, the tme dfference between the declnes of brth and death rates leads 
to three phases of age structure charactersed by a hgh dependency rato 
of chldren, a hgh proporton of workng populaton and a hgh dependency 
rato of the elderly, respectvely (Wllamson 1997). durng the perod between 
the earler declne n death rates and the laggng declne of brth rates, the 
natural growth rate of the populaton clmbed persstently and the share of 
dependant youth n the total populaton ncreased accordngly. As the fertlty 
rate begns to fall, the share of workng-age populaton ncreases n a laggng 
pace of about 20 years. The further drop n fertlty rates wll lead to a slower 
growth n populaton and the populaton wll age. Therefore, two sequental 
nversely U-shaped curves, for the natural growth rate of the populaton and for 
the growth rate of the workng-age populaton, can be expected f one tres to 
outlne the experence of demographc transton by tme seres. in the entre 
perod of reform, chna has wtnessed a contnung ncrease n the share of 
the workng-age populaton and ganed a demographc dvdend from the 
productve populaton structure.
Ths demographc dvdend, translated from success n demographc 
transton, has been captalsed on through reform of the resource-allocaton 
mechansm. Furthermore, the comparatve advantage of labour-ntensve 
products has been realsed by chna’s ntegraton nto economc globalsaton, 
and thus, the phenomenon of dmnshng returns to captal has been deterred 
by the extra sources of growth. Whle the total volume of global nternatonal 
trade has expanded rapdly, n just more than one-quarter of a century of reform 
n chna’s economy, the country’s trade volume has ncreased at a much faster 
rate. chna’s share of commodty mports and exports as a proporton of the 
world total has been enhanced from only slghtly more than 1 per cent n the 
early 1980s to more than 6 per cent n 2004. The hgh revealed comparatve 
advantage n labour-ntensve commodtes clearly lnks trade expanson to 
chna’s advantageous populaton structure (Yue 2001; Batra and khan 2005). 
The world-wde allocaton and flows of nternatonal captal make t possble for 
chna to utlse more efficent capabltes of resource allocaton from outsde 
nvestors and to fill up ts twn gaps n domestc savngs and foregn exchange 
at the early stage of reform and openng up. Takng the total dependency rato 
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as a proxy of the advantageous populaton structure n the perod between 1982 
and 2000, each 1 per cent decrease n the dependency rato led to 0.115 per cent 
of growth n per capta gross domestc product (GdP); that s, the declne n 
total dependency rates contrbuted to more than one-quarter of the per capta 
GdP growth n the reform perod (ca and Wang 2005).
Under a dual economy, wage rates wll persst at a subsstence level untl 
the expandng modern sector exhausts the surplus labour. As a consequence 
of the emergng labour shortage, competton for the labour force wll nevtably 
lead to wage rses n the modern sector and, n turn, n agrculture, and the 
relatonshp between wage rates and productvty n agrculture wll become 
close to economsts’ expectatons (Watanabe 1994). in other words, once the 
demographc transton occurs, the lewsan turnng pont—charactersed as 
a transton from an unlmted labour supply to labour scarcty—wll lead to an 
ncrease n wage rates and hence labour costs. The result of hgher wages and 
the lewsan turnng pont s an ncrease n competton for unsklled workers. 
employers, sectors and regons wll compete for labour and ths wll lead to a 
more ntegrated labour market.
Migrant workers in the urban labour market 
due to the dual economc system mplemented n chna, there s sgnficant 
segmentaton between the rural and urban labour markets. The two markets 
have dfferent levels of regulaton—leadng to mgrant and local workers beng 
employed n two separate labour markets wthn the same cty. Governments 
tend to have less regulaton for mgrant workers, protectng them less than 
local workers. For ths reason, employment and wage formaton for mgrant 
workers are determned manly by market forces. snce the md 1980s, mgrant 
workers have been the major components of labour flows between urban and 
rural areas and across regons. We can take ths group of workers as those 
whose behavour was the first to be marketsed n chna. The followng features 
of mgrant workers could reflect the mechansm of labour market ntegraton 
across regons.
mgrant workers have already been the major component of the urban labour 
market. rural–urban mgraton began n the 1980s, and snce then mgraton has 
contnued to ncrease. on the one hand, ths has been because a fast-growng 
economy creates ncreasng labour demands n non-agrcultural sectors; on the 
other hand, the urban labour market tends to be frendler to mgrant workers. 
snce chna’s entry nto the World Trade organzaton (WTo), the labour-
ntensve ndustres n whch chna possesses nternatonal compettveness 
have grown, ntensfyng the demand for the agrcultural labour force. mgrant 
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workers n the urban labour market provde an mportant human resource that 
supports rapd economc growth. in 2006, mgrant workers accounted for 46.7 
per cent of total employment n urban areas (Table 8.1). Therefore, t makes 
sense to understand regonal labour market ntegraton through the examnaton 
of employment and wage levels for mgrant workers.
The wage rates of mgrant workers are a good ndcator of the relaton 
between the supply of and demand for labour. despte nformal employment, 
the market mechansm plays an actve role n mgrant workers’ employment 
determnaton and wage formaton. relatve to that for urban resdents, the 
market for mgrant workers s more flexble. in partcular, nsttutonal factors 
ntervene less n wage formaton. Therefore, t s useful to analyse labour 
market ntegraton across dfferent regons from the perspectve of the wage 
nequalty of mgrant workers.
Fnally, mgrant workers moblse across regons frequently. in the begnnng 
of the reform perod, socety was senstve to mgraton from the country 
to the cty, and dsputes arose about how best to judge mgraton. labour 
moblty across regons dd, however, reflect the fact that mgrant workers were 
responsve to market sgnals whle the most concentrated areas of mgrant 
workers had always been the ones wth fast growth rates and strong labour 
demands. meanwhle, mgrants movng back and forth between ther place 
of work and ther home towns pass market nformaton to one another, whch 
helps to nform new entrants nto the labour market. labour moblty across 
regons s the premse for labour market ntegraton. it s mgraton that makes 
labour market ntegraton possble.
Convergence of wages among regions
As one of the key outcomes of the labour market, the wage rate s the most 
mportant ndcator avalable to observe the nteracton between labour markets 
of dfferent regons. smlartes and dfferences are evdent n research on 
labour market ntegraton and on the product market or the captal market. if 
wages converge between regons, the trend mples a process of labour market 
ntegraton that s smlar to the ntegraton of the product market, reflected by 
the law of one prce. There s, however, a certan degree of unqueness n each 
labour market, partcularly when dscussng ntegraton. hrng or firng s often 
an ssue of poltcal economy, whch means that changes n the prce of labour 
tend not to be reflected mmedately n the market. The market for mgrant 
workers undergoes dramatc shfts about the tme of chnese New Year, when 
t s often consdered mportant to adjust labour allocaton for the comng year. 
For ths reason, annual data on product markets, rather than quarterly, monthly 
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or even weekly data, could be more helpful for understandng why there are 
regonal movements of mgrant workers. 
dependng on the avalablty of data, two possble methods are employed 
when explorng wage changes and labour market ntegraton. Frst of all, 
analyss on long tme seres among varous labour markets explores whether the 
lnk exsts between markets. When prce changes n one market are reflected n 
another market, the two markets are regarded as ntegrated. Based on ths dea, 
robertson (2000) studed the mpact of NAFTA on labour market ntegraton 
between the Unted states and mexco n border areas. second, we can also 
take advantage of data that reflect long-term trends n labour markets and apply 
the law of one prce. snce the mgraton flow between markets elmnates the 
wage dfference, the convergence of wages between markets wll eventually 
reflect market ntegraton when controllng the dsparty caused by ndvdual 
characterstcs.
There are advantages and dsadvantages when applyng the two methods 
above. The tme-seres analyss s useful for observng the dynamcs of the 
labour market, although long tme-seres data are not usually rch n ndvdual 
nformaton. As s the case wth chna, the long tme-seres data between varous 
markets are not currently avalable and won’t be n the near future. Therefore, 
t s all but mpossble to analyse regonal labour market ntegraton n chna 
Table 8.1  Migrant workers in China’s urban labour market, 2000–2006 
(‘000 persons)
 mgrant workers  Urban employment share of mgrant 
 (‘000) (‘000) workers n urban 
   employment
   (per cent)
2000 78,490 212,740 36.9
2001 83,990 239,400 35.1
2002 104,700 247,800 42.3
2003 113,900 256,390 44.4
2004 118,230 264,760 44.7
2005 125,780 273,310 46.0
2006 132,120 283,100 46.7
Sources: The sze of the mgrant workforce from Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous years 
(a). Yearbook of Rural Household Survey, chna statstcal Press, Bejng. data on urban 
employment are from Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous years (b). Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics in China, chna statstcal Press, Bejng.
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based on such an dea. The dsadvantage of cross-sectonal data wth short tme 
seres s obvous: t s hard to observe long-term trends n short perods. When, 
however, the ndvdual characterstcs are controlled n the wage equaton, we 
can exclude the mpact of ndvdual factors on wage nequalty and observe 
the role of regonal factors more precsely.
in our prevous study, we used aggregated wage data on sub-sectors n 
manufacturng to analyse the devaton of average wages by provnce and found 
that markets were ntegrated between regons (ca and du 2004). Although 
ndustral factors that affect wages are controlled, the study cannot reflect the 
mpact of purely regonal effects snce, wth aggregated data, t s mpossble 
to control ndvdual characterstcs. hence, we take advantage of data at a 
mcro level and expect to observe mpacts of regonal factors on labour market 
ntegraton snce chna’s WTo entry.
data
data n ths chapter were collected by the research center of rural economy, n 
the mnstry of Agrculture. in the past decade, the centre has fixedly surveyed 
20,000 households dstrbuted through 300 vllages. in each household, a basc 
form was filled n that ncluded nformaton such as level of educaton, age, 
gender and health status. snce 2003, a complementary labour survey has 
been done n order to gan more nformaton about labour mgraton. From 
the ndvduals surveyed, we can gan nformaton about the destnatons n 
whch mgrants go to work. combnng the household and ndvdual data, we 
can gan nformaton on ndvdual characterstcs, wages and workng places 
so we can begn to understand the mpacts that geographc factors have on 
wage nequalty. 
inequalty measures and decomposton: regonal effects
in general, the dspartes of ndvdual earnngs can be attrbuted to factors 
n three categores. The first s ndvdual characterstcs, ncludng human 
captal, and demographc characterstcs such as age and gender. The second 
s ndustral and occupatonal features. even n ndustralsed countres, where 
labour markets functons very well, earnng dspartes between ndustres 
exst persstently: that s, workers n dfferent ndustres wth smlar ndvdual 
characterstcs can earn dfferent ncomes. The last factor s regonal. regonal 
dspartes do not easly dsappear when labour moblty between regons does 
not occur. As we saw before, the market mechansm plays an actve role n the 
market for mgrant workers and the ndustral and occupatonal dstrbuton 
of mgrant workers concentrates n a few ndustres and occupatons. it s 
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therefore plausble to explore the role of regonal effects of market ntegraton 
when ndvdual features of partcular markets are controlled.
The wages of mgrant workers have converged n recent years. No matter 
whch nequalty measure was appled, wages were more equal n 2006 than 
n 2003 (Table 8.2). Thel entropy went down from 0.27 to 0.196 and the Gn 
coefficent went from 0.374 to 0.332; the other general entropy and Atknson 
ndces also decreased. Percentage ratos showed that the gap between the 
top 10 per cent and the bottom 10 per cent was slghtly smaller n 2006 than n 
2003, whch could be a result of more protecton for mgrant workers n recent 
years. despte the decreasng trend n ncome nequalty ndces, there s a need 
to look further nto the role of geographc factors n nequalty, whch should 
be found by nequalty decomposton.
The data used here nclude nformaton on dstrbuton of destnaton 
provnces, so we can smply decompose those decomposable nequalty 
measures as nequalty wthn provnces and nequalty between provnces. in 
general, nequalty wthn provnces domnates nequalty between provnces, 
regardless of whch ndex of general entropy s consdered (Table 8.3). For 
example, about 90 per cent of Thel entropy came from wthn provncal factors 
nd 10 per cent was between provnce factors n 2003; and the shares were 93.4 
per cent and 6.6 per cent respectvely n 2006. The table also ndcates that 
Table 8.2  Income inequality measures, 2003–2006 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006
Percentle ratos    
p90/p10 4.469  4.444  4.436  4.232 
p90/p50 2.083  2.222  2.096  2.081 
p10/p50 0.466  0.500  0.472  0.492 
p75/p25 2.143  2.143  2.013  2.083 
General entropy    
Ge(-1) 0.299  0.285  0.236  0.232 
Ge(0) 0.240  0.226  0.192  0.189 
Thel 0.270  0.246  0.204  0.196 
Ge(2) 0.436  0.377  0.282  0.258 
Gn 0.374  0.360  0.334  0.332 
Atknson ndces    
A(0.5) 0.119  0.110  0.093  0.091 
A(1) 0.214  0.202  0.175  0.172 
A(2) 0.374  0.363  0.321  0.317 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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the share of regonal factors fluctuates nstead of monotoncally decreasng. 
Therefore, we cannot nfer that the labour market s more ntegrated based 
smply on such decomposed results, because t s possble to correlate some 
regonal factors wth ndvdual characterstcs—for example, more-able people 
are more capable of mgratng to a place wth hgh wage rates. 
To further explcate the components of ncome nequalty, we wll decompose 
those decomposable ndces based on regresson of earnngs of ncome 
determnants. Accordng to shorrocks (1982), the nequalty ndces can be 
expressed as a sum of weghted ncomes
ii yaI ∑= )()( yy  (1)
in ths equaton, )(yI s the total nequalty ndex—such as Thel entropy, Gn 
coefficents and coefficents of varaton—and iy s the ncome of ndvdual i 
and )(yia s the weght appled to every ndvdual, whch vares wth choce of 
ndces. in the regresson equaton, every regressor contrbutes to nequalty. 
The symbol ks s the contrbuton of factor k, whch s an explanatory varable 

















Table 8.3  Inequality decomposition by provinces: general entropy, 
2003–2006
 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ge(-1) 0.299  0.285  0.236  0.232 
Wthn  0.275 0.258 0.223 0.219
Between 0.024 0.027 0.012 0.013
Ge(0) 0.240  0.226  0.192  0.189 
Wthn  0.215 0.197 0.180 0.176
Between 0.025 0.029 0.012 0.013
Thel 0.270  0.246  0.204  0.196 
Wthn  0.244 0.215 0.191 0.183
Between 0.027 0.031 0.013 0.013
Ge(2) 0.436  0.377  0.279  0.258 
Wthn  0.407 0.342 0.268 0.245
Between 0.029 0.035 0.011 0.013
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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snce kiy n equaton 2 s determned by coefficents of the explanatory 
varables and the magntude of kix , the ncome nequalty based on regresson 
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Followng morduch and scular (2002) we decompose Thel entropy and the 









































































where the left-hand sde varable s monthly earnngs of a mgrant, and the first 
four rght-hand sde varables are ndvdual characterstcs, ncludng years 
of schoolng, gender, age and self-reported health status. except for an error 
term, the last two terms nclude the sum of provncal dummes. Unlke typcal 
earnngs equatons usng a log of wages as a dependent varable, for the purpose 
of decomposng the nequalty ndex—such as Thel entropy—we sacrfice 
the advantage of a sem-log equaton snce the man goal n ths research s to 
look at the role of geographc factors n wage nequalty, nstead of returns to 
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human captal. Table 8.4 presents some of the regresson results on ndvdual 
characterstcs; the provncal dummes are not ncluded n order to save space, 
whle the effects of specfic provnces are not of nterest here. The regresson 
results are generally consstent wth tradtonal predctons: that s, educated, 
healthy, male and aged labour have a relatvely better economc performance 
n the labour market.
Table 8.4 provdes the bass for wage nequalty decomposton. Accordng 
to equaton 4 and equaton 5, combnng the nformaton n the rght-hand sde 
varables, t s possble to decompose Thel entropy nto regonal effects, whch 
are the sum of provncal effects, ndvdual effects, constants and resduals. 
The results are presented n Table 8.5. our man nterest n ths chapter s to 
look at the contrbuton of regonal factors to general nequalty measures 
when ndvdual characterstcs are controlled. in 2003, 28 per cent of wage 
nequalty could be explaned through regonal factors, whle the share was 
20.3 per cent n 2006 (Table 8.5). A monotonc decreasng trend of regonal 
nequalty s also found durng the years snce chna’s WTo entry. Although 
only a few observatons are avalable due to a very short tme seres, the first 
row of the table tells us that regonal labour markets have been ntegrated, at 
least for mgrant workers. 
The results of nequalty decomposton are also consstent wth some other 
observatons. The shortage of unsklled workers, for example, was first reported 
Table 8.4  Regression results of linear wage equation, 2003–2006
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006
Years of schoolng 37.63  29.66 20.11 34.94
 (3.08) (3.17) (3.27) (2.71)
Gender (1 = male)  197.44 197. 86  54.33 231.78
 (15.96)  (15.56)  (15.81) (13.84)
Age  10.41 10.02 6.93 9.35
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.69) (0.60)
self-reported health status –59.97 –74.94 –17.37 –108.19
 (12.72)  (12.70) (13.30) (11.21)
Provncal dummes yes yes yes yes
r2 (adj-r2) 0.13  0.15 0.061 0.12
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.056) (0.12)
No. of observatons  8,372 7,986 6,040 10,094
Notes: standard errors n parentheses. health status s self-reported n five ranks, where one 
s more healthy than five.  
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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n coastal areas and then passed on to other parts of the country. The same 
pattern was found n changes of wage rates, whch ncreased sgnficantly n 
coastal areas first and then transmtted to the nteror (ca and du 2007). Those 
stylsed facts ndcate that employment and wage nformaton are passed on 
across provnces through mgraton flows, whch s the bass of an ntegrated 
labour market.
Conclusions
chna’s employment expanson has kept pace wth ts unprecedented economc 
growth n the reform perod. After accesson to the WTo, chna’s reform and 
openng up has not only contnued, t has ntensfied n a way that s consstent 
wth globalsaton. By breakng up the ron rce-bowl n urban employment 
polcy and elmnatng a seres of hukou-related nsttutonal barrers deterrng 
labour moblty, more jobs have been created and more labourers now mgrate 
from rural to urban sectors. Furthermore, as a result of substantal ncreases 
n employment n rural and urban chna and a declne n the workng-age 
populaton, labour shortage s becomng an ssue for the labour market. All 
those changes have created necessary nsttutonal and structural condtons 
for labour market ntegraton and the analyss of wage convergence of mgrant 
workers has proven that the chnese labour market has n fact moved towards 
ntegraton.
labour market reform s, however, far from complete. in addton, the comng 
lewsan turnng pont further challenges nsttutonal reforms. Abolton of the 
varous nsttutonal obstacles that hnder the development of a labour market 
wll not only enhance mgraton flows, they wll make t a ratonal movement, 
by helpng to create the developmental clmate and job opportuntes for labour 
moblty, whch n turn matures the condtons for abolton of the hukou system. 
Table 8.5  Theil decomposition based on regression
components of nequalty 2003 2004 2005 2006
Thel entropy 0.270  0.246  0.204  0.196 
regonal factors (per cent) 28.08 26.10 22.84 20.31
indvdual factors (per cent) –63.88 –52.92 –33.03 –44.49
constant (per cent) –11.16 –26.22 –60.89 –41.06
resdual (per cent) 146.96 153.04 171.08 165.24
Total (per cent) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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The chnese government, whch has specfic development goals for the next 
10–20 years, should grasp every opportunty to push nsttutonal reforms and 
to encourage labour mgraton once ts mportance s further realsed.
in the course of chna’s dual-economy development, modern urban economc 
sectors expand rapdly and attract mass labour mgraton from rural to urban 
areas, supplyng an nexhaustble labour force to urban sectors at a low cost. 
Thanks to the unlmted supply of labour, mgrant workers n urban sectors have 
nether collectve barganng power for ther wage determnaton, nor can they 
nfluence the labour market polces of local governments. At the development 
stage, therefore, rural–urban mgrants confront a host of nsttutonal obstacles, 
among whch s the hukou system, dvdng the rural and urban labour market. 
legtmsed by the hukou system and ts resultng dscrmnatory nsttutons, 
local governments often blame urban employment pressure on competton 
from mgrant workers and hence form a polcy orentated towards dscrmnatng 
aganst mgrants, cyclng n accordance wth the fluctuaton of the employment 
stuaton n urban labour markets (ca et al. 2003). every tme labour moblty 
from rural to urban areas experences systematc obstructon by government 
polcy, mgrant workers have no choce but to return to contracted land or other 
famly busnesses n ther home vllages, whch serve as a pool that cyclcally 
absorbs the rural surplus of labour. 
Ths chnese-style wage-sharng system causes labour mgraton to be 
temporary, nstablty of off-farm ncome for rural households and persstence 
of a rural–urban ncome gap. only when the relatonshp between supply of and 
demand for labour changes n an nverse drecton aganst the long-standng 
figures can these problems be solved. in the hstores of most ndustralsed 
countres, the moment when systematc labour shortages occurred became 
a turnng pont n whch the employer–employee relatonshp mproved. 
Furthermore, at ths pont, ncome nequalty tends to declne and government 
polcymakers and legslators tend to favour ordnary workers. As nternatonal 
experence suggests, however, f governments are ncapable of makng sound 
polcy choces, even when they understand the requrements of the next phase 
of economc development, t s lkely that the dscrmnatory nsttutons of the 
dual economy wll contnue. if such dscrmnaton aganst ordnary workers 
contnues, t wll leave the workng class severely dsgruntled and could lead 
to fierce socal conflct.1
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Notes
1 korea n the late 1980s s an example that a majorty of the condtons necessary for nsttutonal 
changes satsfyng ordnary workers matured, but the changes were not made, so the socety 
experenced severe conflct between the government and the workng classes (Freeman 
1993).
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unskilled workers in China increased? 
data from seven factores n Guangdong
Xin Meng and Nansheng Bai
chna has experenced strong economc growth for a long tme. The 
sustanablty and character of that growth depends, to a large extent, on 
whether chna has exhausted ts rural surplus labour. in ths chapter, we use 
unque payroll data from seven large manufacturng factores to show that 
wages of unsklled labour n these factores have not ncreased sgnficantly, 
f at all. These findngs could shed some lght on whether chna has reached 
a ‘lewsan turnng pont’ and the extent to whch chnese economc growth 
could be sustanable. 
chna has had 15 years of unprecedented economc growth, whch, to 
a sgnficant extent, s related to a large-scale movement of surplus labour 
from the low-productvty rural sector to the hgh-productvty urban sector. 
rural–urban mgraton provded chnese ndustres wth cheap labour and 
facltated the rapd growth of labour-ntensve manufacturng exports. Those 
who are nterested n the ssue of the sustanablty of chnese economc growth 
would be eager to learn the extent to whch rural–urban mgraton can contnue 
to drve the fast pace of economc growth. 
many recent studes have predcted that chna has exhausted ts surplus 
labour and reached the pont whereby labour shortages (the lewsan turnng 
pont) are occurrng (Garnaut and huang 2006; ca and Wang 2006; ca and 
Wang 2007a, 2007b). The most effectve way to measure whether chna has 
reached the lewsan turnng pont s to examne the wage trend of unsklled 
labour. The dea s that f surplus labour s approachng exhauston, the wages 
of unsklled workers wll start to rse sgnficantly. Unfortunately, chnese 
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offical statstcs do not provde data on the wages of mgrant workers, who 
make up the majorty of non-agrcultural unsklled labour. survey data of 
mgrant workers are often based on non-random samplng of mgrants and are 
cross-sectonal n nature. A few studes that ndcate the possble exhauston 
of surplus labour use manly wage data of urban resdents as ndcators (see, 
for example, Garnaut and huang 2006; ca and Wang 2007a). Ths could be 
msleadng, as the chnese urban labour market stll operates under a two-ter 
system whereby urban-resdent workers are pad a premum wage and are hred 
manly n hgh-status jobs, whle ther rural-mgrant counterparts are employed 
mostly n unsklled jobs and are pad a wage below the margnal productvty 
level (meng and Zhang 2001; knght et al. 1999; meng 2001). To date, no study 
has examned how the wages of unsklled mgrant workers have changed n 
recent years—due manly to the lack of avalable data.
here we employ a unque payroll data set for seven labour-ntensve 
manufacturng factores n Guangdong Provnce for the perod from 2000 to 2004 
to examne how the wages of mgrant workers n these factores have changed 
n that perod. hopefully, our findngs wll shed some lght on the bgger ssue 
of whether chna has reached the lewsan turnng pont. 
Data
in 2004–05, we partcpated n a wage and workng condton study of some 
labour-ntensve factores n Guangdong Provnce, contracted by an outsourcng 
company. The project was desgned to nvestgate whether factores n 
chna, whch work for the outsourcng company, are fulfillng ther far-wage 
commtments and followng the outsourcng company’s code of conduct.
The outsourcng company provded a lst of 82 contractng factores n 
Guangdong Provnce. Based on ths lst, a group of 20 factores was selected 
randomly based on the stratficaton of regon (Guanzhao, dongguan, shenzhen, 
Zhongshan and others), products (footwear, apparel and accessores and gears) 
and sze (firms wth more than 1,000 workers and wth 1,000 or less workers). 
Nne of the 20 firms ether refused or dd not respond to the request from 
the outsourcng company. The remanng 11 firms represent Guangzhou and 
shenzhen ctes, the footwear ndustry and large firms. To correct for ths bas, 
five addtonal factores were added to the lst and two of them were selected. 
The final lst comprsed 13 factores, and each was then ntervewed.
Although the factores were gven assurances that the study would not reveal 
any dentfyng nformaton about ndvdual factores, many were nevertheless 
apprehensve about partcpatng.
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durng ntervews, the general stuaton regardng wages, employment and 
benefits was dscussed and the requrements of payroll data collecton were 
presented, stressng that orgnal data collected would not be provded to the 
outsourcng company. Among the 13 factores vsted, sx refused to partcpate. 
seven factores agreed to provde payroll and personnel data, of whch one 
factory agreed to provde data only for one of ts many producton lnes.
Partcpatng factores provded personnel and monthly records of payroll 
data for the perod from 2000 onwards. of the seven factores nvolved, two 
were footwear factores, two were apparel factores and three were accessores 
and gear factores. most of the factores were large; three were n dongguan, 
two n Guangzhou, one n shenzhen and one n Zhongshan. The vald data 
conssted of 1,163,857 wage records. in August 2004 (the last month for whch 
all sample firms had wage records), the largest factory n the sample had 12,032 
workers, whle the smallest had 651 workers. in that month, three of the sample 
factores had more than 1,000 workers and the remanng four had less than 
1,000 workers (Table 9.1).
The purpose of the data collecton and the voluntary nature of data 
provson could ndcate that the seven factores that provded data were the 
best performers (law abdng) n the area of far wages and lvng condtons. 
The results obtaned from these data, therefore, mght not be representatve 
of chna n general; however, they are lkely to be an overestmate n terms of 
wages, wage growth and other condtons, and hence, are lkely to be based n 
favour of the conjecture that chna has reached the lewsan turnng pont.
Table 9.1 Industry, region, and size distribution of the sample 
factories
Frm  cty reported number Factory type Number of  data perod 
code  of workers  workers n 
    August 2004
1 dongguan 5,553 Footwear 12,032 2000–2004
2 Guangzhou 7,326 Footwear 7,641 2000–2004
3 dongguan 1,200 Apparel 837 2001–2004
4 dongguan 900 Apparel 669 2002–2004
5 shenzhen 550 Accessores and gears 651 2002–2004
6a Zhongshan 6,900 Accessores and gears 701 2000–2004
7 Guangzhou 917 Accessores and gears 1,119 2002–2004
a data provded for only one producton lne.
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Table 9.2 presents summary statstcs of the data. The first panel shows 
the sample dstrbuton by year and ndustry. Fgures from ths panel ndcate 
that n each of the five years the sample s domnated by the footwear ndustry, 
whch accounted for a mnmum of 83 per cent of the sample (2003) and a 
maxmum of 99 per cent of the sample (2000) when nvestgatng annual data. 
Ths mportant feature of the data should be kept n mnd when nterpretng 
the results presented below. Note that among the three types of ndustry, 
footwear has the most labour-ntensve and unsklled jobs. most workers 
work on producton lnes. Apparel workers, although workng on ndvdual 
machnes, requre a farly low level of skll. The accessores and gear ndustry, 
on the other hand, requres hgher skll levels. These factores were producng 
manly golf clubs, n whch the major job nvolved metal polshng, whch had 
a hgh skll content. 
The second panel of Table 9.2 shows the gender dstrbuton of workers n the 
sample. on average, the sample s female domnated, wth women accountng 
for 75 per cent of workers. The dstrbutons vary consderably, however, across 
dfferent ndustres. For example, whle the footwear ndustry s manly female 
domnated, accessores and gear s domnated by male workers. 
The thrd panel presents the dstrbuton of rural mgrant workers relatve 
to urban workers. The footwear ndustry has the largest percentage of rural 
mgrants, the proporton for all ndustres has ncreased to more than 80 per 
cent snce 2003 and, by 2004, the proporton of rural workers accounted for 90 
per cent of the total sample. 
The fourth panel summarses the average age of the sample populaton. 
The mean age of the sample n 2000 was 23.4 years, whle n 2004 t ncreased 
to 25.5 years. Anecdotal evdence provded to support the dea that chna 
has reached the lewsan turnng pont s that many factores are unable to 
find young workers (aged 15–25), who are more energetc and more suted to 
these factory jobs. does the ncrease n the average age of our sample over 
tme support such a conjecture? one of the reasons for a two-year ncrease n 
average age could be related to the panel nature of the data. As workers stay 
longer, they become older. To understand the extent to whch ths ncrease n 
average age of the sample s due to the panel nature, we also examne the age 
of the newly hred workers to see f factores are hrng older workers. The data 
show that for the new workers, the average age ncreased from 22.5 n 2000 
to 23.3 n 2004—an ncrease of less than one year. Although ths s consstent 
wth the anecdotal evdence, the change s not sgnficant.
The educatonal dstrbuton of the workers s presented n the bottom 
panel of the table. As ndcated, the majorty of workers are junor hgh school 
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graduates: about 81–86 per cent. A substantally hgher proporton of male 
workers have senor hgh or techncal hgh school qualficatons relatve to 
female workers. Just less than 1 per cent of the total workers have a college 
or unversty degree. here agan, there s a larger proporton of male workers 
than female workers. For the newly hred workers, the proporton of junor hgh 
school graduates ncreased from 81 per cent n 2000 to 87 per cent n 2004. At 
the same tme, the proporton of people who held prmary school qualficatons 
and those held senor hgh school qualficatons decreased.
Wages and wage growth: first glance 
The most mportant data for ths chapter are wages and hourly wage rates. 
Before presentng data on wages t s mportant to understand the wage 
structure n these factores. Table 9.3 presents the dfferent reportng methods 
regardng wages used n each of the seven factores.
Table 9.3 shows that the sample factores record wages n very dfferent 
ways, and some records are much more complcated than others. Although 
many factores use pece rates to calculate the wages of producton workers—
especally n the apparel and accessores and gear ndustres—when t comes 
to accountng, all the wage data are converted to some type of tme-rate 
wages (based mostly on the new rules set by the outsourcng company wth 
dfferental normal tme and overtme pay for monday to Frday, weekends and 
publc holdays).1 The general format of the payroll data s to record the amount 
workers earned (A), the amount of deductons (B) and the final (net) payment, 
whch equals (A)-(B). 
Wages reported n the payroll data are at a monthly rate, ncludng a basc 
wage and other components. Payroll data also provde workers’ workng days 
and hours. in some cases, however, workng days and hour data are not drectly 
avalable. Formulae provded by the factores are used to calculate workers’ 
monthly workng hours. Based on ths nformaton, hourly wage rates can be 
calculated. in addton, as the data present the five years of wage changes, a 
cty-specfic consumer prce ndex (cPi) seres s used to calculate real wages 
based on the prce level n 2000.2
Table 9.4 presents summary statstcs for wages and hours worked. The 
left panel of the table presents the average real total monthly wages, workng 
hours and hourly wage rates for the total sample for the five-year perod by 
gender and product types,3 whle the rght panel presents the data for mgrant 
producton workers only. 
The data from the left panel show that, on average, real monthly total 
earnngs ncreased by 3.3 per cent per annum (column 1). male workers earn, on 
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average, 13–25 per cent more than female workers (column 5) and the annual 
growth of monthly real earnngs s much faster for men than for women, wth 
a dfference of 1.5 percentage ponts per annum.4
Turnng to monthly hours worked, the total hours worked are about 197 to 
212 a month, whch amounts to 46 to 50 hours a week. Ths s about 8–8.3 hours 
a day, wth sx workng days a week. Ths seems to be on the low sde relatve 
to common perceptons and common findngs of hours worked for mgrant 
workers from other survey data sources. For example, meng and Zhang (2001) 
found that n shangha n 1995 mgrant workers worked an average of 56 hours a 
week. A recent survey of ncome dstrbuton for mgrant workers n 11 provnces 
(ncludng Guangdong) showed that the sample mgrant workers worked, on 
average, 61 hours a week n 2002, whereas the number for Guangdong Provnce 
was 65 hours weekly.5 interestngly, the average weekly hours worked was also 
much lower than the maxmum 60 hours a week requred by the outsourcng 
company. one possble reason for ths s that the pattern of producton s 
seasonal, wth peaks and troughs. When calculatng annual monthly averages, 
they could appear lower than the maxmum hours requred by the outsourcng 
company. The other possble reason s that firms could have msreported 
nformaton about hours worked to satsfy the outsourcng company’s code of 
conduct. The total monthly hours worked vares only slghtly across dfferent 
years: on average, they ncreased by 0.2 per cent per annum, and dd not dffer 
between men and women. The number of monthly hours worked, however, s 
often hgher for female than for male workers.
combnng the nformaton on monthly earnngs and hours worked, hourly 
earnngs data are then calculated. Note that as nformaton on hours worked 
could be based downwards, hourly earnngs data could be based upwards 
accordngly. The major dfference observed between data on hourly earnngs 
and monthly earnngs s that the annual growth of hourly earnngs for male 
workers s much hgher than the annual growth of ther monthly earnngs. Ths 
further prompts one to wonder f the nformaton provded for hours worked 
s accurate.
The above descrptons are based on the total sample, ncludng servce 
workers, manageral and techncal staff. The rght panel of Table 9.4 presents 
the same nformaton for mgrant producton workers, whch ndcates the 
wages for unsklled workers. The most mportant dfference between the total 
sample and the sample of producton workers s that the rate of wage growth 
s much slower for the latter, wth an annual monthly wage ncrease of 2.8 
per cent—about 0.5 percentage ponts lower than that for the total sample. in 
partcular, for female producton workers—the most unsklled group—the real 
hourly wage ncreased by only 2 per cent per annum. 
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monthly and hourly earnngs data for the mgrant producton workers s 
shown n Fgure 9.1. Whle male monthly earnngs ncreased sgnficantly 
between 2001 and 2002, they flattened out after 2002. For the total and female 
samples, the monthly wage ncrease has been lmted. For example, female 
monthly earnngs were about 800 yuan and, by 2004 (five years later), had 
ncreased to only 900 yuan—an annual ncrease of 2.6 per cent—whereas for 
males the ncrease was faster, at an annual rate of 3.4 per cent. The hourly 
earnngs data ndcate a much larger dfference n the wage growth rate, wth 
2 per cent for women and 6.3 per cent for men. 
havng descrbed average levels and changes of wages n these factores, 
we wonder how they compare wth the average mnmum wages for the regons 
covered and wth average urban wage changes n Guangdong Provnce. more 
mportantly, how do they compare wth the ncome levels of the mgrant workers’ 
respectve rural home towns? snce about 90 per cent of the sample workers 
are from Jangx, henan, hube, hunan and schuan provnces, aggregated 
data for these five provnces are presented. 
Table 9.5 compares average mnmum wages for the four regons covered n 
ths study, urban manufacturng workers’ wages for Guangdong Provnce and 
average per capta rural net ncome for the five provnces lsted above, wth the 












































total monthly females monthly
male monthly total hourly
female hourly male hourly
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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average basc monthly pay and the average monthly wages for the sample of 
mgrant producton workers n the perod 2000–04. The first two rows present 
the average mnmum wages for the four regons n Guangdong—the average 
nomnal monthly basc pay for our sample of producton workers. They show 
that whle the mnmum wages ncreased by 2.62 per cent per annum between 
2000 and 2003, the basc pay for the sample of producton workers ncreased by 
4.2 per cent per annum n the same perod. When comparng the level of average 
mnmum wages wth the average basc pay, the basc pay for the producton 
workers n every sngle year s hgher than the offical mnmum wages. in 2002 
and 2003, t s about 9–10 per cent hgher. Ths findng suggests that the sample 
firms have been payng ther workers n lne wth local government labour 
legslaton. it s mportant to keep n mnd that all seven firms studed n ths 
chapter are large and volunteered ther payroll data. Ths findng mght not be 
representatve of the large number of factores that refused to partcpate n the 
study. in fact, anecdotal evdence and many newspaper artcles have revealed 
problems regardng firms’ volaton of the mnmum wage law.6
rows (4) and (5) present the average monthly total earnngs for the 
sample of mgrant producton workers and the urban manufacturng sector n 
Guangdong.7 it s found that mgrant workers earned about 67–80 per cent of 
the urban manufacturng average wage durng the whole perod and the gap 
has been enlarged. 
Table 9.5 also compares average monthly wages of the sample firms wth 
the rural average net monthly ncome8 per labourer for hunan Provnce, where 
almost 40 per cent of the sample workers come from. We find that although 
the average annual growth rate of rural-per-labourer ncome amounted to 
4.2 per cent durng ths perod, t was drven manly by the 2004 government 
polcy to cut the rural tax to zero. Before that, the average annual growth rate 
of rural ncome per labourer between 2000 and 2003 was only 2.6 per cent. 
most mportantly, we find that, on average, mgrant workers n the sample 
factores earned 2.7 to 2.9 tmes the ncome they would have earned had they 
stayed n rural hunan. Ths dfference s, perhaps, the best explanaton as to 
why mgrant workers are wllng to work n these factores. it s also a good 
ndcaton of whether chna has reached the lewsan turnng pont: when rural 
surplus labour s exhausted, rural and urban wages wll start to equalse. Ths 
s certanly not happenng n chna—f anythng, the rural–urban ncome gap 
has ncreased over tme (Fgure 9.2).
The above comparson, however, has one crucal weakness. The China 
Statistical Yearbooks do not provde data on hourly wage rates. it s lkely that 
urban Guangdong workers work fewer hours and hence have much hgher 
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hourly wage rates than the sample workers. du et al. (2006) show that, on 
average, mgrant workers work 55 per cent more hours a week than ther urban-
resdent counterparts. it can be magned that the hourly earnngs gap between 
urban workers and mgrant workers should be much more promnent than the 
gap between the annual wages shown n Fgure 9.2.
Wage growth: more in-depth analysis 
The above analyses present the raw data on wage levels and changes for 
mgrant workers. raw data could, however, be msleadng, as many dfferent 
factors could contrbute to the level and change of wages. For example, the 
longer a worker stays wth a factory, the hgher hs/her earnngs wll be. Gven 
that our data trace ndvduals over five years, at the end of the data perod, the 
average firm tenure of the worker s longer than at the begnnng of the perod 
(19 months versus 26 months), and ths could contrbute to the hgher average 
earnngs at the end of the perod. in addton, factores could hre more better-
educated workers at the end of the perod than at the begnnng. Ths could 
also contrbute to a seemng ncrease of earnngs by lookng at only the raw 
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China—Linking Markets for Growth
data. To examne the wage changes due purely to supply shortage, all these 
factors have to be controlled for. We estmate the followng earnngs equaton 
for ths purpose
ln(Yijt) = α + βXijt + δt + θj + εijt  (1)
where Yijt s hourly earnngs of ndvdual i n firm j at tme t; Xijt s a vector 
of control varables that could affect earnngs, ncludng age and ts squared 
term, firm tenure as measured n months and ts squared term, educaton level, 
occupaton and ndustry dummy varables, dummy varables for each month 
to capture seasonalty effects, a dummy varable for urban workers and a 
gender dummy varable. θ s factory fixed effect, δ s year fixed effect and ε s 
a random error term. Whle educaton measures the formal tranng, firm tenure 
ndcates on-the-job tranng. Age, on the other hand, proxes for general labour 
market experence and some possble age-related physcal condtons, such as 
eyesght and physcal strength, whch could affect labour productvty. Gender 
and mgrant status could to some extent capture labour-market dscrmnaton. 
To nvestgate wage changes over tme, the most mportant coefficents for 
ths study are the year fixed effects, δ. if, over the perod we studed, there s a 
sgnficant labour shortage, we should observe a sgnficant ncrease n δ. 
The earnngs model s estmated for the total sample and a sample of mgrant 
producton workers only. The results are presented n Table 9.6 (the left panel 
for the total sample and the rght panel for the mgrant producton workers). The 
first and fourth columns of each panel report the results for the total sample, 
whle the rest of the columns present the results for male and female workers 
separately. results from the total sample reveal that about 21–27 per cent of 
the wage varatons are explaned by the varables ncluded n the regresson. 
All human captal related varables have the rght sgns and are statstcally 
sgnficant. in partcular, firm tenure and general labour market experence 
have a normal relatonshp wth earnngs. educaton contrbutes postvely to 
earnngs and manageral staff earn more than producton workers, whle women 
earn about 10–12 per cent less than men. Note that n Table 9.4 much larger 
gender raw wage dfferentals are observed (about 15–32 per cent); the lower 
results ndcated here suggest that part of the gender earnngs dfferental can 
be explaned by the dfference n human captal possessons and other firm and 
ndvdual characterstcs controlled for n the regresson. The seasonal varables 
play an mportant role n earnngs determnaton. in partcular, earnngs n 
January are much hgher than the rest of the year and ths s due manly to the 
fact that most factores pay an extra bonus before the chnese New Year (the 
results are avalable on request from the authors). 
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more nterestng results are revealed when the earnngs equatons are estmated 
separately by gender. in partcular, on-the-job tranng (firm tenure) plays a more 
sgnficant role n earnngs determnaton for men than for women. Fgure 9.3 
shows the relatonshp between the number of months a worker works n a 
firm and hs/her earnngs (tenure–earnngs profile) and t ndcates that after 
one year a male worker earns about 5 per cent more than when he first entered 
the factory; ths rate doubles n two years to 10 per cent, all other thngs beng 
equal. in contrast, the wages of female workers ncrease by only 4.2 per cent 
after two years n the factores. Note that n the less-sklled footwear and apparel 
ndustres, more than 77 per cent of workers are women, whle n the more skll-
ntensve accessores and gear ndustry, 63 per cent of workers are men. 
The observed dfference by gender could, to a large extent, reflect structural 
wage dfferences across dfferent ndustres. The types of sklls requred n 
dfferent jobs and ndustres dffer sgnficantly. For example, durng ntervews, 
accessores and gear factores ndcated that t requred two years for a worker 
to become sklled. consequently, workers n ths ndustry are more lkely to 
be pad pece rates. in ths knd of envronment, the longer you work, the 
more sklled you become, the more peces you make and the hgher pay you 
receve. on the other hand, workers n footwear and apparel factores—where 
most female workers n our sample work—tend to be unsklled and operate n 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































China—Linking Markets for Growth
producton lnes. By and large, they are pad tme-rate wages. in ths knd of 
job, the extent to whch experence on the job can ncrease productvty s 
lmted. Thus, job tenure does not seem to affect wages as much as n the 
other ndustres. 
Another nterestng result s the dfference of formal educaton levels on 
earnngs between men and women. Whle formal educaton plays an mportant 
role n earnngs for women, male workers wth senor hgh school qualficaton 
earn less than ther counterparts who have only junor hgh school qualficaton. 
one of the reasons why formal educaton plays an mportant role for women—
who work manly n the unsklled footwear and apparel ndustres—s, perhaps, 
due to the nablty of the current study to control for detaled types of work 
performed by ndvduals. The data used here dentfy only whether a worker s 
nvolved drectly n producton and do not reveal the exact type of work they do. 
Perhaps more educated workers are more lkely to be a foreman or supervsor 
and hence earn more. Another reason could be that when workers work on 
producton lnes, productvty and qualty cannot be montored ndvdually. 
Thus, educaton s used as a screenng devce. 
The results showng that male workers wth more educaton (those workng 
manly n the accessores and gear ndustry) are recevng lower pay are 
abnormal. one possble conjecture s that for these types of jobs, experence 
at a younger age mght be mportant. Younger people could learn quckly 
and be more dexterous than older people. People who have only junor hgh 
school qualficatons could start workng earler than people who have hgher 
educaton and hence be more sklful than those wth hgher qualficatons, 
other thngs beng equal. Ths could not be tested emprcally as the data we 
use have nformaton only about current employment: earler smlar experence 
cannot be nvestgated.
The most mportant result for ths chapter s the year effect. We find that 
controllng for all the other varables, wages barely ncreased n the five years 
studed. Almost all the year dummy varables have negatve sgns, ndcatng 
that, relatve to the year 2000, earnngs of other years have reduced. Fgure 9.4 
presents the results on δ for the mgrant producton worker sample. it uses the 
coefficents obtaned from the estmaton of equaton 1 to smulate wages for a 
20-year-old, wth a junor hgh or prmary school qualficaton and zero months 
of firm tenure, n January for each of the five years. The figure shows that a 
newly hred 20-year-old wth junor hgh school qualficaton earned almost the 
same amount n 2004 as hs/her counterparts n 2000. For a woman, her hourly 
earnngs were 4.12 yuan n 2000, whch declned to 3.8 yuan n 2002, and then 
ncreased gradually to 4.16 yuan n 2004—an average annual growth of less 
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China—Linking Markets for Growth
than 0.2 per cent. For a man, the 2000 hourly earnngs were 4.36 yuan, droppng 
to 4 yuan n 2002, and ncreasng to 4.35 yuan n 2004—barely catchng up 
wth the 2000 level. if, however, we gnore the first two years, when there was 
a reducton n earnngs, and compare the lowest earnngs n 2002 wth those 
of the final year, we observe a slght wage ncrease of about 2.5 per cent per 
annum for men and women.
recall that factores could have msreported the data for hours worked. if 
so, t could bas the estmated earnngs growth. To test ths, we also estmated 
equaton 1 usng log monthly earnngs as the dependent varable.9 The 
smulaton usng these results s presented n Fgure 9.5, whch shows that the 
monthly earnngs growth for men and women s zero to negatve for the entre 
perod and 0.5–1.5 per cent for the last three years. 
Based on the data avalable, wage growth n the sample factores between 
2000 and 2004 has been very slow, n partcular for mgrant producton 
workers. 
Conclusions 
The emprcal results ndcate three man findngs.
1 of the seven sample factores, average hourly wages ncreased by about 
6 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2004 for the total sample of 
workers, but for producton workers the annual average growth rate was 
much lower, at 3.5 per cent. 
2 The major wage growth comes from wage growth for male workers. For 
female workers—who accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total 
sample—the average annual wage growth was about 2.4 per cent. 
3 once we control for educaton, firm tenure and other varables that could 
affect wage levels, the observed wage growth for the total sample and 
male and female samples are all very low. For the five years, average 
annual wage growth has been negatve or near zero. For the last three 
years, the growth rate was about 0.5–1.5 per cent. Wth such small wage 
ncreases, one could hardly argue that chna has reached the lewsan 
turnng pont. 
The man findng, although mportant, could suffer from the followng 
caveats. Frst, the current study could suffer sgnficantly from a sample 
selecton bas. Although effort was made to make sure that the sample was 
selected randomly, due to the unwllngness to partcpate among the lsted 
firms, the final sample s not a randomly selected one. it s possble that the 
factores that were wllng to partcpate n the study were those that followed 
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the outsourcng company’s code of conduct and the offical mnmum wage 
ncreases better than those that refused to partcpate. Thus, the general pcture 
of wage levels and wage growth mght not be as optmstc as we find n ths 
chapter. 
second, the man data used n ths study are from payroll records. it s not 
clear whether these records are genune. it s commonly known that many 
factores n chna adopt a double accountng practce. There s evdence 
that the payroll data provded by some factores are based on some knd of 
converson rules requred by the outsourcng company. in addton, the data 
on hours worked seem to be low. Although t s not clear to what extent ths 
knd of behavour could affect the accuracy of the earnngs and hours-worked 
data, the drecton of the effect s clear. Factores that volunteered to partcpate 
would want to present hgher earnngs and earnngs growth (keepng up wth 
the ncrease n mnmum wages). if there s any systematc bas of the data, t 
should be based upwards. 
Fnally, the data used n ths study end n 2004. it s possble that snce 2004 
wages have been growng at a much faster pace than what we found for the 
perod between 2000 and 2004. The lack of a systematc study of mgrants, 
however, and ther wage changes have prevented us from findng out ths 
nformaton. The current studes that argue that chna has reached the lewsan 
turnng pont do not seem to be based on unsklled workers’ wage data. We hope 
that the current study can shed lmted lght on the ssue, at least up to 2004. 
Notes
1 Based on the ntervew record, the monday–Frday normal tme pay s set at one; monday–Frday 
overtme pay s 50 per cent hgher (1.5 tmes normal pay); weekend pay s 100 per cent hgher 
(two tmes normal pay); whle publc holday pay s 200 per cent hgher (three tmes normal 
pay).
2 The cty-level cPis provded by the Guangdong Bureau of statstcs are presented n Table A1.
3 The data calculated by regon are not presented for confidentalty reasons, as two of the four 
regons have only one factory.
4 Note that as the data used for the total sample dffer sgnficantly from those used for males 
and females separately—due to a 20 per cent sample wthout personnel records—the figures 
presented usng the total sample are not drectly comparable wth those for the gender groups. 
Nevertheless, the trends are comparable.
5 Ths survey was conducted by the insttute of economcs at the chnese Academy of socal 
scences n 2003. The total sample of workers was 5,327 and the sample for Guangdong 
Provnce was 368 mgrant workers.
6 see, for example, http://finance.dayoo.com/gb/content/2006-07/14/content_2566970.htm
7 manufacturng comprses about 23 dfferent ndustry types. ideally, the average annual 
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earnngs of the footwear, apparel and accessores and gear ndustres for Guangdong Provnce 
should be used for ths comparson. The China Statistical Yearbook, however, does not provde 
detaled nformaton for these ndustres separately, nor does t ndcate the employment and 
earnngs dstrbuton among these dfferent ndustry types. The comparson presented here, 
therefore, should be read wth cauton.
8 Ths s calculated by dvdng annual data by 12.
9 The results are not presented, but are avalable on request from the authors.
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Table A9.1 City level CPI 2000=100
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Guangzhou 100.00 98.90 96.53 96.62 98.27
shenzhen 100.00 97.80 98.97 99.67 100.96
dongguan 100.00 98.20 96.33 97.01 99.92
Zhongshan 100.00 99.80 99.10 100.29 103.40
Source: data provded by Natonal Bureau of statstcs of chna
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10
Domestic market integration and 
inter-regional growth spillovers
Jane Golley and Nicolaas Groenewold
Whle chna’s ntegraton nto the global economy durng the past three decades 
has been extremely mpressve, the ntegraton among regons wthn chna 
has been much less so. domestc market ntegraton has a crtcal role to play 
n bndng together a country that has suffered from dsntegratve tendences 
throughout ts hstory. As such, the mportance of ntegraton cannot be 
overstated, partcularly n lght of recent research that seems ‘to confirm 
the pertnence of alarmng forecasts concernng the danger of chna’s move 
towards nternal dsntegraton’ (Poncet 2003:17). Numerous other researchers 
have reached smlar—f not qute as dramatc—conclusons n ther analyses 
of chna throughout the communst era (donnthorne 1967; lyons 1987; Young 
2000; World Bank 2005). 
Ths chapter contrbutes to a growng lterature that addresses the extent 
of domestc market ntegraton n the chnese economy. The next secton 
defines ntegraton and dscusses the costs and benefits assocated wth t. 
Ths alone reveals that answerng two of the most relevant questons—how 
ntegrated are chna’s provnces and how ntegrated should they be—s far from 
straghtforward. A bref dscusson of the numerous methodologes avalable 
for assessng the degree of ntegraton further demonstrates ths pont and 
mples that our own method of emprcal analyss—measurng nter-regonal 
output spllovers—s only one part of a hghly complcated pcture. 
The next secton revews the changng nature of chnese domestc market 
ntegraton durng the communst era. regardless of the methodology 
employed, a salent feature of the dscusson s the almost unversal recognton 
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that chna’s regons are less ntegrated than mght be expected of regons n 
a unfied naton-state. our emprcal results lend further support to ths clam. 
A vector autoregressve (VAr) framework s ntroduced to assess the extent 
of output spllovers between sx regons n chna durng the perod from 1953 
to 2003. The results suggest that whle chna’s better-developed regons are 
relatvely well nterconnected wth each other, spllovers between these regons 
are nether pervasve nor strong. meanwhle, the least-developed regons—that 
s, those most n need of postve growth spllovers from elsewhere—are 
connected only weakly, f at all, wth the rest of the country. Polcy mplcatons 
and recommendatons are offered n the concludng secton.
Regional integration: theory and measurement
integraton can be defined broadly as the ncreasng nterdependence of regons, 
ether wthn or across countres, as reflected n the flow of goods, servces 
and/or factors of producton. The process of ntegraton requres the gradual 
elmnaton of economc fronters and trade-restrctng nstruments between 
regons so that the moblty of goods, servces and factors s not constraned. 
Ths process of ‘ntegraton from below’ can be renforced by ‘ntegraton from 
above’, whch entals the actve promoton of economc cooperaton between 
terrtores through approprate polces or nsttutons (Tnbergen 1965). 
The expanson of trade that arses due to fallng trade barrers underpns 
one of the major benefits of ntegraton. Accordng to the standard neoclasscal 
analyss, a reducton n trade barrers leads to welfare gans through the 
explotaton of comparatve advantage and the consequent ncrease n 
productvty. hgher gross domestc product (GdP) growth rates occur durng 
the transtonal perod—or the short term—n whch resources are reallocated 
and captal accumulaton takes place, as the economy approaches ts new 
steady-state levels of captal and output per worker. Theores relatng the gans 
from trade to long-term growth are based typcally on models of endogenous 
technologcal change.1 
Trade can ncrease the rate of technologcal progress—and hence 
productvty growth—ether through an expanson of output markets enablng 
domestc producers to explot economes of scale, or through an expanson 
of nput markets resultng n lower producton costs (for example, by gvng 
domestc producers access to a wder varety of captal goods, effectvely 
enlargng the base of productve knowledge, as descrbed by romer 1990). The 
gans from trade can be dynamc rather than statc f specalsaton stmulates 
productvty growth through learnng by dong, as n lucas (1988). on the flp 
sde of these benefits, whle trade can act as a condut for technology transfer, 
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theores of technologcal dffuson stress the mportance of the host country (or 
regon) havng a sufficently hgh level of ‘socal capablty’ n order to be able to 
successfully mplement technologes developed n more advanced economes, 
whle regons below a threshold level of development could be unable to make 
effectve use of technology spllovers (see, for example, Abramovtz 1986 and 
howtt 2000). That s, t s not guaranteed that all regons wll be able to benefit 
equally from the trade that takes place between them, whle some regons 
could mss out altogether.2
Beyond the trade-related benefits, ntegraton should also mprove the 
nter-regonal transmsson of growth from faster growng regons to laggng 
ones, through a varety of connectons that are presumably stronger between 
hghly ntegrated regons. These nclude the ncrease n mports from and 
nvestments n laggng regons, the dffuson of nnovatons orgnatng n 
more rapdly growng regons and the ablty of a more rapdly growng regon 
to absorb some of the unemployed or underemployed labour from elsewhere. 
These effects all contrbute to the equalsaton of regonal ncomes, whch s 
benefical n tself from poltcal and socoeconomc perspectves. Wth the 
hope that faster growng regons wll exert a benefical nfluence on other 
regons, however, comes the lkelhood that more hghly ntegrated markets 
wll cause each other to suffer more when economc growth falters n any one 
regon. marshall (1920:241) descrbes how ‘ntegraton, that s, the growng 
ntmacy and firmness of connectons between separate parts of the ndustral 
organsm’ enables each part of that organsm ‘to be less and less self-sufficent, 
to depend for ts wellbeng more and more on other parts, so that any dsorder 
n any part…wll affect other parts also’. moreover, whle trckle-down effects 
are lkely to be stronger across hghly ntegrated regonal markets, so too are 
ther counterparts: ‘polarsaton’ effects, whch descrbe the adverse effects 
that rapd growth n better-developed regons can have on economc progress 
elsewhere (hrschman 1958). These effects nclude the nablty of comparatvely 
nefficent, yet ncome-creatng, ndustres n laggng regons to compete, ‘bran 
dran’ and captal depleton as savngs are redrected towards more profitable 
nvestments n the rapdly growng regons. 
Whle most arguments pont to the long-term benefts of ntegraton 
outweghng the costs, the same cannot necessarly be sad of the short term. 
For example, n a developng economy, the freeng of restrctons on labour 
movements s lkely to result n mgrants movng to wealther regons n search 
of hgher wages. meanwhle, the spread of nnovaton could reman tardy 
because of poor communcaton and transport lnks between the ntegratng 
regons. Ths combnaton would benefit the more rapdly growng regons to 
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the detrment of poorer ones—an ssue that resonates wth the current chnese 
stuaton. Thus, whle ntegraton s regarded generally as desrable, unless t 
proceeds far enough and n the rght ways, a negatve consequence of mproved 
ntegraton could be the worsenng of regonal dspartes, n turn threatenng 
the socal stablty and natonal unty that polcymakers are tryng to acheve.
measurng the extent of ntegraton n ts varous guses, let alone ts costs 
and benefits, s fraught wth dfficultes. if the definton of regonal ntegraton 
was smplfied to the removal of nter-regonal trade barrers, the most drect 
way to measure the extent of ntegraton would be to examne the prevalence 
of these barrers. The lack of tarffs, however, and other well-defined barrers 
to trade wthn a sngle naton make ths smple approach napproprate for our 
analyss here. Another drect approach examnes nter-regonal trade flows, 
based on the assumpton that ntegraton wll result n rsng trade flows. Ths 
method s problematc n chna, gven the paucty of nter-provncal trade 
data, although some attempts have been made (Naughton 2003; Poncet 2003, 
2005). it s also problematc to dstngush the mpact of ntegraton from other 
factors nfluencng nter-regonal trade, ncludng transport costs and regonal 
endowments. 
The producton approach assumes that the more ntegrated the regons, 
the more specalsed the ndustry at the regonal level, wth changes n 
specalsaton taken as evdence of changes n ntegraton over tme (Young 
2000; Ba et al. 2004). one obvous shortcomng here s that much trade between 
regons can be ntra-ndustry trade, whch s consstent wth smlar ndustral 
structures, not dfferent ones. Alternatvely, the margnal returns approach 
assesses factor returns n dfferent regons, based on the assumpton that these 
should converge n an ntegrated market (Tan and Zhang 2005), whle smlar 
methodologes can be used to assess prce equalty across regons, based on 
the law of one prce (Parsley and We 1996; Fan and We 2003). The busness 
cycle approach assumes that more closely ntegrated economes wll exhbt 
strongly correlated busness cycles (Xu 2002; Xu and Voon 2003; Tang 1998), 
and therefore focuses on the smlarty of shocks across regons. 
of greater nterest here, however, s the way n whch shocks n one regon 
are transmtted to others, based on the dea that more ntegrated regons wll 
show stronger transmsson of shocks. Ths brngs us to the nter-regonal 
growth spllover approach, whch s descrbed and adopted below, and whch, 
smply speakng, seeks to dentfy how shocks to GdP n one regon mpact 
on GdP n that regon and on GdP elsewhere, and how those mpacts are 
transmtted over tme. Whle ths approach does not make t possble to draw 
strong conclusons regardng the precse transmsson mechansms between 
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regons—that s, whch trckle-down or polarsaton effects are domnant—t 
does provde a useful startng pont for further nvestgaton nto the ssue. 
Before attemptng ths, however, the next secton revews the lterature on 
regonal ntegraton n chna durng the communst perod.
Regional integration in Communist China3
integraton has been a central theme n explanatons of economc development 
n the Unted states and other countres. in each case, the relatonshp between 
ntegraton and development s complex and crcular. indeed, ‘ntegraton 
s perhaps best vewed not as a cause or result of development, but smply 
as an aspect of development tself’ (lyons 1987:14). Ths s the startng 
observaton made by lyons—n hs semnal work on chna’s domestc market 
ntegraton—who descrbes how the partcular nature of chna’s plannng 
system durng the command era (1953–78) caused ‘economc fragmentaton’ 
(or dsntegraton) along regonal lnes. Unlke the standard sovet plan, chna’s 
plan was formulated and mplemented prmarly along provncal, rather than 
sectoral lnes. The relatve mportance of regonal unts n the plannng process 
meant that f nter-regonal coordnaton was deficent—whch t was—the 
dsntegratve tendences assocated wth compartmentalsed plannng would 
be felt largely along regonal lnes. 
Varous polces pursued by central and local governments renforced the 
dsntegratve nature of chna’s provncally focused plannng mechansm. 
donnthorne (1967) descrbed how mao Zedong’s prncple of self-relance 
wthn admnstratve unts created the ncentve for self-sufficency wthn those 
unts. Ths strengthened the tendency towards a ‘cellular economy’ n whch 
ndependent, comprehensve and relatvely autarkc sub-systems at each and 
every geographc and sectoral unt were desgned to operate ndependently. one 
negatve consequence of ths was ncreasng regonal nequalty, snce ‘[]n an 
admnstratve unt where economc drve and entrepreneurshp s [sc] plentful, 
the polcy of self-relance and self-sufficency may gve added encouragement 
to local ntatve. Where these qualtes are scarce, the lkelhood of reparng 
ths lack from elsewhere wll be dmnshed’ (donnthorne 1972:612). The cellular 
economc structure and fragmentaton that emerged durng the perod of 
command plannng left a strong and lastng mark on nter-provncal relatons. 
durng the reform perod, whle the sources (and the wordng) of the problem 
have changed, ‘provncalsm’, local protectonsm and the consequent lack of 
domestc market ntegraton reman key polcy ssues.
The World Bank (1994) conducted the first major study of chna’s nternal 
market developments durng the reform perod. evdence of sgnficant regonal 
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prce dfferentals across a broad range of producer and consumer goods, 
combned wth declnng nter-provncal trade and nvestment flows, lmted 
nter-provncal labour and captal moblty and bottlenecks n transport, led 
the bank to conclude that chna was far from realsng the benefits of ts 
potentally large nternal market. it called for the harmonsaton of fees and 
fines leved on nter-provncal trade, the prohbton of nter-provncal trade 
barrers, changes n regulatons affectng factor moblty and the removal of 
resdual prce controls. 
Whle some of these ssues have snce been resolved, the essence of the 
problem remans, accordng to the World Bank’s (2005) extensve report on 
the degree of ntegraton n chna’s product and factor markets. in product 
markets, convergng prces and ncreasng specalsaton ndcate ncreased 
ntegraton, but new forms of protectonsm—n local government procurement 
practces, for example—combned wth the slow pace of nsttutonal and 
transport nfrastructure development, contnue to mpede the spread of growth 
across regons. labour markets, whle mprovng n recent years, stll show 
sgnficant fragmentaton across regons and sectors. The bank’s analyss 
of captal markets shows not only large msallocatons across regons and 
sectors, t ndcates that the degree of fragmentaton has deterorated over tme. 
key problems that reman nclude underdeveloped captal markets and large 
dfferences n the regulatons and nsttutonal and nfrastructure envronments 
that affect the relatve attractveness of dfferent localtes.
Young (2000) blames the lack of nternal ntegraton on the ncompleteness 
of chna’s economc reforms. he begns wth a story of the ‘slkworm cocoon 
war’ of the late 1980s, durng whch Zhejang Provnce began to restrct the 
sale of slk cocoons to other parts of chna, and slk factores n neghbourng 
shangha found t necessary to mport raw slk from abroad. he then descrbes 
more generally how ncremental economc reforms that devolved power to local 
governments resulted n compettve local ndustral polces and the mposton 
of a varety of barrers to nter-provncal trade. evdence of convergng provncal 
ndustral structures combned wth fluctuatng perods of convergng and 
dvergng provncal prces leads Young to conclude that ‘the reform process 
led to the fragmentaton of the domestc market and the dstorton of regonal 
producton patterns away from comparatve advantage’ (2000:1,091). replace 
‘reform’ wth ‘plannng’ and the phrase could just as well be n lyons’ (1987) 
semnal work on fragmentaton durng the plannng perod.
Naughton (2003) presents the most optmstc analyss to date, dsputng 
Young’s analyss n partcular but also gong aganst the tde n argung that 
chna s a relatvely well-ntegrated naton-state and s becomng more so over 
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tme. he makes the pont that regonal ntegraton cannot be separated from 
an understandng of enterprse reform, prvatsaton and marketsaton, notng, 
for example, that organsatonal changes at the enterprse level—such as 
conversons of state firms to jont stock companes—are makng t more costly 
for local governments to ntervene n market operatons. Whle challengng the 
vews of most other authors, Naughton agrees that further efforts to ntegrate 
the domestc market are called for, and he sees chna’s challenge as consstng 
of two types of ntegraton.
The first conssts of buldng adequate nfrastructure to permt adequate 
transport of bulky, energy-ntensve commodtes and fuels at reasonable cost. 
The second conssts of creatng a unfied compettve marketplace n whch 
enterprses can explot productvty dfferentals and comparatve advantage 
so that the economy as a whole can reap gans from trade. Progress has been 
made n these areas, but much more needs to be done (Naughton 2003:205).
There have nevtably been comparsons drawn between chna’s—or, more 
aptly, coastal chna’s—exceptonal ntegraton nto the global economy and the 
perceved lack of progress nternally. About the same tme as the first World 
Bank study, Ash and kueh (1993) noted that ncreasng ntegraton of southern 
chna (Guangdong and Fujan) wth hong kong and Tawan contrasted wth—
and could ndeed have contrbuted to—poor nternal ntegraton n the sense 
that backward and forward lnkages between the south and the rest of chna 
remaned weak. Poncet (2003) uses data on provncal trade flows to compare 
the magntude and evoluton of chnese provnces’ engagement n domestc 
and nternatonal trade, and confirms Ash and kueh’s findngs on a bgger scale 
one decade later. she shows that chna’s ncreasng openness n nternatonal 
markets has gone hand n hand wth nternal fragmentaton between 1987 and 
1997, and concludes that whle reforms obvously succeeded n promotng the 
former, they have faled to reduce mpedments to the latter. 
Fu (2004 ) argues that the emphass on foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) drven 
labour-ntensve processng ndustres n the rapdly developng southeastern 
coastal provnces has attracted relatvely moble and efficent resources from 
the nland regons, but t has generated only lmted lnkages and weak spllovers 
n return—thereby descrbng a stuaton n whch polarsaton effects are 
domnatng trckle down. Yao and Zhang (2001) confirm ths, and attrbute the 
dvergence n regonal ncomes to the slow process of spllovers from the coastal 
regon nwards. hu and Jefferson (2002), drawng on evdence from chna’s 
electronc and textle ndustres, take ths pont a step further n establshng 
that Fdi enhances the productvty of the recpent firm, but t depresses that of 
non-Fdi firms, whether located nearby or not. Whle ther findngs suggest that 
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non-Fdi firms wll eventually catch up n terms of productvty n the longer term, 
the short-term mplcatons are that trckle down s lmted even wthn coastal 
ctes where Fdi s concentrated, let alone across to other areas. in sum, there 
seems to be ample evdence that the better-developed coastal regon s becomng 
better ntegrated wth the rest of the world than t s wth the rest of chna. 
That s not to say that transmssons of nter-regonal growth are completely 
absent wthn chna. Yng (2000) uses provncal output data and finds the 
strongest sgnfcant nfluence beng exerted by Guangdong, whch has 
sgnficant GdP growth correlatons wth four of ts five contguous provnces, 
although, notably, two of those correlatons are negatve, not postve. Brun 
et al. (2002) and Zhang and Felmngham (2002) find evdence of spllovers 
from the coastal regon to the central regon and, n the latter, to the western 
regon as well. Groenewold et al. (2006) use annual GdP data for three regons 
(coastal, central and western) and find strong spllovers from the coast to 
the other regons and from the central to the western regon, but none from 
the western regon to anywhere else. Groenewold et al. (forthcomng) extend 
the analyss to sx regons and conclude that the three core regons formng 
chna’s ndustral heartland—the southeast, the changjang rver regon and 
the Yellow rver regon—are relatvely well nterconnected. even across these 
regons, however, they find that the spllover effects are nether pervasve nor 
strong, whle effects are even weaker or entrely absent elsewhere.4 Thus, whle 
there s some evdence that some growth s beng transmtted from the better-
developed regons to the rest of the country, none of the results are ndcatve of 
a hghly ntegrated natonal economy n whch the regons depend ncreasngly 
on each other for ther prosperty rather than on themselves alone. 
China’s inter-regional growth spillovers 
As the precedng secton demonstrates, a wde range of approaches has been 
used for assessng the strength of regonal ntegraton n chna and researchers 
are far from agreed on the extent of ntegraton mpled by ther results. despte 
ths dversty, one common theme appears to be that the regons makng up 
chna’s ndustral core are becomng more ntegrated wth each other (and 
wth the rest of the world) than they are wth the rest of the country. Ths 
secton provdes the results of a spllover analyss to drectly address the nter-
regonal transmsson of growth among chna’s regons. The lmted extent of 
transmssons—as one of the key components of the ntegraton ssue—lends 
further support to ths developng consensus. 
The model used to generate the estmates of nter-regonal spllovers s a 
VAr model estmated usng data for sx chnese regons, gven as follows: 
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southeast, se (Guangdong [ncludng hanan], Fujan and Guangx); changjang 
rver, cr (shangha and Jangsu, Zhejang, hube, hunan, Jangx and Anhu); 
Yellow rver, Yr (inner mongola, henan, shanx, Bejng, Tanjn, shandong 
and hebe); northeast, Ne (helongjang, Jln and laonng); southwest, sW 
(Yunnan, Guzhou, schuan and chongqng); and northwest, NW (Xnjang, 
Gansu, Qngha, Nngxa and shaanx).5 A map of the regons s provded n 
Fgure 10.1.
The results are based on the estmated VAr model n Groenewold et al. 
2006. As argued there, the VAr model s well suted to our applcaton: t does 
not requre a pror theoretcal specficaton (an advantage when there are so 
many competng theores) and t s parsmonous n ts data requrements 
(a decded advantage when workng wth chnese data). The absence of a 
theoretcal framework does, however, have a cost n terms of nterpretaton, 
whch s necessarly more speculatve than t would be had we estmated a 
more complex structural model.  






































Domestic market integration and inter-regional growth spillovers
The VAr model conssts of a set of dynamc equatons of the form
Yit = βi0 + βi1Y1t-1 + βi2Y2t-1 + … + βinYnt-1 + εit,     i = 1, 2, .., n (1)
where the βs are constants to be estmated, Yit s log output for regon i n perod 
t and εit s the error term for the th regon. more lags of each Y can be added 
to the rght-hand sde wthout affectng the argument that follows.
The model parameters can be estmated from tme-seres data for regonal 
outputs. The estmated model s then used to analyse spllovers by shockng 
one of the error terms (say, εj) for one perod and followng through the effects 
on all regonal outputs n the current and subsequent perods. The effects of 
a shock n perod t to εj on regonal outputs from tme t to some future tme 
(t+15 n our analyss) are captured by mpulse response functons (irFs). There 
wll be n2 irFs assocated wth the model, one for each Yi and εj combnaton; 
the value of the ijth irF for perod τ s the effect of a shock to εj on Yi, τ perods 
after the shock occurred. We use the irFs as measures of spllovers from the 
shocked regon to the other regons. 
There s one complcaton n what follows. The above explanaton assumes 
that t s reasonable to shock one εj ndependently of the others. in practce, 
however, the error terms can be correlated wth each other and ths correlaton 
needs to be taken nto account n the smulaton exercse. The most common 
way to do ths s to transform the error terms to make them ndependent, usng 
a cholesk procedure and then to shock the transformed errors.6 Unfortunately, 
the resultng irFs are not ndependent of the order n whch the varables are 
entered nto the model—an order that could be arbtrary to some extent. Ths 
dependence on order s partcularly pronounced when the resduals derved 
from the estmaton of (1) are strongly correlated wth each other. Ths s the 
case n our applcaton to regonal spllovers n chna.
There are varous ways of addressng ths orderng problem. one—not 
uncommon n the applcaton of VArs—s to gnore t and assume that the errors 
are ndependent or, at least, that t makes sense to shock them ndependently. 
Another s to argue that a partcular orderng s more approprate than others. 
A further alternatve, whch we follow, s to conjecture about the source of the 
resdual correlaton and base the resoluton on ths conjecture. We argue that 
the strong resdual correlaton s due to an mportant common component to 
regonal shocks, whch s caused by natonal shocks that have an mpact on all 
regons. if ths s the case, we ought to be able to resolve the orderng problem 
by accountng for the common natonal shock. At least two methods can acheve 
ths: 1) purge the regonal output seres of the common natonal component 
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by a prelmnary regresson of each regonal output on natonal output, and 
2) nclude the natonal output varable n the VAr together wth the regonal 
outputs and order natonal output first. The second method works because 
irFs based on the cholesk decomposton assgn any common component of 
the shocks to the first varable, so f the correlaton s due to a natonal shock 
and the first varable s natonal output, the procedure based on the cholesk 
decomposton wll correctly assgn the common component to natonal output. 
in ths applcaton, we use the second method. it turns out that the resultng 
irFs are not senstve to orderng as long as natonal output s ordered first, 
lendng some support to our conjecture that natonal shocks are the source of 
the common correlatons.
The data we use are based on provncal real GdP for the perod 1953–2003. 
The sources of the data are twofold: the early data come from Wu (2004), who 
obtaned the 1953–95 seres from The Gross Domestic Product of China, 1952–95 
(Natonal Bureau of statstcs 1997). data for 1996–2003 come from the Statistical 
Yearbook of China (Natonal Bureau of statstcs varous years). 
The data are n log form and all seres are tested for statonarty before 
specfyng the model. The (log) regonal outputs (and natonal output) are all 
statonary about trend as long as a break n trend at 1978 and level breaks at 
1966 and 1978 are allowed for. We therefore specfy the model n log levels 
wth these breaks. Two lags are sufficent to remove autocorrelaton from the 
resduals. 
We estmate the model usng data for the entre 1953–2003 perod, despte 
the dramatc changes n economc organsaton and structure durng ths perod, 
whch wll almost certanly have affected the nature of spllovers. in partcular, 
the openng up of the economy snce 1978 after a long perod of central plannng 
and a polcy of regonal self-sufficency led to a strong presumpton of structural 
change n our model. We would have lked to estmate the model separately 
over the pre and post-1978 perods—to mprove parameter stablty and to test 
hypotheses about the nature of changes n spllovers durng our sample. lmted 
expermentaton wth sub-perod estmates made t clear, however, that there 
were not enough data ponts n the two sub-perods to adequately estmate the 
model and we had to base our results on the model estmated over the entre 
1953–2003 perod (but allowng for trend and ntercept breaks at 1978).
The VAr results show a hgh explanatory power for all the equatons—not 
surprsngly gven that they are specfied n log levels and all nclude a trend 
as well as break varables. The natonal output varable (NAT) s sgnficant n 
all equatons at one lag (at least) wth the excepton of the southwest regon, 
where t s only margnally sgnficant, suggestng that ths regon could be 
related only weakly to the natonal economy. 
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The estmated VArs can be used to generate 49 irFs assocated wth ths 
seven-equaton model (sx regons plus the natonal equaton) and we use 
the 36 irFs assocated wth the regonal output equatons to assess regonal 
spllovers. space constrants make t mpossble to report them all and we report 
one set (for a shock to se regon output) and summarse the mplcatons of 
the remander n Table 10.1. The irFs that capture the effects of a unt shock 
to se output on each of the regons are pctured n Fgures 10.2 and 10.3.7 We 
compute the irFs and the cumulatve irFs, the latter beng the accumulaton 
over tme of the irFs.
Fgures 10.2 and 10.3 show that n the short term the strongest effect of a 
shock to se s on se tself. over tme, there s also a substantal effect on cr 
and Yr and these effects overshadow that on se tself after seven or eght 
years. There are effectvely no spllovers to Ne and sW, and the overall effects 
on NW are negatve. 
The model s specfied n terms of logs so that the values of the irFs have 
the dmenson of elastctes of output n one regon wth respect to a shock 
Table 10.1 Summary of spillover effects
  shock to
effect on se (8) cr (9) Yr (13) Ne (10) sW (12) NW (7)
se: sr 0.7546 0.0716 0.0733 0.0858 0.0825 0.0801
max 1.2634 –0.2056 –0.5986 –0.1009 –0.5868 –0.3982
cr: sr 0.2834 0.6163 0.2520 0.2948 0.2836 0.2752
max 5.0284 0.0261 0.5655 0.5541 –0.8673 0.0852
Yr: sr 0.2198 0.3298 0.5359 0.3624 0.3486 0.3383
max 2.9103 –0.1907 0.5365 0.3330 –0.0836 0.4044
Ne: sr 0.1788 0.3107 0.3411 0.5287 0.2564 0.2488
max 0.4696 –0.1057 0.3253 0.2673 0.7172 –0.1115
sW: sr 0.1016 0.0135 0.0517 –0.0526 0.5436 0.0758
max 0.1071 0.0113 0.0004 –0.1385 0.569 0.4946
NW: sr 0.0549 0.0559 0.0705 0.0887 0.1337 0.3062
max –0.3357 –0.0282 –0.1013 –0.0864 0.2288 0.2157
mean GdP 93 252 210 97 54 42
Note: Numbers measure the effect on the row regon of a one-unt shock to the output of 
the column regon. The numbers n the ‘sr’ rows represent short-term (first-perod) effects 
and the numbers n the ‘max’ rows measure the effect when the cumulatve effect s at ts 
maxmum. The numbers n parentheses n the column headngs are the number of years after 
the shock when the maxmum occurs. The mean GdP figures n the last row are n terms of 
bllons of yuan n 1953 prces. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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Fgure 10.3 Cumulative IRFs for a shock to SE 
 Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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to output n another regon. snce the regons are of very dfferent szes, the 
elastctes are dfficult to compare across regons, so we convert them to levels 
at the sample means and report summary measures n Table 10.1. The table 
gves results for the mpact (that s, wthn-the-year) effect and the cumulatve 
effect at ts maxmum. The date of the maxmum cumulatve effect for the shock 
to se output pctured n Fgure 10.3 was chosen to be eght years. Table 10.1 
shows, for example, that the effect of a one-yuan shock to se output was to 
ncrease cr output by 0.2834 yuan n the year of the shock and by a cumulatve 
amount of 5.0284 yuan at ts maxmum effect after nne years. The first column 
of figures therefore summarses all the cumulatve irFs n Fgure 10.3.
The effects of a shock to the se regon seem plausble. The strongest postve 
spllovers by far are on the cr and Yr regons, whch s not surprsng gven 
the contguty of the se and cr regons and also the domnance of these three 
regons n chna’s ndustral output (producng, for example, close to 80 per 
cent of all manufacturng output n the early 1990s). it s prima facie surprsng 
that there seems lttle evdence of a spllover to the other adjonng regon, 
sW—although the lack of a connecton here could smply reflect the qute 
dfferent structure of the two regons as well as the lack of backward lnkages 
from the se to the sW regon. it shows that contguty does not guarantee 
spllovers. The lack of effect on the Ne regon could be explaned by the large 
dstance between the regons and the fact that the Ne regon has a relatvely 
obsolete ndustral structure and few resources. An overall negatve spllover 
mght normally be explaned as evdence that a boost to one regon attracts 
resources that would otherwse have gone to the other regon and therefore 
shows a declne n the output of the second regon. in the case of the relatonshp 
between the se and NW regons, t could reflect the reallocaton of publc 
nvestment resources away from the coastal regons to the nland regons and 
vce versa at tmes durng the sample perod.
The second column of Table 10.1 summarses the effects of a shock to the 
changjang rver regon and shows that the ntal effects are domnated by 
those on the cr regon tself, although there are also marked effects on the 
Yr and Ne regons. over tme, all spllovers are relatvely small, wth negatve 
effects on the se, Yr and Ne regons. Thus, t appears that, n the short term, 
the Ne regon s related more closely to the cr regon than to the se regon, 
whch s not unexpected. The subsequent effects, however, show that shocks 
to the cr regon have at best short-term postve spllovers, partcularly on the 
Ne and Yr regons.
A shock to the Yellow rver regon shows that the ntal effects are domnated 
by those on the regon tself, although there are also substantal short-term 
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effects on the cr and Ne regons. it s nterestng that the spllover to Ne s 
larger than spllovers to Ne from cr and se, whch suggests that geographc 
proxmty matters n ths case. Ths s borne out by the neglgble spllovers 
to the se, sW and NW regons. in the longer term, the spllovers are very 
modest: the largest are to Yr tself and to cr, but these are small compared 
wth the long-term effects of spllovers from se. The combnaton of postve 
growth spllovers from se to Yr and cr, combned wth lmted spllovers n the 
opposte drecton, suggests that upstream ndustres n the latter two regons 
could benefit from growth of downstream ndustres n the former, whle the 
reverse does not seem to be true. 
The irFs showng the effects of a shock to the Ne regon show that the 
short-term effect of a shock to ths regon s domnated by the effect on the 
regon tself, although there are small spllovers to the cr and Yr regons. There 
are no short-term spllovers to the se, sW and NW regons. in the longer term, 
the results of a Ne shock are small, the largest beng on cr, whle spllovers 
to the se, sW and NW regons are negatve (but small absolutely). Thus, we 
can conclude that the lnkages from the Ne regon to the rest of the country 
are weak n the short and the long term, whch suggests that t s relatvely 
solated economcally from the rest of the country—perhaps handcapped by 
ts ncreasngly outmoded ndustral base, as recognsed by the recent polcy 
to ‘revtalse the northeast’ (Geng and Wess 2005). 
A shock to the southwest regon has small postve short-term spllovers to 
all other regons except the se regon, suggestng agan that contguty s not 
sufficent for strong lnkages. over tme, many of these are reversed so that 
the cumulatve effects are negatve, although there s a substantal contnung 
effect on Ne and a smaller one on NW. The latter can be explaned by ts close 
proxmty but ths cannot explan the effect on the Ne regon, whch s at the 
opposte corner of the country.   
Fnally, the ntal effects of a shock to the NW regon are smlar to those for 
the sW regon except that now there s effectvely no spllover to the sW regon, 
whereas there was from sW to NW. over tme, the largest spllover s to sW 
(despte the absence of a short-term effect between these regons), and there s 
also a modest effect on Yr. long-term spllovers to other regons are neglgble 
or negatve. Ths supports the noton that the northwest’s domnance n coal, 
natural gas and ol producton has resulted n an energy-ndustry enclave, whch 
offers lttle n terms of transmttng growth towards the rest of the country.
To sum up the mplcaton of the irFs, overall spllovers are relatvely weak. 
Not unexpectedly n lght of earler lterature, the se regon has the largest 
sustaned spllovers but these are lmted to the cr and Yr regons. The cr and 
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Yr regons have modest spllover effects and these are lmted to the cr, Yr and 
Ne regons, wth (surprsngly) lttle effect on se. The NW and sW regons have 
weak lnkages—they are lttle affected by shocks to other regons and, n turn, 
have lttle effect on the rest of the country. Thus, these core ndustral regons 
of chna (se, cr and Yr) appear to be relatvely well ntegrated (although ths 
s un-drectonal n se’s case), the western regons are connected only loosely 
and the Ne receves small spllovers from most other regons but has postve 
effects only on the core cr and Yr regons. 
Conclusions
regonal ntegraton has been a major polcy challenge throughout 
chna’s hstory, and remans so today. Broadly defined as the ncreasng 
nterdependence of regons as reflected n the flow of goods, servces and/or 
factors of producton, ntegraton, so we have seen, can be promoted from 
‘below’, by the removal of mpedments to trade and factor moblty, and from 
‘above’, by the actve promoton of economc cooperaton through approprate 
polces or nsttutons. The transton away from the former system of command 
plannng—n whch plannng was delberately compartmentalsed along 
provncal lnes and n whch the polcy of self-sufficency encouraged provncal 
ndependence—should n tself have spurred mprovements n nter-provncal 
relatons, wth ntegraton followng as a natural consequence of development 
n an ncreasngly market-based economy. Yet the bulk of the evdence suggests 
that chna’s regons do not appear to be as hghly ntegrated as they should be. 
Gven the wde range of defintons and methodologes avalable for assessng 
the extent and dynamc pattern of ntegraton, t s unlkely that any one pece 
of research wll provde a defintve assessment of chna’s ntegraton ssue. 
instead, ths chapter has contrbuted a small pece to what s qute clearly a 
large and complex puzzle. 
our own emprcal results contrbute to a developng consensus ndcatng 
that ntegraton among chna’s ndustral core regons has proceeded further 
than ther ntegraton wth the rest of the country. in partcular, the postve 
transmsson of growth from the southeast towards the Yellow rver and 
changjang rver regons mples that when the first regon performs well, the 
last two regons benefit, whle the rest of the country receves lttle mpetus 
to ther own regonal rates of growth. Wth these three regons contanng the 
country’s eght rchest provnces and only two of the country’s eght poorest, a 
major cause of concern s that chna s becomng polarsed nto a set of relatvely 
well-ntegrated and developed regons and a set of solated and underdeveloped 
outsders—hardly an optmal scenaro for natonal unty, economc and socal 
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stablty and, perhaps most crucally, preservng poltcal power. Furthermore, 
the one-way street of spllovers from the southeast regon to the Yellow rver 
and changjang rver regons, but not n return, suggests that chna s heavly 
relant on the former regon—and on Guangdong n partcular—for sustanng 
ts rapd rate of GdP growth. Although ths ‘engne of growth’ has served 
chna well to date, a slow-down n the southeast regon wll mpact negatvely 
on the man ndustral centres, whle recevng lttle offset n terms of postve 
growth spllovers from elsewhere n the country. A key challenge for the 
government, then, s to mprove the postve transmssons of growth among 
chna’s regons.
one of the major lmtatons of the VAr model s that t says nothng about 
the channels by whch spllovers are transmtted, so we can only conjecture as 
to why certan regons appear to be more ntegrated than others. stll, t provdes 
a useful take-off pont for further nvestgaton of ths ssue. Why, for example, 
are the benefits of growth n the southeast regon falng to reach the contguous 
southwest, and what could be done to mprove ths stuaton? how mportant are 
transport lnkages between these regons, and what about the atttudes of local 
governments towards promotng nter-regonal trade? Are the southeast, Yellow 
rver and changjang rver regons more hghly ntegrated because of common 
ndustral structures or because of complementary ndustral structures (that 
s, underpnned by ntra-ndustry or nter-ndustry trade, respectvely)? Are the 
northeast and northwest solated because of falures to promote ntegraton 
from above or below? Answers to these questons—and many more—wll 
help to dentfy the approprate role of the central and local governments n 
mprovng ntegraton n the future.
one thng, however, s clear: a comprehensve approach towards domestc 
market ntegraton s essental, snce partal reforms run the rsk that the costs 
of ntegraton wll outwegh the benefits. For example, the government needs to 
ensure not only that mpedments to nter-regonal trade are mnmal, but that 
less-developed regons have the capacty to benefit from technologcal transfers 
emboded n that trade. Perfectly moble labour n the absence of fully developed 
captal markets could result n excessve mgraton out of less-developed 
areas (wth the consequent bran dran there and rsng congeston pressures 
n ndustral centres), wthout nvestments flowng n or nnovatons trcklng 
down. if the recent findngs of the World Bank (2005) are accurate, much 
remans to be done to reduce the msallocatons of captal across regons and 
to prevent further fragmentaton of regonal captal markets, thereby enablng 
nvestment funds to be channelled to those regons most n need. Natonally 
unform regulatons and nsttutons desgned to mnmse nter-regonal barrers 
to trade and transacton costs also have an mportant role to play. 
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A further lmtaton n the applcaton of the VAr model to chna s that data 
constrants make t necessary to use the entre perod from 1953 to 2003, whle 
deally the command and reform perods would have been analysed separately. 
The analyss s undenably a lttle clouded by the fact that ntegraton was 
delberately dscouraged n the command era, and also by the fact that durng 
ths tme the transmsson of growth from one regon to another presumably 
had more to do wth central government decsons than wth the market-based 
transmssons of growth descrbed above. To the extent that ntegraton has 
mproved over tme, our results wll understate the strength of nter-regonal 
lnkages today. however understated they mght be, they do not ndcate the 
need for an alarmst vew of potental nternal dsntegraton wthn chna, but 
rather that more research remans to be done.
Notes
1 Wnters 2004 revews the mechansms by whch trade could mpact on growth.
2 dowrck and Golley (2004) provde emprcal evdence that, snce the 1980s, the benefits of 
trade have accrued manly to rcher countres, wth lttle benefit for less-developed ones.
3 Ths secton draws on Golley (2007).
4 Ths findng confirms state meda reports that ‘admnstratve dsntegraton’ has resulted n 
redundant ndustral constructon wthn the Yangtze (changjang) rver delta, wth 11 of the 15 
major ctes concentratng on spare auto parts manufacturng, and 12 on telecommuncatons. 
meanwhle, vcous competton s hurtng the overall prosperty of the regon. calls are beng 
made to mprove financal cooperaton and to standardse qualficatons, taxes and regulatons 
wthn the area. smlarly, the Pearl rver delta’s market accesson restrctons—‘the area’s 
most pressng problem’—need to be elmnated (Beijing Review 2003:35).
5 For greater detal on the reasons for the definton of the regons and a general descrpton of 
ther characterstcs, see Groenewold et al. (forthcomng).
6 For a recent textbook treatment of ths procedure, see enders (2004:chapter 5).
7 Whle t s common to compute irFs based on one-standard-devaton shocks, we use unt 
shocks. Ths allows for easer comparson of results across regons and mples that the irFs 
have the dmenson of elastctes. For each smulaton, we shock the regon n queston as well 
as natonal output n order to ncorporate the constrant that, n terms of levels, the regonal 
outputs add to natonal output so that t s not possble to shock one regon’s output—holdng 
all other regonal outputs constant—wthout allowng for the consequent contemporaneous 
effect on natonal output. in log terms, we shock the natonal log output by the same as 
the shock to regonal output multpled by ts share n natonal output. The order of the 
varables/regons underlyng these irFs s NAT, se, cr, Yr, Ne, sW and NW. expermentaton 
wth alternatve orderng of the regonal outputs shows that our overall conclusons are not 
affected.
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Foreign direct investment in China
Trends and characterstcs after WTo accesson
Chunlai Chen
Foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) n chna has been one of the most sgnficant 
features of the country’s economc reform and openng up to the outsde world. 
The gradual lberalsaton of restrctons on Fdi snce 1979 and the government’s 
commtment to further openng up have greatly mproved the nvestment 
envronment. Foregn firms have been attracted by the huge domestc market 
and pool of relatvely well-educated, low-cost labour, whch has made chna 
one of the most attractve destnatons for Fdi n the world. 
chna became a member of the World Trade organzaton (WTo) n 
december 2001, after 15 years of negotatons n whch chna agreed to reduce 
tarff and non-tarff barrers to trade n agrculture and manufactured goods, to 
lberalse and open trade n servces to foregn partcpaton, remove restrctons 
on Fdi—partcularly n servces—and mprove protecton of ntellectual 
property rghts. in terms of Fdi, chna has made substantal commtments n 
nvestment lberalsaton, especally n the servces sector, and has agreed to 
comprehensvely mplement the Trade-related investment measures (Trims) 
agreement. Undoubtedly, the reducton n foregn nvestment barrers and the 
lberalsaton of the Fdi regme wll provde great opportuntes for foregn 
nvestors to operate n chna. 
There have been many studes on the mpact of chna’s entry nto the WTo 
on Fdi nflows nto the country (for example, mckbbn and Wlcoxen 1998; hu 
1999; Walmsley and hertel 2000; UNcTAd 2000; chen 2002). The most common 
findngs are that chna’s WTo accesson wll have a postve mpact on ts gross 
domestc product (GdP) growth—manly through efficency gans resultng 
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from trade and nvestment lberalsaton—and t wll accelerate Fdi nflows nto 
chna and ncrease the share of foregn ownershp n chna’s assets. 
What, however, has really happened wth Fdi nflows snce chna’s WTo 
accesson? Ths chapter ntends to provde a bref overvew of the trends and 
characterstcs of Fdi nflows nto chna snce ts WTo accesson by analysng 
aspects of the general trend of Fdi nflows, the composton of Fdi sources, 
the sectoral and regonal dstrbuton of Fdi nflows and the structure of Fdi 
n chna’s manufacturng.
The general trend of FDI inflows into China
Fdi nflows nto chna presented three dstnct phases (see Fgure 11.1): the 
expermental phase from 1979 to 1991, the boom phase from 1992 to 2001, and 
the post-WTo phase from 2002 to 2006.
durng the expermental phase, Fdi nflows were low, but they grew 
steadly. The perod was charactersed by small nvestment projects, hgh 
nvestment costs, restrctve prce controls, poor nfrastructure and lack of 
legal frameworks. 
in the second phase, Fdi nflows ntally ncreased very rapdly, however, 
they slowed after 1997 and declned n 1999 and 2000, followed by a moderate 
recovery n 2001. The slow-down from 1997 to 2000 could be explaned by 
several factors. Frst, there has been a slow-down from the surge n transfers 
of labour-ntensve actvtes from neghbourng Asan economes. in addton, 
the east Asan financal crss weakened substantally the outward nvestment 
abltes of east and southeast Asan economes. As a result, Fdi flows nto 
chna from east and southeast Asa declned substantally snce 1997. second, 
market rates of return to nvestment n chna have not been as hgh as foregn 
nvestors expected. informal relatonshps and corrupton stll hnder many 
busness transactons by foregners. in addton, neffcent state-owned 
enterprses contnue to domnate many key sectors of the economy, especally 
the servces sector. Thrd, there stll are restrctons on Fdi, such as on 
ownershp shares, modes of Fdi entry, busness operatons and regonal and 
sectoral restrctons.
Therefore, chna’s accesson to the WTo came at a crtcal tme, when the 
country was facng dfficultes sustanng a hgh level of Fdi nflows. could 
chna’s WTo accesson revve the trend of ncreasng hgh levels of Fdi 
nflows? 
After entry nto the WTo—wth the mplementaton of ts commtments and 
broader and deeper lberalsaton n trade and nvestment—chna’s economy 
has been growng rapdly. The average annual growth rate of chna’s GdP was 
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10 per cent durng 2002–06.1 chna’s foregn trade has been expandng even 
more rapdly than ts overall economc growth. The total value of chna’s foregn 
trade ncreased from Us$509.65 bllon n 2001 to Us$1,760.4 bllon n 2006, 
wth an annual growth rate of 28.2 per cent. Undoubtedly, chna’s economy has 
benefitted from entry nto the WTo, especally from a more open and lberalsed 
nternatonal trade and Fdi regme. 
After chna’s accesson to the WTo, Fdi nflows presented an ncreasng 
trend. Fdi nflows ncreased from Us$46.9 bllon n 2001 to Us$63 bllon 
n 2006,2 wth an annual growth rate of 6.1 per cent (Fgure 11.1). Ths has 
demonstrated that wth trade and nvestment lberalsaton and reducton 
n foregn nvestment barrers, chna’s WTo accesson has accelerated Fdi 
nflows. 
There has, however, long been an ssue of ‘round-trppng’ of nvestment n 
chna. round-trppng s drven by dfferences n the treatment of foregn and 
domestc nvestors, whch can motvate nvestors to channel funds out of, and 
subsequently nto, an economy n the form of Fdi. Because the funds orgnate 
n the host economy tself, round-trppng nflates Fdi nflows. in chna, because 
of the preferental treatment offered to foregn nvestors (manly through tax 

















Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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ncentves), a sgnficant share of Fdi nflows are round-trpped, manly va hong 
kong (UNcTAd 2007) and, more recently and ncreasngly, va tax havens such 
as the Vrgn, cayman and samoan slands (he 2006). offical estmates from 
the chnese government are not avalable, but one estmate, made by harrold 
and lall (1993), suggested that round-trppng nward Fdi accounted for 25 per 
cent of chna’s Fdi nflows n 1992. some experts estmate that round-trppng 
Fdi currently accounts for 33 per cent of chna’s total Fdi nflows (he 2006).
on 16 march 2007, chnese lawmakers passed the much talked about 
corporate ncome tax law, unfyng tax rates for foregn and domestc enterprses. 
The new tax rate for domestc and foregn enterprses wll be 25 per cent. The 
law s due to take effect on 1 January 2008 (Xnhua News Agency 2007). The new 
law has unfied the two exstng tax codes—one for domestc enterprses, the 
other for foregn-nvested enterprses—and represents a fundamental change 
n chna’s tax polcy. many of the tax ncentves and tax holdays that exsted 
n the old code for foregn nvestors have been changed or elmnated. 
Undoubtedly, the new law and the unficaton of the tax rate wll substantally 
reduce the ncentve for round-trppng. What, however, are the mpacts of the 
new tax law on domestc and foregn-nvested companes and on Fdi nflows 
nto chna? 
Although the current nomnal ncome tax rate s set at 33 per cent, the real 
average ncome tax burden on chna’s domestc companes s 25 per cent 
(Xnhua News Agency 2007), so on average the new tax law wll not reduce the 
real tax burden on domestc companes. 
The current real ncome tax burden on foregn-nvested companes s 15 per 
cent (Xnhua News Agency 2007). on average, the new law wll ncrease the 
tax burden on foregn-nvested companes by 10 percentage ponts. it seems 
that the new law wll have a negatve mpact on foregn-nvested companes—
especally n the short term on small-scale, labour-ntensve, quck profit-earnng 
enterprses from developng economes. 
i would argue, however, that chna’s proposed unfied corporate ncome 
tax rate of 25 per cent for domestc and foregn-nvested companes wll have 
lttle effect on foregn nvestment n chna, especally from large multnatonal 
enterprses. 
Frst, the average corporate ncome tax rate for the 159 countres and regons 
that levy corporate ncome tax s 28.6 per cent, and the average corporate 
ncome tax rate for chna’s 18 neghbourng countres and regons s 26.7 per 
cent (Xnwen shsh 2007). chna’s proposed unfied tax rate of 25 per cent s 
below the global average, so t s qute compettve for attractng foregn and 
domestc nvestment, therefore, there s lttle reason to beleve that the new 
law wll have a sgnficant effect on foregn nvestment. 
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second, n the past few decades, tme-seres econometrc analyses and 
numerous surveys of nternatonal nvestors have shown that tax ncentves are 
not the most nfluental factor for multnatonals when selectng nvestment 
locatons (morsset 2003). Foregn nvestors are, of course, nterested n tax 
rates, but they are more nterested n factors such as a broad nvestment clmate 
and domestc market, the cost and avalablty of labour, basc nfrastructure, 
economc and poltcal stablty, and the lke. 
Thrd, chna’s overall nvestment envronment s qute compettve, wth 
relatvely efficent publc servces, good nfrastructure, a large and fast-growng 
domestc market, abundant and well-educated human resources, low labour 
costs and macroeconomc and poltcal stablty—makng chna one of the most 
attractve locatons for Fdi. Accordng to the 2005 Foreign Direct Investment 
Confidence Index (A.T. kearney inc. 2007), n 2005 chna was the world’s most 
attractve Fdi locaton n the world. chna has mantaned ts lead n the ndex 
for the fourth consecutve year. once agan, chna s the top Fdi locaton for 
first-tme nvestors, wth more than half (55 per cent) of nvestors expected to 
make first-tme nvestments there n the next three years. one n five Fdi dollars 
for first-tme nvestments wll be commtted to the chnese market. chna has 
successfully overcome the perceved rsk assocated wth first-tme market 
entry, whch s typcally the bggest barrer to generatng new Fdi. 
Fourth, the new tax law stll has preferental stpulatons: chna wll contnue 
to offer tax ncentves to nvestment n projects relatng to envronmental 
protecton, agrcultural development, water conservaton, energy savng, 
producton safety, hgh-technology development and publc welfare. hgh-
technology enterprses can stll enjoy a 15 per cent ncome tax rate, and small 
and medum-szed enterprses wth slm profits are requred to pay ncome tax 
at only 20 per cent. certan tax breaks wll also be granted to enterprses n 
specal economc zones and n the less-developed western areas of the country 
(Xnhua News Agency 2007).
Fnally, the new tax law also provdes five-year transtonal perods to offset 
the mpact on foregn companes. The ncome tax rate wll be ncreased gradually 
to 25 per cent durng ths perod, and exstng foregn enterprses can stll enjoy 
tax breaks wthn a regulated tme lmt (Xnhua News Agency 2007). 
Therefore, the new law wll brng chna’s tax laws more n lne wth 
nternatonal standards. it s the fulfilment of a commtment to the WTo for 
equal treatment for domestc and overseas nvestors. The change n the law 
not only proves that the chnese government s determned to contnue ts 
reform and openng up polces—and to work hard to mprove the nvestment 
clmate—t wll help to create a sound nvestment envronment and promote 
chna’s ndustral restructurng and upgradng.
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The composition of FDI sources
By the end of 2001, Fdi n chna was domnated overwhelmngly by developng 
economes, whch accounted for 73.8 per cent of the total accumulated Fdi 
nflows, whle ndustralsed economes accounted for only 26.2 per cent. in 
terms of ndvdual nvestors, Fdi was domnated by four nvestors: hong kong, 
the Unted states, Japan and Tawan, accountng for 48 per cent, 8.7 per cent, 8.2 
per cent and 7.3 per cent of the total accumulated Fdi nflows respectvely. 
After chna’s accesson nto the WTo, developng and ndustralsed 
economes ncreased nvestments n chna. Fdi nflows from developng 
economes ncreased from Us$32.2 bllon n 2001 to Us$39.8 bllon n 2005, 
wth an annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent. Fdi nflows from ndustralsed 
economes also ncreased but at a much slower pace, rsng from Us$13.6 
bllon n 2001 to Us$14.4 bllon n 2005, wth an annual growth rate of 1.5 per 
cent (Fgure 11.2). 
Among the major nvestors from developng economes, hong kong s stll 
the largest; however, ts Fdi nflows nto chna stagnated at about Us$16–17 
bllon from 2001 to 2005 (Table 11.1). As a result, ts share n total Fdi nflows nto 
chna declned from 48.1 per cent at the end of 2001 to 32 per cent n the perod 
2002–05. Fdi nflows from Tawan and sngapore ncreased n 2002 and then 
declned contnuously. consequently, ther shares also declned n the perod 
2002–05. in contrast, Fdi nflows from south korea ncreased dramatcally from 
Us$2.1 bllon n 2001 to Us$4.6 bllon n 2005. As a result, ts share ncreased 
from 3.1 per cent at the end of 2001 to 8.2 per cent n the perod 2002–05. 
The most notable feature s the large ncrease n Fdi nflows from three 
tax-haven economes—the Vrgn, cayman and samoan slands. Fdi nflows 
from the Vrgn islands ncreased dramatcally from Us$4.9 bllon n 2001 to 
Us$8.1 bllon n 2005, an ncrease of 64.8 per cent. As a result, ts share n total 
Fdi nflows ncreased from 4.4 per cent at the end of 2001 to 12.1 per cent n 
the perod 2002–05, makng t the second largest nvestor n chna durng ths 
perod. investments from the cayman and samoan slands also ncreased, as 
dd ther shares n total Fdi nflows nto chna n the perod 2002–05.
The large ncrease n Fdi nflows nto chna from the three tax-haven 
sland economes mght nvolve ‘round-trppng’, as dscussed above, n whch 
domestc chnese nvestors nvest n the tax-haven economes (often through a 
shell company) and then renvest n chna to take advantage of the preferental 
treatment offered to foregn nvestors. 
Another explanaton for the rse n Fdi nto chna from the Vrgn, cayman 
and samoan slands s the ‘transt’ nvestment n chna from other economes—
notably hong kong and Tawan—va the sland economes n order to lower (or 
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elmnate) ther fiscal commtments. For example, the number of companes n 
hong kong that are ncorporated n Bermuda and the cayman islands jumped 
5.2 tmes from 178 n 1990 to 924 n 2000 (Wu et al. 2002). As for Tawanese 
companes, partly to take advantage of the tax regme, but also to bypass the 
Tawanese government’s restrctons on nvestment n the manland, the Vrgn 
islands and the cayman islands rank second and thrd respectvely after chna 
as the bggest recpents of Tawan’s outward nvestment (Bresln 2003). Ths 
suggests that Fdi n chna from hong kong and Tawan s more sgnficant 
than the offical data reveal. The data also reflect use of tax havens by nvestors 
from ndustralsed economes.
in terms of the major nvestors from ndustralsed economes, Fdi nflows 
from the Unted states ncreased from Us$4.3 bllon n 2001 to Us$5.2 bllon 
n 2002, then declned contnuously to Us$2.7 bllon n 2005. As a result, ts 
share n total Fdi nflows nto chna declned from 8.7 per cent (makng t the 
second largest nvestor) at the end of 2001 to 7.4 per cent (rankng t n fourth 
place) n the perod 2002–05. investment from the Unted kngdom dropped 
from Us$1 bllon n 2001 to about Us$0.8 bllon durng 2002 and 2005, whle 
nvestment from France ncreased margnally durng the perod 2001–05. in 





















Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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Foreign direct investment in China
contrast, Fdi nflows from Japan ncreased from Us$4.25 bllon n 2001 to 
Us$5.9 bllon n 2005, mantanng ts poston as the thrd largest nvestor n 
chna n the perod 2002–05. investments from Germany and the Netherlands 
also ncreased n 2005.
Fdi nflows from other countres presented an ncreasng trend, rsng from 
Us$3.8 bllon n 2001 to Us$6.1 bllon n 2005. As a result, ther combned share 
n total Fdi nflows nto chna ncreased from 8.2 per cent at the end of 2001 to 
11.25 per cent n the perod 2002–05. The ncreasng share of Fdi nflows from 
other countres s an ndcaton of the dversficaton of Fdi sources. 
in general, snce chna’s WTo accesson, developng and ndustralsed 
economes have ncreased ther nvestments n the chna because of the 
overall mprovement of the nvestment envronment and the reducton of 
trade and nvestment barrers. The growth rate of Fdi nflows from developng 
economes s, however, much faster than that of ndustralsed economes. As 
a result, developng economes stll domnate Fdi nflows nto chna, and the 
composton of Fdi sources n terms of developng and ndustralsed economes 
has barely changed. 
The domnaton of developng economes n Fdi n chna could be attrbuted 
to ther economc development level and the nature and characterstcs of 
ther firms. Because developng economes have moderate technologcal and 
nnovatve capabltes and are at the md-level of economc development, the 
ownershp advantages possessed by ther firms are concentrated n the forms 
of labour-ntensve producton technology, standardsed product manufacturng 
and well-establshed export market networks. obvously, chna—havng 
relatvely abundant labour resources and a comparatve advantage n labour-
ntensve actvtes—s an attractve locaton for developng-economy nvestors 
to explore overseas nvestment opportuntes, partcularly for export-orented 
Fdi. snce ts accesson to the WTo, chna has, on the one hand, reduced 
trade and nvestment barrers and mproved the nvestment envronment, 
whle, on the other, ts export markets have been greatly enlarged as WTo 
member countres—partcularly ndustralsed economes—have opened 
domestc markets for chna’s exports. Therefore, there are great ncentves 
for developng-country nvestors to ncrease Fdi n chna n general and to 
ncrease export-orented Fdi n partcular. it s expected that chna wll reman 
an mportant host country for nvestments from developng economes well 
nto the future. 
in general, enterprses from ndustralsed economes wth hgh technologcal 
and nnovatve capabltes and hgh overall economc development levels 
wll possess greater ownershp advantages n the form of hgh technology, 
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product dfferentaton, manageral and entrepreneural sklls and ntangble 
knowledge-based assets than those from developng economes. Because 
of these enterprse-specfic ownershp advantages, Fdi from ndustralsed 
economes s more market-orented than that from developng economes. 
The general mplcaton s that host countres wth larger markets, faster 
economc growth and a hgher degree of economc development wll attract 
more market-orented Fdi. chna’s huge domestc market, fast economc growth 
and ncreasng per capta ncome are very attractve to ndustralsed-country 
nvestors, partcularly to market-orented Fdi. Therefore, chna’s accesson to 
the WTo has provded great opportuntes for ndustralsed-country nvestors 
to explore chna’s huge domestc markets. it s expected that wth fulfilment of 
chna’s commtments to the WTo n trade and nvestment lberalsaton, chna 
wll become an ncreasngly mportant host country for Fdi from ndustralsed 
economes, whch wll not only ncrease the total Fdi nflows from ndustralsed 
economes, t wll ncrease ther qualty.
Regional distribution of FDI inflows 
snce chna started to attract Fdi, the regonal dstrbuton of Fdi nflows has 
been very uneven. Fdi nflows nto chna are concentrated overwhelmngly 
n the east of the country. Although there have been some small fluctuatons, 
the gap between the eastern and the central and western regons has been 
ncreasng, especally snce the early 1990s. By the end of 2001, the eastern 
regon attracted 87.8 per cent of the total Fdi nflows nto chna, whle the 
central and western regons receved only 9 per cent and 3.3 per cent of the 
total respectvely. 
Trade and nvestment lberalsaton are expected to brng more benefits to 
the eastern regon than to the rest of the country, especally the western regon. 
Therefore, economc growth n the east wll be hgher and faster than n the west. 
consequently, t s expected that more Fdi wll flow nto the eastern regon and 
the uneven regonal dstrbuton of Fdi nflows nto chna—especally between 
the eastern and the western regons—mght be renforced n the short term. 
After chna’s WTo entry, Fdi nflows contnued to concentrate n the eastern 
regon—ncreasng rapdly from Us$39.8 bllon n 2001 to Us$48 bllon n 2004, 
wth an annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent (Fgure 11.3 and Table 11.2). From 2002 
to 2004, the eastern regon attracted Us$135.2 bllon n Fdi nflows, accountng 
for 86.8 per cent of the total durng that perod. Among the provnces n the 
eastern regon, Jangsu’s performance was the most outstandng. durng the 
perod 2002–04, Jangsu attracted Us$27.9 bllon n Fdi nflows, accountng 
for 17.9 per cent of the total. As a result, Jangsu surpassed Guangdong n 
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attractng Fdi nflows and became the largest Fdi recpent n chna durng 
the perod. Although ts share has been declnng, Guangdong s stll one of the 
most attractve locatons for foregn nvestment. it attracted Us$27.4 bllon n 
Fdi nflows, accountng for 17.6 per cent of the total durng the perod 2002–04. 
laonng, shangha and Zhejang also wtnessed a large ncrease n Fdi nflows 
and ther shares n the total have ncreased. in contrast, Fdi nflows nto Fujan, 
Guangx and hanan have declned. 
The central regon has wtnessed a large ncrease n Fdi nflows snce 2001: 
from Us$4.1 bllon n 2001 to Us$6.4 bllon n 2004, wth an annual growth rate 
of 16.2 per cent. As a result, ts share n total Fdi nflows nto chna ncreased 
from 9 per cent at the end of 2001 to 10.9 per cent n the perod 2002–04. in the 
central regon, the ncreasngly attractve provnces for Fdi are Jangx, hube 
and hunan. These three provnces contrbuted to the majorty of the ncrease 
n Fdi nflows nto the central regon. 
The western regon has experenced a declnng trend n Fdi nflows snce 
2001: from Us$1.4 bllon n 2001 to Us$1 bllon n 2004, wth an annual declnng 
rate of 10.3 per cent. Provnces wth a large declne n Fdi nflows were schuan, 
shaanx and Gansu. 



















Sources: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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China—Linking Markets for Growth
it was hoped that chna’s accesson to the WTo would help to mprove 
the uneven regonal dstrbuton of Fdi nflows, however, evdence has shown 
that snce accesson, the pattern of regonal dstrbuton has been essentally 
mantaned. The eastern regon s stll the most attractve for Fdi, the central 
regon s ncreasng ts attractveness and the western regon stll has a long 
way to go to mprove ts overall nvestment envronment. 
The attractveness of the eastern regon to Fdi s ts relatvely more open 
and developed economy, closer connectons wth the outsde world, better 
nfrastructure, hgher levels of scentfic research and techncal nnovaton 
and the hgher qualty of ts labour forces. Therefore, t s expected that wth 
further lberalsaton n trade and nvestment, the regon wll attract more Fdi 
nflows. 
The poor performance of the western regon s attrbuted manly to ts 
poor overall nvestment envronment. To boost economc growth and thereby 
reduce the gap between the eastern and the central and western regons, the 
chnese government launched the West development strategy n 1998.3 The 
strategy emphasses nfrastructure development, envronmental protecton, 
ndustral structural readjustment, development of scences and educaton 
and economc reform and openness. To mprove the nvestment envronment 
and accelerate economc growth n the western regon, chna has nvested 
heavly n nfrastructure development. Accordng to the western development 
strategy, major nfrastructure projects nclude, for example: nvestng 120 bllon 
yuan n hghway and road constructon between 2000 and 2020; nvestng 100 
bllon yuan n large and medum-szed ralway projects between 2000 and 
2005; creatng a hydroelectrcty generaton base n the western regon and 
constructng a natonal electrcty supply network to transport electrcty from 
the west to the east, between 2000 and 2015; nvestng 300 bllon yuan n gas 
ppelne constructon to transport natural gas from the west to the east, between 
2000 and 2007; and constructng more arports n the western regon (office of 
the West development leadng Group of the state councl 2000). 
Undoubtedly, the western development strategy and the further openng up 
of the central and western regons have provded great opportuntes for foregn 
nvestors. The comparatve advantages of the central and western regons are 
rch natural resources, low labour costs and growng markets. in addton, 
there are many state-owned enterprses n these regons wth huge amounts of 
dle captal stock. chna s stpulatng relevant laws and regulatons on cross-
border mergers and acqustons and foregn nvestors are beng encouraged 
to partcpate n state-owned enterprse reform and transformaton through 
mergers and acqustons. such measures are amed at ncreasng the flow of 
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foregn captal nto the central and western regons n the medum and long 
term. however, ths had not been manfested n drect foregn nvestment flows 
nto the west up to 2004.
Sectoral distribution of FDI inflows
By the end of 2001, the sectoral dstrbuton of Fdi n chna was charactersed 
by ts concentraton n the manufacturng sector, whch attracted 61 per cent of 
the total Fdi nflows nto chna durng the perod 1997–2001; the servces sector 
attracted 36 per cent, whle the prmary sector attracted only 3 per cent.4
After WTo accesson Fdi nflows contnued to concentrate n the 
manufacturng sector, ncreasng from Us$30.2 bllon n 2001 to Us$38.2 
bllon n 2005, wth an annual growth of 6 per cent (Table 11.3). As a result, the 
share of Fdi nflows nto the manufacturng sector ncreased from 66 per cent 
n 2001 to 70 per cent n 2005. 
studes of the mpacts of chna’s WTo accesson predct that, after 
accesson, chna’s labour-ntensve manufacturng ndustres—especally 
textles and clothng—wll grow rapdly, led by the expanson of exports as a 
result of the reducton of mport tarffs and the elmnaton of mport quotas 
from ndustralsed economes on chna’s labour-ntensve manufactured goods. 
To realse ths potental, however, chna needs to ntroduce foregn captal, 
technology and advanced equpment to help upgrade ts relatvely backward 
labour-ntensve ndustres n order to compete n global markets. Therefore, 
WTo accesson provdes great opportuntes for foregn nvestors to nvest n 
chna’s labour-ntensve and export-orented manufacturng ndustres. it s 
expected that more Fdi wll flow nto these ndustres. 
chna’s accesson also provdes great opportuntes for foregn companes 
to nvest n chna’s captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve manufacturng 
ndustres. Foregn companes n these ndustres have advantages over chna’s 
domestc enterprses. Wth further mplementaton of ts WTo commtments, 
chna wll further relax controls on foregn ownershp, allow drect transactons 
of cross-border mergers and acqustons by foregn companes of ts 
enterprses—especally state-owned enterprses—and mprove the protecton 
of ntellectual property rghts. As a result, t s expected that ncreasng amounts 
of Fdi—especally from large ndustralsed-country multnatonals—wll 
flow nto chna’s captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve manufacturng 
ndustres. 
Fdi nflows nto the prmary sector contnued to declne after 2001: ther share 
declned from 4 per cent n 2001 to only 2 per cent n 2005. Ths s not surprsng 
gven the declnng share of the agrcultural sector n chna’s natonal economy 
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Foreign direct investment in China
and the rapd loss of overall comparatve advantage n agrcultural producton 
n chna (chen 2006). in addton, chna’s agrcultural land tenure system and 
the tradtonal small-scale, famly-based agrcultural producton pattern have 
greatly lmted the nflows of agrcultural Fdi wth large-scale producton and 
advanced technology. Therefore, chna wll not attract large amounts of Fdi 
nflows nto ts agrcultural sector wthout fundamentally changng ts land 
tenure system and dramatcally reformng the tradtonal farmng pattern. 
it s expected that after accesson, more Fdi wll flow nto the servces sector, 
however, such nflows have been ncreasng at a slow pace—from Us$13.9 
bllon n 2001 to Us$15.1 bllon n 2005, wth an annual growth rate of only 2 
per cent. Because of the slow growth rate, the share of Fdi nflows nto the 
servces sector declned from 30 per cent n 2001 to 28 per cent n 2005.
in the servces sector, n 2005, Fdi nflows concentrated manly n the 
followng ndustres: real estate (32 per cent); leasng and busness servces 
(22 per cent); transport, storage and postal servces (11 per cent); electrcty, 
gas and water producton and supply (8 per cent); wholesale and retal trade 
(6 per cent); and nformaton, computer servces and software (6 per cent). 
Together, the above ndustres receved 86 per cent of total Fdi nflows nto 
the servces sector. 
in 2005, chna for the first tme publshed the data for Fdi nflows nto ts 
financal sector: they were Us$12.1 bllon n 2005 and Us$6.5 bllon n 2006. By 
the end of 2005, 72 foregn banks from 12 countres and regons had establshed 
254 operatonal nsttutons; 117 foregn banks from 40 countres and regons had 
establshed 240 representatve offices n chna, and the total assets of foregn 
banks ncreased to Us$87.7 bllon. There were 40 foregn-nvested nsurance 
companes, and ther busness accounted for 7 per cent of chna’s nsurance 
market (Zhang 2006). 
chna made substantal commtments to the WTo to open ts servces sector 
to nternatonal trade and Fdi. however, t has taken a step-by-step approach to 
mplementng these commtments. in most of the servces sectors—especally 
n telecommuncatons, bankng and nsurance, wholesale and retal, storage 
and transportaton—chna wll fulfil ts commtments n three to five years 
after accesson. 
chna’s servces sector has been underdeveloped n the natonal economy. 
The share of the servces sector n chna’s GdP has been about 30 per cent, 
whle the global average s about 40 per cent. obvously, the slow development 
of ths sector wll have a serous bottleneck effect on the overall development 
of chna’s economy.
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There are many reasons for the slow development of chna’s servces 
sector—two of the most mportant are the closed nature of the sector and 
monopoly. Before chna’s WTo accesson, ts servces sector was relatvely 
closed to foregn drect partcpaton, whch effectvely protected the state 
monopoly. At present, many of chna’s servce ndustres are stll monopolsed 
by state-owned enterprses, especally n finance and telecommuncatons.
openng the servces sector has been one of the most mportant ssues 
n the blateral negotatons for chna’s WTo accesson. chna has made 
some mportant and concrete commtments n openng the sector to foregn 
nvestors and t s expected that wth full mplementaton, t wll attract more 
Fdi nflows. 
Changes in FDI in the manufacturing sector
Fdi nflows nto chna have been drected overwhelmngly to the manufacturng 
sector, and foregn-nvested firms have become a major part of ths sector. in 
2005, foregn-nvested firms made up 22 per cent of manufacturng enterprses, 
held 32 per cent of manufacturng assets, employed 32 per cent of the 
manufacturng labour force and contrbuted 33 per cent of manufacturng 
value-added. 
snce chna’s accesson to the WTo, foregn-nvested firms n the manu-
facturng sector have undergone rapd expanson and structural changes. 
rapd expanson of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector 
From 2001 to 2005, foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector expanded 
dramatcally. The total assets of these firms grew from 1,386 bllon yuan n 
2001 to 2,952 bllon yuan n 2005—an ncrease of 113 per cent. compared wth 
domestc firms—whose total assets ncreased by 50 per cent between 2001 and 
2005—the growth of foregn-nvested firms was more than two tmes hgher 
(Table 11.4). 
Among the three ndustry groups, from 2001 to 2005, the growth n total 
assets of foregn-nvested firms was the hghest n technology-ntensve 
ndustres5—ncreasng 137 per cent—followed closely by captal-ntensve 
ndustres,6 whch ncreased 125 per cent. Foregn-nvested firms’ total assets 
n labour-ntensve ndustres7 ncreased by 81 per cent.
From 2001 to 2005, the expanson of foregn-nvested firms was partcularly 
sgnficant n furnture manufacturng (183 per cent), chemcal materals and 
products (128 per cent), ferrous metal smeltng (297 per cent), non-ferrous 
metal smeltng (193 per cent), general machnery (145 per cent), specal 
machnery (206 per cent), transport equpment (134 per cent), electroncs and 
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Table 11.4  Total assets of foreign-invested and domestic firms in the 
manufacturing sector, 2001 and 2005 (bllon yuan n constant 
1991 prces)
industry 2001 2005 change (per cent)
Foregn-nvested firms   
Food processng 40.3 85.3 112.0
Food manufacturng 38.1 59.4 56.1
Beverage manufacturng 42.7 54.5 27.5
Tobacco processng 1.0 0.8 -20.0
Textles 73.8 145.9 97.7
clothng and other fibre products 46.0 74.3 61.6
leather and fur products 29.2 57.2 96.3
Tmber processng 15.0 19.7 31.2
Furnture manufacturng 10.5 29.7 182.7
Paper and paper products 52.8 104.6 98.0
Prntng 21.3 28.6 34.1
cultural, educatonal and sports goods 18.6 32.4 74.2
Petroleum refinng and cokng 22.4 38.0 69.6
chemcal materals and products 85.3 194.3 127.9
medcal and pharmaceutcal products 31.9 59.4 86.5
chemcal fibres 18.3 36.9 101.8
rubber products 24.1 44.4 83.9
Plastc products 57.4 108.9 89.7
Non-metal mneral products 71.0 112.0 57.8
Ferrous metal smeltng 27.8 110.3 297.3
Non-ferrous metal smeltng 16.9 49.7 193.4
metal products 61.3 89.3 45.5
General machnery 56.8 139.4 145.5
specal machnery 25.3 77.2 205.6
Transport equpment 117.5 274.9 133.9
electrcal machnery and equpment 96.7 191.8 98.4
electroncs and telecommuncatons equpment 263.8 649.3 146.2
instruments and meters 20.6 55.4 169.3
By ndustry group   
labour ntensve 506.6 915.6 80.7
captal ntensve 384.6 863.8 124.6
Technology ntensve 494.9 1,172.6 136.9
Total 1,386.2 2,951.9 113.0   
domestc firms   
labour ntensve 1,104.9 1,713.7 55.1
captal ntensve 2,052.2 2,997.7 46.1
Technology ntensve 985.3 1,487.7 51.0
Total 4,142.3 6,199.2 49.7
Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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telecommuncatons equpment (146 per cent), and nstruments and meters 
(169 per cent), whch had an above-average rate of ncrease n total assets 
(Table 11.4). it s nterestng to note that n the above nne ndustres, only one 
(furnture manufacturng) s a labour-ntensve ndustry, whle the others are 
captal and technology ntensve. 
The relatve mportance of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng 
sector 
Because of the hgh growth rate n nvestment, foregn-nvested firms have 
become ncreasngly mportant n the manufacturng sector. in terms of total 
assets, the share of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector ncreased 
from 25 per cent n 2001 to 32.3 per cent n 2005. in other words, one-thrd of 
the total assets of chna’s manufacturng sector were held by foregn-nvested 
firms n 2005.
Among the three ndustry groups, foregn-nvested firms n technology-
ntensve ndustres ganed a greater share, and therefore, more mportance than 
those n labour-ntensve and captal-ntensve ndustres n the manufacturng 
sector. By 2005 the share of foregn-nvested firms n technology-ntensve 
ndustres reached 44 per cent—ncreasng 11 percentage ponts over 2001 
(Fgure 11.4). The share n labour-ntensve ndustres ncreased to 35 per cent n 
2005—rsng by 3 percentage ponts compared wth 2001. The share n captal-
ntensve ndustres s stll relatvely low compared wth those n technology-
ntensve and labour-ntensve ndustres; however, t also ncreased—to 22 per 
cent n 2005, rsng by 6.6 percentage ponts from 2001. 
Wth such rapd growth, foregn-nvested firms n some ndustres have 
already ganed domnant or sgnfcant postons n the manufacturng 
sector. Foregn-nvested firms have ganed a domnant poston n: leather 
and fur products (58.5 per cent); furnture manufacturng (57.5 per cent); 
cultural, educatonal and sports goods (63.7 per cent); and electroncs and 
telecommuncatons equpment (71.9 per cent). The shares of foregn-nvested 
firms have reached between 40 and 50 per cent of the ndustres’ total assets 
n: clothng and other fibre products (46.6 per cent); paper and paper products 
(44.9 per cent); rubber products (45.4 per cent); plastc products (49.1 per cent); 
and nstruments and meters (49.7 per cent). 
The structure of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector
emprcal studes have revealed that multnatonal enterprses, relatve to 
ndgenous firms, tend to concentrate ther actvtes n sectors n whch the 
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revealed comparatve advantage ndex s greater than one, or s ncreasng over 
tme (dunnng 1993)—n other words, n the ndustres n whch the country has 
a comparatve advantage or the comparatve advantage s ncreasng.
For developng economes, because they have a comparatve advantage 
n labour-ntensve actvtes, nward Fdi flows usually concentrate n labour-
ntensve ndustres. in the case of chna, n the early stage of Fdi nflows 
nto the manufacturng sector, foregn-nvested firms were concentrated 
overwhelmngly n labour-ntensve ndustres. By the end of 1995, n terms of 
the total assets of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector, 47 per 
cent were n labour-ntensve ndustres, whle only 25 per cent and 27 per cent 
were n captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve ndustres respectvely.
Wth rapd economc growth, a hgh level of captal accumulaton, 
mprovements n human captal development and technology progress, chna’s 
comparatve advantage has changed rapdly. Though t stll has a strong 
comparatve advantage n labour-ntensve actvtes due to ts huge populaton 
and abundant labour supply, chna has greatly ncreased ts comparatve 
Fgure 11.4  Share of foreign-invested firms in manufacturing,  






















Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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advantages n captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve actvtes. As a result, 
Fdi flows nto chna’s manufacturng sector have shfted gradually from a hgh 
concentraton n labour-ntensve ndustres towards ncreasng nvestment n 
captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve ndustres.
By the end of 2001, the structure of foregn-nvested frms n the 
manufacturng sector had changed. in terms of the total assets of such firms, 
the share n labour-ntensve ndustres had fallen to 36 per cent, whle shares 
n captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve ndustres had rsen to 28 per cent 
and 36 per cent respectvely.
snce chna’s accesson to the WTo, Fdi n ts manufacturng sector has 
made even further and larger structural changes. Although a large amount of 
Fdi stll flows nto labour-ntensve ndustres, the share of such ndustres n 
the total assets of foregn-nvested firms has contnued to fall, whle shares of 
captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve ndustres n the total assets have 
been ncreasng. By the end of 2005, the nvestment structure of foregn-nvested 
firms n chna’s manufacturng sector had changed fundamentally (Fgure 11.5). 
Technology-ntensve ndustres have surpassed labour-ntensve ndustres and 
become the most mportant and the largest sector n recevng Fdi. in terms 
of the total assets of foregn-nvested firms, the share of technology-ntensve 
ndustres has ncreased to 40 per cent, whle the share of labour-ntensve 
ndustres has fallen to 31.02 per cent. captal-ntensve ndustres have also 
ncreased ther mportance n recevng Fdi: the share has ncreased to 29.26 
per cent of the total assets of foregn-nvested firms.
in 2005, electroncs and telecommuncatons equpment ndustres attracted 
the largest amount of Fdi, accountng for 22 per cent of the total assets of 
foregn-nvested firms, followed by transport equpment (9 per cent); chemcal 
materals and products (7 per cent); electrcal machnery and equpment (7 per 
cent); and textles (5 per cent). Together, the above five ndustres held nearly 
50 per cent of the total assets of foregn-nvested firms. it s worth notng that, 
except for the textles ndustry, the other four ndustres are all captal and 
technology ntensve. 
The above analyss reveals three mportant characterstcs of Fdi nflows 
nto the manufacturng sector snce chna’s accesson to the WTo. Frst, such 
nflows have ncreased sgnficantly. The growth rate of nvestment n the 
total assets of foregn-nvested firms was more than twce as hgh as that of 
domestc firms. 
second, although Fdi nflows nto all three ndustry groups n the 
manufacturng sector ncreased dramatcally, the growth rates of Fdi nflows 
nto technology-ntensve and captal-ntensve ndustres were much hgher 
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than that nto labour-ntensve ndustres. As a result, the relatve mportance 
of foregn-nvested firms n the three ndustry groups has changed: technology-
ntensve ndustres have surpassed labour-ntensve ndustres. in 2005, 
foregn-nvested firms n technology-ntensve ndustres held 44 per cent of 
the total assets, whle those n labour-ntensve ndustres held 35 per cent of 
the total assets. 
Thrd, Fdi nflows nto the manufacturng sector have gradually changed 
nvestment structures, shftng from a hgh concentraton n labour-ntensve 
ndustres towards ncreasng nvestment n technology-ntensve and captal-
ntensve ndustres. As a result, the last two have become ncreasngly 
mportant to Fdi, and, n 2005, ther combned share reached 69 per cent of the 
total assets of foregn-nvested firms n the manufacturng sector. 
several factors could be attrbuted to the changng structure of Fdi n the 
manufacturng sector. Frst, chna’s changng pattern of comparatve advantage 
n ts economy has nfluenced the nvestment pattern. Although chna stll has 
a strong comparatve advantage n labour-ntensve actvtes, t has greatly 
Fgure 11.5  Structural changes of foreign-invested firms in 






















Source: Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues (a). China Statistical Yearbook, chna 
statstcal Press, Bejng.
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ncreased ts comparatve advantages n captal-ntensve and technology-
ntensve actvtes. As foregn-nvested firms tend to nvest n the ndustres n 
whch the host country has a comparatve advantage or n whch the advantage 
s ncreasng, t s expected that chna’s ncreasng comparatve advantage n 
captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve actvtes wll attract ncreasng Fdi 
nflows nto these ndustres.
second, through enterprse reform and ntense competton, chna’s domestc 
firms have greatly mproved ther compettveness. in 2005, the labour productvty 
of domestc firms n labour-ntensve ndustres had surpassed that of foregn-
nvested firms n the manufacturng sector.8 The ncreasng, fierce competton 
from domestc firms n labour-ntensve ndustres has seen foregn-nvested 
firms gradually losng compettveness n such ndustres, pushng Fdi towards 
captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve ndustres, n whch foregn-nvested 
firms have relatvely strong compettveness compared wth domestc firms.9
Thrd, chna has greatly mproved ts busness envronment and strengthened 
ntellectual property protecton, whch has ncreased the confidence of foregn 
nvestors, encouragng them to brng more captal and technology through 
ther nvestments.
Fourth, ncreasng per capta ncome and the enlargement of chna’s 
domestc market demand for hgh-qualty goods attract ncreasng numbers 
of captal-ntensve and technology-ntensve multnatonal enterprses to 
chna. 
Conclusion
snce chna’s accesson to the WTo, wth the mplementaton of ts WTo 
commtments and broader and deeper lberalsaton n trade and nvestment, 
Fdi nflows nto chna have resumed an upward trend.
developng and ndustralsed economes have ncreased ther nvestments 
n chna. The growth rate of Fdi nflows from developng economes s, however, 
much faster than that from ndustralsed economes. As a result, Fdi nflows 
nto chna are stll domnated by developng economes and the composton of 
Fdi sources has barely changed. The ncreasng share of Fdi nflows nto chna 
from other countres s, however, a postve ndcaton of the dversficaton of 
Fdi sources.
it s expected that chna wll reman an mportant host country for 
nvestments from developng economes nto the future. it s also expected 
that wth further mplementaton of ts commtments to trade and nvestment 
lberalsaton—partcularly n strengthenng ntellectual property rghts 
protecton and openng more economc sectors, especally the servces sector, 
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to Fdi—chna wll become an ncreasngly mportant host country for Fdi 
from ndustralsed economes, whch wll ncrease the total and the qualty 
of Fdi nflows.
snce chna’s accesson to the WTo Fdi nflows are stll concentrated 
overwhelmngly n the eastern regon. Although there s an ncreasng trend of 
Fdi nflows nto the central regon, nflows nto the western regon declned. The 
poor performance of the western regon n attractng Fdi nflows s attrbuted 
manly to ts poor nvestment envronment. Although the chnese government 
has undertaken massve nvestment projects to mprove the overall nvestment 
envronment n the west, the full effects wll take a long tme to materalse. 
it was expected that wth WTo accesson and the openng up of the servces 
sector, more Fdi would flow nto ths sector. however, nflows have been 
ncreasng at a very slow pace. chna made substantal commtments to the 
WTo to open ts servces sector to nternatonal trade and Fdi, and has taken 
a step-by-step approach to mplementaton. in most of the servces sectors, 
chna wll fulfil ts commtments n three to five years after WTo accesson. 
Therefore, t s unrealstc to expect that there wll be a large mmedate ncrease 
n Fdi nflows nto chna’s servces sector. Wth further and full mplementaton 
of ts commtments to the WTo, however, chna wll attract more Fdi nflows 
nto the servces sector. 
After chna’s accesson nto the WTo, Fdi nflows contnued to concentrate 
n the manufacturng sector. chna’s manufacturng s very compettve n 
attractng Fdi nflows. it mantaned ts poston as the number one destnaton 
for manufacturng and assembly n 2005 (A.T. kearney inc. 2007), and ths sector 
wll contnue to attract large Fdi nflows.
Wth the rapd ncrease n Fdi nflows nto manufacturng, foregn-nvested 
firms n the sector have undergone some structural changes. Two changes are 
most mportant. Frst, the growth rate of Fdi nflows nto technology-ntensve 
and captal-ntensve ndustres was much hgher than that of Fdi nflows nto 
labour-ntensve ndustres. As a result, the relatve mportance of foregn-
nvested firms n technology-ntensve ndustres has surpassed ther relatve 
mportance n labour-ntensve ndustres n the manufacturng sector. second, 
the nvestment pattern of foregn-nvested firms n manufacturng has been 
changng gradually. Fdi nflows nto the manufacturng sector have shfted from 
concentratng n labour-ntensve ndustres towards ncreasng nvestment n 
technology-ntensve and captal-ntensve ndustres. As a result, the last two 
have become ncreasngly mportant to Fdi.
in 2007, chna passed the new corporate ncome tax law, whch wll take 
effect on 1 January 2008. The new law unfied the tax rates for foregn and 
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domestc enterprses at 25 per cent. it wll brng chna’s tax laws closer to 
nternatonal standards and s a fulfilment of commtments to the WTo for 
equal treatment for domestc and overseas nvestors. Although meetng the 
WTo commtments wll rase rates of taxaton on foregn enterprses, t s 
not generally expected to have a sgnficant effect on Fdi n chna. its most 
mportant effect wll be to reduce substantally the ncentves for round-trppng, 
mprovng the quantty and qualty of Fdi nflows nto the country. 
Notes
1  chna revsed ts GdP growth rate for the perod 1979–2004 n January 2006. The revsed rates 
for 2002, 2003 and 2004 were 9.1 per cent, 10 per cent and 10.1 per cent, respectvely, and the 
GdP growth rates n 2005 and 2006 were 9.9 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectvely.
2 The data are Fdi nflows nto non-financal sectors only. in 2005, chna for the first tme 
publshed the data for Fdi nflows nto ts financal sector: they were Us$12.1 bllon n 2005 
and Us$6.5 bllon n 2006.  
3 Accordng to ths strategy, western areas nclude 12 provnces, muncpaltes and autonomous 
regons—schuan, chongqng, Guzhou, Yunnan, Gansu, shaanx, Qngha, Nngxa, Xnjang, 
Tbet, Guangx and inner mongola—as well as two prefectures—ensh of hube Provnce 
and Xangx of hunan Provnce. 
4 data for real Fdi nflows by sector are not avalable before 1997.
5 Technology-ntensve ndustres nclude medcal and pharmaceutcal products; general 
machnery; specal machnery; electrcal machnery and equpment; electroncs and 
telecommuncatons equpment; and nstruments and meters.
6 captal-ntensve ndustres nclude beverage manufacturng; tobacco processng; paper and 
paper products; petroleum refinng and cokng; chemcal materals and products; chemcal 
fibres; ferrous metal smeltng; non-ferrous metal smeltng; and transport equpment.
7 labour-ntensve ndustres nclude food processng; food manufacturng; textles; clothng 
and other fibre products; leather and fur products; tmber processng; furnture manufacturng; 
prntng; cultural, educatonal and sports goods; rubber products; plastc products; non-metal 
mneral products; and metal products.
8 The rato of labour productvty of foregn-nvested firms to domestc firms n labour-ntensve 
ndustres n the manufacturng sector n 2005 was 0.93. calculated from China Statistical 
Yearbook 2006 (Natonal Bureau of statstcs, varous ssues [a]). 
9 The rato of labour productvty of foregn-nvested firms to domestc firms n captal-ntensve 
and technology-ntensve ndustres n the manufacturng sector n 2005 was 1.58 and 1.43 
respectvely. calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Natonal Bureau of statstcs, 
varous ssues [a]).
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China’s demand for energy
A global perspectve
Ligang Song and Yu Sheng
The surge n chna’s demand for energy n recent years rases some questons 
about the possble causes for the sgnficant shft n the energy ntensty of the 
chnese economy at ths stage of ts ndustralsaton, as well as ts long-term 
mplcatons for future global supply of and demand for energy, and ts potental 
mpact on the envronment. What has been the overall trend of world energy 
consumpton n the past few decades? how does chna’s pattern of demand 
for energy fit nto the normal pattern experenced by some other east Asan 
economes n the perods durng whch these economes were gong through a 
smlar stage of development? has the ncreased energy ntensty been drven 
prmarly by chna’s ever ncreasng level of nvestment, whch has reached an 
unprecedented scale n recent years? or has t been caused by ncreases n 
domestc demand by households, resultng largely from rsng per capta ncome 
propelled by reform and structural changes, ncludng the unprecedented pace 
and scale of urbansaton? 
Wll chna’s pattern of energy consumpton, whch concentrates on coal, 
need to be changed radcally n order for t to deal wth ts envronmental ssues 
whle sustanng ts economc growth n the long term? What knd of energy 
strategy does chna need to adopt now n order to effectvely reduce ts current 
and future energy ntensty to mtgate ts mpact on supply of world energy 
and prces as well as on the envronment?1 Ths chapter dscusses these ssues 
from a global perspectve.
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World demands for energy: the long-term trend and structural 
change
Wth steady economc and populaton growth n most countres and regons, the 
global demand for energy has mantaned a rapdly ncreasng trend durng the 
past four decades. it ncreased from a total world demand of 3.9 bllon tonnes 
of ol equvalent n 1965 to 10.6 bllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2005—an 
ncrease of 2.7 tmes for the perod (Fgure 12.1). The average annual growth 
rate of world energy demand clmbed to 2.6 per cent over the last 5 years, and 
s lkely to contnue to grow strongly for at least the next 25 years (ieA 2006). 
Ths firm ncrease n demand for energy has helped fuel global economc 
growth but has also placed consderable pressure on many ssues of publc 
concern such as sustanable energy supply, natonal development securty n 
mportng countres and global envronmental protecton. in partcular, how to 
reduce the dependency of economc growth on energy usage and especally 
on carbon emsson-ntensve energy usage, has become the focus of publc 
debate and government polces n ndustralsed and developng economes. 
current world energy consumpton exhbts two sgnficant patterns of 
change. one s that fossl fuels (ncludng crude ol, natural gas and coal) 
contnue to domnate world energy consumpton, meetng about 88 per cent 
of total consumpton (Fgure 12.2). For example, crude ol, natural gas and 
coal accounted for 37, 23 and 28 per cent respectvely of total world energy 
consumpton n 2005, whle other energy products—such as hydropower, 
nuclear power, bomass, geothermal, solar, wnd and other renewable energy 
products—accounted for only 12 per cent. 
The second feature s that energy demand n ndustralsed countres 
ncludng the Unted states, the european Unon, Japan, Australa, New Zealand 
and russa stll accounted for more than half of the total energy demand (54 
per cent of total consumpton). The Unted states was the largest (22 per cent), 
followed by the european Unon (16 per cent), russa (10 per cent), Japan (5 per 
cent) and Australa and New Zealand (1 per cent). The energy demand from 
developng economes—ncludng south korea, Assocaton of south-east 
Asan Natons (AseAN) members, chna and inda—has taken the remanng 
46 per cent share. Among these, chna ranked top (15 per cent), followed by 
inda (4 per cent), AseAN members (3 per cent), south korea (2 per cent) and 
the rest of the world (21 per cent). chna has become the second largest energy 
consumng country n the world (Fgure 12.3). 
The rapd ncrease of energy demand and ts ncreasng trend means 
the world faces two energy-related challenges: findng adequate and secure 
supples of energy at prces that are consstent wth economc stablty; and 
envronmental degradaton caused by excessve fossl-fuel consumpton. 
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Note: Prmary energy comprses commercally traded fuels only—excluded, therefore, are 
fuels such as wood, peat and anmal waste.  
Source: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
Fgure 12.1 World primary energy consumption, 1965–2005   







































Note: Prmary energy comprses commercally traded fuels only—excluded, therefore, are 
fuels such as wood, peat and anmal waste.  
Source: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
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Aganst ths background, the followng characterstcs of world energy demands 
can be observed.
Frst, global demand for cleaner energy products has been ncreasng more 
rapdly than that for tradtonal fossl-fuel products, suggestng that the pattern 
of global energy consumpton s undergong some envronmentally favourable 
structural change. For example, n the perod 1965–2005, the average annual 
growth rates of demand for natural gas, hydropower and nuclear power were 
3.9, 3.2 and 108.1 per cent respectvely (Fgure 12.4). These growth rates were 
not only much hgher than that of the average prmary energy demand (2.7 per 
cent), they were hgher than those for tradtonal fossl fuels such as crude ol 
and coal (2.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent respectvely). in partcular, the Unted 
states, the european Unon, Japan and russa have all sgnficantly ncreased 
ther use of natural gas and nuclear power whle reducng ther demand for 
coal. The structural change n favour of the use of cleaner energy products has 
been takng place manly n ndustralsed countres. 























Note: Prmary energy comprses commercally traded fuels only—excluded, therefore, are 
fuels such as wood, peat and anmal waste.   
Source: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. BP statstcal revew of World energy, 
2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
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second, developng economes—partcularly the newly ndustralsed 
economes n east Asa—have shown a rapdly ncreasng trend of energy 
demand. in the perod 1965–2005, the annual growth rate of energy demand n 
south korea was 9.3 per cent, n Tawan 7.2 per cent, among AseAN members 
7.3 per cent and n chna 5.5 per cent—well above the world average annual 
growth rate of energy demand (2.5 per cent) durng the same perod (Fgure 
12.5). These rates were much hgher than those n Japan (3.2 per cent), Australa 
and New Zealand (3 per cent), the european Unon (1.5 per cent), the Unted 
states (1.4 per cent) and russa (1.2 per cent). 
Thrd, the newly ncreased demand from developng and newly ndustralsed 
economes focuses manly on fossl fuels such as crude ol and coal. durng 
the perod 1965–2005, the annual growth rate of demand for crude ol n south 
korea was 11.6 per cent, Tawan 7.6 per cent, AseAN members 5.8 per cent and 
chna 8.8 per cent. The annual growth rate of demand for coal was 6.2 per cent 
n south korea, 6.6 per cent n Tawan, 16.7 per cent among AseAN members 
Fgure 12.4 World primary energy consumption structure, by product, 

















































Note: Prmary energy comprses commercally traded fuels only—excluded, therefore, are 
fuels such as wood, peat and anmal waste.  
Source: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
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and 4.8 per cent n chna. These rates were much hgher than the global average 
growth rates for crude ol (2.3 per cent) and coal (1.7 per cent).  
These trends provde evdence that the centre of gravty of global energy 
demand has been shftng from organsaton for economc co-operaton and 
development (oecd) countres—whch were tradtonally large consumers of 
fossl fuels—to east Asan developng economes. The developng economes 
n east Asa have had hgher rates of economc and populaton growth than 
oecd countres. Underlyng forces behnd such a shft towards hgh energy 
ntensty n these economes nclude rapd urbansaton, hgh nvestment shares 
of output and hgh and ncreasng export orentaton. The same forces that 
worked for Japan, korea and Tawan n the past are now workng for chna; 
the only dfference s the ncreasng absolute and relatve sze of the chnese 
economy, whch wll magnfy the mpact on world markets beyond the hgh 
levels experenced n the recent past. For ths reason, the strong growth n 
demand for energy n chna s lkely to contnue through ts perod of rapd 
ndustral transformaton, whch wll be assocated wth strong economc 
growth, n the next two decades (Garnaut and song 2006).
due to the lack of domestc energy supples and beng n the catch-up phase 
of ndustralsaton, many economes n east Asa have had lower prce and 
ncome elastctes for energy products than those n ndustralsed countres. 
As a result, they have become ncreasngly dependent on mports of energy 
from overseas, underlyng changes n world energy prces. in fact, east Asan 
ndustralsaton was closely assocated wth two world ol prce rses. one was 
n the 1970s—whch occurred wth rapd economc growth first n Japan, and 
then n korea and Tawan—and the other s the current one, to whch chna’s 
growng economy has contrbuted (Fgure 12.6). Another factor causng the 
prce rse s that energy supplers have been concentratng ncreasngly on 
certan countres or country groups such as russa and the major mddle 
eastern producers. 
compared wth the prce for ol, the surge n the prce of natural gas has 
been more recent (Fgure 12.7), reflectng the tendency of ndustralsed and 
developng economes to move towards cleaner energy optons. World prces 
for coal were comng down from ther peak n the 1970s, but started pckng 
up agan n ths current resource boom (Fgure 12.8). Ths trend s lkely to 
contnue, especally consderng the fact that chna—for the first tme n recent 
decades—became a net mporter of coal durng the first quarter of 2007. 
Wth the above trend of world energy demand dentfied, we can now have a 
close look at the changes of energy demand over tme n chna n order to explan 
ts role n determnng the changes n world energy demand and trade. 
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Fgure 12.6 World real price of crude oil, 1965–2007 (Us$ per barrel)
Note: The nomnal prce for the perod 1965–83 s the Us average and the nomnal prce for the 
perod 1984–2007 s Brent dated. 
Sources: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), varous ssues. BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 1965–2005, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london; internatonal monetary Fund (imF), 
2007. International Financial Statistics, 2006–07, internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc.
Fgure 12.5 World primary energy consumption structure, by country, 






















































Note: Prmary energy comprses commercally traded fuels only—excluded, therefore, are 
fuels such as wood, peat and anmal waste.  
Source: Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
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China’s primary energy demand, supply and trade
Wth an annual gross domestc product (GdP) growth rate of about 10 per cent, 
on average, chna’s total prmary energy consumpton ncreased by 36.3 per 
cent n the past decade, reachng 1.6 bllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2005. 
chna has now become the second largest energy consumer n the world. The 
share of chna’s prmary energy consumpton n the world ncreased from 
4.7 per cent n 1965 to 14.7 per cent n 2005. chna’s share of the ncrease n 
world prmary energy consumpton ncreased from 4.4 per cent n the perod 
1965–70 to 12.6 per cent durng the perod 2000–05. in the past few years, the 
growth rate of prmary energy consumpton n chna has accelerated (Fgure 
12.9),2 promptng the chnese government to set a target for mprovng energy 
efficency by 20 per cent n the perod 2006–10.
chna’s ncreasng demand for energy can be dscussed by lookng at the 
consumpton pattern of dfferent knds of energy products. For example, ts 
demand for coal has been drven by the need for electrcty generaton and 
ndustral producton, and chna’s rch endowment of coal means the product 
accounted for 70 per cent of total energy consumpton growth durng the perod 
1995–2005 (Fgure 12.10). 
Fgure 12.7 International real price of natural gas, 1985–2007  
(Us$ per ‘000 cubc metres, 2004 constant prces)
Note: The spot prce of natural gas s the border prce of russan natural gas n Germany.  
Source: internatonal monetary Fund (imF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, 2006–07, 
internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc.
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Figure 12.9	 China’s	primary	energy	consumption	structure,	by	product,	
1965–2005	(million tonnes of oil equivalent)
										
Figure 12.8 Real	prices	of	internationally	traded	thermal	coal,	1967–2007	















































Note: The spot price of coal is the free-on-board (f.o.b.) price of Australian thermal coal—1,200 
btu/pound, less than 1 per cent sulphur, 14 per cent ash—at Newcastle/Port Kembla.  
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, 2006–07, 











































Source: British Petroleum Global Limited (BP), 2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006, 
British Petroleum Global Limited, London.
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chna’s demand for ol s a result largely of the rapd ncrease n vehcle 
ownershp and ndustral development, wth ol accountng for 17.7 per cent 
of the total energy consumpton growth n the same perod. other energy 
products—such as natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power and so on—account 
for the remanng 11.7 per cent. in 2005, the consumpton of major energy 
products over the total prmary energy consumpton reached 21.1 per cent for 
crude ol, 69.6 per cent for coal, 5.8 per cent for natural gas, 2.7 per cent for 
hydropower and 0.8 per cent for nuclear power.
To meet ts ever ncreasng demand for energy consumpton, chna has been 
ntensfyng producton of all types of energy by ncreasng the total amount of 
nvestment n energy producton. Fgure 12.11 shows the share of nvestment 
n energy sectors over the total GdP n chna durng the perod 1992–2004, n 
comparson wth the world average shares durng the same perod. 
The average rato of nvestment n energy sectors to total GdP n chna durng 
the perod 1992–2004 was 0.25 per cent—more than four tmes that of the world 
average, whch was only 0.06 per cent durng the same perod. The hghest 
rato of nvestment n energy sectors n chna reached a peak of 0.6 per cent n 
1997. Although the east Asan financal crss n 1997 had broken ths trend by 
about 2000 and slowed the pace of nvestment n energy sectors, a new wave of 
nvestment n energy producton n chna seemed to accelerate after 2002. 
As a consequence of the large-scale nvestment n energy, the producton of 
varous types of energy products n chna ncreased sgnficantly. Fgure 12.12 
shows the changes of the producton of some major energy products n chna 
durng the past decade or so. Wth ncreased output from Western and offshore 
fields, crude ol producton ncreased from 162 mllon tonnes of ol equvalent 
n 2000 to 181 mllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2005. coal producton ncreased 
from 656 mllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2000 to 1,107 mllon tonnes of ol 
equvalent n 2005. Natural gas producton ncreased from 24.5 mllon tonnes 
of ol equvalent n 2000 to 45 mllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2005, wth an 
annual growth rate of more than 10 per cent—much hgher than the average 
growth rate of 8.7 per cent durng the prevous three decades. Wth the Three 
Gorges dam hydropower project completed—and other electrcty-related 
constructon n Guangdong and Guangx Provnces—electrcty generaton 
has also ncreased, from 1,368 mllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2000 to 2,474 
mllon tonnes of ol equvalent n 2005.  Ths trend of ncreasng capacty 
of electrcty generaton s contnung, wth 60 ggawatts, or 2.5 per cent of 
establshed capacty, added annually.
despte the rapd ncrease of energy producton n chna, the gaps between 
domestc supply and demand have been ncreasng, especally for crude ol 
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Fgure 12.11  Comparison of investment shares in primary energy sectors 























































Source: World Bank, 2006. World Development Indicators Online Database, World Bank Group, 
Washngton, dc. 











Source: Authors’ calculatons wth data from Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. 
Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london.
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and ts products. These gaps wll have to be met by mports. Between 1971 and 
2003, chna was a net energy exportng country. The stuaton has changed, 
however, snce 1997, when the share of net mports of energy products of total 
energy consumpton ncreased consderably—provdng clear evdence that 
there has been an ncreasngly tght balance between energy demand and 
supply n chna. 
Fgure 12.13 shows the net mports of crude ol, natural gas and coal, 
measured by the dfference between ther producton and consumpton durng 
the past four decades. snce 1993, chna has been a net mportng country for 
crude ol and ts related products and the average annual growth rate of net 
mports was 44 per cent, whch was hgher than that n any other country n 
the world n the same perod. Although producton of natural gas has exceeded 
ts consumpton n chna snce 1993, ths gap has decreased sgnficantly, 
wth ncreased domestc demand after 2000. coal s relatvely more abundant 
than ether crude ol or natural gas n chna. Wth a sgnficant ncrease n 
producton of coal, t has almost met demands snce 2000; however, owng to 
the substtuton effect between coal and crude ol caused by rsng ol prces n 
the world market, ncreases n demand for coal turned chna nto a net mporter 
of coal by early 2007.
chna s, therefore, becomng a new global centre of energy consumpton—
on par wth the Unted states. over tme, a further ncrease n chnese energy 
mports from the global market could add much more pressure to energy 
supples and, consequently, prces—especally for fossl fuels—n chna and 
the world. Thus, findng solutons to meet chna’s energy needs s not only 
mportant for chna to sustan ts long-term economc growth, t s crtcal 
to mantan market stablty for energy products, whch affects the global 
economy. These solutons are specfied n chna’s eleventh Fve-Year Plan 
on energy development, ssued by the Natonal development and reform 
commsson (Ndrc) n Aprl 2007. For these strateges to work effectvely, t 
s useful to explore further how rsng energy ntensty n chna at ths phase 
of ndustralsaton has been determned. 
China’s economic growth and demand for energy
economc growth mpacts on the demand for energy n the followng fashon. 
Frst, when economc growth ncreases GdP per capta n a country, the 
ncreased consumpton per capta can generate addtonal demand for 
energy. For example, a rch country could consume more energy-ntensve 
goods—such as applances for coolng and heatng, famly automobles, 
ar transportaton and so on—than less developed countres. The growth 
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Figure 12.12 Production of crude oil, coal, natural gas and electricity in 
China, 1965–2005 (million tonnes of oil equivalent)
Source: British Petroleum Global Limited (BP), 2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, British 
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Figure 12.13 China’s net imports of crude oil and coal, 1965–2005  
(10,000 metric tonnes)
Note: Net imports are measured by the difference between consumption and production. 
Source: British Petroleum Global Limited (BP), 2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, British 
Petroleum Global Limited, London.
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pattern of this type of energy demand induced by economic growth is usually 
continuing and stable over time. 
Second, when economic growth makes a country cross certain economic 
development stages, the adjustment in production technique and consumption 
pattern can lead to structural changes in energy demand. For example, when 
a country grows from a farming society into an industrialised society, it is 
expected that capital and energy-intensive industrial production will substitute 
for primary products or labour-intensive production and thereby generate a 
large demand for energy. This type of energy demand induced by economic 
structural changes usually takes place at an accelerated pace over certain 
periods of economic development. The two effects combined determine the 
level and scale of energy demand resulting from economic growth (or growth 
of GDP per capita) when population growth is controlled.
In linking changing patterns of energy demand to economic growth, most 
previous studies used the cross-country differences of consumption elasticity 
for energy (Fiebig et al. 1987; Churchill 1994; Brenton 1997; Garcia-Cerrutti 
2000; Bernstein and Griffin 2005). The results obtained, however, vary and are 
hardly consistent. For example, Dahl (1992) argued that energy demand was 
price inelastic and slightly income elastic, but found no clear evidence that 
the developing world’s energy demand was less price or more income elastic 
than for the industrial world. Churchill (1994) and Brenton (1997), using some 
cross-country estimations, found that the income elasticities of demand for 
energy products were higher in poorer countries than in wealthy countries. Such 
inconsistency in the previous studies leads us to think that this could be due 
to the different stages of economic development rather than country-specific 
characteristics that determine the changing pattern of energy consumption. To 
test this, we use the seven-country data for the period 1965–2005 to examine 
the impact of different economic development stages on primary energy 
consumption by using a demand function as specified below.
In Cit=β0+β1 In Yit+β2 In Pit+β3D1+β4D2+β5D3+β6D4+β7D5+β8D6ui+εit   (1)
where Cit stands for primary energy consumption (tonnes of oil equivalent), Yit 
is GDP per capita with constant price (the 2000 US dollar price) and Pit is the 
real price of primary energy (the real price of crude oil). D1 - D2 denote different 
economic development stages, measured by GDP per capita following the method 
from Chenery et al. (1986). That is, we define that the primary industrialisation 
stage, D1, equals one if GDP per capita is between US$1,138 and US$2,275 (with 
the 2000 constant price); the medium industrialisation stage, D2, equals one 
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f GdP per capta s between Us$2,275 and Us$4,550 (wth the 2000 constant 
prce); the advanced ndustralsaton stage, D3, equals one f GdP per capta 
s between Us$4,550 and Us$9,100 (wth the 2000 constant prce); the prmary 
developed economc stage, D4, equals one f GdP per capta s between Us$9,100 
and Us$17,063 (wth the 2000 constant prce); the advanced developed economc 
stage, D5, equals one f GdP per capta s between Us$17,063 and Us$27,300 (wth 
the 2000 constant prce); and the post-development economc stage, D6, equals 
one f GdP per capta s more than Us$27,300 (wth the 2000 constant prce).
Usng the regresson estmaton results, Fgure 12.14 plots the predcted 
relatonshps between energy consumpton ntensty (consumpton of the 
prmary energy per capta) and GdP per capta (n the 2000 constant Us dollar 
prce). it s shown that when GdP per capta n a country rses from Us$2,500 to 
Us$10,000 (n partcular, from Us$3,000 to Us$5,000), there wll be sgnficant 
ncreases n energy consumpton per capta. Beyond the Us$5,000 level of per 
capta ncome, energy consumpton ntensty wll contnue to rse, but at a slower 
pace. After a country reaches per capta ncome of Us$10,000, ncreases n energy 
consumpton ntensty become slower stll.
Ths result s consstent wth the changes of energy consumpton ntenstes 
n east Asa durng the perod 1965–2005 (Fgure 12.15). For example, Japan 
experenced a dramatc ncrease n per capta energy consumpton n the 1960s, 
whle south korea and Tawan experenced a smlar ncrease n the 1980s. 
AseAN countres demonstrated a smlar trend n the 1990s and chna entered 
a phase of rapdly ncreasng energy ntensty after 2000. interestngly, most of 
these sgnficant changes n energy consumpton ntensty took place when the 
countres’ GdP per capta was wthn the range of Us$3,000 to Us$5,000 (n the 
2000 constant prce)—except Japan. Ths could suggest that dfferent stages of 
economc development generate structural changes, whch underle the changes 
n countres’ energy ntenstes. Ths findng helps us to judge how chna’s energy 
ntensty wll relate to the level of ts per capta ncome, and to predct the future 
trajectory that chna s lkely to follow n ncreasng ts energy ntensty.
Wth per capta GdP of Us$1,444 (n the 2000 constant prce) n 2005, chna 
entered a stage of development or ndustralsaton n whch there would be a 
dramatc ncrease n ts energy ntensty n producton. Followng the estmates, 
we can predct that energy consumpton wll contnue to accelerate at least untl 
chna reaches a per capta ncome level of Us$5,000. Fgure 12.16 compares 
energy consumpton ntensty n chna wth the world average of energy 
ntensty durng the perod 1971–2005. The figure shows that a rapd ncrease n 
energy consumpton ntensty n chna started to take place after 2000, drvng 
chnese energy consumpton per capta above the one-tonne level. 
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Fgure 12.15 Primary energy consumption intensity in East Asia, 1965–2005 





























































Sources: Authors’ calculatons usng the data from Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 
2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london; World Bank, 
2006. World Development Indicators Online Database, World Bank Group, Washngton, dc.
Fgure 12.14  Estimated average primary energy consumption per capita 
across different stages of economic development (per capta, 
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Sources: Authors’ calculatons usng data from Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 2006. 
Statistical Review of World Energy, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london; Penn World 
Tables: Table 6.1. 
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moreover, a structural change analyss of energy consumpton ntensty, 
wth the control of real ncome and prce over tme, can also be reflected usng 
the accumulated cUsUm ndex (whch ranges from zero to one).3 The ndex 
s a set of procedures that can be used for testng for structural changes n 
the regresson parameters. in applyng ths approach, emphass s placed on 
graphcal methods. A smple way of nterpretng such a graph s to see whether 
the calculated ndexes (the cUsUms sequence) can cross the lnes of gven 
levels of sgnficance. such ndexes are plotted n Fgure 12.17, whch shows 
that there s a breakng pont at the turn of the new century, whch ndcates 
that chna has entered a new phase of ndustralsaton n whch structural 
changes wth respect to ts pattern of energy consumpton ntensty have 
been occurrng. Ths breakng pont n the changes n chna’s prmary energy 
consumpton s close to the tme when ts per capta ncome surpassed the 
mark of Us$1,000—a clear sgnal that chna has entered the new phase of 
ndustralsaton assocated wth ncreasng energy ntensty.
Gven the estmate of the internatonal energy Agency (ieA) of an annual 
growth rate n chna of 6.4 per cent durng the next 20 years, chna’s real GdP 
per capta could reach Us$2,686 n 2015 and Us$4,996 n 2025.4 Ths essentally 
means—from what we have just descrbed regardng the stages-of-development 
Fgure 12.16  Comparison of primary energy consumption intensity 































































Sources: Authors’ calculatons usng the data from Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 
2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london; World Bank, 
2006. World Development Indicators Online Database, World Bank Group, Washngton, dc.
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argument—that chna’s energy ntensty wll contnue to rse at an accelerated 
pace n the next 15 to 20 years. Ths s largely because chna has just entered 
a phase of ndustralsaton n whch ts ndustral actvtes wll concentrate 
manly on those heavy ndustres that now consume about 54 per cent of chna’s 
total energy consumpton—up from 39 per cent only five years ago (rosen and 
houser 2007). These conclusons would be even stronger f the ieA were to 
apply a hgher, more realstc estmate of chna’s future growth rate.
Furthermore, wth the rapd ncrease n per capta ncome, consumers’ 
energy consumpton has been ncreasng too, whch has been boosted by 
household consumpton such as for coolng and heatng applances and prvate 
vehcles and transportaton. Accordng to rosen and houser (2007), however, 
the commercal and transportaton sectors won’t surpass ndustry as energy 
demand drvers untl a country reaches Us$5,000 per capta GdP. By ths 
crteron, the ndustral sectors wll contnue to be the key drvers for energy 





































Sources: Authors’ calculatons usng the data from Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted (BP), 
2006. Statistical Review of World Energy, Brtsh Petroleum Global lmted, london; World Bank, 
2006. World Development Indicators Online Database, World Bank Group, Washngton, dc.
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consumpton at least for the next 10–15 years. in that tme frame, t s lkely that 
the world wll wtness chnese energy consumpton per capta double—or more 
than trple f we thnk n terms of more realstc chnese growth rates.
The envronmental mpact of the rsng energy ntensty n chna wll be 
enormous because the relatvely hgh energy consumpton ntenstes are 
assocated closely wth ncreases n greenhouse gas emssons. such a prospect 
could be altered, of course, by mprovements n technology, efficency and 
the mplementaton of envronmental polces and regulatons that moderate 
growth n greenhouse gas emssons. one factor that makes t dfficult for chna 
to tackle ts worsenng envronmental problems, however, s the composton 
of ts energy consumpton and producton, whch are domnated by coal. For 
example, accordng to chna’s eleventh Fve-Year Plan on energy development 
(Ndrc 2007), producton of coal wll contnue to take the largest share (74.7 
per cent) of chna’s total prmary energy producton by 2010, followed by ol 
(11.3 per cent), hydropower (7.5 per cent), natural gas (5 per cent) and nuclear 
power (1 per cent). By then, the share of coal producton s forecast to drop 
only margnally, by 1.8 percentage ponts.
As a result, the ieA predcts that chna wll—from now untl 2030—account 
for 40 per cent of the growth of global annual carbon doxde emssons. These 
may turn out to be underestmates—bear n mnd that ths s based on estmates 
of chnese economc growth that are only two thrds of those dscussed n 
chapter 1 as beng relevant to the Platnum Age of economc growth.
The nefficent use of energy n chna has worsened even further supply 
constrants and placed added pressure on the envronment. chna has made 
great progress n mprovng ts energy efficency, but there s consderable 
room for t to do more compared wth the levels of energy efficency n more 
advanced countres (Fgure 12.18). 
Gven the rsng energy demand and constrants on energy supply, chna has 
made energy securty the top prorty of ts energy polcy goals. The eleventh 
Fve-Year Plan delneates measures for the enhancement of energy securty, 
wth a strong emphass on ncreasng nvestment n energy producton and 
mprovng the efficency of energy use. 
To acheve the targets, a number of measures could be mplemented 
(Bradley and Yang 2006). Frst, energy ndustres could by modernsed by 
closng small and nefficent coal-mnes and power plants and refineres wth 
backward technology, whle at the same tme ntensfyng nvestment n the 
energy-producton sector. second, efficent technologes could be ntroduced 
nto the process of energy consumpton—from producton and transportaton 
to consumpton. small and nefficent ron and steel producton plants could 
be closed. Thrd, sources of nternatonal energy supply could be dversfied 
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Table 12.1 Future growth of China’s economy, energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions, 2000–2020 and 2020–2050 (per cent)
 2000–2020 2020–2050
Annual growth rate of GdP (per cent) 7.2 4.8
Annual growth rate of energy consumpton (per cent) 4.3 1.7
elastctes of energy consumptona 0.59 0.35
Annual decreasng rate of energy ntensty of GdP (per cent) 2.8 3.0
Annual growth rate of co2 emssons (per cent) 3.5 0.7
Annual decreasng rate of co2 emssons ntensty of GdP (per cent) 3.4 3.8
a elastctes of energy consumpton were calculated by dvdng annual growth rate of energy 
consumpton by annual growth rate of GdP. 
Source: chna, 2007. National Assessment Report on Climate Change, prepared by the mnstry 
of scence and Technology, chna meteorologcal Admnstraton, and the chnese Academy of 
scences, scentfic Publsher, Bejng:Table 22.3.
Fgure 12.18  Primary energy consumption efficiency across countries, 
1965–2005 (tonnes of ol equvalent per Us$)
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through multlateral and blateral trade treates. Fourth, current energy 
consumpton could be dverted further from drty, non-renewable fossl fuels to 
clean, sustanable energy—such as hydropower and nuclear power. Ffth, the 
energy prce system could be reformed to enhance more efficent use of energy. 
Fnally, new laws and regulatons could be enacted to regulate exploraton, 
producton and consumpton of energy, and ther mpact on the envronment 
could be mtgated by desgnng and mplementng an efficent, effectve and 
far polluton tradng regme.
The adopton of these measures could pave the way for chna to acheve 
ts long-term objectves of economc growth, energy consumpton and co2 
emssons (Table 12.1). Accordng to ths projecton, chna could reduce ts 
emssons ntensty of GdP by 42 per cent over the perod 2006–20.
Conclusions
chna, together wth other east Asan economes and inda, wll ncreasngly 
become the new centre of global prmary energy consumpton and a major 
source of envronmental polluton n the next 20 years. Prevous studes on 
energy seem to have underestmated the potental mpact of chna’s economc 
growth on the balance of energy supply and demand. in partcular, prevous 
studes tended to neglect the ncremental energy demand from chna resultng 
from the shft from a lower economc development stage to a more advanced 
stage of ndustralsaton as well as understatng lkely economc growth rates. 
increasng nvestment n energy producton and mprovements n energy 
efficency could help to allevate the pressure of balancng energy supply and 
demand n the short term. seekng new sources of energy through technologcal 
nnovatons and nternatonal economc and technologcal cooperaton would, 
however, be an mportant long-term soluton to the dlemma of mantanng the 
sustanablty of economc growth whle protectng the envronment.
Notes
1 chna s consderng serously such a strategy as t overtook the Unted states n carbon 
doxde emssons by 8 per cent n 2006 accordng to a report released by the Netherlands 
envronmental Assessment Agency on 19 June 2007.
2 chna’s energy demand elastcty—whch s the rato of energy demand growth to GdP 
growth—ncreased from less than 0.5 between 1978 and 2000 to 1.5 between 2001 and 2006 
(rosen and houser 2007).
3 see Brown et al. (1975) and maskus (1983) for the techncal detals for applyng ths approach, 
and see Johnston (1984) for the statstcal tests and nterpretaton of these ndexes.
4 These are rather conservatve estmates compared wth most forecasts of 7–8 per cent annual 
growth rates n the chnese economy durng the next decade or so (see, for example, maddson 
2006).
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13
Crouching bull, hidden bear
The chnese equtes markets n fat years  
and lean years
Ted Rule
When i last vsted the chnese stock exchanges two years ago, they were n 
dre strats (rule 2005). The market ndces had been n declne snce 2001. in 
may 2005, the shangha index stood at 1,060—less than half of ts 2001 peak 
of 2,245. durng 2005, the shenzhen and shangha exchanges were two of the 
three worst performng exchanges n the world, wth year-on-year declnes of 
11.7 per cent and 8.3 per cent respectvely. only the Tehran stock exchange 
performed worse (World Federaton of exchanges 2007a). in terms of market 
captalsaton, the once great shangha exchange had slumped to nneteenth 
n the world, smlar n sze to sngapore but sgnficantly smaller than the 
mumba and Natonal stock exchanges of inda (World Federaton of exchanges 
2007a). key prce–earnngs ratos had declned from ther peak of 37.7X n 2001 
to 16.3X n 2005 (World Federaton of exchanges 2007a). As chnese companes 
made up an ever-greater proporton of the hong kong board, such declnes n 
prce–earnngs ratos started to nfluence the less volatle hong kong ratos. 
hong kong prce–earnngs ratos fell from a hgh of 19X n 2003 to 15.6X n 2005 
(World Federaton of exchanges 2007a). 
even though the chnese economy contnued to be the fastest growng 
major economy n the world and the world’s largest recpent of foregn drect 
nvestment (Fdi), the role of the shangha and shenzhen markets n moblsng 
new captal declned drastcally. Ths was due partly to a ban on new ntal 
publc offerngs (iPos). But t seems doubtful whether market condtons were 
conducve to successful iPos even f they had been permtted. At Us$3.6 bllon 
rased, shangha ranked twenty-fourth among world exchanges n terms of 
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captal rased. Ths was a lttle more than Tel Avv, less than oslo, Athens or 
Tehran and sgnficantly less than the indan exchanges, whch rased Us$19 
bllon between them. shenzhen rased a mere Us$351 mllon n new captal 
n 2005 and not a sngle cent was rased n secondary ssues. only colombo, 
Budapest and ljubljana exchanges performed worse. Turnover n shangha and 
shenzhen declned by 26 per cent and 20.6 per cent respectvely n the already 
dsappontng 2004 figures (World Federaton of exchanges 2007b). 
Ths was not a happy pcture. indeed, the mood around regulators and other 
government bodes assocated wth the markets was growng ncreasngly 
frantc. Too many ordnary people had lost too much money speculatng on 
stocks and the spectre of socal unrest loomed. in may 2005, there was a 
seres of meetngs around the country to dscuss measures to stmulate the 
markets. it was hoped that these measures would return a northerly aspect to 
the figures and, hopefully, a smle to the faces of the tens of mllons of retal 
nvestors. measures proposed even ncluded an extraordnary suggeston that 
the government should establsh a fund to stmulate the market.1
Hong Kong gathers strength
meanwhle, outsde the closed shop of the two domestc markets, lfe went on 
as normal. The economy was growng at 10 per cent per annum, there was an 
enormous demand for expanson and other captal and t was beng met from 
the markets. hong kong, however, was the market supplyng ths demand. in 
2005, the prevous mould of nternatonal captal rasng was broken and hong 
kong started to come nto ts own as chna’s captal gateway to the world and 
one of the world’s leadng exchanges.
in 2005, three of the five largest iPos n the world were of chnese companes 
on the hong kong exchange (Table 13.1).
despte the weakness n the chnese domestc markets and the slump n 
iPo and secondary rasng actvty, chna domnated Asan iPo actvty n 
2005. more than half of the Us$41 bllon rased n Asan iPos was rased by 
chnese companes. Ths was almost four tmes the amount rased by Japanese 
companes and 10 tmes the amount rased by indan companes (Table 13.2).
Partly as a result of all ths chnese actvty, hong kong became the fourth 
largest captal-rasng exchange n the world after New York, london and 
Toronto (Toronto was boosted by the boom n mnerals rasngs resultng from 
chnese demand for resources). Professonals commented, ‘Ths marks a new 
era, not just for chna but for the global captal markets n general. By lstng 
n hong kong and sellng tranches of shares to qualfied nvestors n the Us 
and europe, chnese companes have sdestepped tradtonal assumptons that 
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the only way for large corporatons to gan access to global captal pools was 
to complete a full Us lstng’ (ernst and Young 2006a). 
Thus the problem dd not le wth the chnese economy. The economy was 
fine. it dd not mean that there was a lmted demand for captal, nor dd t 
mean that foregn supplers of captal were not nterested n chnese paper. 
The enormous success of hong kong-based chnese iPos at the nadr of the 
domestc markets gave the le to that proposton. The problem lay wthn the 
shangha and shenzhen markets themselves.
The long decline
it s approprate at ths juncture to restate the reasons i enumerated n my 
prevous paper (rule 2005) for the declne of the domestc markets. essentally, 
there were three reasons.
• The markets had been overprced and were due for a serous correcton. 
At the peak n 2001, shangha average prce–earnngs ratos were 37.7X 
and shenzhen’s were averagng 39.8X—the same rato as appled n Tokyo 
n 1990 close to the peak of the Japanese bubble.2 Ths overprcng was 
ascrbed varously to market mmaturty and lack of a large nsttutonal 
sector. 
• There was too much money chasng too lttle product. Ths was because 
of a regulatory system that ratoned iPo slots and took lstng decsons 
out of the hands of underwrters and others who took the actual iPo rsk. 
A 2000 decson partly resolved ths problem by gvng more weght n 
decdng who should go to iPo to the people who took the underwrtng 
rsk. Ths put further downward pressure on prces.
• The market was serously spooked by a 2001 decson to experment 
Table 13.1 Leading international IPOs, 2005
     domcle  industry Proceeds  Prmary
   (Us$ bllon) exchange
chna constructon Bank chna Banks 9.2 hong kong
electrcté de France France Power 8.2 euronext
Gaz de France France Power 4.2 euronext
chna shenhua energy chna mnng 3.3 hong kong
Bank of communcatons chna Banks 2.2 hong kong
Source: ernst and Young, 2006a. Accelerating Growth—Global IPO Trends 2006, ernst and 
Young.
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Table 13.2  IPO activity in Asia, 2005 (captal rased by natonalty of firm)
domcle Total captal rased (Us$ mllon) Number of iPos
chna 24,263 114
Japan 6,231 157








Source: ernst and Young, 2006a. Accelerating Growth—Global IPO Trends 2006, ernst and 
Young.
wth sellng down state-owned shares. The two-thrds of chnese-lsted 
company shares owned by the state n one form or another were non-
tradable and would never come to market. on 12 June 2001, a modest 
proposal was mplemented that would see a lmted sell-down of state 
shares. Under the proposal, new iPos of state-owned enterprses 
would sell down a block of 10 per cent of exstng state shares wth the 
proceeds gong to the socal securty Fund. No exstng lsted company 
was affected. Ths scared the market and marked the begnnng of the 
declne. The market was afrad of enormous amounts of state paper 
floodng the board and leadng to a collapse n value. 
in Aprl 2005, the chna securtes regulatory commsson (csrc) 
announced the ‘expermental’ converson of the non-tradable shares of three 
lsted companes to tradablty, and n June a further 42 companes joned the 
‘experment’. Ths marked the nadr of the domestc markets.
Ths, possbly concdentally, marked the bottom of the chnese bear market. 
Four years of declne were replaced by a boom, whch contnues today. The 
markets reman sprtely and extremely volatle, subject to volent movements 
on whm, rumour and occasonal manpulaton. Although the domestc markets 
are back, hong kong has strengthened ts poston as the ‘bg brother’ of the 
chnese equtes market.
But there are sgns of a growng maturty. lots of ordnary people were hurt 
badly durng the bear market and are no longer so eager to beleve n ther own 
nvncblty or to rely on ther own judgement. Ths has led to the growth of a 
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fledglng nsttutonal sector—especally n the area of mutual funds—a concept 
that chnese retal nvestors have adopted wth characterstc gusto. And, for 
a bref moment n march 2007, even mghty Wall street trembled momentarly 
n response to sentment on the east bank of the Whangpoo rver and on the 
shangha Bund.3 
Before lookng at the boom, however, let us examne some of the factors 
that helped put a bottom on the bear market. These were the resoluton for the 
tme beng of the non-tradable share ssue, growth of mutual funds and the 
ntroducton of sophstcated hedgng nstruments to help manage rsk.
Administrative measures
The key admnstratve measure adopted to revve the chnese share markets 
was the reform of the state shareholdng system. Ths s usually referred to as the 
non-tradable share reform. Ths reform dd not mean the complete prvatsaton 
of state-held shares, although ths s what was feared most by shareholders. Not 
even all state shares were held drectly by the state. many ‘state’ shares were 
held by ncorporated bodes, whch, as regstered busnesses, had ‘legal-person’ 
status. Ths artfically created some of the benefits of share ownershp, even 
though the ultmate owner was stll the state. drectly held state shares were 
also held at dfferent levels of government, and were ‘owned’ and managed by 
dfferent levels of state Assets supervson and management commssons. 
centrally held shares were managed by the central commsson, provncally 
held shares were managed by the Provncal commssons and so on. some 
owners of non-tradable shares were prvate ndvduals and even foregners. 
The chnese companes law locked up the shares of sponsor organsatons. 
When the non-tradable share ssue first came to publc notce n 2001, the 
occason that brought t to the fore was a proposal to prop up the state Penson 
Fund and the state socal securty Fund by a small sell-down of state shares 
and the allocaton of 10 per cent of the state’s holdngs n future iPos to those 
funds. Usng state share holdngs to captalse the socal securty Funds 
remans a subject of actve debate today (The People’s Daily 2006a), however, 
the objectve of the reform was never mass prvatsaton and a sudden dumpng 
of state shares on the market. 
The objectve of the non-tradable share reform was the further extenson 
of the benefits of the shareholdng system to state-owned lsted companes. 
Because ther shares were non-tradable, state-owned companes were unable 
to enjoy two of the benefits of the shareholdng system: they could not cash 
out ther holdngs and apply the proceeds to other purposes, and they were 
mmune from takeover pressure. Ths reduced the nfluence of mnorty opnon 
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on busness decsons. some state-owned companes had qute vared regsters 
of legal-person owners and state owners at dfferent levels. snce these shares 
were non-tradable, however, the legal-person owners were unable to cash out 
n the event of poor share performance or a takeover offer. Ths meant that 
sometmes qute small controllng nterests could afford to gnore the nterests 
of large mnorty shareholders. share prce performance was clearly an ssue 
for lsted companes that wshed to mantan access to the captal markets, 
but there was never that snkng realsaton that the market mght decde that 
ts nterests were better served by havng a dfferent person lookng after ts 
nvestment.
charman shang Fuln and hs colleagues at the csrc undertook the delcate 
task of ntroducng an essental reform, whch the market was very afrad of. 
The delcacy of the task was compounded by ts tmng. The market had been 
declnng for four years and the ndex was at less than half of ts peak.
Fear and greed 
Fear
charman shang s an nterestng character. he has never been consdered 
one of the ntellectual or polcy powerhouses of the chnese financal system, 
but he was often the man whom Zhu rongj called on to fix unfixable problems 
n the financal system. hs first navgaton of shark-nfested waters was n 
1994 when he resolved the ssue of trangular debt between state-owned 
enterprses—an ssue that had threatened to paralyse the whole payments 
system. in 2000, he was made Governor of the Agrcultural Bank, whch was 
stll the weakest of the state-owned banks. There he made and carred through 
several of the most dfficult decsons, ncludng closng 3,000 branches and 
layng off 50,000 staff.
shang understood that n dealng wth shareholders t was necessary to 
deal smultaneously wth the conflctng emotons of fear and greed. on 27 
June 2005, shang addressed the ssue of fear. he announced that the am 
of the reform was not to sell out all non-tradable shares on the market but to 
elmnate the tradng rght dfferental. ‘makng all shares tradable doesn’t mean 
sellng out all shares,’ he commented (chnaPaper onlne 2007). Any sales of 
state shares would have to be approved by the state Assets supervson and 
management commsson. There would be gudelnes specfyng the amount 
of shares that should reman n state hands at any tme and also lock-ups. he 
was commentng on the ‘Notce regardng the ssue of expermentng wth 
reforms to the splt-share structure of lsted companes’ (csrc 2004). Under 
ths notce, the method of makng shares tradable was to be decded by the 
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company tself. The method had to be approved by not only a full eGm, but 
two-thrds of attendng tradable shareholders. Flotaton of the shares on the 
market was forbdden n the first year of reform and lmted to 5 per cent of 
outstandng shares n the second year.
A further decson also expanded the pool of captal avalable for buyng 
shares held by the publc. it was decded that state-owned enterprses could 
expand ther holdngs n companes by buyng shares held by the publc. Ths 
put the publc and the state on an equal footng and gave the publc a potentally 
large buyer. The basc ratonale appears to have been to allow controllng 
shareholders to buy n the market, thus holdng up market prces n case small 
shareholders began dumpng stock after the reforms. 
The ssue of foregn shareholders holdng non-tradable shares n lsted 
companes was also addressed. on 7 November, t was announced jontly 
by the csrc and the mnstry of commerce that foregn strategc nvestors 
would be able to enter chnese companes by buyng prevously untradable ‘A’ 
shares from state and other sources. ‘A’ shares had prevously been avalable 
to foregners only va Qualfied Foregn insttutonal investors (QFiis). Ths was 
subject to varous lock-up arrangements but potentally sgnficantly wdened 
and deepened the market (mnstry of commerce 2007). Foregn stakes of more 
than 25 per cent would attract normal sno–foregn jont-venture prvleges.
Greed
Ths successfully addressed the fear ssue. The ssue of greed was addressed 
by smply throwng large amounts of money at publc shareholders. each 
reformng company was to compensate tradable shareholders for potental 
losses that mght be ncurred n the reform process. each company was to 
make ts own decsons on the quantum and form of compensaton, subject 
to approval by the csrc. compensaton took the form of cash, bonus shares 
and other measures. many of these compensaton schemes were extremely 
generous to mnorty shareholders, especally n the early stages. A couple of 
examples demonstrate ths. one of the first companes to float ts non-tradable 
shares, sany heavy industres, offered three free shares plus 8 yuan n cash 
for every state share sold (South China Morning Post 2001). Jangx changl 
Automoble sprng offered 3.5 shares for every state share floated; Zhuha 
huafa industral offered three shares for every state share floated; and Aeolus 
Tyre company lmted offered holders of ts non-tradable shares 4.2 shares for 
every 10 owned (Forbes.com 2007a). Generally speakng, between two and five 
shares’ compensaton was offered for each state share floated.
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Warrants were offered for the first tme as part of ths compensaton package. 
They were warmly welcomed by nvestors and quckly became an ntegral part 
of the market mx. indeed, market wsdom was that when a company completed 
ts reform, share prces mmedately went up.
it s hard to look at the skll wth whch these very fundamental reforms 
were carred out wthout some feelng of admraton. Far from causng a market 
collapse, the reforms sparked off the boom that contnues today. After the first 
three expermental conversons n Aprl 2005, there came 42 firms n June 2005. 
many of these were newly lsted firms from the shenzhen small and medum 
enterprse (sme) board. The logc appears to have been that many of them 
already had substantal prvate partcpaton and they would thus requre less 
change n ther structures. 
Then the reform started n earnest. each week, two or three companes 
would announce ther reform plans. By late November 2006, Q Bn, the research 
drector of the csrc, could report that 90 per cent of lsted firms had resolved 
ther non-tradable share ssues. Ths was spread across 1,161 companes 
representng 96 per cent of the market captal of the shangha and shenzhen 
lsted companes. one hundred and thrty companes had stll not compled 
wth the csrc’s requrements but most of these had ether ‘huge losses’ or 
had ther shares used as collateral or frozen by the courts. Q encouraged them 
to use mergers and acqustons to solve ther problems. After all, brngng the 
pressure of the threat of takeover to bear on majorty shareholders had been 
one of the orgnal objectves of the reform (The People’s Daily 2006c).
At the same tme, the csrc felt strong enough to start attackng some of 
the abuses that the prevous system had found dfficult to control. At a meetng 
n changsha n october 2006, the csrc announced that t would prosecute 
controllng shareholders of lsted companes who had appled lsted company 
funds to ther own use. Ths had been made a crmnal offence only n June 2006, 
reportedly after personal nterventon by Premer Wen Jabao. Between then and 
the end of september 2006, 309 companes had recovered 20.4 bllon yuan from 
controllng shareholders and 15 executves had been arrested or prosecuted 
for msappropraton of funds (The People’s Daily 2006b). The csrc also felt 
comfortable enough to reopen the ssue that had orgnally been the occason 
for the declne of the market n 2001, namely the possblty of transferrng 
state-owned shares to the penson and socal securty funds. At the end of 
september 2006, t was reported that the government was once agan studyng 
the possblty of transferrng 10 per cent of state shares n lsted companes to 
the Natonal Penson Fund and the Natonal socal securty Fund.
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New trading products
As the markets progressed through 2006, t quckly became clear that a new 
style of chnese market was startng to emerge from the chaotc slump of the 
prevous five years. The exuberance and volatlty remaned but there was a 
new sophstcaton. Ths could be seen most clearly n the emergence of new 
tradng products and n the growth of nvestment nsttutons, partcularly retal 
mutual funds.
Warrants became a fundamental part of the tradable share reform and 
spread from there to the general market. A warrant s an nstrument that 
gves the holder an opton to buy or sell a share at a fixed prce—often at a 
dscount to market prce—wthn a gven perod. There s no oblgaton to 
exercse the opton, whch smply falls away f not exercsed. it s used mostly 
as a hedgng nstrument, but t can rse and fall rapdly n prce dependng on 
whether the exercse prce s hgher or lower than the current market prce of 
the underlyng share. Because of ths volatlty, t s a popular nvestment wth 
the less rsk-averse end of the nvestor spectrum. Ths end of the spectrum s 
well represented n the chnese markets. 
The tradable share reform concentrated ts approach to compensaton 
orgnally on ssung cash and new shares to tradable shareholders as 
compensaton for a potental fall n share prce. The fact that share prces dd 
not fall after the first couple of reform experments, however, coupled wth a 
md 2005 decson to allow the creaton of covered warrants, opened a new 
avenue of compensaton. soon the ssue of warrants by reformng companes 
became the normal path to compensate exstng shareholders. As the market 
reversed ts declne, the gearng effect of warrants n a bull market suddenly 
became apparent to even the most amateur nvestors. From a trckle n md 
2005, shangha boomed to become the world’s thrd largest ssuer and trader 
of covered warrants n 2006, after the deutsche Börse and hong kong (World 
Federaton of exchanges 2007c).
it was a smlar story wth mutual funds. it had long been an ambton of 
the ntellectuals behnd the chnese markets—partcularly former reform 
commsson charman lu hongru—to avod the casno-lke behavour 
assocated wth retal nvestng and to support the development of nsttutons. 
hstory teaches us, however, that nsttutons that nvest on behalf of ndvduals 
grow up only when ndvduals feel that they are unable to get the full benefits 
of ther nvestments by themselves, and turn to professonals. 
Ths s what has happened n chna. ordnary nvestors had watched the 
value of ther holdngs dwndle by half n the perod 2000–05 and were suddenly 
prepared to put ther busness n professonal hands. Foregn partcpaton 
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was a key stmulus for the development of mutual funds. Bloomberg reported 
that the arrval n shangha of Frankln Templeton n 2003 was one of the first 
foregn-nvested fund management busnesses (internatonal herald Trbune 
2006). it was followed rapdly by nternatonal firms such as iNG’s Asa Pacfic 
investment management Unt, deutsche Bank, credt susse, socété Générale 
and Australa’s colonal Frst state. durng 2006, mutual funds rased an 
astonshng 387 bllon yuan for nvestment n the share markets (internatonal 
herald Trbune 2006). The peak of the mutual fund madness seemed to come 
on 7 december 2007, when Bejng-based harvest Fund management—19.9 
per cent owned by deutsche Bank—rased 40 bllon yuan n a sngle day 
(Forbes.com 2007b). Ths prompted the csrc to put a 10 bllon yuan per day 
lmt on fund rasng n the hope of controllng funds rushng nto the market. 
The top performer for 2006 was reported to be invesco’s Great Wall domestc 
demand Fund, whch returned 182 per cent for the year (internatonal herald 
Trbune 2006). interestngly, although t s dfficult to confirm from publshed 
data, the general vew among the nvestng communty s that shenzhen s a 
major beneficary of ths development, wth some nformants estmatng that 
up to 40 per cent of funds are managed out of ths southern cty. 
Thus, from the ashes of the bear market a new market was born. it was 
stll recognsably chnese, speculatve and retal based, but t had a new 
sophstcaton, new products and new nsttutons.
The boom
The measures that the csrc took to reform and stmulate the markets were 
extremely successful. The four-year bear market had turned around nto 2006’s 
greatest boom and the csrc was nclned to take the credt for ths.
on 26 Aprl 2007, the shangha index stood at 3,783. Ths was a 283 per cent 
ncrease from ts lowest pont of just under 1,000 n early June 2005 (chna 
exchanges Web 2007). At the end of march 2007, the shangha index had grown 
by 161.2 per cent from march 2006 and the shenzhen index had ncreased by 
55.3 per cent n the same perod. These were the two hghest ncreases n 
the world. only lma stock exchange had grown faster (World Federaton of 
exchanges 2007d). At the end of 2006, the shangha market cap had grown 
by 220.8 per cent from the end of 2005—the hghest ncrease n the world—to 
Us$917,507 bllon, whch made t the fourteenth largest market n the world 
as measured by market cap. in the same perod, the shenzhen market cap 
had grown by 97.1 per cent—the thrd hghest ncrease n the world for the 
perod—to Us$227,947 bllon. Together, at Us$1,145,454 bllon, they consttuted 
the twelfth largest market n the world n terms of market cap, ahead of the 
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Australan stock exchange. When hong kong’s market cap s added nto the 
mx, at Us$1,714,953 bllon, they consttute the sxth largest market n the world 
(World Federaton of exchanges 2007e). 
The frantc actvty of the first quarter of 2007 further emphassed the comng 
role of the chnese markets. By the end of march 2007, shangha’s market 
cap had ncreased by a massve 314 per cent on the same perod n 2006, to 
Us$1,297,387 bllon, whch made t by tself the tenth largest market n the world. 
in the same perod, shenzhen’s market cap grew by 182 per cent. shangha 
and shenzhen together, at Us$1,656,275 bllon, were the nnth largest market 
n the world, and wth hong kong, at Us$3,390,392 bllon, the sxth largest n 
the world (World Federaton of exchanges 2007f).
market turnover figures are the ndcators that best gve a feelng for the wld 
and unrestraned nature of the actvty on the chnese markets durng the boom. 
lookng at the numbers for the end of 2006, an ncrease n market turnover of 
209.4 per cent n shangha and 174 per cent n shenzhen on the same perod n 
2005 seems mpressve. shangha s stll only fifteenth n the world and shenzhen 
only nneteenth (World Federaton of exchanges 2007g), but tradng volume for 
January to march 2007 n shangha was an almost unbelevable 640.2 per cent 
hgher than n the same perod n 2006, and shenzhen was up 529.4 per cent for 
the same perod. it seemed that everybody was begnnng to get that feelng of 
omnpotence and nfallblty that drves human behavour durng serous booms. 
At Us$652 bllon, shangha by tself had the seventh hghest tradng volume 
n the world. shenzhen, at Us$339 bllon, was tenth n the world, wth a hgher 
tradng volume than hong kong (Us$327 bllon) (World Federaton of exchanges 
2007h). Together, shangha and shenzhen, n Us dollar terms, represented the 
fifth largest market n the world durng ths perod.
We should not take these boom-tme figures as ndcators of the long 
or medum term future of the domestc markets. The figures are extremely 
volatle and, n the medum term, almost certanly unsustanable. current 
prce–earnngs ratos are n the hgh 30s—already back to close party wth 
Tokyo’s at the peak of ts bubble—and a correcton, probably a serous one, 
s not very far away. Ths correcton, when t comes, wll probably once agan 
push the chnese markets back nto the second league of nternatonal markets 
for a perod. 
if we are lookng to the longer term, however, the most nterestng figures for 
the perod 2006–07 are those for funds rased. here we see yet more evdence 
of a strong underlyng demand by very large companes for access to world 
captal markets for very large sums of money. The recaptalsaton of the 
chnese banks gave hong kong the world’s largest ever iPo (the internatonal 
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commercal Bank of chna iPo of october 2006) durng the perod under revew. 
it drew the attenton of nternatonal captal provders to the chnese markets 
serously for the first tme. Ths was evdenced when, for the first tme snce the 
1930s, volatlty on the shangha market was cted by observers as the cause of 
a serous hccup on Wall street. The chnese markets could be due for some 
serous pan, but they aren’t about to go away.
The boom in capital raising and the dominant role of Hong Kong
The 2005 mega-lstngs of chnese banks were the precursors of the revoluton 
n nternatonal fund rasng, whch the world wtnessed wth a mxture of 
bemusement and—on the part of New York—mld panc durng 2006. The 
domestc exchanges were players n terms of cash rased but they contnued 
to suffer from the suspcon n the nternatonal markets that they weren’t qute 
kosher and that ther regulatory standards were not up to scratch. And even 
f nternatonal nvestors had wanted to play n the domestc markets—there 
was plenty of evdence that they were too scared to do so—currency and 
other regulatory consderatons meant that ther ablty to do so was severely 
crcumscrbed. once agan, the great beneficary was hong kong.
hong kong was the prmary market for nternatonal offerngs by major 
chnese banks durng 2006. The requrement of chnese banks for captal to 
brng them nto conformty wth the Basel rules was enormous and, n the 
judgement of ther boards, could be satsfied only by access to nternatonal 
markets. There was also a consderaton of prestge. internatonal nsttutonal 
nvestors brought respectablty. The threat of greater scrutny by the world 
market was also thought to be a dsncentve to the dodgy practces—legal and 
llegal—that had charactersed the performances of chnese banks to date. 
Ths was ther thrd refinancng n a decade and nobody was keen to dp nto 
the state coffers for a fourth round.
Thus n 2006, three massve chnese bank iPos were launched from hong 
kong. on 1 June 2007, the Bank of chna lsted on the hong kong exchange, 
rasng Us$11.1 bllon. on 22 september, shenzhen-based chna merchants 
Bank lsted, rasng Us$2.7 bllon. on 27 october, the internatonal commercal 
Bank of chna (icBc) lsted, after rasng a massve Us$21.9 bllon n a 
smultaneous hong kong–shangha lstng. The hong kong h-share lstng 
rased Us$16 bllon whle the shangha A-share lstng rased Us$5 bllon (icBc 
2007). Ths was the largest ever iPo, eclpsng NTT docomo’s Us$18.4 bllon 
lstng n 1998 (cBc News 2007). The shangha A-share lstng alone ranked as 
the world’s fourth largest iPo of the year (ernst and Young 2006b).
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Ths pushed hong kong to the poston of the world’s second largest stock 
exchange n terms of captal rasng, eclpsng even Wall street. in 2006, london 
rased Us$55.8 bllon, hong kong rased Us$43 bllon, whle New York rased 
Us$37.1 bllon (World Federaton of exchanges). of hong kong’s Us$43 bllon, 
Us$37.5 bllon was rased n iPos of h-share or red-chp companes (hong 
kong exchanges and clearng lmted 2007).
One country, two systems: Hong Kong Exchange’s dependence 
on Chinese business
i have commented prevously on just how dependent the hong kong exchange 
has become on chnese busness and how much t has become the world 
gateway for chna’s captal rasng, but t s worthwhle revstng how ths 
tendency has progressed n the two years snce i last addressed ths ssue.
in 2006, ‘h’ shares and red chps accounted for 47.68 per cent of hong 
kong’s total market captalsaton (28.13 per cent n 2004; 26.88 per cent n 
2000) and 56.39 per cent of total market turnover (45.58 per cent n 2004; 29.34 
per cent n 2000). At 14 out of 38, the number of chnese consttuents of the 
hang seng index remaned farly stable. A couple of chnese companes—such 
as denway motors and lenovo—had been deleted from the ndex, however, 
the addton of the heavyweght chnese banks meant that the weghtng of 
chnese companes n the ndex ncreased sgnficantly. Aganst ths t should 
be noted that the free-float factor assgned to h-share companes by hang seng 
servces was relatvely low. The Bank of chna’s free-float factor s as low as 
30 per cent, and the constructon Bank’s s a mere 15 per cent (hsi servces 
lmted 2007). Nonetheless, these are massve enterprses and, when chna 
sneezes, the hong kong stock exchange gets a severe flu.
A new scale of deal comes to Hong Kong: can the deals keep 
flowing?
The flotaton of the bg banks was obvously the key factor n hong kong’s rse 
to near domnaton of the world’s captal-rasng markets. But how sustanable 
s hong kong’s new promnence n nternatonal equty markets n the near to 
medum term?
The entry of chna nto the hong kong market has fundamentally changed 
the scale of deals n that market and brought hong kong a new respectablty 
n world markets. An nterestng manfestaton of ths s the total dsappearance 
of the small Brtsh merchant banks such as Wardleys, standard chartered Asa 
and schroeders, whch domnated the market n the 1980s and early 1990s, and 
ther replacement wth Wall street heavyweghts such as Goldman sachs.4 
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snce the early 1990s, chna has consstently suppled the hong kong market 
wth a stream of deals that were much bgger than anythng hong kong had 
seen before. 
The banks are the latest ndcatons of ths trend. The large sze of the bank 
deals s a response to the specfic set of crcumstances mentoned above. Are 
there any other large enterprses watng n the wngs to keep up the stream 
of deals to allow hong kong to mantan ths prme poston? in the long term, 
unquestonably; n the short to medum term, possbly. The best potental source 
of smlar deals n the short to medum term les n the terms of the tradable 
share reform. implct n ths reform s the noton of mergers and acqustons 
as a method of consoldaton of shaky state enterprses and ultmately ther 
prvatsaton. Prvatsaton s a fraught word n chnese poltcs, but the acton 
already taken n the bankng sector recognses that mnorty shareholders are 
not smply cash cows to be mlked at wll but real partcpants n the decson-
makng processes of the enterprses. The search on the part of the lstng banks 
for strategc partners makes ths clear. so on-market mergers and acqustons 
appear to be the comng trend n the domestc markets and partcularly n 
state-owned companes. Ths s the area where we should look for the future 
mega-deal flow source for hong kong.
if we accept ths proposton, the next queston s whch sector of the chnese 
economy s posed to take advantage of ths new set of opportuntes? in my 
estmaton, the next area for consoldaton, financal strengthenng and lstng 
for nternatonal captal s the ron and steel sector. chna s now the world’s 
largest steel maker—producng 419 mllon tonnes n 2006, or more than one-
thrd of total world producton—but ts steel companes are small and scattered. 
in the past couple of years, chnese economc polcymakers have looked wth 
ncreasng concern at the consoldaton of the world steel ndustry and the on-
market merger and acquston actvtes of Arcelor and mttal. They recognse 
the urgent necessty for consoldaton n the chnese steel ndustry but have 
dfficulty findng a base company for ths consoldaton. local governments are 
too protectve of the vested nterests of ther own local steel makers to allow ths 
to happen easly. one possble soluton beng dscussed actvely n Bejng at 
the moment s the extenson of the tradable share reform to the steel ndustry, 
the nvtaton of strategc partners, the rasng of captal on world markets and 
consoldaton through classc on-market mergers and acqustons.5 if ths 
comes to pass, as now seems ncreasngly possble, hong kong s sure to 
have a major role and there are many other state-controlled ndustres lnng 
up for smlar reforms. These deals wll probably not be as large as the banks, 
but they wll be very large by any other standards.
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so at ths stage, chnese deal flows do not seem to be a problem for the 
hong kong stock exchange. The real challenge to hong kong’s pre-emnent 
poston as chna’s world captal-rasng gateway wll come when the renmnb 
becomes freely tradable and foregn nvestors are able to put ther money 
drectly nto chnese enterprses. At that stage, all three chnese exchanges 
suddenly become potental market leaders. it s nvdous to make predctons 
at ths stage as to whch one wll ultmately preval. hong kong supporters 
pont to hong kong’s reputaton as a well-regulated market that nternatonal 
captal can trust, and certanly there s plenty of evdence that that asserton 
s true. it s equally true, however, that the regulaton of domestc markets has 
mproved steadly and mpressvely n the past seven years to a stage where t 
s recognsable as beng of nternatonal standard. equally, captal s notorously 
fickle. insttutonal nvestors often make sheep look lke anmals of ndependent 
judgement and, f there’s a buck to be made and all your colleagues are tellng 
you to go to shangha ahead of hong kong, anythng can happen—and 
surprsngly quckly.
Irrational exuberance? The valuation of the banks
The current boom could well be the source of future problems for hong kong. i 
am not n the busness of predctng prces or market levels; i smply make the 
pont that every boom s followed eventually by a bust, n whch markets typcally 
lose between 75 and 90 per cent of ther boom value. The Japanese boom and 
bust of the 1980s and 1990s was eerly complant wth ths old market saw.6
The current chnese boom shows a lot of smlartes wth the Japanese 
boom of the 1980s. Prce–equty ratos are hoverng about the 40s—just where 
Japan was when thngs started to go south. A partcularly worryng parallel s 
the emergence of chnese banks among the world’s largest by market cap. in 
the late 1980s, any lst of the world’s largest banks by market cap was domnated 
by Japanese banks, to the extent that there appeared to be lttle competton. 
A subsequent near-collapse of the Japanese bankng system demonstrated 
that ths status reflected the enormous amount of cash swshng around n the 
Japanese economy, not the underlyng financal strength of the banks. 
Now we see the phenomenon of the icBc becomng the world’s thrd largest 
bank by market cap, after ctbank and Bank of Amerca, but ahead of hsBc. 
Between ts lstng n october 2006 and early march 2007, the icBc’s share prce 
rose by 43 per cent (reuters 2007). The icBc and the other lsted chnese banks 
were tradng at between 2.5 and 2.7 tmes book value—a sgnficant premum 
to nternatonal banks, whch typcally trade at approxmately 2.1 tmes book 
value (The People’s Daily 2006d).
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it s nstructve to compare the qualty of the icBc’s loan book wth that of 
ts now smaller rval hsBc. At first blush, the icBc’s loan book doesn’t look 
too bad. durng 2006, the icBc saw ts non-performng loan rato decrease to 
3.79 per cent for the year, from 4.69 per cent n 2005; however, ths was after two 
major recaptalsatons. The correspondng figure for 2004 was 21.16 per cent 
(The People’s Daily 2006d). For the september quarter 2006, hsBc declared ts 
non-performng loans to be 6.54 per cent of total assets (lace Fnancal 2007). 
Ths s a poor figure comng on the heels of hsBc North Amerca’s problems 
wth sub-prme loans and, on the face of t, would appear to be sgnficantly 
worse than the icBc’s figure. The dfference s that hsBc has a long track 
record of fixng problems caused by occasonal poor credt decsons and the 
market usually prces t accordngly. The icBc, n contrast, has a long record 
of recaptalsatons and dluton of shareholder value. Perhaps t would be 
more reasonable to compare hsBc’s 6.54 per cent wth the icBc’s 2004 figure 
of 21.16 per cent. on ths bass, nvestors’ valuatons of the icBc would seem 
to reflect what Alan Greenspan, referrng to another boom, called ‘rratonal 
exuberance’.
A coming bear market? Political implications?
several other measures suggest that the domestc markets seem posed for 
a severe correcton at best. chartng s an nexact scence but t often has 
good predctve effects at the end of bull markets and the begnnng of bear 
markets. several chartsts have ponted out smlartes between the shangha 
chart and the NAsdAQ chart shortly before the ‘Tech wreck’ of 2000. Ths 
nvolves a seres of retests at the second standard devaton wth shangha’s 
Aprl–July 2006 retests correspondng wth NAsdAQ’s of June–Aprl 1999 and 
shangha’s of November 2006 – January 2007, correspondng wth NAsdAQ’s 
of August–october 2007. The current (may 2007) shangha retest of the second 
devaton appears to correspond wth NAsdAQ’s final retest of 2000, before t 
went nto deep declne.
Who knows? so far, the market’s random walk contnues, but f a serous 
correcton comes, the fact that even the nsttutons have a retal bent n chna 
means that there wll be poltcal consequences. many commentators beleve 
that under hu Jntao, the left has taken advantage of hs seemng vacllaton 
on hs own poltcal stance to further ts poston. certanly, n recent months 
the trckle of artcles from sources such as the chnese Academy of socal 
scences attackng ‘neo-lberalsm’ n economc polcy has become a torrent. 
Partcularly durng the refinancng of the banks and ther subsequent lstng, 
there was a raft of artcles, sometmes n leftst publcatons such as Utopia 
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but often n trade publcatons such as Zhengzhuan Shichang Zhoukan, argung 
that the banks were beng sold off too cheaply.7 Whether ths trend wll have 
sufficent momentum n a securtes-crash scenaro to push the nfluence of the 
left back nto economc polcymakng—where t has been weak for more than a 
decade and a half—s a contentous queston. certanly, the flagshp of reform, 
Caijing magazne, felt t necessary on 28 January 2006 to publsh a stngng 
artcle supportng the achevements of reform and exhortng polcymakers not 
to turn from ths path.8
in such an eventualty what does the left have to replace the stock exchanges, 
other than a set of faled financng mechansms? Whatever the shortcomngs 
of the exchanges, t s clear that no one wants to go back to the methods of 
a planned economy. Too many people are nvolved, too many people make a 
lvng out of the exchanges and, at the end of the day, they solve an ntractable 
problem: how to get captal for chna’s development. To replace ths mechansm 
would requre a revoluton wth unpredctable consequences, whch s precsely 
what New chna, wth ts emphass on ‘harmony’, s not about to have.
Notes
1  Notes of dscusson between the author and partcpants n the meetng. The precedents 
quoted for such acton were Alexander hamlton’s support of the market n the panc of 1792 
and Us Presdent ronald reagan’s supposed nterventon n the market (actually a loosenng 
of lqudty by the Federal reserve) after the crash of 1987.
2 World Federaton of exchanges 2007a. Note, however, that Japanese prce–earnngs ratos 
reached even more absurd levels durng the md 1990s when, t was rumoured, the Japanese 
government used Postal savngs Bank funds to support the market and avod a feared melt-
down n the bankng system. The average prce–earnngs rato n Tokyo n 1994 was 79.5X and 
n 1995 86.5X.
3 Ths sudden declne of nearly 10 per cent n one day took place just after the chnese New Year 
holday. many nvestors were ether away on holdays or hurtng after the dsbursements of the 
holday perod. it was possbly just a concdence, but n a market as heavly retal weghted 
as the chnese domestc market, such consderatons matter.
4 Author’s dscussons wth the hong kong stock exchange, may 2007.
5 dscussons between the author and economc mnstres and commssons, Bejng, June 
2006.
6 Note, of course, that the Japanese bust was dstorted by the Japanese government’s use of 
the Postal savngs Bank deposts to prop up the market at just above the level where t was 
estmated that a drop n value of the shareholdngs of the banks threatened the ntegrty of 
the bankng system.
7 For examples of the leftst crtcsms of neo-lberalsm, see Guangming Daily (2004) and 
Securities Market Weekly (2006).
8 Pupng (2006). There s speculaton that huang Pupng s the pseudonym of the ntellectual 
father of Caijing and one of the early sponsors of the stock exchanges, Wang Bomng.
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competng nterpretatons of the nteracton of domestc monetary polcy and 
the foregn exchange rate n chna often arse from dfferent assumptons 
regardng the effectveness of captal controls. At one end of the spectrum 
s the vew that captal controls merely alter the form of captal flows wthout 
alterng ther magntude. in ths vew, the heavly managed renmnb exchange 
rate mples that chna mports ts monetary polcy and lacks control over local 
short-term nterest rates. At the other end s the vew that captal controls are 
stll bndng enough to allow the chnese government to set short-term nterest 
rates, despte the lmted flexblty of the exchange rate. The contrasts between 
these vews sharpen n the context of growng cross-border flows under the 
current and captal accounts n the past 10 years as well as the accelerated 
foregn reserve accumulaton snce 2005. 
dfferent vews on the status quo also nform the nterpretaton of outcomes 
for future lberalsaton of captal flows. Agan, at one extreme, ths would 
unevenly lower transacton costs and thereby alter the mx of cross-border 
captal flows, but wthout necessarly affectng ther total volume. in ths 
nterpretaton, captal account lberalsaton mght be of nterest to specalsts n 
nternatonal finance, but not to those who follow the chnese macroeconomy. At 
the other extreme, captal account lberalsaton would nfluence the scale and 
composton of captal flows and ultmately force a choce between exchange 
rate management and an ndependent monetary polcy.
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Ths chapter examnes prce evdence to determne how effectve chna’s 
captal controls have been n the past and how effectve they reman. We focus 
on the analyss of prce evdence because t provdes the most tellng evdence 
on the queston (for a dscusson of the flow evdence, see ma and mccauley 
forthcomng). our basc concluson s that sustaned nterest rate dfferentals 
mean that chnese captal controls have contnued to bnd. These observed 
dfferentals cannot, n our vew, be accounted for plausbly by lqudty or 
credt factors. even the narrowng of these dfferentals snce the unpeggng of 
the renmnb n July 2005 leaves them at substantal levels. if captal controls 
stll bte, future lberalsaton s lkely to proceed ncrementally n order to 
accommodate a shftng balance of exchange rate and financal and monetary 
stablty objectves. 
We define monetary autonomy narrowly n terms of the government’s ablty 
to set short-term domestc nterest rates. such a definton could be approprate 
to many ndustral countres where monetary polcy has confined tself to 
settng a short-term nterest rate. in fact, chna’s monetary polcy employs a 
wde varety of other nstruments, ncludng admnstratve controls of depost 
and mnmum lendng rates as well as quanttatve measures such as reserve 
requrements, lendng quotas, wndow gudance and restrctons on nvestment. 
such measures could gve chna’s monetary polcy room to manoeuvre even 
f ts short-term nterest rates were tghtly constraned by the exchange rate 
polcy. Thus, a findng that short-term nterest rates are not tghtly constraned 
mples a fortiori monetary ndependence n the broader sense, whch s more 
relevant n the case of chna.
Growing cross-border flows in China
chna’s captal control regme has two mportant features. Frst, captal controls 
tended to be tghter for cross-border flows thought to be more volatle than for 
more stable flows. second, the regulatory regme over tme has shfted from 
one based aganst outflows towards one managng two-way cross-border 
captal flows n a more balanced fashon. related to the latter s the tendency 
for polcymakers to systemcally ‘lean aganst the wnd’ n the sense that control 
measures on outflows are strengthened to resst deprecaton pressures on 
the exchange rate and vce versa. Whle such a dscrmnatory control regme 
could complcate any analyss, more strngent control measures over short-term 
flows to resst prevalng market pressures would hghlght short-term nterest 
rates as a useful measure of the efficacy of captal controls. 
one factor condtonng the efficacy of captal controls s the sze of external 
flows. despte contnued captal controls, the past two decades have wtnessed 
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a rapd rse n chna’s cross-border flows on the current and captal accounts. 
As a share of gross domestc product (GdP), chna’s gross cross-border flows 
more than quntupled to more than 120 per cent n 2005, from less than 20 per 
cent n 1982 (Fgure 14.1), wth a notceable acceleraton n the 1990s. Also, 
notwthstandng the remarkable expanson of the gross current account flows, 
chna’s captal account flows have been ganng relatve mportance.1 in 2005, 
gross captal account flows represented one-thrd of chna’s total gross cross-
border flows, compared wth just 13 per cent n 1982 and 25 per cent n 1990.2 
The backdrop of growng cross-border flows suggests that the chnese 
economy has become ncreasngly open and ntegrated nto the global economy 
and s thus more prone to nfluences from global markets than before. in 
partcular, larger external flows pont to more opportuntes to avod and evade 
captal controls. Ths n turn rases questons about the efficacy of captal 
controls, wth mplcatons for monetary autonomy, financal stablty and future 
captal account lberalsaton. 
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Growng trade and financal openness, however, does not support an 
mmedate concluson about the efficacy of captal controls. in partcular, even 
large and hghly responsve cross-border flows could lmt wthout guttng captal 
controls, just as small and stable flows need not mply effectve controls. A more 
drect and strngent test of captal control effectveness s whether substantal 
cross-border arbtrage opportuntes persst for a consderable perod. such a 
test—based not on flows but on onshore and offshore prces—can also ndcate 
how the effectveness has vared over tme. When prce and flow measures 
are consstent wth each other, one can arrve at an easy concluson regardng 
captal moblty; but when they pont n dfferent drectons, prce evdence 
should be gven more weght. in a departure from the exstng lterature, we 
examne only the prce measures n gaugng the captal moblty.
Price test of capital mobility: onshore and offshore renminbi 
yields
The combnaton of onshore renmnb nterest rates, offshore Us dollar rates and 
non-delverable forward (NdF) exchange rates s analysed next, to test for captal 
moblty between chna and the offshore financal markets. The null hypothess s 
that there are no substantal dfferences between renmnb nterest rates onshore, 
on the one hand, and those mpled by the offshore NdFs n conjuncton wth Us 
dollar lbor, on the other.3 The methodology of estmatng such onshore–offshore 
renmnb yeld gaps s based on ma et al. (2004), as detaled n the Appendx. 
The dea s that large and persstent onshore–offshore yeld gaps suggest 
sgnficant cross-border market segmentaton and thus bndng captal controls; 
but occasonal small gaps do not necessarly mply neffectveness of captal 
controls. We nterpret the evdence as supportng the alternatve hypothess 
of there beng an economcally substantal gap between onshore and offshore 
renmnb yelds. Acceptance of ths hypothess favours the vew that captal 
controls n chna have so far remaned substantally bndng.
measurng onshore and offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals
especally n the case of relatvely less-developed money and foregn exchange 
markets, nstruments must be chosen carefully to perform ths test. care must 
be exercsed n the dmensons of maturty, lqudty and credt. ideally, one 
wants to compare nstruments of dentcal maturty, enjoyng the same lqudty, 
whch are ssued by the same prvate partes, usually banks. An approprate 
comparson would be between the yelds on large Us dollar certficates of 
depost n New York versus yelds on Us dollar deposts posted n london by 
the top-rated banks that report to the Brtsh Bankers Assocaton (BBA). such 
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a comparson often s based on the three-month maturty that s representatve 
of domestc and offshore yelds. The banks nvolved n the comparson are qute 
smlar n ther double-A credt standng. 
Liquidity considerations. in the case of chna, the challenge has n practce 
come from gettng a reasonable match between a representatve renmnb 
money market yeld, on the one hand, and the NdF rate, on the other. in 
partcular, the nterbank renmnb money market trades wth greatest lqudty 
at very short maturtes—overnght to seven days—whle the NdF market trades 
wth greatest lqudty at longer tenors of three months to one year. 
Ths chapter mproves on the prevous estmates of onshore–offshore 
renmnb yeld gaps n the dmenson of lqudty (ma et al. 2004). The latter 
traded off the above consderatons and chose to compare the three-month 
chna nterbank offered rate (chiBor) yeld to the three-month NdF.4 Ths 
comparson stretched to a relatvely long and llqud maturty n the domestc 
money market, on one hand, and took a relatvely short maturty n the offshore 
market, on the other. here, we update these earler measures as well as 
complement the earler analyss wth a new comparson based on a dfferent 
par of nstruments. in partcular, we also compare the weekly aucton rates 
for PBc one-year blls avalable snce 2004 wth the one-year NdF. Ths choce 
compares lqud nstruments n both markets, although t ntroduces possble 
credt dfferences between the soveregn bll and the bank NdF or depost 
(see below). 
lqudty across the two markets matches well at the one-year tenor. The 
PBc ssued 1.2 trllon renmnb (about Us$150 bllon) of ts one-year blls n 
2005 out of a total bll ssuance of 2.8 trllon renmnb, for an average weekly 
ssuance of about Us$3 bllon equvalent.5 From January to march 2006, 
ssuance ranged between 40 and 120 bllon renmnb a week. in the NdF 
market, the one-year maturty s reportedly the most traded maturty (ma et 
al. 2004; debelle et al. 2006). 
The less lqud the nstruments that are used for arbtrage of onshore and 
offshore yelds, the less tellng are observed small yeld dfferences. one can 
thnk of an arbtrage tunnel nsde of whch further arbtrage transactons are not 
profitable, gven bd-ask spreads and any tendency for flows of orders to move 
the market. The upshot s that a findng that captal controls are neffectve could 
well be consstent wth observed yeld gaps of, say, 25 bass ponts or less. 
Credit considerations. Wth regard to credt, comparng soveregn and bank 
yelds on onshore and offshore nstruments, respectvely, s problematc 
n prncple, but n practce t does not skew the comparson substantally. 
credt default swaps suggest that the credt standng of chna attracts an 
nsurance payment of only a handful of bass ponts more than that of the major 
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nternatonal banks that form the Us dollar lbor panel (see Table A14.2). snce 
offshore renmnb rates were lower than the onshore PBc bll yeld n the perod 
2004–06, the mxng of soveregn and bank credt does wden the estmated 
yeld gap for ths perod, thus favourng the findng that captal controls are 
effectve. But as we wll see below, the scale of the estmated yeld dfferences 
of 100 to 400 bass ponts dwarfs the five bass pont credt dfference. 
Wth our earler comparson of chiBor and offshore yelds, credt dfferences 
tended to reduce the absolute value of the observed yeld dfferentals over much 
of the sample perod. From 1999 to 2001, hghly rated banks dealng offshore 
under nternatonal law pad hgher (mpled) yelds than dd domestc chnese 
banks dealng onshore. Takng nto account the credt dfference would only 
have wdened the gap. 
An example of cross-border arbitrage on renminbi interest rates. Before 
examnng the data, t mght be useful to consder a partcular example of 
an arbtrage transacton at the one-year tenor by a multnatonal firm wth a 
profitable operaton n chna. snce september 2003, the offshore speculatve 
demand to be long n renmnb has gven the treasurer of such a firm a strong 
ncentve to, n effect, hold renmnb onshore and sell them forward offshore 
(that s, lendng renmnb onshore and borrowng them offshore). one way of 
constructng such a poston s for the affilate n chna not to convert renmnb 
nto dollars n order to remt a dvdend to ts parent outsde chna. instead, the 
funds are retaned n renmnb and nvested n the chnese money market. The 
yeld on the one-year depost s proxed by the PBc bll rate (one can thnk of 
a bank takng the funds n trust and nvestng n the PBc bll). Thus, renmnb 
funds have been lent onshore. 
smultaneously, the affilate borrows dollars at one-year lbor, replacng 
the cash flow of the unpad dvdend from chna, and sells renmnb one year 
forward aganst Us dollars, say, to a hedge fund. Ths combnaton of dollar 
borrowng and forward poston amounts to borrowng renmnb offshore 
and convertng the proceeds nto dollars, and the rate of nterest pad s (by 
constructon) the relatvely low NdF-mpled renmnb yeld. At the year’s end, 
the renmnb nvested onshore can be sold for dollars at the then-prevalng 
spot exchange rate, whch s also used to determne any profit or loss on the 
NdF, leavng the firm wth the arbtrage gan between the nterest rate n the 
chnese money market and the lower offshore yeld. Thus, by laggng a current 
dollar payment—namely, the profit repatraton—the firm has n effect acqured 
a long renmnb poston and locked n a gan by sellng t offshore.  
one of the useful features of ths example s that t shows that arbtrage 
between the onshore money market and the offshore forward market s 
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not lmted to banks. of course, not all foregn firms operatng n chna are 
profitable; some have entered jont ventures that constran such arbtrage and 
not all would be wllng to ncrease ther balance sheet n chna. Nevertheless, 
such corporate opportuntes are tellng because otherwse a falure to equalse 
nterest rates could be taken to be merely a symptom of the nefficency of 
chnese banks. instead, the profit opportuntes present themselves to global 
companes, whch can be presumed to brng to chna effcent treasury 
operatons and ndeed the benefit of havng operated wthn and around captal 
controls n other economes.
onshore–offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals based on three-month 
chiBor
our earler analyss compared a domestc nterest rate—the so-called three-
month chiBor—wth the offshore renmnb rate mpled by three-month 
NdFs and dollar lbor. We found economcally very sgnficant dfferences. 
Fgure 14.2 compares the three-month yeld gap for the renmnb wth Asan 
peers for the perods 1999–2001 and 2002–04. The absolute value of the gap 
between renmnb yelds onshore and offshore averaged 250–300 bass ponts 
n the five years to early 2004. Ths placed chna n the mddle of our sample 
and ndeed s very wde compared wth the onshore–offshore dfferental of 
50–100 bass ponts for the korean won n the same perod, and a gap of 20–30 
bass ponts observed for the Japanese yen before captal controls were lfted 
n the early 1980s (otan and Twar 1981). The narrowng of the dfferentals 
n 2002–04 was n fact less evdent n the case of chna than for most of the 
other Asan currences.
An updated estmate of the yeld gap for 1999–2006 reveals an even bgger 
average gap of 310 bass ponts n absolute value and also suggests several 
dstnct phases of market condtons (Fgure 14.3). in general, f controls bnd, 
one would expect offshore rates to be above onshore rates when market 
partcpants are postonng for renmnb weakness and the net drecton of 
flows of funds s outward. conversely, offshore rates would fall below onshore 
rates when postonng favours renmnb strength and funds are seekng to 
enter chna. 
in the perod from the east Asan fnancal crss through untl early 
2001, the weght of offshore postonng was n the drecton of a weakenng 
renmnb, resultng n hgher yelds offshore. Then followed a perod of smaller 
dfferences durng 2001–02, whch saw offshore rates below those onshore, but 
wth a gap of less than 150 bass ponts. Ths perod featured more balanced 
postonng on the renmnb. Wth the ntensficaton of publc pressure from 
274































































































































































































































































































How effective are China’s capital controls?
tradng partners on chna’s exchange rate polcy n september 2003, however, 
offshore yelds dropped substantally below ther onshore counterparts. The 
weght of offshore postonng was n the drecton of a strengthenng renmnb. 
As chnese companes converted dollar holdngs or borrowngs nto renmnb, 
reserve growth accelerated, far exceedng the pace that could be explaned by 
the current account surplus and drect nvestment nflows. The average yeld 
gap wdened to more than 360 bass ponts from January 2003 to Aprl 2006. The 
gap reached a peak of 800 bass ponts n md 2005, when the mpled offshore 
yeld fell well below zero.6 snce the July 2005 polcy change, however, the yeld 
gap has narrowed markedly—to less than 200 bass ponts. 
The prncpal message based on our prevous and more updated estmates 
of three-month tenor of the chiBor and renmnb NdF s that the onshore–
offshore gap n the renmnb yelds has been persstently substantal n absolute 
terms and ts sgn has been consstent wth prevalng market pressures. in 
other words, htherto, chna’s captal controls have prevented sufficent cross-
border arbtrage to equalse onshore and offshore short-term yelds.
Fgure 14.3  The onshore less offshore renminbi yields, based on three-

















































































































Note: onshore less offshore yeld.  
Sources: Bloomberg; PBc; authors’ own estmates.
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onshore–offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals based on PBc blls
The above findng that offshore renmnb yelds have traded consstently below 
those onshore n the past two years s confirmed by another test based on a 
newly avalable and more lqud benchmark money-market yeld n renmnb n 
chna. As noted above, the ntroducton of a weekly aucton of PBc blls n early 
2004 has provded an alternatve bass for comparson of domestc renmnb 
money-market yelds wth the renmnb yelds mpled by the NdFs traded 
offshore. Ths more tellng and updated test—coverng the two and half years 
between Aprl 2004 and November 2006—produces a much smoother estmate 
of the yeld gap, consstent wth better lqudty n both markets (Fgure 14.4).
Ths more refined and updated test based on tradng n lqud market 
segments offers further evdence of bndng controls. From Aprl 2004 to Aprl 
2007, the one-year PBc bll yelded, on average, 250 bass ponts more than the 
yeld mpled by the offshore NdF. Ths gap of 250 bass ponts compares wth 
an average of 320 bass ponts based on the three-month chiBor. Both suggest 
two dstnct phases n the yeld gaps snce Aprl 2004. Before the July 2005 polcy 
move, the gap was wder and more volatle, reactng to polcy comments and 
market rumours. The average spread for ths first phase was about 400 bass 
ponts on both estmates. After the July 2005 polcy shft, the yeld gap shrank 
to 100–200 bass ponts for three-month chiBor and the one-year PBc bll 
aucton yelds and stayed there untl the gaps wdened agan nto 2007. 
onshore–offshore yeld gaps snce the July 2005 polcy change
how should ths convergence of offshore to onshore renmnb yelds n 2005–06 
be nterpreted? it s remarkable that the onshore–offshore nterest dfferental 
narrowed sharply n the wake of the July 2005 polcy change and remaned 
qute narrow untl the end of 2006. Those observers wth a pror convcton 
that captal controls lost effectveness n the presence of growng cross-border 
flows mght read the reducton of the onshore–offshore renmnb nterest rate 
dfferental as demonstratng ther convctons. Ths possble nterpretaton s 
smple. We offer a more nuanced nterpretaton that allows scope for polcy 
and temporary opportuntes to evade controls. 
regardng polcy, we see the ntal narrowng of the onshore and offshore 
renmnb yeld dfferental as a chosen outcome of polcy rather than as a 
forced outcome of the weght of money. in the approach to the depeggng, the 
chnese authortes doubtless apprecated the rsk of a market reacton to any 
managed ext strategy. in these crcumstances, prudence mght suggest a 
polcy of not relyng too heavly on captal controls, even f these were judged 
generally effectve. As t happened, rsng Us nterest rates offered the opton 
277
How effective are China’s capital controls?
of what mght be termed an opportunstc polcy of uncovered nterest party. 
Thus, n the months before and after July 2005, chnese authortes wdened 
the renmnb–dollar nterest gap by reducng the one-year PBc bll rate through 
polcy rate cuts aganst the backdrop of rsng Us polcy rates. Ths opened up 
a 3–4 per cent gap between Us dollar and renmnb yelds. 
Then after July 2005, the chnese authortes shaped expectatons of a 3–4 
per cent annual apprecaton through statements and the actual pace of the 
spot crawl. indeed, market expectatons seemed to have been remarkably 
well contaned durng the transton (ma and mccauley forthcomng). The 
consstency of such exchange rate expectatons and the dollar–renmnb nterest 
rate dfferental served to keep onshore and offshore renmnb rates not too 
far out of lne. our nterpretaton suggests that the PBc de facto behaved as 
though nterest rate party were an operatng target n settng nterest rates 
and the speed of the crawl, thereby possbly lowerng the rsks nherent n the 
regme transton. Ths approach reduced relance on the consderable captal 
controls stll n place, albet to some extent at the cost of relyng more on the 
non-nterest rate nstruments of monetary polcy.



























































































12m yield gap 3m yield gap
Note: weekly data; 12-month (three-month) NdF, one-year PBc bll yeld (three-month 
chiBor) and 12-month (three-month) lbor. 
Sources: People’s Bank of chna; Bloomberg; Bank for internatonal settlements estmates.
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There were also temporary opportuntes to evade the captal controls that 
arose because of the lag between market development and the artculaton of 
captal controls. in partcular, the development n 2006 of an onshore forward 
market mght have added a new channel for nflows that helped to narrow the 
onshore–offshore dfferental. An onshore renmnb forward market was first 
ntroduced n late 2005.7 Ths onshore forward market allowed some players wth 
a presence n both the onshore and offshore markets to engage n arbtrage. 
in partcular, such players could buy renmnb forward n the onshore market 
(at relatvely hgh mpled nterest rates) and smultaneously sell renmnb 
forward n the offshore market (at relatvely low mpled nterest rates). much lke 
borrowng renmnb offshore and placng renmnb onshore, such transactons 
would tend to rase the offshore nterest rates towards domestc nterest rate 
levels, brngng the onshore and offshore forward curves closer to each other 
than otherwse. such transactons were apparently made possble by a lacuna 
n the onshore prudental regulaton of net foregn currency postons for banks, 
whch set lmts on net spot but not forward postons. in effect, the development 
of the onshore forward market created a temporary channel for arbtrage, 
though not one wde enough to rase offshore rates to domestc levels. 
our nuanced nterpretaton s supported by development snce early 2007, 
when the onshore–offshore renmnb yeld gaps started wdenng agan to 
more than 300 bass ponts, puttng captal controls to a stronger test. in our 
vew, ths latest wdenng has less to do wth the resurgent efficacy of captal 
controls than wth a partal reversal of the above factors. in response to the 
nflows related to arbtrage between the offshore and emergng onshore forward 
markets, chnese authortes have, snce the thrd quarter of 2006, tghtened 
the rules. measures taken have ncluded an explct prohbton of onshore 
nsttutons from partcpatng n the offshore NdF market, an ncluson of 
forward postons n the new prudental regulatons of net bank foregn currency 
postons and a sharp reducton n the de facto celng on chnese resdents 
brngng dollars onshore.8 moreover, snce md 2006, the accelerated pace of 
spot apprecaton and the larger recorded trade surpluses have condtoned 
market expectatons of future apprecaton, forcng the mpled offshore yelds 
to return to zero or even nto negatve terrtory. snce the one-year PBc bll yeld 
rebounded from a low of 1.5 per cent about md 2005 to 2.8 per cent by late 
2006, the onshore–offshore yeld gap wdened further.
in total, the wde dfferences between onshore and offshore renmnb 
nterest rates pont to the efficacy of captal controls. most recently, the chnese 
authortes guded domestc nterest rates and expectatons of apprecaton 
nto broad consstency wth rsng Us dollar nterest rates to reduce the rsks 
nherent n the ntal exchange rate regme shft. The resultng one percentage 
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pont gap between onshore and offshore renmnb yelds mght have been 
desred n order to lessen the polcy burden on captal controls, whch have 
been bndng but not watertght. The experence wth the onshore forwards n 
2005–06, however, suggests that mantanng effectve captal controls gets 
harder wth the development of financal markets and further deregulaton of 
cross-border transactons. The wder yeld gaps snce early 2007 nevertheless 
pont to a regme of stll-bndng captal control n chna. 
Price measures: tests of uncovered interest parity
The falure of the onshore and offshore renmnb yelds to equalse through 
cross-border arbtrage ndcates that captal controls bte. Ths n turn ponts 
to a degree of monetary ndependence n chna. Ths secton addresses ths 
queston drectly by first assessng the relatonshp between short-term yelds 
n chna and the Unted states and then by comparng the renmnb–dollar 
short-term nterest rate gap wth those of the hong kong dollar–Us dollar and 
euro–Us dollar pars. 
interest rate dfferentals n a perod of de facto fixed exchange rates 
chna and the Unted states went through very dstnct nterest rate cycles 
between 1996 and 2006, despte the de facto dollar peg of the chnese renmnb 
untl July 2005. Fgure 14.5 reveals szeable and sustaned, albet varyng, 
dfferentals between short-term renmnb yelds n chna and the Us dollar 
yelds n the Unted states and the Unted kngdom. Yeld dfferentals, whether 
measured n terms of polcy rates or short-term money market rates, have 
generally been 100 bass ponts or more n absolute value. in sum, experence 
between the tghtenng of the peg to the dollar n 1997 and ts loosenng n md 
2005 suggested that chnese monetary authortes could stll set a somewhat 
ndependent domestc polcy (even n the face of captal flows responsve to 
the resultng yeld gap, as shown below). 
cheung et al. (2003) fit autoregressve models to the short-term nterest rate 
dfferental between chna and the Unted states and find that 
…the lagged uncovered nterest dfferental varables are postvely sgnficant 
and ndcatve of strong persstence…if mones are free to move across 
markets, arbtrage can generate profits based on the pattern of persstent 
devaton and help restore the party. however, ths knd of arbtrage actvty s 
qute dfficult, especally n the short run, gven the prevalng captal controls 
n the Prc (cheung et al. 2003:11). 
Another findng of cheung et al. (2003) has been read by echengreen (2004) 
as ndcatng that the captal controls have become less effectve over tme. 
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in partcular, cheung et al. (2003) report a statstcally sgnficant downward 
trend n the nterest rate dfferental n the sample perod from January 1996 to 
may 2002.9 echengreen’s nterpretaton s weakened, however, snce the result 
depends on data from the early to md 1990s. recall that chna experenced a 
bout of moderately hgh nflaton—reachng 20 per cent—n 1994–95, trggerng 
a draconan tghtenng by the authortes. The one-month chnese nterbank 
rate remaned at double-dgt levels n 1995–97 and remaned at 6–8 per cent 
throughout 1998. only after the east Asan financal crss had delvered sharp 
deflatonary shocks to the chnese economy through ts apprecaton of the 
effectve exchange rate of the renmnb dd chnese polcymakers cut nterest 
rates repeatedly. 
We test the followng three hypotheses: that the Us dollar–renmnb nterest 
rate dfferental (n absolute terms) s sgnficantly dfferent from zero; that the 
dfferental has shown a declnng trend; that the average dfferental or ts trend 
changed durng the sample perod. our tests are based on the three measures 
of nterest rates n Fgure 14.6 for July 1997 and July 2005 and allow for possble 
datum breaks wthn ths sample perod. Table 14.1 reports the test results, 
confirmng the vew that chna’s captal controls reman effectve. 




















































































3m Chinese repo less US Treasury
PBC base lending rate less US Federal fund rate
3m CHIBOR less US$ Libor
Source:  ceic data company.
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Frst, for the whole sample perod from 1997 to 2005, or for subsamples, the 
absolute values of the dollar–renmnb nomnal nterest rate dfferentals dffer 
sgnficantly from zero for all three nterest rate measures. secondly, though 
t appears from the entre sample perod that the dfferental was trendng 
downwards, the hypothess of a declnng trend n the dollar–renmnb nterest 
rate dfferentals s rejected wthn the subsamples.
Fnally, when the data are allowed to determne the most lkely shft pont, the 
tests reject the null hypothess of no break. in partcular, nducton dentfies a 
break n the neghbourhood of md 2001—roughly the md pont of the sample 
perod. Gven ths break, the absolute szes of the nterest rate dfferentals 
between the renmnb and the Us dollar are narrower for the second half of 
the sample than for the first half, but reman substantal statstcally. As noted, 
however, there s lttle evdence of a declnng trend wthn the subsamples, 
and ndeed we find the wrong sgn for the estmated trend coefficents n all 
cases. 
The econometrc evdence n Table 14.1 confirms the hypothess of sgnficant 
renmnb–Us dollar nterest rate dfferentals. Ths s a strong statement that, 
on average, chna’s captal controls have been effectve n mantanng a wedge 
between nterest rates on the Us dollar and renmnb, despte the de facto dollar 
peg of the renmnb. our statstcal tests do not support the hypothess of a 
declnng trend n the nterest rate dfferentals, once a break n the sample s 
allowed. in partcular, durng 2001–05, when chna deepened ts partcpaton 
n the global economy consderably and controls were generally relaxed, the 
estmated trend convergence of short-term nterest rates has the wrong sgn n 
all of the cases. if closer financal ntegraton forces nterest rate convergence 
gven exchange rate stablty, t s hard to account for the lack of convergence 
n more recent years. 
Thus, the dstnct nterest rate cycles n chna and the Unted states 
support the dea that chna’s captal controls have bound sufficently to provde 
polcymakers some degree of short-term monetary autonomy under a de facto 
dollar peg.10 We nterpret the observed convergence of polcy rates n the 1990s 
as owng more to nflaton convergence than to weaker captal controls. rather 
than happenstance, the nflaton and nterest rate convergence n 1996–2000 
can be seen as reflectng the dollar peg’s provson of a useful medum-term 
monetary anchor through prces for traded goods.11 What matters for the present 
analyss, however, s that, n the context of low nflaton n both countres, 
captal controls have permtted chnese nterest rates to dverge from those of 
the Federal reserve, notwthstandng the exchange rate lnkage.
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relatve monetary ndependence
it mght be argued that the yeld dfferentals just consdered are not wde 
enough to ndcate monetary ndependence. Ths objecton suggests the 
usefulness of some benchmarks. how do the dfferentals between the domestc 
renmnb yelds and Us dollar yelds compare wth those between the hong 
kong dollar and Us dollar yelds as well as those between the euro and Us 
dollar yelds? As a small open economy, hong kong has a dollar-based currency 
board system and no captal controls whatsoever. The euro area, on the other, 
s a large economy, but one wth a flexble exchange rate and an open captal 
account. The latter s a much more strngent test than a benchmark based on the 
Us dollar–hong kong dollar par. Any smlarty n dollar and euro yelds cannot 
Table 14.1  Renminbi–US dollar interest rate differential
Y = dfferental between the PBc lendng rate and Us Federal fund rate
(1) Y = 194.5 – 0.73 T Adj-r2 = 0.033; dW = 0.119
 (4.10)**  (–1.05)
   
(2)  Y = 152.8 d1 + 106.5 d2 + 1.57 T1  + 0.79 T2 Adj-r2 = 0.11; dW = 0.145
 (1.89)*        (4.28)**      (0.65)   (0.66) Wald Tests: F(2, 93) = 2.06
Y = dfferental between three-month chnese repo and three-month Us T-bll
(1) Y = 266.0 – 1.87 T Adj-r2 = 0.155; dW = 0.153 
 (5.4)**   (–2.82)**
   
(2)  Y = 186.3 d1 + 47.9 d2 + 2.69 T1 + 1.88 T2 Adj-r
2 = 0.413; dW = 0.287
 (2.39)**       (1.86)*     (1.1)    (1.89)* Wald Tests: F(2, 132) = 9.48
Y = dfferental between three-month chiBor and lbor
(1) Y = 272.0 – 2.02 T Adj-r2 = 0.218; dW = 0.258
 (5.83)**   (–2.96)**
  
(2)  Y = 274.6 d1 + 64.0 d2 – 1.35 T1 + 1.64 T2 Adj-r
2 = 0.334; dW = 0.327
 (3.75)**       (2.87)**     (–0.6)    (1.65)* Wald Tests: F(2, 132) = 7.19
Notes: All dependent varables are expressed n absolute value. T = lnear trend; T1 (T2) = 
lnear trend for the first (second) perod; d1 (d2) = dummy varable for the first (second) 
perod. Newey-West estmaton on the monthly data for July 1997 and July 2005: accordng 
to the log lkelhood ratos, the most lkely breakng ponts vary but concentrate around may, 
June and July 2001, so we mpose a common break pont at June 2001. The Wald Test statstcs 
are for the jont null hypothess of equal ntercepts and slopes. Numbers n parentheses are 
t-statstcs: ** ndcates 5 per cent sgnficance; * ndcates 10 per cent sgnficance. 
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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reflect the exchange rate polcy of the euro area (unlke, say, any smlarty n 
Us dollar and hong kong dollar yelds). 
The hong kong dollar–Us dollar benchmark hghlghts the efficacy of captal 
controls n chna, snce hong kong has complete captal moblty but chna has 
mantaned substantal controls, yet both lnked ther currences tghtly to the 
Us dollar. As expected, the hong kong dollar–Us dollar yeld pars exhbt much 
narrower and more stable dfferentals and much hgher correlatons than do 
the chiBor–lbor pars at one-week and three-month maturtes (Table 14.2). 
in partcular, the hbor–lbor correlatons are close to unty, compared wth less 
than one-thrd for the chiBor–lbor pars. Ths s a classc case of a small open 
economy choosng a fixed change rate and gvng up ts monetary autonomy, 
regardless of the respectve busness cycles. hence the hong kong dollar–Us 
dollar benchmark s hghly advantageous to our argument that chna’s captal 
controls have substantally hndered cross-border arbtrage. one drawback of 
usng the hong kong dollar–Us dollar benchmark, however, s that t can only 
suggest that chna’s nterest rate settng has more room to manoeuvre than 
an economy wth very lttle such room. 
A more strngent test based on the euro–Us dollar benchmark—where there 
s a strong presumpton of autonomy n nterest rate settng—stll supports 
our arguments. it s more strngent because, even wth other thngs beng 
equal, the sheer sze of the euro area or of chna would secure tself greater 
autonomy relatve to hong kong. The euro–Us dollar yeld pars have narrower 
and more stable dfferentals than do the renmnb–Us dollar pars (Table 14.3). 
Table 14.2  Interbank rate differentials: renminbi–US dollar and Hong 
Kong dollar–US dollar (bps)
 
 one-week Three-month
 chiBor– hbor– chiBor– hbor– 
 lbor lbor lbor lbor
Average of absolute dfference 160.5 54.1 166.6 47.0
maxmum of dfferental 173.4 71.2 213.2 99.7
mnmum of dfferental –429.6 –222.8 –439.0 –213.0
standard devaton 181.4 54.8 194.9 58.9
correlaton coefficent 0.32 0.97 0.21 0.97
Note: The nterbank market offer rates are chiBor for the renmnb, lbor for the Us dollar 
and hbor for the hong kong dollar. monthly data from January 1999 to march 2006.  
Source: ceic data company.
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 chiBor– eurbor– chiBor– eurbor–
 lbor lbor lbor lbor
Average of absolute dfference 160.47 143.45 166.64 144.56
maxmum of dfferental 173.36 190.04 213.16 166.81
mnmum of dfferental –429.58 –281.50 –439.01 –284.07
standard devaton 181.39 156.60 194.88 157.37
correlaton coefficent 0.32 0.58 0.21 0.60
Note: The nterbank market offer rates are chiBor for the renmnb, lbor for the Us dollar 
and eurbor for the euro; monthly data from January 1999 to march 2006.  
Source: ceic data company.
more tellngly, for the perod under consderaton, eurbor and lbor exhbt 
greater postve co-movements than do the chiBor and lbor. These results 
hold as well across splt samples. Thus, the evdence from nterbank market 
yelds suggests that chna—wth a fixed exchange rate and contnued captal 
controls—does not mport ts nterest rate polcy from the Unted states to any 
greater extent than the euro area. Ths observaton s consstent wth the vew 
that captal controls n chna reman bndng.
Conclusion
The analyss n ths chapter fnds that chna’s captal controls reman 
substantally bndng. They prevent the equalsaton of onshore renmnb 
yelds and those mpled by offshore NdFs. We also find that the observed 
convergence of short-term nterest rates between chna and the Unted states 
was more characterstc of the md to late 1990s than of the years snce. Wth ts 
remanng captal controls, chna’s short-term nterest rate settng seems less 
mported from the Unted states than ether that of hong kong (as a small open 
economy wth a hard dollar peg) or that of the euro area (as a large economy 
wth a flexble exchange rate). 
The partal convergence of onshore and offshore renmnb yelds durng 
md 2005 and late 2006 s nterpreted as reflectng the authortes’ choce to 
act as though they were bound by nterest rate party. That s, n the transton 
from the pegged regme, the chnese authortes found t convenent to take 
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the burden off the captal controls by sgnallng a rate of apprecaton aganst 
the dollar that was broadly consstent wth the Us dollar–renmnb nterest 
rate dfferental. We also recognse an element of unntended and temporary 
relaxaton of captal controls resultng from financal market development 
gettng ahead of the controls. The latest onshore–offshore gaps have, however, 
wdened and reman large; and t appears that the authortes are agan testng 
the effectveness of captal controls.
over tme, financal market development and further lessenng of controls 
should pave the way for phased ntegraton of chna nto the global market, 
and wll dmnsh the mportance of the remanng controls. Nevertheless, 
our findngs of bndng captal controls n chna could also help shed lght on 
how polcymakers n chna wll pace the country’s contnung captal account 
lberalsaton. our analyss suggests that the choces regardng lberalsaton 
wll affect more than the form of nflows.  
Notes
1 lane and mles-Ferrantt (2006) find that chna’s stock of nternatonal assets and labltes 
has barely kept pace wth the global stock, n contrast wth chna’s growng share of global 
GdP and nternatonal trade. They compare asset/lablty stocks wth GdP flows, whle we 
compare two types of nternatonal flows. on our measure, chna’s financal ntegraton s 
outpacng ts trade ntegraton.
2 Gross captal account flows are lkely underestmated relatve to gross current account flows 
because some captal flows take the form of current account transactons n order to avod 
offical restrctons (see below). Also, most reported bank-related gross flows represent 
changes between two dates and do not capture any ntervenng gross flows. 
3 For related lterature on captal moblty and controls, see Frankel (1992) and otan and Twar 
(1981). captal controls are also dscussed n the contexts of lberalsaton sequence (Frankel 
2004; Prasad et al. 2005) and financal contagon (kawa and Takag 2001). An overvew of the 
Asan NdF markets can be found n ma et al. (2004) and debelle et al. (2006). The key nter-bank 
nterest rates used n ths chapter are london nter-bank offer rate (lbor) for the Us dollar, 
the chnese nter-bank offer rate (chiBor) for the renmnb and hong kong nter-bank offer 
rate (hbor) for the hong kong dollar.
4 The PBc ntroduced a new set of benchmark nterbank money market reference rates, 
shangha interbank offered rates (shiBor), n January 2007. 
5 China Money, No. 2, 2006:76.
6 Negatve nomnal nterest rates mpled by the prcng of forward exchange rates are not prma 
face evdence of an nefficent market. it mght be recalled that, durng the perod of zero yen 
nterest rates, fractonally negatve nterest rates n yen were mpled by yen–dollar swaps. 
What kept the negatve nterest rate only fractonally negatve was foregn banks parkng 
the yen funds n non-nterest-bearng current accounts at the Bank of Japan. The analogy 
s mperfect because the negatve nterest rate n yen avalable to foregn banks reflected 
the credt standng of the Japanese banks and ther need to rase dollars. But the analogy s 
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useful n that t hghlghts the fact that n the chnese case controls prevented non-resdents 
from obtanng nterest-bearng or even non-nterest-bearng long postons n the renmnb 
onshore, so some were wllng to pay nterest on long forward postons offshore. 
7 in the onshore forward and swap market, the forward rates have been prced prmarly by 
dfferentals between onshore nterest rates and Us dollar nterest rates and made avalable 
manly for hedgng for real underlyng transactons. 
8 A chnese ndvdual now can brng onshore only a maxmum of Us$50,000 per annum under 
the current account, down from a prevous de facto celng of Us$300,000. 
9 The authors cauton: ‘[t]here s a subtlety nvolved n usng party condtons to evaluate the 
level of ntegraton. When a party condton s rejected, then…dmnutons of devatons may 
be due ether to greater economc ntegraton, greater convergence of economc polces, or 
both’ (p.6). We nclne to polcy convergence. 
10 indeed, Granger causalty tests suggest that of the three nterest rate pars shown n Fgure 
14.6, none of the causalty runs from the Us rate to the chnese rate. indeed, the null hypothess 
that the three-month chnese repo yeld does not cause the three-month Us Treasury bll yeld 
cannot be rejected. Ths runs counter to the general vew that the Unted states s a global 
nterest rate setter and chna a follower. 
11 robert mundell and ron mcknnon have long stressed the mportance of the renmnb’s de 
facto dollar peg as a credble nomnal anchor. it remans, however, an emprcal queston as 
to how much of the nflaton convergence should be attrbuted to ths anchor as opposed to 
strong-arm chnese macro controls. The Us Federal reserve tghtened aggressvely from 1994 
to md 1995 when the renmnb was first stablsed aganst the Us dollar. in the next three 
years, the Federal reserve eased somewhat whle former chnese Premer Zhu rongj took 
forceful measures to control domestc nflaton untl the east Asan financal crss delvered 
strong deflatonary shocks to the chnese economy. 
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Appendix
The spread between onshore yelds and NdF-mpled offshore yelds
in the absence of captal controls, the forward exchange rate of the home 
currency s lnked by arbtrage to ts spot rate and the nterest rate dfferental 
between the home currency and the dollar through the covered nterest party 
condton (ma et al. 2004).
F = s(1+r)/(1+r$)
where ‘F’ s the forward rate, ‘s’ the spot rate, ‘r’ the nterest rate on the 
home currency and r$ the dollar nterest rate. When there are no cross-border 
restrctons, borrowng and lendng ensure that the above holds. 
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When captal controls bnd, however, non-resdents mght not have full 
access to onshore credt or placements, gvng rse to NdFs. 
NdF = s(1+)/(1+r$) 
where ‘’ s the NdF-mpled yeld on the home currency offshore. Note that 
by definton, ‘’ s not constraned by the zero lower bound and could be 
substantally negatve. To the extent that the arbtrage between the onshore 
money market and offshore NdF market s effectvely constraned by captal 
controls, the NdF-mpled offshore nterest rate, ‘’, can dffer consderably 
from the nterest rate prevalng n the onshore money market, ‘r’. A large and 
persstent onshore–offshore spread (r – ) ndcates the presence of effectve 
cross-border restrctons. The sgn of the yeld gap could also reveal prevalng 
market condtons: a postve sgn mples apprecaton pressures on the home 
currency n the presence of captal controls and vce versa. 
Whle a persstently bg onshore–offshore yeld gap ndcates market 
segmentaton, a temporarly narrower gap wll not necessarly suggest less 
effectve captal controls. one possblty s that market condtons are such 
that apprecaton or deprecaton pressures on the currency are largely absent 
so that the estmated yeld gap s relatvely small. 
Another, n prncple equvalent, approach s to estmate the mpled onshore 
yeld on the home currency usng the onshore delverable forwards and then 
to compare t wth the NdF-mpled offshore yeld. Alternatvely, one could 
compare the onshore delverable forwards drectly wth ther NdF counterparts 
to derve a forward premum spread. The merts of these dfferent approaches 
depend n part on data avalablty and market lqudty. in chna’s case, these 
alternatve measures could become more useful over tme, as the relevant 
onshore markets develop and data become more avalable. 
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Table A14.1  Credit default swap rates for People’s Republic of China and 
British Bankers Association’s Libor panel banks (at the one-
year maturty n 2004–2006, n bass ponts)
issuer low hgh Average
People’s republc of chna 5.4 27.6 11.2
Us dollar lbor panel members:   
Bank of Amerca 2.7 24.6 6.8
Barclays 5.0 9.0 6.9
ctbank 1.9 15.5 4.7
hBos 1.8 9.0 4.5
hsBc 2.2 9.8 4.2
JP morgan chase 1.3 23.0 4.9
lloyds 1.9 6.5 3.4
BmTU 6.8 63.0 19.0
Nornchukn 5.8 20.0 9.4
rabobank 3.4 11.9 5.9
royal Bank of scotland 2.7 6.2 4.0
royal Bank of canada 2.0 11.4 5.1
UBs 1.9 7.3 3.5
WesT lB 2.8 22.8 6.9
Average across banks 3.0 17.1 6.4
Source: markt (avalable onlne at http://www.markt.com/marketng/ndex.php).
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15
Reforming China’s exchange 
arrangements
monetary and financal soveregnty,  
sequencng and the foregn exchange market
Huw McKay
chna’s choce of foregn exchange regme has been a topc of busy debate for 
more than a decade (Goldsten 2004; echengreen 2004; Frankel 2004; Prasad et 
al. 2005; mcknnon 2006; and mckay 2003, among many others). Ths dscusson 
has been entwned logcally wth the queston of captal account reform (Prasad 
et al. 2005; mckay 2005a) and the degree of monetary soveregnty chna enjoys 
under ts evolvng nternatonal financal arrangements (ma and mccauley 
forthcomng; cheung et al. 2003; ma et al. 2004; he dong et al. 2005; mckay 
2005b). A less populated field apples current, hstorcal and projected regme 
parameters to the development of, and prospects for, the chnese financal 
system and the foregn exchange market tself (mckay 2006; ho et al. 2005). 
The decson to reform the parameters of chna’s exchange arrangements 
has always been about more than rapprochement wth the Unted states n the 
matter of financal suzeranty. There s no attempt n ths chapter to address 
the nternatonal externaltes generated by the combnaton of chna’s polcy 
choces and those made smultaneously by other current account surplus 
economes and the Unted states. chna’s polcy delberatons are vewed as 
a predomnantly nternal matter, whch nvolve the balancng of a number of 
competng endogenous prortes and msmatched ncentves.  
Ths chapter detals the state of play n chnese foregn exchange markets 
and sketches a potental development path that envsages respectable growth 
n tradng actvty over a mult-year horzon. Ths outcome s contngent on a 
gradual phased reducton n outward captal controls and a more rapd (but stll 
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managed) pace of currency apprecaton. issues surroundng ths assumpton 
form a sgnficant porton of the body of ths chapter.
The basc concluson s that foregn exchange turnover—whch s currently 
exceptonally low n absolute and relatve terms—wll expand wth ncreasng 
symmetry n the captal control regme and ncreased volatlty n the Us 
dollar–renmnb exchange rate. The antcpated ncrease n onshore lqudty, 
and n renmnb tradng generally, should be seen as a bengn development 
for the regonal and global foregn exchange market. it s natural to antcpate 
that some of the gross ncrease n onshore tradng wll be dverted from other 
centres. Yet wth aggregate turnover so low at present, and gven that ths low 
level of lqudty s an outgrowth of admnstratve desgn rather than market 
forces, t s natural to predct that a shft towards a more lberal constellaton 
of exchange arrangements wll provde a contnung net fillp for global foregn 
exchange market lqudty.
Historical background and the state of play
chna unfied onshore currency tradng n 1994, wth the establshment of the 
shangha-based chna Foregn exchange Tradng system (cFeTs). Before the 
nauguraton of ths tradng platform and clearng system, tradng took place 
n upwards of 100 ndependent centres. intally only Us dollar–renmnb and 
hong kong dollar–renmnb were traded. Japanese yen–renmnb was added to 
the system n 1995 and euro–renmnb n 2002. in may 2005, eght non-renmnb 
crosses were also made avalable: Us dollar–Japanese yen, euro–Us dollar, 
Us dollar–swss franc, Us dollar–Brtsh pound, Us dollar–hong kong dollar, 
Australan dollar–Us dollar, euro–Japanese yen and Us dollar–canadan dollar. 
Forward tradng was added to the platform n August 2005, two months after 
the revaluaton of the renmnb aganst the Us dollar.
Turnover data from the early years of cFeTs’ operaton show that lttle growth 
occurred between 1994 and 1998. The trennal foregn exchange survey for 1998 
by the Bank for internatonal settlements (Bis 1999a) estmated that foregn 
exchange turnover n manland chna averaged Us$211 mllon a day, one-tenth 
of 1 per cent of the global total.1 The nterm survey n 2001 mpled relatve 
stass (Bis 2002), but turnover for 2004 (Bis 2005) showed resoundng growth. 
in Aprl 2004, onshore turnover had rsen to Us$614 mllon a day, equvalent to 
three-tenths of 1 per cent of the global total. it s mportant to note that the Bis 
data could exclude a number of transactons nvolvng the non-bank sector, and 
nterbank clearng actvty that occurs outsde of the cFeTs platform (ho et al. 
2005). so t s lkely that renmnb turnover s underestmated to a degree. Addng 
n an estmate of non-reported onshore trades, plus all other recorded trades 
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nvolvng the renmnb, rrespectve of locaton, ncludng the non-delverable 
forward market,2 rases the total to Us$3.6 bllon. That would be equvalent to 
1.5 per cent of global foregn exchange turnover. 
By counter-currency, n the december quarter of 2004, the Us dollar was 
nvolved n 53.2 per cent of cFeTs trades, the Japanese yen n 38.7 per cent, the 
hong kong dollar n 8.1 per cent and the euro n a neglgble porton (cFeTs data 
from the ceic chna database). A factor that wll mpact on foregn exchange 
market development wll be the evoluton of the nvocng practces of chna’s 
tradng firms. At present, the Us dollar s by far the domnant nvoce currency for 
chnese trade transactons, however, that mght not always be the case. As chnese 
exporters move up the value chan, t s possble that they wll pursue an ‘nvocng-
to-market’ currency denomnaton strategy. Ths trend has been observed among 
the G7 countres and n korea (Yun 2005). Ths would bas turnover away from 
the Us dollar and towards other nternatonal currences such as the euro and 
the Japanese yen. if and when the renmnb becomes nternatonalsed, t could 
become the nvoce currency for many chnese mports. That would brng those 
firms whch export to chna nto the renmnb markets, offerng depth and an 
njecton of foregn exchange rsk management experence.
The Bis data for Aprl 2004 show a domnance of spot transactons relatve 
to forwards or swaps n the tradtonal market space, and a relatvely low level 
of overall actvty n the renmnb. spot transactons accounted for about 55 per 
cent of all renmnb trades, compared wth 47 per cent for the indan rupee, 21 
per cent for the hong kong dollar, 49 per cent for the korean won, 37 per cent 
for the indonesan rupah, 30 per cent for the sngaporean dollar and 38 per 
cent for the Tha baht. in the dervatves market, renmnb turnover s extremely 
low. cross-currency swaps reportedly averaged just Us$4 mllon a day, and 
optons just Us$136 mllon—far below the levels prevalng n the markets of 
the new ndustralsed economes.3 relatve volume and market structure are 
summarsed n Fgures 15.1 and 15.2. These figures ndcate that not only s the 
chnese foregn exchange market rather shallow, t s far from sophstcated. 
The fact that the cFeTs platform accommodated forwards tradng only from 
August 2005 underscores ths pont.
Analysis
it s useful to scale the turnover data to help define the relatve depth of the 
chnese foregn exchange market. Three figures have been prepared wth ths 
n mnd, representng the relatonshp between foregn exchange turnover 
and ncome, scale and real demand proxes, respectvely. Fgure 15.3 plots 
foregn exchange turnover aganst a measure of relatve lvng standards: gross 
domestc product (GdP) per capta at purchasng power party (PPP) exchange 
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rates as a percentage of the Us level. Fgure 15.4 plots foregn exchange turnover 
aganst a scale measure (share of world GdP at PPP exchange rates). Fgure 
15.5 plots foregn exchange turnover as a rato to gross trade flows, whch are 
an approxmaton of the real underlyng demand for foregn exchange. 
The last two measures show that chna s a clear outler, exhbtng sharply 
lower turnover than mght be expected gven the economy’s overall sze and 
the scale of ts tradng actvty. The first relatonshp, however, mples that 
chna’s low foregn exchange turnover figures are a state of nature that mght 
be deduced from ts low relatve lvng standard.
The correct way to balance these apparently contradctory results s to argue 
that, as a low-ncome country chna should not be expected to exhbt hghly 
open exchange arrangements at ths pont n tme; but gven that chna’s foregn 
exchange markets are even less lqud than ts east Asan peers, the current 
constellaton of exchange arrangements s less lberal than t mght be at ths 
stage of economc development.
chna’s lowly rankng n the foregn exchange turnover stakes has 
mplcatons for the debate on the effectveness of the captal control regme. 
To stylse somewhat, chna’s captal controls are relatvely porous wth regards 
to nward flows, but relatvely bndng on outward flows. Ths vew rejects 
the clam that chna’s controls are neffectve at the aggregate level, erodng 
monetary soveregnty.4 if outward controls are bndng—as they certanly 
appear to be (ma and mccauley forthcomng)—onshore partes wll experence 
an unrequted (latent) demand for foregn exchange transactons. Yet bndng 
controls prevent these demands from beng requted. ergo, chnese foregn 
exchange lqudty wll be lower than n markets where smlar outflows are not 
restrcted, all other thngs beng equal. 
Note that ths hypothetcal reasonng says nothng about the exchange 
rate tself, whch s the prce at whch actual transactons take place. The 
dscusson s for the moment nterested solely n turnover rather than the 
demand–supply balance. The proposton beng establshed s that turnover 
s low not because the demand for foregn exchange s low, but because the 
market s dstorted (suppressed) by regulaton. The dstorton serves to penalse 
turnover by dsallowng transactons that mght otherwse take place. remove 
the restrctons and lqudty wll rse.
Future development
Any effort to sketch a development path for chna’s foregn exchange markets 
must ncorporate a vew on the evoluton of the regulatory envronment for 
captal flows. it must also encompass a vew on the future course of the 
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exchange rate regme tself. These ssues cut deep nto the umbrella theme of 
macroeconomc polcy desgn for the next decade. 
The choce of an exchange rate regme and the basc regulatory approach 
to cross-border captal flow s nseparable from the broader ssue of monetary 
polcy desgn. Theory s unequvocal on the pont that the combnaton of a fixed 
exchange rate wth an open captal account and an ndependent monetary 
polcy s ncompatble. Yet chna and a number of developng economes 
arguably attempt to run a monetary polcy that s n effect a bastardsed form of 
ths ‘unholy trnty’.5 The vrtue of each arm of monetary polcy s compromsed 
whle the authortes search for a pragmatc constellaton that s not obvously 
damagng but always feels lke second best, or worse (corden 2002; Tarapore 
2006).
Fgure 15.6 shows two arms of the trnty—the degree of exchange rate 
flexblty and the degree of captal account openness—n concert wth per 
capta GdP. The large equlateral trangle represents the Unted states, wth 
ts wealth, ts open captal account and ts flexble exchange rate. The mddle-
szed trangle represents the average economy n east Asa (excludng Japan). 
The smallest trangle s chna.
Fgure 15.5  Foreign exchange turnover and real demand, 2004 (rato*)
a Annualsed foregn exchange turnover scaled by gross merchandse and servces trade for 2004 
calendar year, converted at market exchange rates. 
Sources: Turnover data from Bank for internatonal settlements (Bis), 2005. Triennial Central 
Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in April 2004, Bank for 
internatonal settlements, Basel. ratos are author’s calculatons usng trade data from the 
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Note the llberal overall polcy regme n Asa, and chna’s low absolute 
scores on captal account openness and foregn exchange flexblty. There s 
also nformaton content n the skew of these two trangles. in Asa generally, 
the skew s moderately towards a more flexble currency and away from an 
open captal account. Ths reflects n part the falure of ntermedate regmes n 
korea, Thaland and indonesa durng the east Asan financal crss, draggng 
polcymakers reluctantly down the more flexble path. At ths tme, polcymakers 
across Asa reacted by strengthenng captal controls, exercsng ex post 
financal soveregnty after the collapse of the ex ante exchange rate regme. 
open captal accounts n sngapore and hong kong boost the average on the 
bottom left axs substantally.
in chna, the skew goes the other way. The polcy mx n chna s a clear 
llustraton of the ‘cherry-pckng’ approach to regme desgn. The hgher 
score on captal openness comes from chna’s wllngness to ndulge nflows, 
partcularly of drect nvestment. The lower score on exchange rate flexblty 
derves from the heavly managed exchange rate regme and the low turnover 
created jontly by the lack of volatlty and the depressng mpact of captal 
controls.






Note: * Non-Japan Asan average computed from author’s estmate of foregn exchange 
flexblty and captal openness n the newly ndustralsed economes (as defined n Note 3) 
plus malaysa, Thaland, the Phlppnes, indonesa and inda. 
Sources: Author’s estmates for foregn exchange flexblty and captal openness. income 
levels from internatonal monetary Fund Weo database. Avalable from http://www.mf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/ndex.aspx
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The loophole n the unholy trnty condtons that chna explots s that 
you can have your cake (an nflexble exchange rate and domestc monetary 
soveregnty) and eat t too (captal nflow of the desred knd), f you are wllng 
and able to ntervene n the foregn exchange market and sterlse captal 
nflows sufficently to neuter the mpact on domestc monetary condtons. 
in other words, the People’s Bank of chna must be wllng to accrue foregn 
exchange reserves equvalent to the sum of the current account balance and 
the captal and financal accounts. it must also wthdraw the lqudty that ts 
foregn exchange nterventon generates. in a macro regme sense, Fgure 
15.7 shows the ever-ncreasng nterventon/sterlsaton mperatve f chna’s 
explotaton of the loophole s to be prevented from leakng nto domestc 
lqudty condtons.
By march 2007, chna’s foregn reserves had rsen to a total of Us$1,202 
bllon. in the sx months to march, reserves accumulated at an average monthly 
pace n excess of Us$50 bllon. in addton to moppng up lqudty through bond 





ratio of fx reserve to imports
fx flexibilitycapital freedom
Note: * Non-Japan Asan average computed from author’s estmate of foregn exchange 
flexblty and captal openness n the newly ndustralsed economes (as defined n Note 3) 
plus malaysa, Thaland, the Phlppnes, indonesa and inda. 
Sources: Author’s estmates for foregn exchange flexblty and captal openness. Foregn 
exchange reserves and mport levels from the  ceic data company. Where necessary, mports 
were converted to Us dollars usng exchange rates from the reserve Bank of Australa F Tables 
(avalable from http://www.rba.gov.au/statstcs/Bulletn/ndex.html).
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ssuance—an actvty that was sufficent for sterlsaton purposes from 2003 to 
the first half of 2006—the authortes began usng other tools as well. Through 
progressve polcy shfts, the proporton of bank deposts held compulsorly at 
the central bank (the requred reserve rato) ncreased from 6 per cent n 2003 
to 11 per cent n Aprl 2007. Further ncreases n the requred reserve rato are 
just a matter of tme. 
The effectveness of the admnstratve sterlsaton effort n the early stages 
of the boom n captal nflow s assessed n he dong et al. (2005) and mckay 
(2005b). Both papers argue that chna’s sterlsaton actvty was sufficent to 
successfully nsulate domestc credt condtons from captal nflow. in other 
words, monetary soveregnty was mantaned. Admttedly, the datum samples 
n each paper do not extend to the second half of 2006, when the sterlsaton 
burden was rsng dramatcally n lne wth the spectacular ncrease n the 
monthly trade surplus from August. Further, as nterest rates are not fully 
market determned, t s dfficult to deduce a clear sgnal from the onshore 
money markets n ths regard. Thrdly, mckay (2005b) found tentatve evdence 
that foregn exchange reserve growth leaked nto the grey lendng market n a 
lmted fashon. The statstcal relaton was judged to be of nsufficent strength 
to be of macroeconomc sgnficance, but that could easly change f the degree 
of nterventon requred to stablse the currency were to rse steeply.
chna has not yet reached a pont where ts sterlsaton operaton s 
becomng a major macroeconomc or logstcal problem. other Asan 
economes—such as korea, Tawan and malaysa—have drected a far greater 
effort to sterlsaton at tmes n the past 10 years, consstent wth ther hgher 
trade-to-GdP ratos relatve to chna. issuance of sterlsaton nstruments n 
these three economes peaked at 431 per cent, 228 per cent and 132 per cent 
of base money, respectvely, durng the current Us dollar downturn. in chna, 
central bank bond ssuance rose to about 125 per cent of base money n md 
2006. huge nflows n the march quarter of 2007 pushed ssuance above 140 per 
cent of base money. hkes n the requred reserve rato began to be nsttuted 
from md 2006, reducng the burden somewhat (see Fgures 15.8 and 15.9). 
Gven the superordnate long-term polcy goal of achevng a consumer-
orented economc structure, t seems natural that n future the authortes 
wll compromse less and less n terms of ther control over domestc credt 
condtons. Further, whle the present methods of nterventon and sterlsaton 
can contnue for some ndetermnate tme, t s clearly a finte method. The 
resources chewed up by the sterlsaton effort (labour and captal, funds kept as 
reserves and therefore not employed elsewhere) have an opportunty cost that 
at some pont wll exceed the perceved benefits. consumersm also mples a 
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Note: The last datum pont n the requred reserves rato to base money was calculated before 
the 29 Aprl 2007 announcement of a rate hke. 
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reduced focus on exchange rate stablty and external compettveness ssues 
n the future. That n turn would ease the pressure to mantan captal controls. 
in short, the parameter loophole that chna s currently explotng wll at some 
pont declne n popularty wth polcymakers.
The present mx of parameters s consstent wth the export-drven 
development model that has served chna well. The maturaton and exhauston 
of ths strategy wll sgnal a new approach to monetary polcy and nternatonal 
financal arrangements. 
if the authortes dd have t n mnd to move away from the current 
constellaton of regme parameters, preparatory actvty and polcy changes 
would be observed followng a sequence smlar to that outlned below. Under 
bengn nternal and external economc condtons, the normatve path from 
a fixed to a floatng exchange rate s reasonably well defined. The followng 
catalogue of tasks wll get the job done n a decade or so. The benchmark work 
n the ‘sequencng’ field s mcknnon (1993).
1. establsh convertblty on the current account and unfy onshore tradng 
of the currency.
2. Work towards establshng an alternatve anchor for monetary polcy. 
Ths step also ncorporates progressve lberalsaton of nterest 
rate determnaton. inflaton targetng s one possble alternatve 
model/anchor, successful applcaton of whch requres central bank 
ndependence, the unfcaton of monetary and foregn exchange 
polcy6 and the establshment of nflaton-fightng ‘credblty’ wth the 
market.7 
3. establsh an onshore forward market to provde domestc nsttutons 
wth the tools to hedge the rsks assocated wth ncreased exchange 
rate flexblty. 
4. Wden the allowable tradng band around the exstng peg to gve 
domestc nsttutons a chance to ‘tran’ themselves to deal wth exchange 
rate volatlty under protected condtons. Progressvely decrease the 
market-makng role of the monetary authorty as the nterbank market 
matures.
5. Work to allevate any exstng asymmetres n captal account regulatons 
to avert a bas n captal flows that wll create skewed rsks regardng 
movement n the exchange rate. desgn a strategy for ensurng fuller captal 
account convertblty n the future (more on ths theme below). Ths could 
nclude the hghlghtng of concomtants, although they should be couched 
n such a way as to not materally reduce polcy flexblty n the future.
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6. Progressvely ncrease the allowable degree of exchange rate volatlty 
as competency mproves and the market deepens organcally.
7. When the allowable degree of volatlty approaches a level where t s 
essentally redundant, quetly move to a free-floatng, market-determned 
exchange rate.
in chna, we have seen actvty n many of these areas, notably a wdenng 
of the allowable tradng band aganst the Us dollar to +/– 0.5 per cent on 
18 may (Fgure 15.10). Yet wth the excepton of the ntal step of current 
account convertblty—whch was completed n the md 1990s—condtons 
reman flud. The central bank has been workng on the greater applcaton 
of market-based counter-cyclcal tools, yet they contnue to be mxed wth 
admnstratve controls. The ntended benchmark for market-based nterest 
rate determnaton—the newly nsttuted shangha nterbank offered rates 
(shiBor, n multple tenors)—was unveled on 4 January 2007 (China Money 
2007). depost and lendng rates are stll constraned by floors and celngs. The 
nterbank money markets are mmature and relatvely llqud. The drecton of 
reform s clear, but there are obvous hurdles stll to surmount n ths area. song 
(2005) provdes a useful analyss of developments n nterest rate lberalsaton 
and offers a compellng efficency argument for deregulaton. 
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The relatve mmaturty of the onshore forward foregn exchange market has 
already been detaled. it was establshed n August 2005, so t s a very young 
market. spot transactons stll domnate overall turnover. it s not credble to 
say to the prvate sector that ‘the currency s gong to be more flexble, do 
somethng about t’, n the knowledge that a lqud onshore forward market s 
not readly avalable to firms wshng to hedge the newly created rsk. 
one way that the authortes are seekng to boost lqudty s by mposng 
prvate turnover targets on the major players n the onshore market. Ths tactc 
has, however, not been a great success. intervews wth market partcpants 
show that these targets are often met through dummy trades that are poston 
neutral, and are therefore not addng real lqudty to the market.8 Players wth 
the credt worthness to access onshore and offshore markets tend to transact 
n the deeper and more sophstcated of the two, whch undoubtedly s offshore. 
in short, the market partcpants who could do the most to deepen the onshore 
market are choosng to conduct a mnmum of transactons there. 
The authortes are smultaneously workng hard to smulate two-way rsk 
wthn the newly mnted +/– 0.5 per cent band wthout devatng from a 3–5 
per cent annualsed rate of nomnal apprecaton aganst the Us dollar. The 
announced daly fixng rate sometmes looks ncongruous n the larger context 
of broader foregn exchange market movements, but sometmes t must be so 
to tran firms to expect the unexpected, thereby encouragng them to protect 
themselves accordngly. once agan, ths actvty s preparatory for a more 
flexble future, but not a bold new world startng tomorrow.
once agan, the ncentves of the bureaucratc archtects of the market are 
n conflct wth those of potental partcpants. The bureaucrats would lke 
firms to begn transactng n forwards now to buld competency and famlarty 
under the bengn condtons of weak volatlty exhbted by the current regme. 
But firms are not transactng, because condtons have been too bengn. To be 
blunt, firms wll not bear hedgng costs unless they are scared by what they 
have observed on the exchange rate apprecaton front. But scarng firms wth 
sharp renmnb gans would remove the protectve condtons the authortes 
have been cultvatng so carefully. it s the latter that s most lkely to gve, as 
the non-hedgers hold the ratonal ground.
Us dollar–renmnb moves snce the revaluaton n 2005 have clearly not 
been sufficently frghtenng to spur hedgng actvty. The new allowable daly 
volatlty of +/– 0.5 per cent, announced n the lead-up to the 2007 strategc 
economc dalogue wth the Unted states, was nsttuted despte the old band 
of +/– 0.3 per cent not beng consstently tested. The lack of volatlty has 
generated complacency rather than panc. it seems lkely that hedgng actvty, 
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and forward turnover, wll reman low untl the tradng band s wdened (or tested 
wth more frequency) and more aggressve apprecaton s delvered. 
The fifth tem n the catalogue s another major stckng pont. As stated 
many tmes already, chnese captal controls are of the cherry-pckng 
varety. Foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) attracton s a stated polcy goal, and 
a performance metrc for provncal governments. Newly nstated Qualfied 
Foregn insttutonal investor (QFii) nward-bound nvestment quotas wll add 
to overall nflow. more than 50 QFii applcatons have been approved snce may 
2003, wth combned quotas n excess of Us$8 bllon (state Admnstraton 
of Foregn exchange n.d.). Further, the Fdi exempton potentally allows not 
only genune nvestment but captal flow of a less permanent nature (ma and 
mccauley forthcomng). consequently, the captal account s qute porous n the 
nward drecton. in addton, chna’s mmense trade surplus (Us$177 bllon n 
2006 and lkely to easly exceed Us$200 bllon n 2007 after recordng a Us$46 
bllon outcome n the seasonally unfavourable march quarter) generates a large 
and expandng nward flow. on the other hand, domestc savngs are fenced n, 
wth outflows lmted to offical reserve asset management, a meagre amount 






















a Both seres exclude nvestment n financal firms. 
Sources: ceic data company; 2006 data for nward nvestment are author’s estmate.
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of debt repayments and currently modest Qualfied domestc insttutonal 
investor (Qdii) outward-bound nvestment flows. A burgeonng demand for 
outward foregn drect nvestment, partcularly n the strategc areas of energy, 
food and metals, s yet to make much of a splash. Fgure 15.11 hghlghts the 
mbalance between nward and outward drect nvestment flows.
The asymmetry nherent n ths structure leads to an apprecaton bas 
for the renmnb. if funds come n, wthout a correspondng flow n the 
opposte drecton, an excess supply of foregn currency s generated, puttng 
apprecaton pressure on the local unt. in effect, chna runs a twn external 
surplus on ts current and captal accounts. The asymmetry could be corrected 
ether by wavng controls on outflow or penalsng nflow. The momentum of 
reform clearly favours the former opton.
Projectng reforms desgned to lberalse captal outflow s not as easy as t 
mght at first seem. The dfficulty comes due to the fact that lberalsng outflow 
means the potental release of captve domestc savngs. chna’s financal asset 
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stock features an unusually hgh share of bank deposts (Fgure 15.12). Ths 
has not come about by chance. keepng a hgh level of household savngs n 
deposts s a form of subsdy for the banks. Bank balance sheets have been 
weak snce the sharp nflatonary boom of the md 1990s turned sour (lardy 
1998; Bank for internatonal settlements 1999b; huang 2001; ma and Fung 2002; 
ma 2006; mckay 2005c).
chna’s bank profits rely to a large extent on an artfically wde margn 
between depost and lendng rates. Ths margn s created by offical controls 
on ‘floor’ lendng rates and ‘celng’ depost rates. if, however, the pool of 
domestc savngs were to shrnk due to heghtened captal egress, these cosy 
arrangements would have to end. The local banks would requre the flexblty 
to offer more attractve terms to mantan depostors. Two per cent of chna’s 
populaton controls close to 60 per cent of deposts (Farrell et al. 2006). Ths 
wealthy populaton segment can safely be descrbed as sophstcated nvestors. 
They wll no doubt seek to dversfy ther cash holdngs n terms of asset class, 
geography and currency denomnaton once the opportunty to do so arses. 
That sad, the weak take-up of Qdii products may ndcate that the recent 
strength of the A share market and the threat of the currency erodng offshore 
gans may ndcate that at present there s a ratonal ncentve to be over-weght 
domestc assets.  
if the banks had robust balance sheets, ths would not be a great threat. 
As thngs are, legacy non-performng loans (NPls) have not been fully carved 
out, creatng an nherent vulnerablty. The admnstraton knows that these 
loans—and those sttng unsold on asset management company balance 
sheets—are bascally contngent fiscal labltes. That beng the case, t s not 
n the government’s nterest to expose the banks to a materal loss of deposts 
at ths tme, partcularly n the lght of the World Trade organzaton-nspred 
ncrease n competton from foregn banks n domestc currency busness 
snce december 2006. 
The recent ntal publc offerngs of major state banks were attractve for 
many reasons, not the least of whch was to get strategc foregn nvestors to 
provde captal njectons that pad a huge premum over book value wthout 
cedng controllng nterests. These new shareholders are part of the NPl bal 
out story, as are the exstng shareholders (mnstry of Fnance, hujn) and bank 
customers. But the man loser s lkely to be the taxpayer (ma 2006). 
Fgure 15.13 represents a story smlar to the catalogue of normatve reform 
steps outlned above. The dfference s that wth knowledge of the vulnerablty 
of chnese banks, the assumpton of bengn nternal condtons must be 
overturned. indeed, when the bankng equaton s consdered, the arguments 
on nternatonal financal reform become somewhat crcular.
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Sources: standard and Poor’s ratng agency for NPl estmates (subscrpton only newsletter); 
Westpac strategy  for foregn exchange volatlty estmates. in many cases the standard and 
Poor’s estmate wll be many multples of the offical estmate. standard and Poor’s s used to 
ensure consstent methodology across the sample.
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The major stckng pont s the need to reduce asymmetry n the captal 
account to reduce the exstng one-way bas on the exchange rate. That means 
allowng sgnficant outflows and that n turn means freeng bank deposts to 
find a new home. That s obvously anathema. Yet f the captal account s left 
asymmetrc, apprecaton pressure wll reman undmmed due to a contnuaton 
of the excess of nflows. Fgure 15.14 shows the relatonshp between foregn 
exchange volatlty and financal system strength n selected Asan countres. 
The countres n the sample have been chosen for ther demonstrated capacty 
to manage volatlty n ther exchange rate. ergo we can style observed volatlty 
levels as a polcy choce. The negatve relatonshp between bank balance 
sheets and sanctoned volatlty s strong and consstent wth the core of the 
argument.
A strategy for gradual captal account lberalsaton
From the chnese admnstraton’s pont of vew, the path of least resstance 
seems clear: try to muddle through on the reform front untl the bankng 
system grows out of ts NPl problem. Yet a bolder admnstraton can do more 
than muddle through. here we revst pont five n our catalogue, where the 
concept of a road-map for fuller captal account openness was ntroduced. inda 
has formalsed ths concept wth the publcaton of a report from a workng 
commttee of the reserve Bank of inda on fuller captal account convertblty 
(Tarapore 2006).
captal outflows can be lberalsed n a selectve fashon that makes 
t dfficult for household savngs to move offshore but enables firms and 
nsttutonal nvestors to do so more freely. A heghtened degree of outward 
foregn drect nvestment s the obvous first pont of call. 
outward drect nvestment s permtted only after an examnaton of the 
source of the foregn exchange funds for the venture s undertaken and the 
relevant mnstres have been nformed and have authorsed the transacton. 
strategc actvtes such as export promoton, resource development and 
scentfic research and development are already gven preferental treatment 
(internatonal monetary Fund 2006). Yet outward drect nvestment flows have 
been weak (see Fgure 15.11). 
one reason for the lack of drect nvestment outflow could be that chnese 
manufacturng firms have lttle desre to buld producton capacty offshore, 
when they can produce much more compettvely at home. Further, advanced-
country tarff rates are not presently restrctve, so there s lttle reason to set 
up behnd these barrers. Another factor could be that due to the legacy firm 
structure, the conglomerate/network structures that encouraged upstream 
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vertcal ntegraton by Japanese corporate groups durng that economy’s 
ndustralsaton drve are less evdent n chna.9 in the partcular case of 
resources, ncludng energy, t s only snce 2003 that prces have become 
onerous. large mporters of commodtes and energy faced a bengn prce 
and supply envronment through much of the 1990s. Therefore, drect control 
of resources was not a major ssue. That has clearly changed.
it would seem natural that n the current envronment the chnese 
admnstraton would heghten ts focus on acqurng sutable offshore assets n 
the resources arena. That would be very easy to formalse n the polcy rhetorc, as 
nothng n partcular has to be done to the letter of the law to boost outward drect 
nvestment. The authortes can play a firmer sgnallng role though, perhaps va 
blateral trade arrangements wth resource-rch jursdctons that could allow 
preferental treatment for chnese enttes n the drect nvestment field.10
stronger outflows of drect nvestment would also provde a vehcle through 
whch other funds could find ther way offshore. Just as hot money reportedly 
currently makes ts way nto chna under the guse of ‘real demand’ flows, 
well-connected domestc nvestors could use the same clandestne methods 
to get ther money out. 
on the portfolo sde, as dscussed above, domestc nvestors can apply to 
move funds offshore for specfic purposes. By requrng approval for everythng, 
the authortes hope to mnmse the sort of outflows that mght be problematc 
gven the backdrop of bank balance sheet vulnerablty. it s not dfficult to 
foresee a modest ncrease n outward portfolo flow through the Qdii channel. it 
s more dfficult to see the sort of reforms that would enable chnese household 
savers to drectly send ther funds offshore.
in sum, chna’s strategy regardng captal egress s lkely to focus on 
outward drect nvestment n the first nstance, and portfolo flows at a more 
dstant date.
captal account deregulaton s an mmense and complex task, partcularly 
so when an élte bureaucracy has bound up the gamut of nternatonal financal 
arrangements wth red tape. examples abound across east and south Asa n 
ths regard. it should be noted that Japan took some 30 years to unwnd ts once 
pervasve captal account regulatons. That seems lke a long tme, partcularly 
when much of the work was done aganst the backdrop of apparently healthy 
bank balance sheets n the 1980s. The reforms were not due to outsde pressure; 
they were a response to nternal demand (mckay 2004). 
in inda, t s now 16 years snce the ntal lberalsng reforms of then Fnance 
mnster dr manmohan sngh. The ssue had been moot for a decade before now 
Prme mnster sngh put t back on the agenda last year (Tarapore 2006).
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The lesson from these countres s that captal account deregulaton 
proceeds at an unpredctable pace, wth flurres of energy nterspersed wth 
long perods of nactvty. contrary to foregn exchange regme choce, whch 
can be thrust on a country by market forces (mckay 2003; Bubula and Ötker-
robe 2003), captal control s a dscretonary legslatve matter: soveregnty 
s always mantaned. That mples firmly that captal account (de)regulaton 
can be conducted voluntarly at tmes of domestc need and can stand aloof 
to external or market pressures.
how long mght chna take to acheve symmetry n ts captal flow 
regme aganst the present backdrop of a strkngly weak financal system? 
That s beyond the scope of ths work. What s mportant to note s that, for 
the moment, a proactve approach to boostng outward drect nvestment 
and a prudent approach to ncreasng portfolo flows by the corporate and 
professonal nvestment communtes s probably n chna’s best nterests. 
equally mportantly, any reform should be desgned to keep household savngs 
captve for a whle longer.
Summary and conclusions
chna’s foregn exchange market s charactersed by a low level of turnover 
and a lack of sophstcaton. low absolute and relatve levels of lqudty are an 
outgrowth of the rsk-averse umbrella polcy regme. The current regme restrcts 
captal outflow and exchange rate flexblty. A materal ncrease n turnover n 
the onshore market awats a more lberal polcy settng on both counts.
Prospects for deregulaton are sound but not completely overwhelmng. 
The weakness of the bankng system ntrudes rather rudely on the normatve 
arguments for exchange rate flexblty and accompanyng de-restrcton of the 
captal account. indeed, the lne that chna s ready to accommodate greater 
exchange rate flexblty and a substantally more open captal account appears 
crcular when the bankng ssue looms nto vew. Yet a selectve easng of 
restrctons on outflow by corporatons and professonal nvestors would help 
allevate a porton of the exstng asymmetres, wthout unduly threatenng 
captve bank deposts. 
Greater outflows are needed to reduce the strong one-way bas for the 
exchange rate and to stem the rapd accumulaton of foregn exchange reserves. 
in turn, ths would reduce the requred sterlsaton effort. chna’s loophole 
approach towards ts core polcy parameters s clearly a finte one. At some 
future pont, the sum of the sterlsaton effort and the opportunty cost of 
reserve holdng wll exceed the perceved stablty benefits n the mnds of 
polcymakers.
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once chna commts fully to the pursut of a consumer-drven economc 
structure, the current mx of polcy parameters wll be dscarded ratonally. The 
present mx of parameters s consstent wth the export-drven development 
model that has charactersed the economy n the reform era. The maturaton and 
exhauston of ths strategy wll sgnal a new approach to monetary polcy and 
nternatonal financal arrangements. The emphass wll shft from an external 
anchor—the fixed exchange rate—to levers controllng nternal lqudty.
on the exchange rate regme tself, the apprecaton trajectory of the 
renmnb snce the revaluaton has been managed so tghtly that firms have 
chosen to eschew hedgng actvty. Turnover s lkely to be relatvely suppressed 
untl the mperatve to hedge rses. The very gradual apprecaton of the renmnb 
observed so far has not been sufficent to convnce firms that the costs of 
hedgng are less than those of not dong so. Gven ths realty, the admnstraton 
could decde that greater apprecaton and assocated volatlty are a necessary 
evl on the way to buldng a developed foregn exchange market. 
Notes
1 The data presented here are for turnover by country, not by currency. They are taken from 
Table e-4 of the trennal Bis surveys (1996, 1999a, 2002, 2005).
2 ‘Non-delverable forwards’, or NdFs, are a cash-settled forward contract on a non-captal 
account convertble (that s, ‘non-delverable’ offshore) currency. The notonal prncpal 
amount, the outrght foregn exchange rate and maturty (fixng date) are all agreed at ncepton. 
on maturty there s no exchange of prncpal. A cash dfferental, n Us dollars, s pad or 
receved dependng on the relatvty between the fixng rate and the orgnal contract. For an 
overvew of the Asan NdF market, see debelle et al. (2006) and ma et al. (2004). For logstcs 
of NdFs relatve to delverable forwards, see Westpac insttutonal Bank (2006). 
3 New ndustralsed economes as defined by the internatonal monetary Fund: republc of 
korea, Tawan Provnce of chna, hong kong specal Admnstratve regon of chna and 
sngapore. 
4 Ths debate s played out n cheung et al. (2003); echengreen (2004); ma et al. (2004); and ma 
and mccauley (forthcomng).
5 The ‘unholy trnty’ of an open captal account, a fixed exchange rate and an ndependent 
monetary polcy s a logcal findng from the open-economy macroeconomcs developed n 
the early 1960s by mundell (1960, 1963) and Flemng (1962). Ther deas on the exchange rate 
were synthessed and augmented by dornbusch (1976). it can be found n contemporary texts 
as the ‘mundell–Flemng–dornbusch’ model: for example, n obstfeld and rogoff (1996).
6 The Bank of korea s an nflaton targeter, but the mnstry of Fnance and economy stll 
controls foregn exchange polcy. it s not an mpossble separaton of powers, but s lkely a 
sub-optmal one. 
7 The lterature on nflaton targetng s mmense. For a useful survey, see lowe (1997). For a 
dscusson of the applcablty of nflaton targetng for Asa, see debelle (2001).
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8 intervew subjects came from local chnese banks and foregn banks wth a hgh-profile 
presence n the onshore and offshore markets. 
9 Ths s a huge topc and far beyond the reaches of ths work. For a comparatve study of firm 
structures across Asa, see Tpton (2007). 
10 Blateral free trade agreements currently under dscusson wth chle and Australa could 
eventually meet ths crteron. 
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China’s real exchange rate
Jane Golley and Rod Tyers
There s ncreasng nternatonal pressure for the chnese authortes to allow 
the currency to float more freely. it has been argued that the apprecaton of 
the renmnb snce 2005 s just the begnnng of a necessary upward trend, 
gven the belef that the currency s currently undervalued, by margns rangng 
from ‘small’ to as hgh as 50 per cent (Frankel 2004; Wang 2004; Goldsten 
2004; coudert and couharde 2005).  expectatons that chna’s underlyng 
real exchange rate wll apprecate n the future are based commonly on 
the Balassa (1964)-samuelson (1964) hypothess. Ths mples a postve 
relatonshp between economc growth and the real exchange rate, drven 
by productvty catch-up n developng economes’ tradable sectors and, n 
assocaton, rsng prces n ther non-traded sectors. Yet, whle the Balassa-
samuelson charactersaton of the growth process s a useful abstracton, t 
s suspect on several fronts, not least of whch s ts omsson of productvty 
gans n the non-tradable sector, whch tend to be deprecatng.1 moreover, at 
ts core t reles on the law of one prce for tradable goods.  departures from 
ths assumpton are now wdely recognsed, under whch crcumstance there 
are numerous other drvers of chna’s economc growth that affect the real 
exchange rate (Tyers et al. 2006). These nclude labour force expanson, skll 
acquston, changes n the savng rate and trade and financal reforms, many 
of whch are also deprecatng.  Thus, the net effect of chna’s rapd economc 
growth on ts real exchange rate depends on the sources of that growth and 
the consequent pattern of endowment changes and sectoral dstrbutons of 
productvty growth and tradablty. 
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Ths chapter explores the nteractons between sources of growth and the 
real exchange rate and  consders the Balassa-samuelson hypothess n the 
context of recent and future sources of chnese economc growth, offerng 
a varety of reasons why chna’s behavour need not be consstent wth the 
hypothess. chna’s macroeconomc polcy regme and ts contnung reforms 
to the financal sector, both of whch have profound mplcatons for the trend 
of ts real exchange rate, are dscussed. The ssues arsng n these sectons 
are assessed usng a smulaton model of the global economy n whch a full 
demographc sub-model s ncorporated. The ncluson of demography captures 
the mpendng declne n chna’s overall labour force and the rse n ts skll 
ntensty. Baselne and comparator smulatons are constructed to examne the 
senstvty of real exchange rate paths to changes n the labour supply (acheved 
va changes to fertlty polcy that encourage larger famles), alternatve labour 
productvty and skll upgradng scenaros, and financal sector reform. 
Balassa-Samuelson: theory and reality
if the nomnal exchange rate, E, s defined as the number of unts of foregn 
exchange obtaned for a unt of the domestc currency, the real exchange rate, 
Re , can be defined correspondngly as the rate of exchange between the home 
product bundle and correspondng bundles produced abroad. it follows that 
the blateral real exchange rate for a focus (home) country wth foregn tradng 
partner i can be approxmated as the common currency rato of the gross 
domestc product (GdP) prces (deflators) of the two countres, ( ),Y N TP p p  
and ( ), /Y N Ti i i iP p p E , where Tp and Np  are ndces over all the focus country’s 
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Ths s the fundamental relatonshp between the real and nomnal exchange 
rates. consder the case n whch prces at home and abroad are measured n 
a common currency, the share of non-traded products n GdP, θ, s the same at 
home and abroad, prces are aggregated approprately usng a cobb-douglas 
ndex and the law of one prce apples to all traded goods. The latter mples 
that trade s costless and undstorted, so that 
T T
ip p= . Under these condtons, 
the real exchange rate becomes
( ) ( )
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From ths, the key role of non-traded goods prces s clear. When prces 
are measured n a common currency, or relatve to a common numerare, t 
s the rato of the home and foregn non-traded goods prces that matters n 
determnng the real exchange rate.
consder a rcardan exchange n whch output per worker s TA ab= , 
NA ac= , Ti iA ab=  and 
N
i iA ac= . here, a s common to both sectors and 
regons, b s a component of productvty that s based towards the traded sector 
and c s a component based towards the non-traded sector. The parameters b 
and c are dfferent between countres. The relatonshps between the wage rate 
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By the Balassa-samuelson hypothess, f the focus country has hgher 
tradable productvty growth, ib b> , and assumng that ic c= , ts real exchange 
rate must be apprecatng. The hypothess then mples that, f developng 
economes are poorer because ther tradable labour productvty s lower, then 
comparatvely rapd growth should cause real apprecatons.
The key assumptons of the hypothess are, however, suspect.
Tradable productvty gap 
durng some perods and n some developng economes, productvty growth 
has been observed to be hgher n the non-tradable sector,3 leadng to ic c>  and 
tendng to deprecate the real exchange rate. modern transport, financal, health 
and educaton servces offer consderable potental for productvty catch-
up. Whatever the relatve performance of chna’s servces sector n the past, 
recent evdence suggests substantal potental for catch-up and accelerated 
productvty growth n the future (see ma 2006).
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The law of one prce for tradable goods
Falures of the law of one prce have been observed for tradable goods n specfic 
nstances.4 Goods and servces are not homogeneous across countres but are 
dfferentated at mnmum by country of orgn.5 supply and/or demand sde 
factors that rase the volume of tradable producton move the home country 
down the global demand curves for ts product varetes, reducng ts supply 
prces and resultng n deteroraton n the terms of trade and a deprecaton 
of ts real exchange rate. Factor endowment growth and changes n polcy that 
lead to substtuton n demand for home products deprecate real exchange 
rates and the magntudes of ther effects depend crucally on the degree of 
substtutablty between the dfferentated products.
Labour arbitrage in most developng economes, the margnal product of 
ndustral labour exceeds that of rural labour due to the more rapd accumulaton 
of ndustral captal. There s, therefore, a harrs-Todaro gulf between the wages 
n the expandng and contractng sectors. if labour moblty between the rural 
and ndustral sectors s nferor to that between the rural and servce sectors 
(partcularly the constructon sector), then ndustral productvty growth does 
not necessarly drve up servce wages or servce costs.6
closed captal account 
The assumpton that the real exchange rate depends only on nteractons among 
countres assocated wth trade n merchandse s clearly volated n many of 
today’s developng economes, and partcularly n chna. its volaton, n concert 
wth falures of the law of one prce for traded goods, means that any nflux of 
payments (n the form of a foregn drect nvestment or portfolo captal flow) 
rases aggregate demand. snce traded goods are suppled more elastcally va 
mports than are non-traded goods—whch depend on home resources—such 
an nflux must rase relatve non-traded prces and therefore apprecate the real 
exchange rate. conversely, effluxes wll cause deprecaton.
Not surprsngly then, emprcal evdence n support of the Balassa-
samuelson hypothess s mxed. choudhr and khan (2004), for example, find 
favourable evdence usng a small sample of developng economes that does 
not nclude manland chna, Tawan or hong kong. Bergn et al. (2006) find a 
postve assocaton between prce levels and real per capta ncome that s 
strong only n large samples of countres. myajma (2005) uses a sample of 15 
organsaton for economc co-operaton and development (oecd) countres 
between 1970 and 2000 to establsh that the hypothess does not always hold 
durng growth surges, whch on numerous occasons were led by productvty 
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growth n non-traded sectors. The east Asan evdence snce 1980 also appears 
mxed. Fgure 16.1 plots blateral real exchange rates aganst the Unted states 
for manland chna and some of ts neghbours, demonstratng that there s 
no clear pattern.
To examne the productvty-gap component of the hypothess for chna, 
we estmate smple solow resduals for the economy as a whole and for three 
sectors: ‘Food’, ‘industry’ and ‘servces’, adjustng the offically publshed 
urban employment data for underestmaton, as dscussed n ca and Wang 
(2006).7 The average annual changes n the solow resduals for each sector 
are gven n Table 16.1. These show strong productvty performance by the 
chnese economy snce the md 1980s, wth a slow-down n the 1998–2001 
perod assocated wth the east Asan financal crss. consstent wth the 
analyses of lu (2006) and Fogel (2006), productvty growth appears to have 
been strongest n the ndustral sector and weakest n the servce sector.8 Yet, 




























































a These are ndces of nomnal blateral rates deflated accordng to / USR Y Ye E P P= ⋅ ,  
where E s the nomnal exchange rate n Us dollars per unt of local currency; PY s the local 
GdP prce; and USYP  s the correspondng Us GdP prce. The left graph sets 1980=1.00 whle, to 
show the trends n the later years, that on the rght sets 1990=1.00. 
Sources: For korea, Japan and manland chna the data are from internatonal monetary Fund 
(imF) 2007a. International Financial Statistics, the internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, 
dc.  For Tawan they are from the webstes of the central Bank of chna (Tawan) and the 
drectorate-General of Budget, Accountng and statstcs, executve Yuan.
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partcularly n recent years, the dfferences are not large. Ths has lmted the 
extent of servce prce nflaton, whch, whle evdent n Fgure 16.2 snce 1995, 
s not overwhelmng.
Takng a dfferent approach, rodrk (2006) measures the productvty 
assocated wth chna’s exports and shows t to be sgnficantly hgher than 
what would normally be expected for a country at chna’s ncome level. he 
also shows that ths has been an mportant determnant of chna’s growth 
durng the perod 1992–2003. relevant to the dscusson here, he asks whether 
the chnese economy wll run out of steam once the convergence n export 
productvty nears completon, or whether t wll be able to ‘dscover’ new 
products on world markets and enable export-led growth to contnue. Whle 
such speculaton suggests future real apprecatons based on productvty 
growth n the tradable sector, consderable future growth could stem from 
productvty catch-up n the servce sector—a deprecatng force. The fact that 
recent productvty growth n manufacturng has been assocated wth foregn 
drect nvestment (Fdi) and that servce Fdi has begun to grow only recently, 
suggests that servces productvty wll be a major contrbutor n the future. 
clearly, the sectoral dstrbuton of productvty gans s crtcal n determnng 
the real exchange rate.
in turn, productvty dfferences across sectors wll be affected by levels of 
educaton and tranng. Fogel (2006) predcts that nvestment n human captal 
has the potental to serve as chna’s key engne of economc growth for the next 
two decades, a pont that s well recognsed by chna’s leaders (as emphassed 
n the eleventh Fve-Year Plan). he qualfies the mpact of enhancng the qualty 
of labour through educaton on the growth rate of per capta ncome and shows 
that ncreasng secondary and tertary enrolment ratos has a szeable mpact 
on the growth of labour productvty and the per capta GdP growth rate.9 To the 
extent that servces are skll ntensve (as they are accordng to past data), ths wll 
boost performance n the servce sector—agan, tendng to deprecate chna’s 
real exchange rate. of course, to the extent that structural changes lead to rapd 
upgradng n the skll ntensty of tradables n the process of economc growth n 
chna, as t has n other countres, ths relatonshp wll operate n reverse.
Allowng for falures of the law of one prce for tradable goods, there are 
numerous other forces tendng to deprecate the real exchange rate n the long 
term. durng the past two decades one such force has been chna’s ‘demographc 
dvdend’, stemmng from the hgh proporton of workng-aged people n the 
total populaton. Ths, accordng to ca and Wang (2005), accounted for about 
one-quarter of per capta GdP growth between 1980 and 2003.10 it has played 
a crtcal role n keepng wages and hence the real exchange rate low, thereby 
enablng the rapd expanson of labour-ntensve manufactured exports. in the 
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Table 16.1  Estimated Chinese total factor productivity growth, by 
sector, 1986–2005 (per cent per annum)
 Whole economy Food industry servces
1986–89 3.5 1.4 3.8 3.8
1990–94 5.0 1.6 7.7 2.3
1995–97 5.7 5.5 3.7 3.2
1998–2001 4.1 -0.2 8.9 -0.5
2002–2005 6.0 5.4 6.3 4.6
Source: Tyers, r., Golley, J., Bu, Y. and Ban, i., 2006. China’s economic growth and its real 
exchange rate, Workng Papers n economcs and econometrcs, No. 476, The Australan 
Natonal Unversty, canberra.




































































a These are sectoral prce ndces for ‘prmary ndustry’, whch s manly agrculture; 
‘secondary ndustry’, whch s prmarly manufacturng and constructon; and ‘tertary 
ndustry’, whch s other servces. The left graph sets 1978=1.00 whle, to show the trends n 
the later years, that on the rght sets 1996=1.00. 
Source: The prce ndces are mpled by volume and value data from Natonal Bureau of 
statstcs, 2007. China Statistical Abstract 2006, chna statstcal Press, Bejng.
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future, however, the ageng of the populaton and the consequent declne n the 
labour supply wll have the opposte effect, placng upward pressure on real 
wages and the real exchange rate.11 Alternatve populaton polces, such as the 
relaxaton of the one chld Polcy, clearly stand to affect economc growth va 
the labour supply, and therefore on the real exchange rate as well.
The Balassa-samuelson assumpton that productvty gans translate 
nto hgher wages (equatons 3–5) s underpnned by the assumpton of full 
employment and labour-market arbtrage. Whle myajma (2005) finds that ths 
assumpton s satsfied for hs oecd sample, t s far from clear that t has also 
held for chna n the past. ca and Wang (2006) show that, durng the perod 
1995–2002, average annual manufacturng wage growth was 11.6 per cent n 
chna—below ther estmate of productvty growth (12.2 per cent), a pont that 
s also supported by Fan (2006). And f, as noted above, rural labour s more 
moble nto some servces than nto manufacturng, the wage cost effect on 
servces mght have been yet smaller. Thus, labour moblty nto the non-rural 
sectors could have offset the apprecatng forces n recent decades.
Yet there s evdence that ths s about to change. The emergence of a 
shortage of rural mgrant workers n the past few years sgnals a transton 
to a more lmted labour surplus (ca and Wang 2006).12 in combnaton wth 
the demographc transton towards a declnng proporton of the populaton 
of workng age, t s lkely that wage growth wll keep pace wth productvty 
growth n the future. moreover, contnung World Trade organzaton (WTo) 
commtments could delver further productvty gans n traded sectors—
especally n agrculture—as domestc markets are ncreasngly expected to 
compete nternatonally or persh. if these trade-related productvty gans 
domnate chna’s pattern of growth then, n combnaton wth tghtenng labour 
markets, Balassa-samuelson apprecatons could start to materalse.
The nominal exchange rate regime and capital controls
The exchange rate reforms launched by the chnese authortes n July 2005 
were ntended to at least demonstrate a departure from the de facto fixed Us 
dollar peg, nomnally allowng the currency to fluctuate by up to 0.3 per cent 
a day. These reforms have, however, had a lmted mpact so far, yeldng a 
cumulatve blateral apprecaton of about 6 per cent by may 2007. These are 
long term not recent forces. Notwthstandng chna’s hgh rate of nward Fdi, 
the past decade has seen net outflows on ts combned financal and captal 
accounts (hereafter referred to smply as ‘the captal account’) and assocated 
current account surpluses. These net outflows represent an excess of domestc 
savngs over nvestment.
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To see ths, note that the equalty of net flows on the captal account to the 
nvestment–savng gap follows from the standard aggregate expendture and 
dsposal denttes.13 definng net nflows as postve, the result can be wrtten 
as
NF DKA S R I S= − ∆ = −  (6)
where I s nvestment, SNF (net foregn savng) s net prvate nflow on the 
financal account and R∆  s the annual addton to offical foregn reserves. 
in the presence of captal controls, SNF s roughly equal to nward Fdi. Both 
sdes of the equaton are negatve n the case of chna, ndcatng net outflows. 
These net outflows have expanded snce the md 1990s, partcularly snce 2004 
(Fgure 16.3). extraordnarly, even though nvestment accounts for 45 per cent 
of chna’s GdP, more than half of ts GdP s saved.























a snce errors and omssons are large, we have adjusted the least accurately measured tems 
n each sub-account (usually net factor ncome and net prvate flows on the financal account) 
to ensure balance. 
Sources: internatonal monetary Fund, 2007a. International Financial Statistics, internatonal 
monetary Fund, Washngton, dc; internatonal monetary Fund, 2007b. World Economic Outlook 
Database, internatonal monetary Fund, Washngton, dc. some 2006 figures are from the 
economst intellgence Unt as derved from Natonal Bureau of statstcs (2007).
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it would therefore appear that a key to the puzzle as to why chna’s real 
exchange rate has not apprecated n the Balassa-samuelson manner s ts 
very hgh total savng rate. some external commentators bemoan the dearth 
of consumpton and advocate ts stmulus (Bernanke 2006). expressng a 
wdely held vew outsde chna, lardy (2006:85) argues that: ‘As the world’s 
second largest surplus country, chna must allow ts currency to apprecate 
aganst the dollar and t must take steps to allow a transton to a growth path 
drven more by domestc consumpton than by further ncreases n ts external 
surplus.’ snce the gross outflows on ts captal account take the form of reserve 
accumulaton, chna, n combnaton wth other Asan economes that are also 
rasng reserves, has been accused of ‘monetary mercantlsm’ (Azenman and 
lee 2006). it s mpled that reserve accumulaton s chosen freely n order to 
keep the real exchange rate low. That ths s unfar crtcsm s evdent from the 
denttes. By definton, from equaton 6 we have that
D NFR S I S∆ = − +  (7)
Ths ndcates that, as long as total domestc savngs exceed nvestment and 
captal controls prevent the matchng of nward Fdi by prvate outflows, ΔR 
must be postve. The magntudes n equaton 7 are also ndcated n Fgure 16.3. 
The monetary mercantlst crtque of the rate of reserve accumulaton would 
therefore be better drected at the hgh savng rate and the captal controls.
Prasad et al. (2005) post that, wth persstent external poltcal pressure for 
real exchange rate apprecaton, t would be better to let ths happen by allowng 
the nomnal exchange rate to apprecate rather than through domestc nflaton, 
and they descrbe n detal how greater exchange rate flexblty would pave the 
way for captal account lberalsaton. Ths rases two ssues. Frst, are there non-
mercantlst reasons why chna has ressted the pressure to make the renmnb 
sgnficantly more flexble, even whle ts financal sector s beng reformed? And, 
second, what would be the effects of the reforms (combned wth the removal of 
captal controls) on the real exchange rate and the renmnb?
consder whether t s reasonable to expect ncreased exchange rate flexblty 
before the uptake of the reforms essental to financal and captal account 
lberalsaton. The reason why the People’s Bank of chna (PBc) sterlses Us 
dollar nflows net of mport costs s because, short of these reforms, there s no 
prvate market on whch those large volumes of Us dollars can be exchanged 
for renmnb. htherto, chna’s bankng system has lacked dervatve markets 
for currency and debt nstruments to do the necessary hedgng and t s not 
sufficently dstant from decades of soft budget constrants assocated wth 
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the channellng of government subsdes to state-owned enterprses through 
accumulated debt. Ths has necesstated the placng of the PBc’s Us dollar 
recepts abroad. And, to avod excess lqudty, these placements have been 
sterlsed. however, holdngs of domestc credt have been nsufficent to 
sterlse ths flow on the asset sde of the balance sheet, so ‘sterlsaton 
bonds’ have been ssued on the debt sde (Table 16.2). Just as the reserves 
have come to domnate the asset sde of the balance sheet, sterlsaton bonds 
have assumed sgnficance on the debt sde. in effect, the PBc has acted as 
a condut for domestc savers who mght otherwse acqure foregn assets but 
are restrcted from dong so by captal controls. The current pressure from 
abroad to revalue therefore places the PBc n a dfficult poston. snce the 
PBc’s assets are prmarly n Us dollars and ts labltes are n renmnb, too 
prompt an apprecaton of the renmnb would result n substantal losses 
that would need to be covered n renmnb from the government budget. Ths 
suggests that a larger role for the nomnal exchange rate must awat the fruts 
of contnung financal reforms and captal market deepenng.14
second, when captal controls are eventually relaxed and the renmnb 
becomes fully convertble, t s not guaranteed that an apprecaton wll 
result. Whle the majorty of recent scholarly research finds the renmnb to 
be undervalued, a number of studes do not.15 Prasad et al. (2005) pont to the 
potental for deprecaton after the gradual lberalsaton of the captal account, 
Table 16.2  The balance sheet of the People’s Bank of China, ca. 2006
Assets Liabilities
Domestic credit, DC The monetary base, MB
central bank clams on depostory and other  currency and bank reserves
financal corporatons and on the central government
20 per cent of GdP 37 per cent of GdP
 
Official foreign reserves, R Sterilisation bonds, SB 
41 per cent of GdP debt to the chnese publc
  14 per cent of GdP
  Other liabilities, OL
  includes government ownershp
  10 per cent of GdP
Source: People’s Bank of chna, 2006. Balance Sheet of Monetary Authority, People’s Bank of 
chna, Bejng. 
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whch could lead to net outflows as domestc nvestors seek to dversfy ther 
portfolos. moreover, there s already substantal evdence of nformal prvate 
outflows from chna (Prasad and We 2005), whch would be expected to expand 
f legalsed, placng further downward pressure on the real exchange rate.16 in 
addton, the recent surge n speculatve nflows n antcpaton of apprecaton 
s lkely to be temporary and could easly be reversed.17
The eventual establshment of a complete and stable prvate market for the 
renmnb wll have two effects. Frst, a more flexble exchange rate wll allow the 
PBc to follow the practce of central banks abroad and focus on the control of 
nflaton. Ths means that the forces underlyng real exchange rate dynamcs wll 
also determne the path of the nomnal exchange rate. second, the accumulaton 
of offical foregn reserves can abate, to be replaced by prvate outflows. Yet, 
at least n the short term, whether ths wll cause an apprecaton (nomnal or 
real) depends on whether the PBc’s reserves are the equvalent of the prvate 
sector’s desred foregn holdngs. if the net effect of the captal controls (wth 
reserve accumulaton replacng prvate outflows) s to have restrcted the 
scale of chna’s collectve foregn holdngs, dependng on the PBc’s response, 
lberalsaton wll rase outflows and, at least temporarly, deprecate the real 
exchange rate. if, on the other hand, the reserves are larger than the foregn 
holdngs that would otherwse be chosen by the prvate market, lberalsaton 
would result n net nflows and a real apprecaton.18
A further determnant of the drecton of any change n external flows s 
perceved rsk. The two key determnants of nvestment are the antcpated 
rate of return on nstalled captal, net of deprecaton, on whch the nvestment 
volume depends postvely, and the real cost of funds (the real borrowng 
rate), on whch t depends negatvely. Although these mght be expected 
to converge on common values n a steady state, ths s rare n practce. in 
developng economes, there are nterest premums that drve both above the 
correspondng levels n the ndustralsed world. indcatve of ths premum for 
the case of chna s the spread between ts domestc bond yelds and those of 
Us Treasury bonds, whch has held at about 40 per cent durng the past decade. 
These ‘nterest premums’ have two components: a rsk-free component, due 
n chna’s case to the financal market segmentaton that wll be relaxed wth 
lberalsaton, and a rsk premum that compensates nvestors for exchange rate 
rsk, nformaton asymmetres and perceved rsks of expropraton. changes 
n the stablty of the chnese economy or of ts poltcs wll greatly nfluence 
ths rsk component, castng further uncertanty over the short-term path of 
financal flows.19
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Modelling the determinants of China’s real exchange rate
here we examne quanttatvely the relatonshp between shocks assocated 
wth chna’s economc growth and ts real exchange rate. To do ths effectvely, 
a numercal model s requred that s global n scope and that ncorporates 
the generalsatons of the Balassa-samuelson assumptons dscussed above. 
recall that these ncluded a means to allow productvty growth n non-tradable 
as well as tradable sectors, departures from the law of one prce for tradable 
goods, a more sophstcated representaton of the labour market and an open 
captal account. Wth these generalsatons, almost all shocks to the economy 
have mplcatons for the real exchange rate.
We use a model that offers these generalsatons. Adapted from Tyers and 
sh (2007a, 2007b), t s a mult-regon, mult-product dynamc smulaton model 
of the world economy.20 in the verson used, the world s subdvded nto 14 
regons (Table 16.3). industres are aggregated nto three sectors: food (ncludng 
processed foods), ndustry (mnng and manufacturng) and servces (ncludng 
constructon)—the latter beng lttle traded n comparson wth the other two. 
Falures of the law of one prce are represented by product dfferentaton, so 
that consumers substtute mperfectly between products from dfferent regons. 
As n other dynamc models of the global economy, the endogenous component 
of smulated economc growth s physcal captal accumulaton. Techncal 
change s ntroduced n the form of exogenous productvty growth that s 
sector and factor specfic, allowng the analyss of productvty performance that 
dffers between tradable and non-tradable sectors. consstent wth the results 
ndcated n Table 16.1, baselne productvty n the food sector s assumed to 
grow more rapdly than that n the other sectors n chna. Ths allows contnued 
sheddng of labour to those sectors.21 in general, baselne productvty growth 
rates n servces are modelled as lower than n the tradable goods sectors n 
all regons.
All regonal captal accounts are open and nvestors have adaptve 
expectatons about real regonal net rates of return on nstalled captal. in each 
regon, the level of nvestment s determned by a comparson of expected net 
rates of return on domestc nstalled captal wth borrowng rates yelded by a 
global trust, to whch each regon’s savng contrbutes, adjusted by calbrated 
regon-specfic nterest premums. lagged adjustment processes ensure, 
however, that financal captal s not fully moble nternatonally n the short 
term, but that the paths of domestc and global nterest rates become parallel, 
separated only by exogenous premums n the long term. in representng chna, 
however, one caveat s that no explct control s mposed on the outflow of 
prvate financal captal. General financal reform s represented by a dmnuton 
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of the nterest premum and ths causes an unambguous nflux of financal 
captal to chna.
To augment the model’s charactersaton of changes n labour supply 
and qualty, t encompasses demographc and economc change. it tracks 
populatons n four age groups, two genders and two skll categores: a total 
of 16 populaton groups n each of the 14 regons. The skll subdvson s 
between producton labour (unsklled) and professonal labour (sklled).22 each 
age–gender–skll group s represented as a homogeneous sub-populaton wth 
a group-specfic brth and death rate, labour force partcpaton rate and rates 
of mmgraton and emgraton. By thus capturng the effects of chna’s low 
fertlty, the model projects the reversal of ts labour supply trend, as ndcated 
n Fgure 16.4. The mplcaton of ths for the real exchange rate s that a labour 
Table 16.3  Regional composition in the global model
Region Composition of aggregates
Australa 
North Amerca canada, mexco, Unted states
Western europe european Unon, ncludng swtzerland and scandnava  
 but excludng the czech republc, hungary and Poland
central europe and  
the former sovet Unon  central europe, ncludng the czech republc, hungary  
 and Poland
Japan 
chna includes hong kong and Tawan
indonesa 
other east Asa republc of korea, malaysa, the Phlppnes, sngapore,  
 Thaland and Vetnam
inda 
other south Asa Bangladesh, Bhutan, maldves, Nepal, Pakstan and sr  
 lanka
south Amerca Argentna, Bolva, Brazl, chle, colomba, ecuador, Peru,  
 Venezuela and Uruguay
mddle east and North Afrca includes morocco through to the islamc republc of iran
sub-saharan Afrca The rest of Afrca
rest of world includes the rest of central Amerca, the rest of indo- 
 chna, the small sland states of the Pacfic, Atlantc and  
 indan oceans and the medterranean sea, myanmar and  
 mongola, New Zealand and the former Yugoslava
Source: GTAP Global database, Verson 5.
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force that s growng faster than those of tradng partner countres—other thngs 
beng equal—lowers costs and deprecates the real exchange rate. A relatve 
declne n the labour supply would be expected to have the reverse effect.
For the Balassa-samuelson hypothess, the key s the dfference between 
the performances of traded and non-traded sectors. To the extent that ther 
labour ntenstes dffer, labour supply trends make a dfference. As t turns 
out, however, trends n skll composton are more mportant. These depend on 
the rate at whch each regon’s educaton and socal development nsttutons 
transform unsklled (producton-worker) famles nto sklled (professonal-
worker) famles. each year a partcular proporton of the populaton n each 
producton-worker age–gender group s transferred to professonal status. The 
ntal values of these proportons depend on the regons’ levels of development, 
the assocated capactes of ther educaton systems and the relatve szes of 












1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
 China population
 China labour force
a These are cumulatve percentage departures from the base year 1997, drawn from the 
baselne smulaton n whch chna’s fertlty s projected to declne from 1.9 to 1.5. 
Source: Base lne smulaton of the model descrbed n the text.  For a more detaled 
descrpton of the demographc aspects of ths smulaton, see Golley, J. and Tyers, r., 2006. 
‘chna’s growth to 2030: demographc change and the labour supply constrant’, n r. Garnaut 
and l. song (eds), The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development, Asa Pacfic Press, The 
Australan Natonal Unversty, canberra:203–26 (verson n chnese forthcomng n Chinese 
Labor Economics).
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ther producton and professonal labour forces. rates of transformaton change 
through tme wth real per capta ncome and the level of the sklled wage 
premum. chna’s skll share s projected to rse through tme whle that n North 
Amerca remans statc. The contrast s due to North Amerca’s hgher ntal 
skll share, ts hgh rate of unsklled mmgraton and ts hgher fertlty rate.
The 16 age-gender-skll groups dffer n ther shares of regonal dsposable 
ncome, consumpton preferences, savng rates and labour supply behavour. 
Whle the consumpton–savngs choce dffers for each group, t s dependent 
for all on group-specfic real per capta dsposable ncome and the real lendng 
rate. Governments are assumed to balance ther budgets whle savng and 
borrowng are undertaken by the prvate sector. The baselne scenaro s a 
‘busness-as-usual’ projecton of the global economy untl 2030. in part because 
of ts comparatvely young populaton and hence ts contnung rapd labour 
force growth, inda attracts substantal new nvestment and s projected to take 
over from chna as the world’s most rapdly expandng regon. comparatvely 
rapd populaton growth, however, detracts from inda’s long-term real per 
capta ncome performance. By ths crteron, chna s the strongest performng 
regon through the three decades.
Growth shocks and China’s real exchange rate
our focus s on shocks that enhance the rate of GdP growth, for whch we draw 
on smulatons carred out by Tyers et al. (2006). These nclude once-and-for-all 
productvty ncreases, skll transformaton rate ncreases, brth-rate ncreases, 
nterest premum decreases and tarff decreases (ncreases n openness). in 
each case, we run a new smulaton n whch the determnant n queston s 
shocked once and for all, as of 2005. We then extract the elastcty of chna’s 
real exchange rate to each shock, trackng the values through tme to 2030. We 
focus on the blateral real exchange rate, measured as n equaton 1, aganst 
the regon ‘North Amerca’, snce ths best parallels chna’s nomnal exchange 
rate polcy and the renmnb valuaton debate.
Productvty growth ncrease
We first shock total factor productvty separately n each sector. The elastcty 
s the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each 
percentage per annum ncrease n total factor productvty. The overall rate of 
economc growth proves to be qute senstve to such productvty shocks snce 
the larger these are for a partcular regon, the larger s that regon’s margnal 
product of captal. The regon therefore enjoys hgher levels of nvestment and 
hence a double boost to ts growth rate. Productvty growth n both tradable 
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sectors yelds real apprecatons but ‘ndustry’ s by far the greater contrbutor 
to chna’s trade and therefore the most sgnficant for the real exchange rate 
(Fgure 16.5). The apprecatng effects of tradable productvty ncreases are 
consstent wth the Balassa-samuelson hypothess and are, as expected, 
due to wage growth and relatve servce prce nflaton. They are bolstered 
n the short term by ncreased nvestment and hence greater net nflows on 
the captal account. in the long term, however, the enlargement of the captal 
stock reduces costs and hence offsets the real exchange rate gans. Also, as 
expected from the domnance of non-traded sector prces n equaton 2, faster 
servce productvty growth deprecates the real exchange rate—modestly n 
the early years but to a domnant extent n the long term, when t s renforced 
by assocated captal accumulaton.
if productvty s boosted equ-proportonally n all sectors, the net effect s 
a small real apprecaton n the short term and a substantal real deprecaton 
n the long term. The Balassa-samuelson effect s domnant n the short term 
Fgure 16.5 Elasticities of the projected real exchange rate to the rate of 































a Ths s the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage per 
annum ncrease n total factor productvty n each of the three sectors after 2005. 
Source: Tyers, r., Golley, J., Bu, Y. and Ban, i., 2006. China’s economic growth and its real 
exchange rate, Workng Papers n economcs and econometrcs, No. 476, The Australan 
Natonal Unversty, canberra.
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but s overwhelmed by servces productvty n the long term. The short-term 
net apprecaton s bolstered by the assocated rse n captal returns and 
hence the attracton of ncreased nvestment from abroad. Beyond a decade, 
as costs are reduced by the across-the-board rse n productvty, combned 
wth the assocated captal expanson, the elastcty turns negatve and very 
quckly expands n that drecton. The partcular strength of changes n servce 
productvty s notable, suggestng that the forecastng of real exchange rates 
depends mportantly on ths dfficult-to-measure behavour. indeed, f our 
productvty estmates n Table 16.1 are correct, recent dfferences between 
chna’s productvty performance n the tradable and servce sectors are not 
large. Ths suggests that, f chna’s future growth s drven ncreasngly by 
servces productvty mprovements, ts real exchange rate could contnue on 
a deprecatng trend.
skll acquston rate ncrease
When the skll acquston rate s ncreased n developng regons such as chna, 
where the unsklled (or producton) worker populaton s larger than ts sklled 
(or professonal) counterpart, the proportonal boost to sklled workers s larger 
than the proportonal loss of unsklled workers. The result s greater output 
and, other thngs beng equal, a real deprecaton. Ths tendency s enhanced, 
however, by the fact that the servces sector s comparatvely skll ntensve, 
so that the shock causes a relatvely large boost to servce output and hence 
a relatvely large fall n the servce prce. The result s a strong responsveness 
of GdP growth to skll acquston and a relatvely large real deprecaton. The 
elastctes n ths case are percentage departures of the growth rate and real 
exchange rate for each percentage of the populaton n producton-worker 
famles that s transformed each year. defined ths way, skll transformaton 
places downward pressure on the real exchange rate of a magntude smlar 
to total factor productvty n servces (Fgure 16.6).
Brth rate ncrease
The brth rate affects the real exchange rate by rasng the populaton (ntally) 
and the labour force (subsequently). The ntal effect s to rase aggregate 
demand but not to contrbute to supply snce ncome s redstrbuted to the 
non-savng and non-workng young. Net nflows on the captal account rse and 
the real exchange rate apprecates. in the long term, when the ncreased brth 
rate yelds a larger workforce, the supply effects predomnate. Wage costs are 
lower and the real exchange rate declnes. it s somewhat surprsng that the 
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elastcty of the real exchange rate to the brth rate  s so small (Fgure 16.7). 
The results suggest that chna’s brth rate, and hence ts low fertlty, wll be 
only a modest contrbutor to the future of ts real exchange rate.
interest premum declne
in the short term, the declne n chna’s nterest premum results n net captal 
nflows, whch rases nvestment and therefore ncreases aggregate demand and 
the real exchange rate. A postve demand-drven effect s therefore expected n 
the first nstance. in the long term, however, when the effect of the nvestment 
on the captal stock s realsed, the supply sde domnates. more abundant and 
hence cheaper captal reduces producton costs, yeldng a real deprecaton. 
The elastcty-to-premum declne s large and postve n the short term, wth 
the lag to the swtch n sgn at least 15 years (Fgure 16.7).
Fgure 16.6  Elasticities of the projected real exchange rate to the fertility 


























a Ths s the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage 
pont change n the total fertlty rate and for each addtonal percentage of the populaton of 
producton-worker famles that s transformed annually to professonal status. 
Source: Tyers, r., Golley, J., Bu, Y. and Ban, i., 2006. China’s economic growth and its real 
exchange rate, Workng Papers n economcs and econometrcs, No. 476, The Australan 
Natonal Unversty, canberra.
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Ths smulaton helps to explan the lack of apprecaton of the real exchange 
rate to date.  it says that an expanson of net nflow on the financal and captal 
accounts of the balance of payments causes a real apprecaton n the short-
medum run.  snce there has n fact been an expanson n net outflows on 
these accounts (Fgure 16.3), the effect has been to apply downward pressure 
on chna’s real exchange rate. Whle domestc savngs contnue to domnate 
nvestment, ths substantal deprecatng effect s lkely to contnue offsettng 
the short-term (Balassa-samuelson) apprecatng effect of productvty changes 
(Fgure 16.5).
a Ths s the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each 1) percentage 
ncrease n the overall mport penetraton rato, 2) percentage pont ncrease n the concurrent 
average savngs rate (all group savngs rates are shfted by equal proportons), and 3) 
percentage pont reducton n the domestc nterest rate due to a reduced premum, startng n 
2005. 
Source: Tyers, r., Golley, J., Bu, Y. and Ban, i., 2006. China’s economic growth and its real 
exchange rate, Workng Papers n economcs and econometrcs, No. 476, The Australan 
Natonal Unversty, canberra.
Fgure 16.7  Elasticities of the projected real exchange rate to trade 
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Trade lberalsaton
Trade lberalsaton swtches demand away from home-produced goods and 
servces towards mported varetes. For a sngle regon, the supply of goods 
and servces from the much larger foregn market s more elastc than that of 
home varetes, constraned as they are by local factor supples and technology. 
The effect of the demand swtch, then, s to reduce the relatve prces of the 
home varetes and hence to deprecate the real exchange rate. The elastcty of 
openness s constructed by dvdng the percentage change n the real exchange 
rate by the percentage pont change n the overall mport penetraton rato (the 
rato of the value of mports to the total value of domestc consumpton). The 
shock on whch t s based s a phased removal of all chna’s merchandse trade 
barrers over five years.23 The elastcty has the expected negatve sgn, and ts 
magntude grows through tme (Fgure 16.7). The declne occurs because of the 
concentraton of chna’s merchandse protecton n captal-ntensve ndustres. 
Although the effects on GdP are postve, lower home-product prces n these 
ndustres reduce average home captal returns and hence reduce nvestment 
and captal growth, enlargng the negatve elastcty through tme.
Conclusion
Whle the Balassa-samuelson hypothess s borne out for chna—n that 
productvty has apparently grown faster n the tradable than n the non-tradable 
sectors and there has been relatve servce prce nflaton—the effect of ths 
on the real exchange rate has been counteracted by other forces. it s lkely 
that the strongest of these forces s the rse of chna’s total savngs relatve 
to ts nvestment and the assocated expanson of net outflows on ts captal 
account. other deprecatng forces that are lkely to have contrbuted nclude the 
demographc dvdend and the assocated elastcty of labour supply, trade reform, 
skll acquston and servces productvty growth. much attenton s pad n the 
lterature to chna’s monetary polcy and, n partcular, to the PBc’s accumulaton 
of foregn exchange reserves. in our vew, however, the PBc’s monetary stance—
embodyng as t does the objectve of exchange rate stablty—s necesstated by 
financal mmaturty. in partcular, whle chna’s savngs exceed ts nvestment, 
the reserves and captal controls merely alter the publc–prvate composton of 
external flows but need not sgnficantly affect ther magntudes. indeed, t s 
possble that the future removal of chna’s captal controls could see accelerated 
outflows as chnese nsttutons seek to enlarge ther prvate holdngs of foregn 
assets. dependng on the PBc’s response, the short-term effect of ths could be 
further downward pressure on the real exchange rate.
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To examne the effects of the full varety of growth-related shocks on the 
real exchange rate n the future, we turned to a dynamc model of the global 
economy. A baselne busness-as-usual smulaton s constructed to 2030, 
wheren chna’s growth rate slows due to ageng and slower labour force 
growth. The prncpal determnants of chna’s economc growth are then 
shocked separately and ther ndependent effects on the real exchange rate 
observed over tme. sectoral total factor productvty s rased, the rate of skll 
acquston by the workforce s ncreased, the fertlty polcy s relaxed, financal 
reform reduces chna’s nterest premum, and trade reforms further open the 
economy. in each case, an elastcty of the real exchange rate to the orgnal 
shock s charted (Fgure 16.8).
The results suggest that, whle populaton polcy affects the real exchange 
rate n the drectons expected, demographc change s not a strong 

































a Ths s the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage 
ncrease n the overall mport penetraton rato, M/C, caused by tarff reductons that began n 
2005. 
Source:  Tyers, r., Golley, J., Bu, Y. and Ban, i., 2006. China’s economic growth and its real 
exchange rate, Workng Papers n economcs and econometrcs, No. 476, The Australan 
Natonal Unversty, canberra.
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determnant, at least wthn the three decades examned. in the short term, 
the key determnant s net financal captal nflux, whch apprecates the real 
exchange rate, or efflux, whch deprecates t. in the medum term, scope does 
emerge for Balassa-samuelson real apprecaton, f servces lag sufficently 
behnd ndustral productvty. in the long term, however, f servces reman 
relatvely skll ntensve on average, ther performance wll be bolstered by both 
drect productvty mprovements and skll acquston, and the senstvty of the 
real exchange rate to these effects s very large.  snce chnese productvty 
growth has been hgher than that of ts tradng partners for more than a decade, 
and consderable scope remans for productvty catch-up n servces, these 
long-term forces mght bear down on the real exchange rate n future. if, nstead, 
servce sector productvty growth contnues to be comparatvely weak, real 
apprecatons could also occur. it s dfficult to gnore the fact, however, that 
the majorty of the growth-related shocks examned—ncludng overall (and 
partcularly servces) productvty growth, professonal tranng and further 
trade reform—cause the real exchange rate to deprecate n the long term.
Fundamentally, whchever productvty pattern domnates, the future path 
of the real exchange rate wll depend most on the contnuaton of shocks to 
aggregate demand due to net flows on the captal account and hence on the 
future path of chna’s domestc savngs relatve to ts nvestment. it s dfficult to 
magne ncreases n ts savngs rate beyond those already recorded. eventually, 
t must fall. When t does, net flows on the captal account are lkely to be 
reversed, resultng n an apprecatng force. The long-term outcome wll then 
depend on the extent to whch ths force s offset by contnued skll acquston 
and servces productvty growth.
Notes
1 myajma (2005) notes the promnence of servces productvty n the growth experence of 
many organsaton for economc co-operaton and development (oecd) countres.
2 here we magne that, rather than the contnuum of tradablty that s observed across goods 
and servces, traded and non-traded goods are separated starkly as T, N.
3 For example, the cold War nfrastructure nvestments n korea and Tawan reduced servce 
costs at early stages n ther perods of rapd expanson.
4 see, for example, Bergn et al. (2006); crucn et al. (2005); and drne and rault (2005).
5 Ths s a standard assumpton n the most wdely used numercal models of open economes 
and global trade (see, for example, dxon et al. 1982; mckbbn and sachs 1991; hertel 1997; 
and dxon and rmmer 2002).
6 evdence for ths s offered by chang and Tyers (2003).
7 The ‘Food’ sector s defined as Prmary industry plus Food Processng; ‘industry’ as secondary 
industry mnus constructon and Food Processng; whle ‘servces’ s defined as Tertary 
industry plus constructon. see Tyers et al. (2006) for further detals.
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8 moreover, t must be borne n mnd that servces output volumes and prces are measured more 
poorly than those n merchandse sectors n all countres. These comparatve measures therefore 
carry large error margns. lu (2006) estmates labour productvty n chna’s manufacturng and 
servce sectors between 1978 and 2004. he descrbes the evoluton of chna’s manufacturng 
labour productvty after 1978 as a two-stage process: durng the first stage (1978–90) t was only 
1.9 per cent per annum, compared wth a per capta GdP growth rate of 7.5 per cent; whle durng 
the second stage (1991–2004) t ncreased dramatcally, averagng 13.1 per cent—sgnficantly 
hgher than the offical per capta GdP growth rate of 8.2 per cent. labour productvty n the 
servce sector averaged 4.3 per cent per annum for the entre perod. Fogel 2006 dsaggregates 
per capta ncome growth between 1978 and 2002 and shows that 69 per cent of growth was 
due to ncreases n labour productvty, whch grew most rapdly n ndustry (6.2 per cent per 
annum), nearly as hgh n agrculture (5.7 per cent) and lowest, but stll substantal, n servces 
(4.5 per cent). 
9 For example, he calculates that f the tertary enrolment rato rose from sx to 25 n the next 20 
years (puttng chna where the Western european natons were n 1980), the growth rate of labour 
productvty would rse by 4.4 per cent between 2000 and 2020, and that ths would account for 
more than 60 per cent of the per capta GdP growth target set n 2002. Wth the tertary rato 
ncreasng from 12.5 per cent to 19 per cent between 2000 and 2004, f anythng, hs estmates 
could be too conservatve.
10 see Bloom and Wllamson (1998) for a generc dscusson of the demographc dvdend n 
developng economes.
11 Golley and Tyers (2006) confirm ths, findng that the non-workng aged dependency rato could 
rse to 43 per cent.
12 They note that by 2003, there was a shortage of mgrant workers n the Pearl rver delta regon, 
a phenomenon that has snce spread to the Yangtze rver delta regon and even to some central 
provnces, such as Jangx, Anhu and henan, whch are usually the source of mgrants, not the 
destnaton.  
13 The rght hand sde of ths dentty stems from the combnaton of aggregate expendture on 
GdP, Y = C + I + G + X + M; the fact that GNP s YN = Y + N, where N s net factor ncome 
from abroad; the GNP dsposal dentty, YN = C + T + S, and the balance of payments, BoP = 
0 = KA + CA, where the current account s CA = X – M + N.
14 in the meantme, the approach beng taken by the chnese government to control ‘external 
mbalances’ focuses on the rate of economc expanson. Growth s constraned by control over 
land releases and lqudty, the latter through lmts on base money growth, aded by sterlsaton 
bonds, as Fgure 16.4 ndcates. other polces servng ths purpose nclude reductons n export 
facltaton (n the rate of rembursement of some export taxes) and, at least n prospect, the 
reducton of mport tarffs on some luxury products. Fnancal reforms are proceedng quckly, 
however, so that some ncreased exchange rate flexblty s beng offered by the People’s Bank 
of chna, as suggested by the extenson of the daly renmnb–Us dollar rate fluctuaton bounds 
from 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent as of late may.
15 Frankel 2004 finds that the renmnb was undervalued by 36 per cent n 2000; Goldsten 2004, 
who clams t was undervalued by 15–30 per cent n 2004; and coudert and couharde 2005, who 
find the undervaluaton to be larger. see dunaway and l 2005 for a survey, ncludng one that 
finds overvaluaton (Wang 2004, 2005). Tyers et al. (forthcomng) use a structural model to find 
evdence of undervaluaton n the md to late 1990s but offer no clear findng for 2004.
16 Further evdence of large sums of captal flght out of chna s offered by scular (1998) and 
Gunter (2004).
17 Accordng to Fan (2006), speculatve nflows were as hgh as Us$105 bllon n 2004 (see also 
Prasad and We 2005).
340
China—Linking Markets for Growth
18 in separate work by the authors, the foregn asset share of chna’s collectve portfolo 
s estmated to be lower than average for countres of ts sze and development level, ts 
substantal reserves notwthstandng. Ths suggests the former outcome s the more lkely 
one.
19 Tyers and Golley (2006) use measures of chna’s nvestment premum to explore the 
mplcatons of financal reform. Ther modellng approach underles the results presented 
n the remander of the chapter.
20 The model has ts orgns n GTAP-Dynamic, the standard verson of whch s a dervatve of ts 
comparatve statc progentor, GTAP (hertel 1997). its dynamcs are descrbed n ianchovchna 
and mcdougall (2000).
21 Wang and dng (2006) recently estmated that there were 40 mllon surplus workers n chna’s 
agrcultural sector. Whle underemployment s not explct n our model, the assumpton of 
hgh labour productvty growth n agrculture mples that agrculture s capable of sheddng 
labour more quckly than other sectors. Ths essentally mmcs the surplus labour problem, 
whch s thereby accounted for mplctly.
22 The subdvson between producton workers and professonals and para-professonals 
accords wth the internatonal labour organzaton’s occupaton-based classficaton and s 
consstent wth the labour dvson adopted n the GTAP database. see lu et al. (1998).
23 The elastcty s nsenstve to the scale of the lberalsaton though not to the composton 
of chna’s protecton. For the levels of protecton emboded n the database for 1997, see 
dmaranan and mcdougall (2002). 
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An externally dependent economy 
and real estate bubbles
Lijian Sun and Shengxing Zhang
The two promnent phenomena n the world economy n recent years have been 
excessve monetary lqudty and asset prce bubbles (Bank for internatonal 
settlements 2004; Unted Natons 2006; oecd 2006). in the past, Western 
ndustralsed countres experenced dfferent knds of bubbles, for example: 
nformaton technology (iT) stock bubbles from 1996 to 1999; bond prce bubbles 
from 2000 to 2002; and real estate bubbles from 2002 untl now. Although each 
bubble had specfic characterstcs (hunter et al. 2005),1 the latest research 
shows that excessve monetary lqudty s an ndspensable factor n explanng 
recent prce bubbles n captal markets—for example, stock, bond and real 
estate markets (issng 2002; Gouteron and szpro 2005).
The co-movement of excessve monetary lqudty and asset prce bubbles 
began to attract economsts’ attenton as early as 1929 wth the start of the 
Great depresson. At that tme, economsts agreed that a lendng boom would 
stmulate bubbles n captal markets (Whte 1990). specfically, for the case 
of the Japanese bubble economy n the late 1980s, many Japanese scholars 
also ponted out that the Japanese government’s expanded monetary polcy 
durng yen apprecaton resulted n stock and real estate bubbles. some have 
descrbed the Japanese economy as sufferng from depresson because of the 
burstng of the bubble (okna and shratsuka 2005). on the other hand, many 
other researchers explan that tght monetary polcy can nduce the collapse 
of financal markets (Fredman and schwartz 1982; Bernanke 2001; Posen 
2006). much recent emprcal research, however, reveals that there s no drect 
causal lnk between a central bank’s monetary polcy and asset prce bubbles 
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(Bordo and Jeanne 2002; mshkn and Whte 2002; detken and smets 2004). 
in ths sense, monetary polces are nether the cause of nor the cure for asset 
prce bubbles.
Nevertheless, monetary lqudty has now become obvously excessve all 
over the world, so the key pont s to uncover the man cause of ths phenomenon 
and ts relatonshp wth asset bubbles. in recent years, many scholars have 
explaned the mechansm of excessve lqudty. ortalo-magne and rady (2006) 
argued that the mpact of busness cycles on personal ncome nduced changes 
n monetary lqudty, whch n turn nfluenced housng demand, causng surges 
n real estate prces. Addtonally, a lack of nvestment channels would force 
nvestment to concentrate n well-behaved markets so that speculatve bubbles 
n these markets became ncreasngly pervasve (Ventura 2004; caballero and 
krshnamurthy 2005). other scholars found that n bank-based countres, real 
estate bubbles and collapses were common, whch was an outcome of the 
myopc behavour of banks: when the economy was boomng, banks ncreased 
lendng for real estate purchases when prces were rsng, and cut lendng when 
real estate prces were fallng. Thus, the myopc behavour of banks ntensfies 
prce fluctuaton (herrng and Wachter 2005).
excessve monetary lqudty n chna s fierce and the growth rates of m1 
and m2 are much greater than that of gross domestc product (GdP) (People’s 
Bank of chna 2006). Yuan and Fan (2003) and the research group of the chna 
real estate chamber of commerce (2006)2 report that excessve monetary 
lqudty ndeed leads to real estate bubbles, although t does not brng about 
hgh nflaton n commodty markets, as the central bank worred t would. 
sun (2006) ndcates that the mechansm of real estate bubbles n chna s 
sgnficantly dfferent from that n Western ndustralsed countres. Therefore, 
the objectve of ths chapter s to explore the reasons for excessve monetary 
lqudty n chna and ts mpact on real estate prces. 
From examnaton of the fundamental macroeconomc ndces, and the 
overlappng generaton (olG) model explanng the hgh savng rato of the 
younger generaton (Trole 1985), and usng emprcal analyss of provncal 
panel data, we make three contrbutons. Frst, we examne the logc behnd 
real estate bubbles n chna. We focus on the way that excessve monetary 
lqudty—as the root of real estate bubbles—results from the ncreasngly 
externally dependent economc structure. second, we test the vew that 
excessve monetary lqudty does not stmulate prvate consumpton because 
resdents are less confident of mantanng ther ncomes. on the contrary, t 
ncreases the burden on the bankng system by encouragng excessve prvate 
savngs as a result of nefficent captal markets. Thrd, we look at how real 
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estate bubbles are a result of prvate precautonary savngs. Whle each agent, 
ncludng banks and ndvduals, tres to nvest n assets wth safe and hgh 
returns, the aggregate result s over-nvestment n these assets. The rsk of a 
‘credt crunch’ thus ncreases and socal welfare s mpared. 
Admttedly, some scholars have also nvestgated the nfluence of surpluses 
n the balance of payments on asset prces n emergng markets. For nstance, 
Park and Park (1995) take the example of financal lberalsaton n south 
korea—whch led to foregn captal nflows n the 1990s—and appled the 
keynesan general equlbrum model to explan how the apprecaton of nomnal 
exchange rates accompaned by captal nflows nfluenced the relatve prce 
of tradable and non-tradable goods. They found that although the real nterest 
rate was very hgh because of tght monetary polces, optmstc expectatons 
towards the real estate market offset the effort to restrct the money supply, n 
the end leadng to real estate bubbles. 
The common pont n these artcles s that a real estate bubble results from 
huge captal nflows, whch alter the nomnal exchange rate and the domestc 
prce level, dstortng the real exchange rate. in the case of the chnese economy, 
however, we argue that even f the nomnal exchange rate does not change and 
the captal account remans strctly regulated, real estate bubbles can occur, 
as long as foregn reserves drven by exports keep growng and the financal 
system s underdeveloped. collyns and senhadj (2002) found n the emprcal 
analyss of the east Asan financal crss that foregn nvestors’ over-optmsm 
and the fragle financal system caused bubbles n stock markets and real estate 
markets. Ths research s also a reflecton of the openng of the captal account 
n a vulnerable financal system. stll, the above research on the fraglty of 
financal systems cannot explan why bubbles occur only n real estate markets 
wthout the openng of the captal account n countres such as chna (ogawa 
and sun 2001), whle our paper valdates the relatonshp between excessve 
monetary lqudty and real estate bubbles n chna’s economy, based on our 
theoretcal model about prvate savng and nvestment behavour and related 
emprcal analyss.
real estate bubbles are complex that scholars have not yet acheved 
agreement on ther causes, features and nfluences (hunter et al. 2005).3 
Accordngly, there are conflctng polcy suggestons (meltzer 2003; Trchet 
2005; roubn 2006). in ths chapter, we are not so ambtous as to explore a 
complete set of related economc ndces or an ntegrated one affectng real 
estate bubbles. in ths sense, monetary lqudty s just one of many mportant 
factors causng real estate bubbles and our research s complementary to 
other research n ths field. The ndex of excessve monetary lqudty, however, 
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emphasses the effect of mbalances n the economc structure on real estate 
bubbles, whch has not been studed systematcally before. on the other hand, 
many factors revealed by prevous research explanng bubbles are related 
to excessve monetary lqudty, such as money lluson (Brunnermeer and 
Jullard 2006), ncomplete nformaton (morrs and shn 2002; Favara and song 
2006), nelastc house supply (Gyourko et al. 2006), buyer optmsm (herrng 
and Wachter 2005; case et al. 2003) and ncomplete financal markets (sten 
1995; ortalo-magne and rady 2006).
To fully reflect the nfluence of structural excessve monetary lqudty on 
real estate bubbles, we make several mprovements on the exstng lterature. 
Frst, we find that excessve monetary lqudty results from twn surpluses (the 
captal account and the current account) n the balance of payments under the 
rgd exchange rate system, rather than from expandng monetary polces, 
whch s derved from fundamental prncples of open macroeconomcs and 
related macroeconomc ndces commonly accepted by scholars (calvo et al. 
1993; Agénor and montel 1999). second, excessve consumer savngs wll lead 
to over-nvestment n bubble assets n an ncomplete financal market where 
bubbles are expected, accordng to the olG model for prvate savngs and 
nvestment behavour (caballero and krshnamurthy 2005). Thrd, we select 
bank deposts as the ndex for excessve monetary lqudty rather than bank 
loans (used by prevous researchers), based on the phenomenon that savngs 
accompaned by the growth of foregn reserve ncrease rapdly and banks over-
nvest n real estate assets. last but not least, we create an ndex for lqudty 
spllover effects to dentfy the nfluence of lqudty dfferences on real estate 
bubbles across provnces. 
our research shows that n the case of real estate bubbles n contemporary 
chna, the savngs ndex s statstcally more sgnfcant than the loan 
ndex, whch manfests the structural excessve monetary lqudty to be an 
ndspensable reason behnd real estate bubbles. Therefore, our suggeston 
of a radcal approach to appeasng the surge of real estate bubbles n chna 
s to solve the structural mbalance n the chnese economy—specfically, the 
conflct between the expanson of trade and the fraglty of financal systems.
The externally dependent economy and excessive monetary 
liquidity
chna’s rapdly growng economy has the followng features: extensve fixed 
nvestment (i) grows rapdly; domestc demand led by ndvdual consumpton 
(c) remans mld; whle at the same tme, resdental dsposable ncomes keep 
ncreasng and prvate savngs (s) n banks grow proportonally4 (Fgure 17.1 and 
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People’s Bank of chna 2006). That s, nvestment n chna s surplus compared 
wth domestc consumpton but nsufficent compared wth domestc savngs 
snce s-i>0. Thrd, though net exports (eX-im) are ncreasng substantally, the 
scale s stll lmted. chna’s gross exports account for more than 60 per cent of 
GdP, whch s much larger than the figure the Unted states and Japan (the rato 
of net exports to GdP s a commonly used ndex for the external dependence of 
an economy). most exports are of manufactured products, a hgh proporton of 
whch are from foregn-owned enterprses (Fgure 2). The ncrease n exports s 
accompaned by the mportaton of hgh value-added ntermedate goods (im).5 
The last characterstc s that the chnese government’s fiscal polcy tends to 
be conservatve (T>G).
From a basc prncple of open macroeconomcs, the combnaton of 
superfluous domestc savngs and conservatve fiscal polcy wll lead to a 
trade surplus.
( ) ( ) ( )S I T G EX IM− + − ≡ −  (1)













































Year on year growth rate of residential savings (Per cent)
Scale of residential savings (100 mil.Yuan)
Source: chna Wnd database.
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 in fact, wth the persstently fast-growng chnese economy and the 
ncreasngly externally dependent economc structure accompanyng that 
growth (dependent on exports and foregn drect nvestment), the twn surpluses 
n the balance of payments are nevtable. Therefore, wth a stable exchange 
rate,6 a lastng surplus n the current account (cA), led by a trade surplus 
(eX-im), and the captal account (kA). led by foregn drect nvestment (Fdi), 
trgger ncreases n foregn reserves, recently n chna, to hstorcal heghts 
(see equaton 2 and Fgure 17.2).
CA KA RE+ ≡  (2)
excessve lqudty (uncontrollable ncrease n monetary supply, m) resultng 
from the expandng foregn reserve wll restran the ‘mracle’ of lastng rapd 
economc growth n an externally dependent economc structure. in order to 
mantan the prce compettveness of domestc enterprses, the central bank 
has to mplement contractve monetary polces7 (we define a contractve 
monetary polcy as forcbly lowerng domestc credt, dc, to stablse monetary 
supply, m)8 (see Fgure 17.3).9









































Long term capital account (mil.US$)
Short term capital account (mil.US$)
Error and omission (mil.US$)
Source: chna Wnd database.
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Growth rate of bank loan (Per cent) Growth rate of M1 (Per cent)
Growth rate of M2 (Per cent)
Source: chna Wnd database.






























































Growth rate of real estate sales price (Per cent)
Growth rate of commercial house price (Per cent)
Growth rate of private house price (Per cent)
Source: chna Wnd database.
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specfically, we employ the equaton of the central bank’s balance sheet to 
show the mechansm of money supply
M DC RE≡ +  (3) 
Although the combnaton of tght monetary polcy, persstently growng 
fixed nvestment and the over-savng behavour of consumers effectvely releve 
the pressure of nflaton n the commodty market, the fragle bankng system s 
facng the challenge of excessve monetary lqudty (Fgure 17.3). For nstance, 
confined by the macro control polcy and nsttutonal restrctons, banks cannot 
freely expand loans to enterprses and adjust depost and credt nterest rates. 
hence, the boostng of deposts (see Fgure 17.1 and m2 n Fgure 17.3) worsens 
the mbalance on commercal banks’ balance sheets. 
once banks try to balance ther balance sheets, they have to pursue 
hgh-return assets10 such as real estate loans. on the demand sde, chnese 
consumers have to suppress current consumpton and save most of ther 
ncreasng ncome n banks n order to nvest n safe and ncreasngly valuable 
assets11 for future health nsurance, pensons, educatonal expendture and 
unemployment nsurance. The expandng supply and demand of lqudty can 
boost real estate prces (see Fgure 17.4).12
it s the externally dependent economc structure (export dependent and 
Fdi dependent) that brngs excessve monetary lqudty (prvate savngs or 
m2), rather than relaxed monetary polcy (the nflaton of m1 or dc), as n 
ndustralsed countres. Wll excessve monetary lqudty from externally 
dependent economc structures cause real estate bubbles, as the relaxed 
monetary polcy does n ndustralsed countres? What s the mechansm for 
and features of t? We wll answer these questons through formal theoretcal 
models n the next secton. 
A simple OLG model
We use an olG model13 to analyse the nherent connecton between the 
externally dependent economy and real estate bubbles. We note the coexstence 
of a lack of socal securty, lagged development of financal systems and fast 
growth of prvate savngs n chna. muth (1961), Brock (1975) and Gaber (1990) 
set up the ratonal bubble mechansm. The poneerng paper of Trole (1985) 
ntroduced the ratonal bubble mechansm nto the olG model to study asset 
prce bubbles, whch shows that n a dynamcally nefficent economy wth 
excessve captal accumulaton, ratonal bubbles would reduce the excessve 
captal accumulaton and thus realse Pareto’s mprovement.14 The model of 
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caballero and krshnamurthy (2005), however, and our paper suggest that n 
an externally dependent (dynamcally nefficent) economy, the ratonal bubble 
could lower socal welfare15 by a credt crunch n the bankng system when 
bubbles burst, although t could stmulate enterprses to expand ther producton 
when the real estate market booms. Whle caballero and krshnamurthy 
(2005) focus on economes dependent on foregn debt, we focus on economes 
dependng on exports and Fdi growth, whch s the case n chna. so, we beleve 
that our model can better explan the story behnd excessve monetary lqudty 
and real estate bubbles n the chnese economy.
model set up
Frst, we assume an externally dependent economy of two overlappng 
generatons. specfically, the young generaton born at the begnnng of perod 
‘t’ works n foregn enterprses that are export orented and grow at a constant 
rate ‘g’. For precautonary ncentves mentoned above, the young generaton 
saves all ts ncome, Ft, n the form of foregn savngs or nvestment n the real 
estate market (the only two nstruments wth safe and hgh returns) n order to 
get hgh and smoothed ncome. The total assets of the old generaton n perod 
t+1 amounts to Ft+1,t (measured by foregn currency), whch the old generaton 
uses ether to produce as entrepreneurs or to fund entrepreneurs’ producton 
as bankers.16 For smplficaton, ncome from the old generaton’s career wll 
cover the consumpton of the whole socety. in addton, the fixed asset tK  
owned by the old generaton wll be bequeathed to the young generaton.
obvously, ncome dfference between the young generaton n perod ‘t’ 
and perod t+1 s determned by the growth rate of exports, snce the young 
all work n export-orented enterprses:
1 (1 )t tF g F+ = +   (4)
if the young generaton nvests δ part of ther ncome n the real estate market 
and the annual return of real estate nvestment s br  (a stochastc varable), 
then the total foregn assets17 of the old generaton n perod t+1, accumulated 
from perod ‘t’, when they are young, s
  *1, [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
b
t t tF F r rδ δ+ = + + − +% %  (5)
Furthermore, the old-generaton entrepreneurs collateralse ther fixed 
assets, tK , to borrow banks’ fixed assets for manufacturng and use ther 
foregn assets (marked as 1,t tF + ) to mport raw materals from abroad. The rates 
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should be above one, denoted as R and 1
BL
tr+  respectvely. All funds are utlsed 
to manufacture domestc non-durable products, whch n turn brngs a return 
of ‘R’ per unt of nvestment. (‘R’ s determned exogenously by productvty.) 
Therefore, the ex post trade surplus at perod ‘t’ s equal to the exports of the 
young generaton mnus the mports of the old generaton,
Ft+1 – Ft+1,t = [( g – r* ) – δ( rb – r* )] Ft (6)
Namely, the trade surplus ncreases wth the growth rate of exports, whle t 
decreases wth the nvestment scale and return n the real estate market. 
Wth the equlbrum of the credt market, banks’ maxmum lendng should 













n whch ρ s the valuaton coefficent for the collateralsed fixed assets gven 
by banks (ρ s a postve number, usually smaller than one, snce banks wll not 
lend as much as the collateralsed value). entrepreneural value s determned 
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Banks’ profits are from rent of ther real estate and nterest from lendng so 
they wll receve at the end of perod t+1
1, 1
BL
t t t tRK F r+ ++    (9)
snce the probablty for the young generaton to become bankers or 
entrepreneurs s fifty-fifty, the young wll choose ther house nvestment rato 
to maxmse ther expected ncomes n the future, 
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second, regardng the mechansm of bubbles n the real estate market, we 
assume that the ntrnsc value of real estate s zero. Ths smplficaton focuses 
our attenton on the ‘bubble sde’ of the real estate market. snce the ntrnsc 
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value of real estate s stable when bubbles emerge n the market, we beleve 
ths smplficaton to be reasonable. When the young generaton n perod ‘t’ 
beleves that the purchased real estate can be sold to the next generaton at 
a hgher prce, speculaton wll preval and the self-fulfillng ratonal bubble 
wll come nto exstence. in ths settng, the growth rate of real estate prces s 
determned by the growth rate of the young generaton’s earnngs and exports. 
more specfically, br g= , n whch br  represents the growth rate of real estate 
prces.
in ths model, we see that the ‘structural’ twn surpluses of the balance of 
payments (see equatons 1, 2) brng about excessve lqudty, whch n turn 
forms bubbles n the real estate market. The young wll sell ther assets n 
advance altogether18 only when external shock forces bubbles to expand too 
rapdly ( br g> ). so people begn to consder that ncome growth cannot 
sustan the bubbles and the bubble bursts because of ther sellng acton. if 
the probablty of a bubble burst s π, then the expected return of real estate 
nvestment ( ˆbr ) s
 1 + ˆbr  = (1 – π)(1 + g) (11)
snce we focus on consumers’ motvaton for real estate nvestment and 
the correspondng real estate bubble, we assume the expected return of real 
estate nvestment to be always greater than foregn savngs,
ˆbr  – r* = (1 – π)(g – r*) – π(1 + r*) > 0 (12)
in addton, the movement of real estate prces could nfluence the loan supply 
and demand n the credt market (see equatons 5, 7), whch n turn nfluences 
banks’ lendng rates. Therefore, durng the bubble economy, the lendng scale 
s  1, [1 ( )]
B
t t tF r g r Fδ
∗ ∗
+ = + + −  and the loan rate s 1 1
BL B
t tr r+ += ; when the bubble has 
burst, the lendng scale wll be 1, (1 )(1 )
C
t t tF r Fδ
∗
+ = + − , wth the lendng rate 
assumed to be 1 1
BL C
t tr r+ += .19
The optmal portfolo allocaton of the young generaton











rg ππ  (13)
The optmal allocaton parameter, δ, does not appear n the first order 





tr+ ) under the condton of a sustaned bubble and bubble collapse are 
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determned n advance by the young generaton, they can always maxmse 
ther expected ncome and they are ndfferent about the portfolo allocaton, 
snce the potental loss (return = -1) of the bubble collapse (the probablty s 
π) s always offset by the potental gan (g-r*) of the bubble sustanng (the 
probablty s 1-π). here, 1( )
B
tR r ++  s the normal return of banks n a bubble-
sustanng perod and 1( )
C
tR r ++  n a bubble-burst perod.
on the other hand, we need to make sure that the credt market s clear. 
Utlsng the equlbrum of the credt market (equaton 7), we can get the 
equlbrum lendng rate when bubbles are sustaned
 
 








=  + + −   (14)
For smplficaton, we let t tF K= , and assume that ρR < 1.20 obvously, 1 1
B
tr+ =  
means that the savngs n the young generaton are so abundant that supply of 
loans of the old generaton forces the lendng rate to the bottom lne.
lkewse, the lendng rate when bubbles burst s
 








=   −  
 (15)
The equaton means that when bubbles burst, the savngs of the young 
generaton contract, as does the lendng of the old generaton. Therefore, the 
lendng rate rses. of course, the lendng rate should be no smaller than one 
and no greater than the return of producton ‘R’.
Usng the first order condton (equaton 13), together wth 1 1
B
tr+ =  (and 
equaton 15), we can get the ex ante optmal portfolo allocaton (δ*).21 
Accordng to the ndvdual optmal portfolo allocaton, we can confirm the 
concluson of exstng references n the ntroducton that bubbles do stmulate 
real nvestment. The ncrease of real nvestment does not, however, necessarly 
justfy the allocaton. in the next secton, we wll judge the approprateness of 
the optmal allocaton, δ*, accordng to ts nfluence on socal welfare.
evaluaton of socal welfare and over-nvestment n the real estate 
market
snce the asset value of the young generaton s elevated n a bubble economy, 
the values of the entrepreneurs’ captal and the banks’ loan scale both ncrease. 
The total socal output s




RQ F r g r R RK RKδ            ρ
+
= + + − + − +  (16)
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There would, however, be two possbltes when bubbles burst. The first s 
that wthout credt crunch, featured by 1 1
C
tr+ = , the total socal output s
 




RQ F r R RK RKδ                    ρ+= + − + − +  (17)
The second s that wth credt crunch, featured by 1 1
C
tr + > , the total socal 
output s
 , *(1 )(1 )C L t tQ RF r RKδ= + − +  (18)
comparng the three equatons on aggregate output, we find that bubbles 
have two effects. one s to stmulate producton (equaton 16); the other s 
to restran producton (equatons 17 and 18). Therefore, the government wll 
maxmse the expected socal output takng both effects nto account. Notce 
that the objectve functon of socal welfare s dfferent from that of ndvdual 
expected ncome:
0 1





here ,C C SQ Q=  or ,C C LQ Q= . Then we could obtan
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− + − < >
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π  (20)
The first order condtons do not hold and we get the corner soluton. For 
the first nequalty, the model has assumed that the expected return of bubble 
assets s greater than the foregn depost rate. To the other nequalty, snce 
ths s when the loss of socal output reaches ts maxmum, the nequalty s 
stll acceptable. Besdes, bank credt rates are rgd n the two extreme ponts, 
whch ndcates that the ncrease of real estate nvestment ratos does not affect 
the lendng rate n the two extreme ponts, but the real estate nvestment rato 
has a postve monotonc correlaton wth the credt rate n the mddle area. if 
we denote δS and δL as the crtcal values for the condtons of ‘mddle term=1’22 
and ‘mddle term=R’ respectvely, we can conclude (see equatons 19 and 20) 
that the government’s optmal preference nvestment rato, δG, s always δS n 
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both condtons. As well, δG s always lower than the ndvdual optmal rato, δ*. 
Ths means that ndvdual nvestment n the real estate market s speculatve 
and, from the perspectve of socal welfare, ndvdual ratonal nvestment n 
real estate markets s excessve. 
δG = δS < δ* (21)
in short, the model demonstrates that wth an ncomplete financal market, 
the excessve monetary lqudty brought about by export ncreases wll be 
transformed nto ndvdual motvaton to nvest n the real estate market, 
resultng n ratonal or speculatve bubbles. From the vewpont of socal welfare, 
the nvestment s excessve. Followng the stylsed fact and the olG model, 
quanttatve analyss wll be gven below.
Data, variable selection and empirical modelling
Ths secton ntends to answer quanttatvely two mportant questons. is 
excessve monetary lqudty s the man contrbutor to real estate bubbles n 
chna? is there speculatve nvestment n the real estate market?
We adopt panel data analyss based on the regonal data from 28 provnces23 
n chna rather than the tme-seres analyss usng macroeconomc data. Ths s 
because excessve monetary lqudty s a new phenomenon that has emerged 
only n recent years.24 Therefore, the tme-seres analyss cannot dentfy the 
bubble for lack of sufficent data (kalra et al. 2000). 
The cross-provncal panel data n ths chapter are from February 2004 to 
december 2005. even f year-on-year adjustment s conducted to ensure the 
consstency of emprcal analyss wth the theoretcal model, and to releve the 
problem of the tme-seres characterstc, each varable stll has as many as 
308 observatons. We further study the rpple effect (cameron et al. 2006), that 
s, to ntroduce the spllover lqudty varable n order to dscuss the nfluence 
of cross-provncal lqudty dfferences on local real estate prces. it s an 
mportant crteron of speculatve nvestment (the second ssue to be tested) 
uncovered by the stylsed fact and the theoretcal model of whether the rpple 
effect s statstcally sgnficant.25
snce we want to examne the real estate bubble resultng from the externally 
dependent economy, we use the dfference between the growth rate of real 
estate prces n chna mnus the short-term Us bond rate as the dependent 
varable n our emprcal model, accordng to the theoretcal model (see equaton 
12). As real estate prces are not obtanable drectly, we calculate the prces from 
the dvson of the sales revenue and the sale prce of commercal houses.
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When selectng ndependent varables, we choose the growth rate of 
savngs,26 rather that of bank loans or monetary supply, because we want to 
emphasse the role of monetary lqudty. in fact, banks are regulated wth 
respect to the rato of deposts to loans durng the sample perod; the scale of 
loans s therefore determned by that of savngs. And the down payments of 
ndvduals and the autonomous lendng of enterprses, whle not ncluded n 
credt varables, are reflected n savngs. so, the growth rate of savngs can 
better llustrate real estate bubbles. 
The spllover effect varables are measured by the dfference between the 
growth rate of local savngs and aggregate savngs. Ths ndex can examne 
whether captal wll flow from captal-rch areas to captal-deficent areas. 
such captal flow wll promote real estate bubbles n captal-deficent areas. 
Wth cross-provncal captal flows, the growth rate of real estate prces all over 
chna could tend to converge. As for other ndependent varables that need 
to be controlled, we choose varables accordng to the survey on emprcal 
works about real estate bubbles (cameron et al. 2006) and the avalablty of 
chnese data. specfically, these varables are the growth rate of resdental 
ncome, enterprse profits, losses of loss-makng enterprses and land prces.27 
resdental ncome and enterprse profits can reflect fundamentals of the 
economy, but can also control the nfluence of cross-provncal dfferences of 
economc development on real estate prces. The ncluson of the varable of 
losses of loss-makng enterprses follows a new argument that enterprses wth 
low productvty and profitablty tend to speculate n the real estate market 
(Ventura 2004). constructon cost s also a fundamental factor that cannot be 
omtted. But snce the regonal data for ths varable are not accessble, we 
use land prce as ts ndex. land prces were found n the same way as the 
real estate prce.
Therefore, the panel data model we employ s
[the rate of change n real estate prce after adjustment]it = 
α + β1[growth rate of personal savngs]t + β2[growth rate of corporate savngs]t  
+ β3[resdental overflow savngs]t + β4[entrepreneural overflow savngs]t  
+ β5[growth rate of personal ncome]t + β6[growth rate of corporate profits]t  
+ β7[growth rate of corporate losses]t + β8[growth rate of land prces]t + εt.28 
For each varable n the model, we examne ts characterstcs, from whch we 
can ntut the nfluence of excessve monetary lqudty on real estate bubbles 
(not tabulated).
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most of the monthly data n ths chapter are from the chna Wnd database 
and data about provncal savngs are from Statistics Monthly, publshed by 
the People’s Bank of chna. All varables are adjusted to elmnate seasonal 
effects (the year-on-year growth rate) as well as nflaton (adjusted by the 
consumer prce ndex). The Us nterest rate s adjusted by the Us consumer 
Prce index.29
Results of empirical analysis 
Table 17.1 shows the estmaton of the emprcal model of panel data dscussed 
above. models 1 and 2 are analysed n order to test the robustness of the general 
model 3, especally for the sgnficance of the ndces for excessve monetary 
lqudty. in model 1, we consder only the mpact of the scale of savngs on 
real estate prces. model 2 further examnes the spllover effect of excessve 
monetary lqudty.
obvously, whether n the general model or the smplfied models, the growth 
of local savngs (monetary lqudty) also has a postve nfluence on the real 
estate prce. in the sample perod we selected, the monetary lqudty of local 
enterprses has a larger nfluence on the real estate prce. interestngly, after 
controllng the lqudty ndces, although the sgn of the estmated parameters 
of the growth rates of resdental ncome, land prces and enterprse profits 
are consstent wth the general economc prncples, none are statstcally 
sgnficant. For the growth rate of losses of loss-makng enterprses, the 
parameter s also nsgnficant and even the sgn of the parameter s ncorrect.30 
Therefore, the excessve monetary lqudty s probably the domnant factor 
supportng real estate bubbles. Ths result answers the first queston rased 
at the begnnng of the prevous secton.
As for the spllover effect ndces, only the enterprse savngs spllover 
varable has a sgnficant effect on real estate prces, whle the resdental 
savngs spllover varable does not contrbute to the bubbles.31 Ths result 
confirms the speculatve behavour of enterprses n the real estate market snce 
we beleve the cross-regonal captal flows are, to a large extent, speculatve. 
Thus, we have answered the second queston.
The constant s sgnficant, whch shows that those mportant varables we 
put nto the constant do have nfluence over real estate bubbles. snce we use 
growth rates for all the varables n the regresson, the determnant coefficent 
(r square) s relatvely low. 
in order to ensure the precson of the panel data analyss method, we apply 
the Breusch-Pagan lm Test and the hausman Test to the sample (see Table 
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Table 17.1  Estimation of random effecta, b
dependent varable: housng prce adjusted model 1 model 2 model 3
explanatory varable (all n annual growth rate)
resdental savngs 0.487***  1.284*** 1.263***
 (0.174) (0.348) (0.368)
enterprse savngs    1.709***        2.075***        2.179***
 (0.212) (0.493) (0.501)
resdental savngs spllover effect         0.307           0.226   
  (0.542) (0.554)
enterprse savngs spllover effect                        1.727***        1.839***
  (0.518) (0.525)
resdental ncome                                        0.048   
                                 (0.110)
land prce                                        0.023   
                                 (0.017)
enterprse profit                                        0.003   
                                 (0.043)
losses of loss-makng enterprses                                       –0.015   
                                 (0.031)
constant       –0.137***       –0.274***       –0.285***
 (0.034) (0.050) (0.051) 
r-squared overall  0.1588 0.1884 0.2049
Number of observables          .308             .308             .308   
rho (fracton of varance due to u_) 0.539 0.548 0.561
Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
a stata s employed to perform the panel data analyss. The number n parentheses ‘()’ 
represents the standard error of the estmaton.  
b snce n Breusch-Pagan’s lm Test, ch-sq(27) = 90.23988, P-value = 9.7e-09; 
heteroskedastcty n group ols regresson s phenomenal so that t s necessary to use panel 
data models. Furthermore, n the hausman Test, ch-sq(8) = 2.06, P-value = 0.9790, whch 
means that the null hypothess of no correlaton between the fixed term and ndependent 
varables cannot be rejected. Therefore, we use random-effect models n our estmatons.
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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17.1). From the random effect model employed, we can see that the regonal 
characterstcs of real estate prce growth s not fixed, whch could be a result 
of the overflow effect of monetary lqudty. 
Conclusions
Frst, we argue that an externally dependent economy wth structural 
mbalances charactersed by twn surpluses can, for example, brng about 
excessve monetary lqudty under a rgd exchange rate system. excessve 
lqudty of ths knd s dstnctly dfferent from that of the standard case n 
whch excessve lqudty s the result of a knd of loose monetary polcy amed 
at combatng economc slowng or depresson.
second, we extend c–k’s savng-nvestment model to uncover that 
excessve monetary lqudty can ncur ratonal bubbles n real estate markets 
n an economy such as chna’s, where ts financal market has not been well 
establshed. Under these crcumstances, people tend to speculate n the real 
estate market out of the precautonary savngs motvatons of smoothng ther 
ncome. Ths mechansm s not covered n the current lterature about chnese 
real estate bubbles (Wang 2005; Y 2005). The exstng studes of the nfluence 
of excessve monetary lqudty on real estate prces have not pad enough 
attenton to the relevant effect of the externally dependent economc structure 
on real estate bubbles.
Thrd, we select savngs and spllover varables of savngs to test the 
mechansm of real estate bubbles ntroduced by basc macroeconomc 
prncples and the olG model. Through panel data analyss of 28 provnces, 
we found that the current real estate bubble n chna s caused manly by the 
externally dependent economc structure, whch results n excessve monetary 
lqudty. enterprse savngs and ther spllover effect play more mportant roles 
than ther resdental counterparts.
Based on the above results, our polcy suggeston to solve the problem of 
excessve monetary lqudty s that, n the short term, the government should 
ntensfy fiscal and monetary restrant on speculatve real estate nvestment (for 
example, to ncrease the captal adequacy rato of the banks and rase taxes on 
real estate nvestments). Ths wll modfy ndvduals’ ratonal expectatons of 
the surge of real estate prces: n the long term, the government should change 
the current rgd exchange rate system, develop chnese financal markets, 
mprove the socal securty system and adjust the dependence of growth on 
expanson of net exports.32
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Notes
1 There has been much research on the ssue of real estate bubbles recently. some excellent 
surveys are ncluded n hunter et al. (2005).  most focuses on the followng aspects: the causes 
and measurement of real estate bubbles, ther mpact on the real economy and government 
supervson and regulaton of real estate nvestment. some excellent surveys are ncluded n 
hunter et al. 2005.
2 investgatons of housng reform and relatve questons on the late 1990s could take Zhou 
2003 and sato 2006 as references. it s obvous that the abundance of ndvduals nvolved 
n real estate speculaton nowadays s a consequence of government-dstrbuted affordable 
housng n the early reform perod.
3 kndleberger (1987) defined asset bubbles ths way: ‘[a] sharp rse n prce of an asset or 
a range of assets n a contnuous process, wth the ntal rse generatng expectatons of 
further rses and attractng new buyers—generally speculators nterested n profits from 
tradng rather than n ts use or earnng capacty. The rse s then followed by a reversal of 
expectatons and a sharp declne n prce, often resultng n severe financal crss—n short, 
the bubble bursts.’
4 recently, enterprse savngs have been ncreasng gradually, because profits are declnng 
and the renmnb s expected to apprecate.
5 Though the contrbuton of net exports to GdP s low, processng-trade enterprses absorb 
numerous low-pad workers and exports help releve the deflatonary pressure from the growth 
of producton capacty.
6 if the prce-adjustng monetary polcy s effectve, exchange rate adjustment can nhbt 
excessve monetary lqudty better than the contractve monetary polcy n the current stuaton 
of the twn surpluses. due to the fraglty of the chnese financal system, however, and the 
externally dependent economy, the central bank cannot actvely employ prce-adjustng 
polces (mcknnon 2005 and Frankel 2004).
7 The nflaton pressure trggered by excessve monetary lqudty could ntensfy polarsaton 
between the rch and the poor.
8 The central bank also actvely appled the sterlsed monetary polcy n the foregn exchange 
market from 2003 to 2005, although the nterventon was weak compared wth the surges of 
captal nflows. The government’s burden wll, however, become large f sterlsaton s used 
for a long tme. 
9 m1 stands for cash and demand depost, m2 ncludes savng depost and m1. Fgure 17.3 
shows clearly the central bank’s sterlsed monetary nterventon. 
10 in crcumstances of nterest rate regulaton, banks have no rght to lower the savngs nterest 
rate. even f banks can, most people could also put excessve lqudty nto the bankng system 
for real estate nvestment wth safe and hgher returns.  
11 in ths paper, assets wth safe and hgher returns refer to assets wth ratonal bubbles. currently 
n chna, bubbles occur most easly n those assets well supported by government polces 
and by optmstc expectatons n the market. As long as the market beleves the boom s 
sustanable, safe and hgher returns wll persst. real estate bubbles n contemporary chna 
llustrate the mechansm.
12 From Fgure 17.4, the prce declne from 2005 s due to strcter regulaton by the government 
on the entrance of foregn captal nto the real estate market. Therefore, some foregn hot 
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money left ths market, whch s consstent wth the phenomenon of hot money flght from 
chna as dsplayed n Fgure 17.2, whch shows negatve net short-term captal nflow. Ths 
postve correlaton between monetary lqudty and real estate prces s n accordance wth 
our theory and emprcal results. 
13 Blanchard and Fscher (1989) covered varous theoretcal mechansms of olG models usng 
three chapters n lectures on macroeconomcs. ljungqvst and sargent (2004) explan the 
applcaton of olG n the second edton of the famous recursve macroeconomcs Theory. 
There are also some classcal papers on olG models. For nstance, we can categorse olG 
models accordng to asset attrbutes nto the followng types: the olG model wth money 
(samuelson 1958); wth corporate bonds (damond 1965); wth corporate bonds and bubble 
assets (Trole 1985); wth equty and corporate bonds (Abel et al. 1989); wth government 
bonds (Barro 1973); and wth penson funds (damond and mrrlees 1978).
14 Blanchard and Watson 1982, Wel 1987 and Ventura 2004 also value bubbles postvely.
15 kng and Ferguson 1993, sant-Paul 1992 and Grossman and Yanagawa 1993, whle studyng 
economc growth, pont out that bubbles can also occur n a dynamcally efficent economy, 
whch could lower the nvestment rato n real captal, and technology advancement slows 
down accordngly. Thus, economc growth s hampered and socal welfare declnes. 
16 such a set up s to emphasse ‘nvestment’ nstead of ‘consumpton’. Addng consumpton 
behavour nto the model, such as done by Trole (1985), wll not change the result of our 
paper.
17 We assume that the fixed exchange rate s one for smplcty and domestc currency s 
convertble through the current account. 
18 The fall of real estate prces n 2005 n chna cannot be nterpreted as a burst of bubbles; t 
was just a temporary effect of macro control polces (currently, br g< ). 
19 Although the lendng rate s rgd, credt ratonng s popular n chna. in ths sense, the latent 
lendng rate s changng.
20 lackng efficent credt rsk management, banks n emergng markets would greatly dscount 
collateral assets.
21 There are two extreme stuatons. if 1 1
C
tr+ = , accordng to equaton 12,
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 The optmal nvestment rato should be δ*=1, that s, to put ther whole ncome n the real 
estate market. on the contrary, f 1
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 dumpng all real estate assets would be the optmal choce—n other words, δ*=0. The credt 
market, however, s not clear n these two stuatons, so these two solutons do not hold.  
22 The mddle term equals
 










23 The followng provnces and ctes are ncluded: Bejng, Tanjn, hebe, shanx, Nemengu, 
laonng, Jln, helongjang, shangha, Jangsu, Zhejang, Anhu, Fujan, Jangx, shandong, 
henan, hube, hunan, Guangdong, Guangx, hanan, chongqng, schuan, Guzhou, Yunnan, 
shanx, Gansu and Nngxa.
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24 The reform of housng markets n chna started less than 10 years ago. Tme-seres data of 
real estate prces are very lmted.
25 snce data about the asset allocaton varable n the theoretcal model are unavalable, we 
use the spllover varable as the proxy for the portfolo allocaton to see f there s speculatve 
behavour.   
26 data on the renmnb counterpart of foregn reserves are not accessble as requred by our 
theoretcal model.
27 There are some other mport-control varables, such as demographc structure, the populaton 
growth rate, bank mortgage rates, the stock of real estate and the portfolo allocaton to 
securtes. monthly provncal data of these varables are not avalable, so we put them nto 
the constant because we assume that these varables are relatvely stable n the short term.
28 εit = ki + uit : i represents the cross-sectonal nformaton, t represents tme, k s the fixed 
effect. The hausman Test wll be conducted to determne whch of the two effects—fixed and 
random—s relevant for our panel data analyss (hsao 2003).
29 We abandon the data from Qngha, Xnjang and Xzang because of ts ncompleteness. 
For two mssng observatons of the land prce and resdental ncome, we use smoothng 
modficaton.
30 The reason for nsgnficance of resdental ncome s that people can easly access the 
speculatve real estate market by borrowng to cover the down payment. smlar mechansms 
can explan the nsgnficance of enterprse profits and losses of loss-makng enterprses. even 
f land prces can affect real estate prces, a transacton cannot be reached wthout enough 
lqudty. Therefore, land prces are not sgnficant after controllng monetary lqudty. 
31 such contrasts could be because ndvdual cross-provncal nvestment s much more 
nconvenent and costly than enterprse nvestment, because enterprses can borrow and lend 
from each other freely and thus enjoy ndrectly the hgh return of real estate nvestment n 
other areas. 
32 As long as people’s worres about future ncome persst, surplus savngs wll not dsappear 
even f the renmnb apprecates and resdents’ dsposable ncomes ncrease.
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does economc openng lead to nternatonal as well as domestc market 
ntegraton? The objectve of ths chapter s to examne whether chna’s 
polcy of openng promotes domestc economc ntegraton. do the growng 
external lnks work aganst the local protectonsm and market segmentaton? 
Partcularly snce the begnnng of the chnese economc reformaton, regonal 
protectonsm and segmentaton have blocked a unfied natonal market, 
brought about nefficency n nter-regonal resource allocaton, dstorted the 
market mechansm and dsturbed the prce sgnal. Ultmately, they weaken 
macroeconomc polces. Therefore, t s necessary to understand the causes 
of domestc market segmentaton and to find the ways of dealng wth them. 
Ths chapter examnes the determnants of segmentaton of the chnese 
nter-regonal goods market on the bass of provncal panel data, focusng 
on the mpact of economc openng—a fundamental component of chnese 
economc reform, drvng prvatsaton and deregulaton. The correlaton 
between nternatonal and domestc ntegraton s explored, and the analyss 
predcts a contnung trend of domestc market ntegraton n chna. 
There has been academc contenton over whether there has been a 
tendency towards nter-provncal ntegraton or segmentaton n post-reform 
chna. The process through whch t happens stll requres theoretcal and 
emprcal analyss. emprcal research n ths field s recent (Poncet 2005; 
Ba et al. 2004). There can be further development n measurng market 
segmentaton, the selecton and definton of ndependent varables, and 
ncreased sophstcaton n regresson analyss. Ths chapter makes three 
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contrbutons. Frst, n order to measure chna’s nter-provncal segmentaton, 
we use chnese provncal retal prce ndex (rPi) data nstead of ndustral 
concentraton or trade flow data. second, we focus on the effect of economc 
openng on market segmentaton. in addton, our approach captures the effects 
of employment pressure, government consumpton, nter-regonal technology 
dfferentals and geography. Thrd, the methodology mproves on prevous 
papers by attemptng to elmnate endogenous bas, ncludng smultanety 
bas and omtted-varables bas.
Literature review
What has nfluenced chnese domestc market ntegraton? Ba et al. (2004) 
and Poncet (2005) reached some pertnent conclusons n ther emprcal 
research.
Ba et al. (2004) estmated the overall level of geographc concentraton 
of chna’s ndustres and factors nfluencng changes. he used the hoover 
coefficent as the dependent varable, and examned the mpacts of local 
protectonsm, scale of economy and externaltes on ndustral concentraton. 
The data supported the hypothess that ndustres wth a hgher tax-plus-profit 
rato n the past and those wth a hgher share of state-owned enterprses tended 
to have a hgher degree of local protectonsm, and therefore a lower level of 
ndustral concentraton. There s sgnficant negatve correlaton between the 
output share of state-owned enterprses and local ndustral concentraton 
(hoover coefficent), so he concluded that local protectonsm could lead to 
market segmentaton.
Poncet (2004) appled a gravty model (head and mayer 2000) for estmaton 
of the domestc border effect n nter-provncal and ntra-provncal trade 
flows for 1992 and 1997. she used an ndex representng the degree of 
domestc market segmentaton. she then examned the relatonshp between 
endogenous protecton and the border effect on trade. she also argued that 
local protectonst polcy was an outcome of demand (by prvate agents and 
nterest groups) and supply (poltcans and government), whch eventually 
caused ncreased domestc segmentaton. hence, her ndependent varables 
nclude fiscal expendture, publc consumpton (the supply factors) and the 
unemployment rate (the demand factor). The regresson results showed that 
an ncrease n the unemployment rate and government nterventon enhanced 
market segmentaton. 
Ths lterature s poneerng n ths area, but needs further development.
Frst, the effect of economc openng has not been gven adequate emphass.1 
The fact s, n chna, economc reform vrtually concded wth the new openness 
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to nternatonal trade. The open economy could change the ntegraton of the 
domestc market profoundly, by affectng nter-regonal trade flows, the behavour 
of local governments, the strateges of enterprses and people’s thoughts. For 
example, some varables n Ba et al. (2004) and Poncet (2005), such as the 
share of state-owned enterprses and publc consumpton, are nfluenced by 
economc openng.2 Furthermore, openng led to a decreasng government role 
n the economy. Therefore, smply puttng economc openng nto unobserved 
resduals could generate an omtted-varables bas n estmates.3
second, the measurements used represented poorly the magntude of 
domestc market ntegraton. Ba et al. (2004) nvestgated the coefficent of 
ndustral concentraton as a substtute for ntegraton. however, there s no 
necessarly postve correlaton between ndustral concentraton and market 
ntegraton. Ths needs to be analysed more closely.
smlarly, the ‘border effect’ derved from trade flows (Poncet 2005) needs 
more analyss. it s hard to dstngush other economc effects, such as resource 
endowment or scale economcs from those of ntegraton on trade flows. For 
example, lttle dfference between resource endowments or scale of economy 
makes the border effect nosy. Addtonally, f the products of two areas are 
hghly substtutable, a small rse n trade costs could lead to a large reducton 
n nter-regonal trade volume (Parsley and We 2001a). Therefore, these two 
measurements have ther lmtatons.
Thrd, the two studes emphassed local protectonsm, but ths s extremely 
dfficult to evaluate. Ba et al. (2004) argued that local governments benefitted 
from nter-regonal trade barrers, so they tended to protect ndustres wth 
hgher past tax-plus-profit ratos and wth a hgher share of state-owned 
enterprses. Therefore, the two ratos represented the degree of local 
protectonsm. Ths s doubtful, however, because local governments have 
ncentves to protect some lower tax-plus-profit enterprses (ln and lu 2004).4 
Poncet (2004) clamed that local protectonsm pursued a dual objectve: fiscal 
revenue maxmsaton, and socal stablty and economc equty. she looked at 
the demand and supply of local protectonsm, whch comes from employment 
(unemployment rate), fiscal autonomy (fiscal expendture) and nterventon 
power (publc consumpton). Yet none of these varables equates drectly to 
local protectonsm. The unemployment rate s partcularly controversal. on one 
hand, much of the lterature debates whether chna’s unemployment statstcs 
badly underestmated the real stuaton (lu 2002; Wang et al. 2004; ca et al. 
2004; Xue and We 2004). on the other hand, provncal governments engaged 
n mantanng exstng employment n state-owned ndustres, whch s a latent 
unemployed group, rather than helpng the unemployed to find new jobs.
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By comparson, ths chapter has three nnovatons. Frst, we use the 
chnese provncal rPi to abstract the measure of chna’s provncal market 
segmentaton. second, we nvestgate the effects of economc openng, 
employment pressure, government consumpton, nter-regonal technology 
dfferentals and geographc dstance on market segmentaton. exstng 
studes have provded several explanatons of how economc openng mpacts 
on domestc ntegraton. Poncet (2002, 2003b) ponted out that nternatonal 
trade substtuted for natonal trade, thus economc openng fragmented the 
domestc market. l et al. (2003) set up a model demonstratng that when tarffs 
were sufficently low, openng made the domestc market more compettve 
and mproved market ntegraton. We provde new evdence on the relatonshp 
between them. Thrd, we elmnate smultanety bas by puttng n lagged polcy 
varables. As for economc openng, we also use nstrument varables to reduce 
smultanety bas and omtted-varable bas. 
in addton, our segmentaton ndex s developed from a convncng 
theoretcal foundaton (Parsley and We 1996, 2000a, 2001b). it presents new 
evdence of an ntegrated chnese domestc goods market, consstent wth the 
findngs of Naughton (1999), Xu (2002) and Ba et al. (2004), but dffers from 
those of Young (2000) and Poncet (2002, 2003b). 
The heated debate about market segmentaton n chna began wth Young 
(2000), who found that provncal economc structures were ncreasngly 
smlar after examnng the structure of gross domestc product (GdP) and 
manufacturng output, per capta output of man products and some prce data. 
The explanaton was that nter-regonal competton and local protecton led 
to fragmentaton of the domestc market and dstorton of regonal producton 
away from local comparatve advantage. relyng on the evdence that chnese 
provnces were more nvolved n nternatonal trade wth a decrease n domestc 
trade flow, Poncet (2002, 2003b) concluded that chna’s provncal borders 
ncreasngly segmented the whole country. Numerous analyses, however, took 
a sceptcal vew of such clams. The prevalent crtcsm was that Young’s (2000) 
ndces were too smple to capture the tendency of domestc segmentaton. 
As we have already dscussed, the measure derved from trade flow (Poncet 
2002, 2003b) was nosy because many factors, such as resource endowment 
and scale of economy, could change the trade flow. stll a small cost of trade 
could lead to a large reducton n trade volume f the substtuton effect was 
strong (Parsley and We 2001a). 
Naughton (1999) compared the commodty composton of nter-provncal 
trade between 1987 and 1992. he revealed that the ncrease of trade volume 
was caused manly by the rse n ntra-ndustry trade wthn manufacturng 
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(final goods), rather than the trade of ntermedate nputs. Ths concdes wth 
the observed competton among producers n dfferent regons. Xu (2002) 
decomposed provncal sectoral real value-added growth nto common natonal 
effects, ndustry-specfic effects and provnce-specfic effects by an error-
components model. The emprcal analyss for the perod from 1991 to 1998 
showed that wth sgnficant co-movements n the long term, even provnce-
specfic factors stll accounted for 35 per cent of the varance of short-term 
real output growth. hs results suggested that the provncal economy was 
ntegrated ncompletely under the reforms. Fnally, the findngs of Ba et al. 
(2004) also supported an ncrease n chnese market ntegraton: n the perod 
from 1985 to 1997, the concentraton of chnese ndustres fell ntally, and then 
ncreased sgnficantly. As we ponted out, however, ndustral concentraton 
s not equvalent to market ntegraton.
These debates have reled on ndrect measures from producton structure, 
trade flow, prces and ndustry concentraton. in fact, the prevous lterature has 
used ‘relatve prces’ to abstract drect ndces of ntegraton n two ways. Fan and 
We (2006) first appled the Augmented dckey-Fuller (AdF) test to tme seres of 
each category of chnese goods, then used the mW Test (maddala and Wu 1999) 
on unbalanced panel data as a whole. Accordng to the parameters of the model, 
they estmated the half-lfe for prce convergence, whch offered strong evdence 
of prce convergence and market ntegraton n chna. such a findng sts well wth 
the vew that chna’s transton to a market economy has been qute successful 
durng the past two decades. Nevertheless, ther analyss llumnated only the 
status of competton n the domestc market and not the course of convergence, 
so t cannot be extended to further research on causes of ntegraton. 
here, we follow Parsley and We’s model (1996, 2001a, 2001b) to observe the 
varance of relatve prce, Var(P/Pj). small Var(P/Pj) mples that the relatve 
prce s fallng. We can take the relatve prce as a dynamc ndex of market 
ntegraton. The detals wll be demonstrated n a later secton.
The determinants of China’s domestic integration
Numerous publcatons have argued that chnese market ntegraton s affected 
by the behavour of local governments. After decentralsaton and taxaton 
system reform, local governments had the chance to obtan rents from local 
firms’ profits, so they had an ncentve to renforce regonal segmentaton. 
hence, we group the potental determnants nto three categores. The first 
s economc openng, the key of ths chapter. The second ncludes factors 
related to government behavour. The last covers other factors that need to 
be controlled.
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To the best of our knowledge, economc openng has multple mpacts on 
market ntegraton, some of whch are postve, and others negatve. Frst of 
all, n a relatvely closed economy marked by low-level openng and a hgh 
tarff rate, local governments can mplement segmentaton polces to protect 
ther ndustres. in ths sense, a decrease n nter-provncal trade ntensty s 
accompaned by rapd nternatonal trade openng (Poncet 2002, 2003b, 2005). 
As the economy opens further and tarff rates fall, however, the cost of local 
protecton and segmentaton augments ths because of competton, and 
eventually nternatonal trade lberalsaton restrans local protectonsm (l et 
al. 2003). second, by nfluencng the external stuaton that local governments 
face, economc openng accelerates ntegraton ndrectly. For example, when 
the economy opens further, more foregn nvestments enter and the behavour 
of ndvduals s transformed n dversfied enterprses. As a result, the power 
of non-state enterprses ncreases and the economc nterventon of the 
government fades. 
meanwhle, much foregn captal s nvested n jont ventures. Jontly 
operated ndustral groups need to cooperate wth local governments. 
Furthermore, openng has an rreversble effect on people’s thnkng, such 
as ther understandng of government: the publc pushes local governments 
to remedy ther welfare functons and to facltate domestc ntegraton. 
Therefore, there mght be a non-lnear correlaton between economc openng 
and domestc ntegraton. in ths story, when openng s n ts ntal stages, 
t could strengthen market segmentaton, but further openng could enhance 
domestc market ntegraton. Fnally, openng promotes domestc ntegraton. 
The evdence for ths wll be shown n the next sectons.
There are also some ssues concernng local governments. Brefly, chnese 
local governments have dual objectves: to optmse ther benefits and to 
maxmse the utltes of resdents. For the first goal, they tend to mplement 
segmentaton polces for ncreased fiscal revenue. For the second one, they 
engage n mantanng employment and developng strategc ndustres. 
Therefore, we pay attenton to the followng determnants n our emprcal 
model.
•	 economc nterventon of local government. in a planned economy, the 
fiscal system s hghly centralsed. snce 1978, fiscal decentralsaton of 
revenue, taxaton, control of enterprses, nvestment and financng has 
strengthened the capablty of offical nterventon. Under ths system, 
polcymakers gan benefits from the local economy, so they have an 
ncentve to partcpate n economc actvtes drectly. our hypothess 
s that provnces wth a larger share of fiscal revenue relatve to the sze 
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of the economy are more wllng than others to segment nter-regonal 
markets to protect ther ndustres.
•	 economc natonalsaton. in a transtonal economy such as chna’s, 
mantanng employment s always a prmary government objectve. 
chna’s employment pressure comes drectly from local state-owned 
ndustres. hstorcally, the pre-reform employment system dsgused 
large urban unemployment n the state-owned sector. in the 1990s, a 
shortage of captal brought about ncreasng deficency of non-labour 
nvestment. There were more and more redundant workers n state-
owned enterprse as a result of ntense goods market competton, 
shrnkng demand, wage rses n non-state-owned counterparts and the 
constrant of reducng the number of employees (dong and Putterman 
2002). so, we take the state-owned employment share as the weght 
of the natonalsed economy, whch shows the employment pressure 
and therefore the pressure of domestc segmentaton. The noteworthy 
pont s that there are some alternatve explanatons for the correlaton 
between economc natonalsaton and domestc segmentaton, such 
as state-owned captal beng commanded by local governments (Png 
2004), or local governments benefittng from state-owned enterprses 
(Ba et al. 2004).
•	 The nter-regonal technology dfferental. lu et al. (2004) argued that 
the fiscal target and employment goal was not the only explanaton for 
duplcatve ndustres and nter-regonal economc segmentaton. if hgh-
tech ndustres have ncreasng returns, less-developed regons wll not 
specalse accordng to statc comparatve advantage but wll rase ther 
barganng poston by nter-regonal segmentaton and by developng 
‘strategc’ ndustres. Thus, they could gan a hgher barganng poston n 
the future and even catch up wth the rch regons. Therefore, we expect 
that the less-developed regons prefer a segmented economy and protect 
local strategc ndustres. 
last but not least, two factors must be controlled for n the emprcal models.
•	 Geographc dstance. in general, long dstances mean hgh transportaton 
costs, then more transacton costs. even f governments are neutral, the 
commodty flow s stll restrcted by geographc space. We thnk dstance 
mght ‘create’ market segmentaton.
•	 The stage of marketsaton reform. chna’s marketsaton could be dvded 
nto two stages. Before 1994, the process was relatvely sluggsh. in 1993, 
the thrd sesson of the fourteenth congress of the communst Party 
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of chna enacted a decson to establsh a socalst market economy. 
Taxaton system reform, unfcaton of exchange rates, fnancal 
system reform, state-owned enterprse reform and some other reforms 
began the next year. Therefore, 1994 was the startng pont of the new 
phase of chna’s marketsaton reform. From then on, the evoluton of 
domestc goods market ntegraton mght be dfferent from the pattern 
demonstrated n the perod before 1994.5 We hypothesse that the post 
1994 reforms saw an ncreased level of market ntegraton.
The measure of market segmentation for Chinese domestic goods 
how to find a credble measure of ntegraton or segmentaton s the most 
dffcult part of emprcal studes. Gven the drawbacks of the exstng 
approaches—producton, trade flow and the specalsaton ndex—we construct 
the panel data of the nter-regonal segmentaton ndex usng regonal rPi of 
consumer goods by the method of Parsley and We (2001a, 2001b).
datum and ndex computng
The logc of measurng market segmentaton by relatve prces s based on 
the ceberg model (samuelson 1954), whch amends the orgnal law of one 
Prce (loP) theory. Generally, there are certan knds of transportaton costs, 
such as freght costs, that are consumed durng transactons lke an ceberg 
meltng. only a fracton of the goods’ value survves. Ths mples that perfect 
arbtrage requres only the relatve prce fluctuatng wthn a range but not 
beng constant. suppose P s the prce of a product n locaton ‘’, and Pj s ts 
prce n locaton ‘j’. The proportonal transacton cost (wastage occurrng as 
commodtes are traded between two regons) s ‘c’ (0<c<1). The necessary 
condton for the exstence of arbtrage s P(1-c)>Pj or Pj(1-c)>P, n whch trade 
occurs. otherwse, the relatve prce of product P/Pj falls nto a non-arbtrage 
range [1-c, 1/(1-c)]. here, the transacton cost n a broad sense ncludes all 
sorts of factors that wear down the value of goods n the process of trade, such 
as physcal geography or nsttutonal arrangements. Under ths prncpal, a 
reducton of freght costs or a decrease n nsttutonal trade barrers reduce 
transacton costs and mprove market ntegraton; correspondngly, the range 
of fluctuaton of the relatve prce shrnks.
our prmary data are retal prce ndces of commodtes by regon obtaned 
from the China Statistical Yearbook for varous years. We calculated 17 years (1985 
– 2001) wth 61 pars of conjont provnces’ relatve prce varances,  )/PVar(P tjt i . 
The total number of observatons s 1,037 (17×61). Because  )/PVar(P tjt i  data are 
tme seres for every conjont provnce par, we can observe ther movements 
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by regon. The evoluton of tme seres reflects the tendency of goods market 
ntegraton. Addtonally, Parsley and We’s (2001b) approach has another vrtue. 
By synthessng the prce nformaton of varous goods, we get the estmate of 
goods market segmentaton.
our study starts wth relatve prce varances of conjont provnce pars, 
because these knds of data can be synthessed to provncal segmentaton 
ndces (see the next secton). in the real story of natonal trade, the provncal 
trade polcy s generally consstent between neghbourng and other provnces, 
so when domestc ntegraton ncreases, the trend mght be shown first n 
conjont provnce pars. such common sense s, however, dfficult to prove.
We focus on the absolute value of the relatve prce kijtQ∆ , where 






ijt =∆ 6 s the first-order dfference of percentage 
prce dfference of dentcal product ‘k’ n two conjont provnces, ‘’ and ‘j’, 
at tme ‘t’. We construct ths form of relatve prce ndex from the retal prce 








jt P/P  transform to kijtQ∆ ,
it it-1 it it-1
k k k k k k k k k
ijt jt jt-1 jt jt-1Q ln(P /P )- ln(P /P ) ln(P / P )- ln(P / P )∆ = =  (1)
Further, when a market s segmented, t s the extreme case that the ceberg 
cost, ‘c’, reaches a maxmum; eventually kijtQ  wll converge along wth 
k
ijtQ∆ . in 
ths respect, kijtQ  s equvalent to 
k
ijtQ∆  n descrbng the process of segmentaton. 
The problem s, for any provnce par or tme perod, kijtQ∆  could be postve 
or negatve. in fact, n the same year and wth the same provnce par, takng 




jitQ∆− . That s to say, the order of provnces affects the value of 
)QVar( ijt∆ . The absolute value avods ths knd of nconsstency. lookng back 
at the ceberg model, the logarthm of the non-arbtrage nterval, [1-c,1/(1-c)], s 
symmetrcal, [Ln(1-c), -Ln(1-c)]. it mples that the opposte number of kQ∆  
reveals the same extent of relatve prce fluctuaton, but arbtrage happens n 
the reverse drecton wth dfferent sgns of kQ∆ .
The method of relatve prce analyss requres a three-dmensonal database 
(t×m×k), where the ndces ‘t’, ‘m’ and ‘k’ represent tme, provnce and goods 
respectvely. our prmary data are the retal prce ndces of commodtes by 
regon, three-dmensonal panel data (17×28×9) coverng 17 years from 1985 to 
2001, 28 provnces, muncpaltes or autonomous regons and nne commodtes. 
our filtraton rules of goods are as follows.
• 1985 s the startng year, because there were no rPi statstcs by regon 
before 1985, and 1985 was the first year of the prce reform after the thrd 
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sesson of the twelfth congress of the communst Party of chna. From 
then on, prces were decded manly by the market.
• Three provnces—hanan, chongqng and Tbet—are excluded due to 
ncomplete data.7
• The old commodty categores lsted only before 1985 are excluded. 
Therefore, the data n ths chapter nclude nne types of goods wth 
contnuous records: gran; fresh vegetables; beverages, tobacco and lquor; 
garments, shoes and hats; tradtonal chnese and Western medcnes; 
newspapers and magaznes; statonery and sports goods; daly use artcles; 
and fuel. 4) There was a commodty reclassficaton after 1987 wth mnor 
adjustments, so n order to get as much data as possble, we fill n the data 
for beverages, tobacco and lquor; garments, shoes and hats; tradtonal 
chnese and Western medcnes; newspapers and magaznes; statonery and 
sports goods n 1985 and 1986 wth data for tea, tobacco and lquor; clothes; 
medcnes and medcal equpment; newspapers and magaznes; statonery 
and entertanment goods, respectvely.
Accordng to the computaton above, we get the vectors of the dfferental 
n the relatve prce ndex, kijtQ∆ , contanng 9,333 (9×61×17) observatons 
wthout mssng data. it s stll a lttle far from the segmentaton ndex. We 
need to calculate the cross-sectonal varance wth respect to goods. Under 
our assumpton, a hgher varance means a wder arbtrage nterval and mples 
more serous segmentaton.8 Wth the purpose of abstractng regonal effects, 
we must remove the goods-specfic effects first. For nstance, n a certan 
perod, the gran market experences sgnficant prce fluctuaton wthn two 
locatons, ‘’ and ‘j’. The cause could be dvded nto two parts: one s related 
to the nature of the gran market (for example, the prce of gran changes 
markedly, snce gran yelds are easly nfluenced by natural condtons); the 
second s ndependent of the characterstcs of goods, but determned by 
market condtons between locatons ‘’ and ‘j’, or some random factors. For 
nstance, locaton ‘’ s ht by a natural calamty, so the gran prce jumps, 
or the local government of ‘’ strengthens trade barrers. if we calculate the 
varance wthout filterng the goods-specfic effects from kijtQ∆ , the result 
could overrate the real value caused by nter-regonal trade barrers. We use 
de-mean to remove the goods-specfic effect: let kijtQ∆ =ak+ kijtε  (Parsley and We 
2001a, 2001b), where ak s a knd of fixed effect of goods, ‘k’, and kijtε  represents 
the regonal specfic effects between locatons ‘’ and ‘j’. in fact, ak= ktQ∆ , the 
mean of ktQ∆ , for 61 provnce pars at tme ‘t’ and for goods ‘k’. Then de-mean 
yelds )()aa(QQ kijtkijtkkktkijt ε−ε+−=∆−∆ . let 
k
ijtq = kijtkijt ε−ε = ktkijt QQ ∆−∆ .9 Fnally, our 
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segmentaton ndex s the varance of kijtq , defined as Var(
k
ijtq ). As the precedng 
shows, kijtq  s related only to regonally specfic effects and other random effects 
and we have a total of 1,037 (61×17) observatons.
The ntegraton of the chnese domestc goods market 
Based on our segmentaton ndex, we can summarse the ntegraton evoluton 
process of each regon and the whole country. in the first place, we compute 
the average segmentaton level for regons by year. The result s a tme seres 
contanng 17 years’ data. We can detect an oscllatory path n the perod 
1985–2001 n Fgure 18.1. The aggregate segmentaton ndex first rses and 
eventually falls, whch demonstrates that chna’s goods market s ntegratng 
gradually. Ths s the opposte findng to Young (2000) and Poncet (2002).
The purpose of ths chapter s to verfy that economc openng and other 
varables wll affect domestc market ntegraton va the behavour of local 
governments. Thus we need to transform the data by 61 provnce pars to data 
by provnce. For example, the segmentaton ndex of shangha s the mean 
of the nter-regonal ndex of shangha–Jangsu and shangha–Zhejang. 
other regonal segmentaton ndces are created followng the same logc, 
so we get 476 (28×17) observatons. They present the movement of goods 
market segmentaton of 28 regons n 17 years. Authentcally, the provncal 
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segmentaton ndex captures the magntude of ntegraton between ths 
provnce and all ts neghbours. Fgure 18.2 depcts the ndvdual regon’s 
segmentaton ndces. There s a great dversty of movements, some of whch 
are nsgnficant n certan regons such as schuan (23) and Guzhou (24), but 
as a whole, the trends concde wth that of the whole country: most regons’ 
goods markets are convergng to a certan level of ntegraton.
Fnally, we calculate the average ndex for years by regon. There s great 
dversty across dfferent areas (Table 18.1). A notceable pont s the three 
muncpaltes of Bejng, Tanjn and shangha—rank first, second and fourth 
respectvely. some muncpaltes enjoy specal polces, have a better economy 
and a smaller area, so local government nterventons work better. hence, ther 
market ntegraton s relatvely slower than others. Focusng on the rankngs 
between 1985 and 2001, another pont of vew s that the ranks of most regons 
change dramatcally.
Data and estimation
Now we turn to the theoretcal frame and determnants dscussed n secton 
three. We begn our formal nvestgaton wth the basc model 
Segmit = c + ΣβkXkit-1 + γ1Area + γ2Dummy94 + αi + εit (2)
let itSegm  be the segmentaton ndex of regon ‘’ at tme ‘t’. As we mentoned, 
t s a dmensonless varable, so our final dependent varables are 100 tmes 
the orgnal ones; ths treatment helps us get larger estmated parameters. The 
mprovement of ntegraton occurs wth the smaller segm value. so, varables 
wth negatve parameters promote ntegraton; those wth postve parameters 
mpede ntegraton. 
The rght hand sde of equaton 2 lsts our ndependent varables. The prmary 
data n perod 1985–98 were obtaned from Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials in 50 Years of New China (Natonal Bureau of statstcs 1999); the 
remanng data for 1999–2001 were obtaned from China Statistical Yearbooks. 
our sample covers 28 regons. The data for schuan Provnce do not nclude 
chongqng.10 The statstcs for hanan, Tbet and chongqng were ncomplete 
for 1985–2001, so were not ncluded n our sample.
‘X’ s the vector of polcy varables nfluencng local government decsons. 
These varables are endogenous due to smultanety bas, for whch we use the 
one-year lag of Xs to treat. The entres of X nclude
• Trade—the share of total nternatonal trade n GdP—or the dependency 
rato of nternatonal trade11—denotes the degree of economc openng. 
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Fgure 18.2 Market segmentation index by region, 1985–2001
 
1 Bejng  9  shangha 17 hube 27 shaanx
2 Tanjn 10 Jangsu 18 hunan 28 Gansu
3 hebe 11 Zhejang 19 Guangdong 29 Qnha
4 shanx 12 Anhu 20 Guangx 30 Nngxa
5 inner mongola 13 Fujan 21 hanan 31 Xnjang
6 laonng 14 Jangx 23 schuan
7 Jln 15 shandong 24 Guzhou
8 helongjang 16 henan 25 Yunnan
Note: The trade/GdP rato wth one year lag s used as an explanatory varable n the 
regresson. To make the figure readable, the orgnal data multpled by 100 are reported.  
Source: Authors’ calculatons.
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Table 18.1  Ranking of segmentation index by region
Provnce means over  rank 1985 rank 2001 rank
 17 years 
Bejng 0.273 1 0.099 14 0.057 22
Tanjn  0.260 2 0.152 7 0.078 14
Fujan 0.240 3 0.102 13 0.051 25
shangha 0.233 4 0.05 26 0.195 1
Guangdong  0.233 5 0.135 9 0.091 11
hebe 0.217 6 0.164 6 0.046 27
Zhejang  0.197 7 0.092 16 0.074 17
helongjang 0.194 8 0.393 1 0.068 20
inner mongola 0.175 9 0.117 10 0.108 8
Nngxa 0.166 10 0.074 21 0.141 6
hunan 0.166 11 0.087 17 0.191 2
shaanx 0.164 12 0.076 19 0.104 10
henan 0.157 13 0.182 4 0.072 19
laonng 0.153 14 0.081 18 0.169 4
Guangx 0.152 15 0.142 8 0.074 16
Jangx 0.148 16 0.113 11 0.089 12
Jangsu 0.147 17 0.038 27 0.087 13
Xnjang 0.143 18 0.092 15 0.033 28
Jln 0.142 19 0.244 2 0.124 7
Anhu 0.141 20 0.035 28 0.055 23
Guzhou 0.137 21 0.108 12 0.185 3
shanx 0.134 22 0.174 5 0.049 26
shandong 0.131 23 0.075 20 0.052 24
Qnha 0.124 24 0.063 23 0.064 21
Yunnan 0.115 25 0.206 3 0.105 9
Gansu 0.113 26 0.056 25 0.074 18
schuan 0.109 27 0.067 22 0.169 5
hube 0.106 28 0.059 24 0.076 15
Source: Authors’ rankng.
383
Economic opening and domestic market integration
consderng that the effect s n non-lnear form, we construct the 
quadratc term of openng (Tradesq) n our model. Fgure 18.3 presents 
the upward trend of the dependency rato on nternatonal trade from 
1985 to 2001. it s consstent wth ncreasng economc openng. The 
promnent case s Guangzhou Provnce: n terms of the level and the rate 
of change, ths provnce exceeds that of other regons. As we deduced 
n secton three, there could be a non-lnear effect of economc openng, 
so that the coefficent of the lnear term could be postve, and that of 
the quadratc term could be negatve.
• Govcons—the rato of government consumpton to GdP s the proxy of 
the fiscal objectves of local governments—an mportant motve for local 
protecton—so we expect to detect a postve correlaton between ths 
varable and the segmentaton. in emprcal studes, an alternatve of 
government nterference s the rato of provncal government expendture 
to GdP.12 We tred t n our regresson and the result was consstent but 
less sgnficant, so we report only the estmates wth Govcons. 
• SOE—the share of state-owned employees n total employees. As we 
mentoned n secton three, ths s an ndcator for employment pressure 
and publc authorty n the local economy. The coefficent could be 
postve.
•	 Techdiff—the rato of GdP per worker per regon wth that of ts 
neghbours, whch s a proxy of technology dfference. The GdP per 
worker of neghbourng regons s the smple arthmetc mean of that of 
all conjont regons, whch assgns each neghbour the same weghtng 
coefficents. lu et al. (2004) presented a theoretcal framework to prove 
that the less-developed regons had a motve to set segmentaton, but 
better-developed regons pursued market ntegraton. in ths logc, the 
coefficent of Techdiff could be negatve.
We also ncluded two mportant control varables n our regresson model
• Area—the average sze of a regon and ts neghbours. We use ths 
varable to ndcate roughly the average physcal sze of local and conjont 
provnces. Area = local sze + (total area of neghbours ÷ the number of 
neghbours). Because most provnces have several neghbours, a smple 
straght-lne dstance cannot capture the nature of geographc dstance. 
The antcpated sgn of ths varable s postve.13
• Dummy94—the dummy varable of tme—let them be one after 1994, 
otherwse they equal zero. After the mplementaton of a seres of reforms 
n 1994, ntegraton could be strengthened sgnficantly. Therefore, ths 
varable could be negatvely related wth the segmentaton ndex.
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Fgure 18.3  The ratio of dependence on international trade by region, 
1985–2001
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Economic opening and domestic market integration
in our model, αi s the unobservable provncal fixed effect, whch s constant 
over tme and specfic to the provnce, ‘’, and εt s the dsturbance. snce the 
unobservable term αi could be correlated wth some ndependent varables, the 
ols estmates are based. one of the general ways to reduce the bas caused 
by omtted varables represented by the constant αi s the method of de-mean 
mposed on all varables before regressons, whch s the fixed effects (Fe) 
approach. if αi s uncorrelated wth the other regressors, the random effects 
(re) model s more efficent and we can test the fixed and random effects 
regressons by the hausman Test to decde whch of the two alternatves s 
better. if two coefficent estmators dffer systematcally, αi s correlated wth one 
of the explanatory varables and only the Fe treatment s consstent. otherwse, 
the fact that the ndvdual effect αi s uncorrelated wth the other regressors 
cannot be rejected, and the efficent estmators of the re model are better.
That αi s constant over tme s, however, a very strong assumpton. 
Unobserved tme-varyng factors can cause estmators to be nconsstent, 
so nstrument varable estmaton s helpful. The results could also be tested 
wth the hausman Test. if the estmate of the nstrument varable model s 
sgnficantly dfferent from that of the ols estmaton, the hypothess that some 
of the regressors are endogenous cannot be rejected, the nstrument varable 
estmaton s consstent and the orgnal ols estmaton s more efficent.
results are reported n Table 18.2. The regresson (1) begns wth explanatory 
varables Trade, Govcons, SOE, Area and Dummy94. The hausman Test rejects 
the re estmaton, so we cannot estmate the effect of physcal dstance (Area). 
in ths model, Govcons and SOE strengthen segmentaton, and the estmate of 
Dummy94 shows that, after 1994, the accelerated marketsaton reform caused 
segmentaton to abate. our results show, the coefficent of economc openng 
s postve, suggestng trade openng rases segmentaton. For the sake of 
examnng the effect of economc openng more precsely, we add Tradesq 
n regresson (2) to capture a potental non-lnear effect. The hausman Test 
rejects the re approach. compared wth (1), coefficent estmates of Govcons 
and SOE change slghtly wth ths specficaton, but wth the sgnficant postve 
estmate of Trade and negatve estmate of the quadratc term, Tradesq, model 
(2) s more compatble wth our theoretcal framework. The effect of openng 
s non-lnear. At ts ntal stage, openng strengthens market segmentaton, 
but further openng enhances domestc market ntegraton. Numercally, the 
crtcal pont s Trade = 1.272. Before ths pont, economc openng ncreases 
segmentaton; after ths, t ncreases ntegraton. The value 1.272 falls nto the 
observable nterval; the data for Guangdong Provnce exceeded ths level after 
1991.
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in the next step, Techdiff s added n model (3). The estmate of Techdiff 
s nsgnficant, but the sgn s negatve as the theory predcts. The negatve 
coefficent means that lagged regons have a smaller ndex of Techdiff, and more 
serous market segmentaton, whle the better-developed regons wth hgher 
Techdiff have smaller segmentaton magntude. The nsgnficant estmate 
s reasonable here. Frstly, the technology dfference theory works better n 
hgh-tech ndustres wth ncreasng turns (lu et al. 2004), but our explanatory 
varables are set up from prce ndces of ordnary consumer goods. secondly, 
the technologcal dfference has a long-term effect, so our one-year lagged 
model cannot capture ths characterstc. Thrdly, lke the effect of openng, the 
technologcal dfference could nfluence segmentaton n a non-lnear form, 
but our model has only a lnear term of technology. 
lookng back at the results so far, we extend the study on the crtcal value of 
the nversed-U shape of the effects of economc openng. in regresson (2), the 
pont s Trade = 1.272, but n regresson (3), the pont s Trade = 1.043. Although 
these two values are wthn our sample, only Guangdong has exceeded that level 
of economc openng. We worry that the non-lnear effects of openng are due 
only to the outlers n our sample. so the next step s to drop all observatons 
n Guangdong from our sample, and repeat the regresson (3); we get the result 
n column (4). The basc findng s smlar, but the crtcal value drops to Trade 
= 0.7273, a value wthn our new sample. Now, we can draw the convncng 
concluson that a non-lnear relatonshp exsts between economc openng 
and market segmentaton.
Fnally, consderng the extraordnarly hgh values of the segmentaton 
ndces n the three muncpaltes, we drop them, and repeat the estmaton. 
Table 18.2, column (5) reports the random effect estmates, the coefficents of 
regressors meet our expectaton and most of them are statstcally sgnficant, 
except Techdiff.
The estmates n Table 18.2 mght be based f omtted varables contan 
tme-varyng ones. in that case, the Fe and the re are nconsstent. Table 
18.3 presents the test results of nstrument varable estmatons. our goal s 
to find the unbased estmator of economc openng, so we mplement three 
nstrument varables.
• The pre-reform openng ndex n 1978, denoted as trade78. it s the 
nternatonal trade share n GdP n 1978 and represents the hstorcal 
nfluence.
•  The mnmum ralway dstance from the captal of a regon to the man 
chnese ports of hong kong or shangha (denoted as port).14 Ths 
nstrument varable represents the geographc effect and s the vald 
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Table 18.2  Market segmentation and its determinants
dependant varable            segmentaton
  All regons  Guangdong  Bejng, Tanjn
    excluded  and shangha
     excluded
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
independent  Fe Fe re re Fe
varables 
Trade 0.2621*** 0.7180*** 0.5653*** 0.6944*** 0.7831***
 (0.0864) (0.2073) (0.1216) (0.1707) (0.2216)
Tradesq n.a. –0.2821** –0.2711*** –0.4773** –0.3067**
  (0.1167) (0.0769) (0.2422) (0.1200)
Govcons 1.0059*** 0.9019** 0.3449 0.3405 0.9589**
 (0.3835) (0.3838) (0.2648) (0.2694) (0.3733)
Soe 0.9279*** 1.0085*** 0.7199*** 0.6481*** 0.9876***
 (0.2174) (0.2187) (0.1960) (0.2227) (0.2235)
Techdiff n.a. n.a. –0.0104 –0.0075 –0.0430
   (0.0192) (0.0212) (0.1060)
Area (dropped) (dropped) –2.4197 –2.1790 (dropped)
   (2.0891) (2.1210) 
Dummy94 –0.0831*** –0.0957*** –0.0969*** –0.1012*** –0.1028***
 (0.0221) (0.0226) (0.0209) (0.0219) (0.2252)
Constant –0.8533*** –0.9692*** –0.5702*** –0.5125** –0.9187***
 (0.2350) (0.2386) (0.2039) (0.2234) (0.2494)
Wthn r2 0.1441 0.1554 0.1463 0.1351 0.1812
F-value 18.35 16.01 n.a. n.a. 14.24
Wald ch2 n.a. n.a. 90.68 78.82 n.a.
hausman Test
P-value 15.12 9.72 9.76 10.20 14.64
 0.0045 0.0835 0.1352 0.1158 0.0232
No. of observatons 468 468 468 451 417
No. of regons 28 28 28 27 25
Notes: standard errors n parentheses; ***, **, * denote sgnficance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 
per cent level; the null hypothess of the hausman Test has no systematc dfference between Fe 
and re models. 
Sources: Authors’ calculatons.
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Table 18.3  Market segmentation and its determinants (instrumental 
variable estimation) 
dependant varables segmentaton
                                All regons  Guangdong  Bejng, Tanjn
   excluded  and shangha
    excluded 
 (6) (7) (8) (9)
independent  iV-Fe iV-re iV-re iV-Fe
varables 
Trade 3.1001*** 0.7202 0.5060* 3.0345***
 (0.9308) (0.6589) (0.2629) (0.9454)
Tradesq –1.5240*** –0.4635 –0.3350 –1.6581***
 (0.5826) (0.5879) (0.4245) (0.6054)
Govcons 0.3820 0.3113  0.3623  0.5508
 (0.4838) (0.2996)  (0.2763) (0.4604)
Soe 1.7757*** 0.5382*  0.5487*  1.2645***
 (0.3898) (0.2795) (0.2989)  (0.3160)
Techdiff n.a. –0.0138 –0.0030 –0.2533
  (0.0383) (0.0282) (0.1702)
Area (dropped) –1.6967 –3.0731 (dropped)
  (3.9994) (2.2910) 
Dummy94 –0.1551*** –0.1089*** –0.1010*** –0.1616***
 (0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0236) (0.0352)
Constant –1.9349*** –0.3974 –0.4038 –1.1359***
 (0.4459) (0.2717) (0.2860) (0.3761)
Wthn r2 . 0.1236 0.1316 .
Between r2 0.5373 0.4085 0.4409 0.3016
iV portrate trad78rate trad78rate  portrate
hausman Test
P-value 8.29 1.17 1.34 6.11
 0.1410 0.9916 0.9874 0.4111
Notes: standard errors n parentheses; ***, **, * denote sgnficance at 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent, 10 per cent level; the null hypothess of the hausman Test s that there s no systematc 
dfference between iV estmaton and orgnal models; the wthn r2 of (6) and (9) are too small, 
so stata does not report them. 
Sources: Authors’ calculatons.
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nstrument varable for economc openng n We and Wu (2001 ). We 
compare the dstances only to hong kong or shangha because they 
are two bggest ports n chna, located n the Pearl rver delta and the 
Yangtse rver delta, respectvely, and ther throughputs are far beyond 
those of other ports. 
• The exchange rate (denoted as rate) determnes the nternatonal relatve 
prce drectly and affects the volume of nternatonal trade of each 
provnce accordngly, but t does not nfluence ntegraton drectly, so t 
s a vald nstrumental varable. 
exchange rate and nternatonal trade nterplay mutually, so we use the lagged 
rate as the iV of openng. in our regresson model, openng s a one-year lagged 
trade varable, so the rate iV n estmaton s the two-year lagged exchange rate. 
The problem s, n Table 18.2, columns (2) and (5) are all Fe models; iVs constant 
over tme are elmnated n the de-mean process. so we set up two nteracton 
terms, the nteracton of trade78 and rate (trade78rate), and the nteracton of 
port and rate (portrate). These two nstruments are composed of tme-varyng 
exchange rate and tme-fxed regonal specfc or hstorcal effects. The 
justficaton for usng the nteracton terms as nstruments s that the effects of 
the nstruments on economc openng depend on each other. in more concrete 
terms, the effects of hstory and geography on openng wll be greater f the 
prce of nternatonal trade s more advantageous, and the exchange rate wll 
have more sgnficant effects on openng n regons wth better geographc and 
hstorcal condtons. We have used both nstrumental varables n the model 
alternately. All results of the hausman Test do not reject the null hypothess of 
no systematc dfference between iV and the orgnal models. Table 18.3 reports 
the correspondng iV models of columns (2)–(5) n Table 18.2, and the models 
wth alternatve iVs that we do not report here also reject the endogenety of 
openng, so the estmates n Table 18.2 are convncng.
Conclusions
many studes on the chnese domestc market have provded evdence n 
support of the general trends of market ntegraton as a result of economc 
transformaton. The exstence of domestc market segmentaton, however, and 
the negatve effects of local protectonsm can hardly be rejected (Zhen and l 
2003; Poncet 2003a). For ths reason, examnng the determnants of domestc 
market ntegraton s stll an mportant ssue facng researchers as well as 
decson makers n chna. 
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our emprcal results answer two questons. Frst, has the domestc goods 
market become more ntegrated snce the reforms? The segmentaton ndex 
constructed by chnese rPi data shows a dfferent tendency from that found by 
Young’s (2000) and Poncet’s (2002) findngs. The man findng s that the trend of 
market ntegraton s persstent and ncreases over tme, although such a trend 
also experences serous short-term aberratons, and untl now the progress n 
market ntegraton has vared across dfferent provnces.
second, dd more ntegrated nternatonal trade substtute nter-provncal 
trade and ntensfy domestc market segmentaton, as stated by Poncet (2002, 
2003b)? We nvestgated the ncdence of trade openng, whch has been a 
prmary polcy focus n chnese economc reform. our study captures a non-
lnear correlaton, meanng that the openng polcy could worsen the extent of 
market segmentaton n ts ntal stage of development, but further openng 
enhances and strengthens the process and the extent of domestc market 
ntegraton. such findngs endorse the vew that movng towards an open 
economy s fundamentally conducve to the objectve of buldng an ntegrated 
market system n chna.
We also analysed the nfluence of geography, pressure for employment, 
government consumpton and technology dfferentals. evdence reveals 
that employment pressure and government consumpton worsen market 
segmentaton. 
in concluson, economc openng benefits domestc market ntegraton. 
however, most provnces stll have a long way to go to be ntegrated more nto 
the natonal market system. meanwhle, nsttutonal reforms, such as those 
amed at constranng local government nterventon and contnual prvatsaton, 
wll help to further enhance the process of market ntegraton n chna.
Notes
1 Poncet 2004 argued that the volume of ntra-provncal trade flow was not nfluenced by the 
parallel evoluton of nternatonal trade. But her former paper (2003b) stated that chnese 
provnces’ greater nvolvement n nternatonal trade went hand-n-hand wth a decrease n 
domestc trade flow ntensty between 1987 and 1997.
2 in our data, economc openng has a negatve correlaton wth the share of state-owned 
enterprses and publc consumpton.
3 moreover, these two papers partally overlooked the smultanety bas. in most studes of 
ths field, however, the varables of government polcy are usually correlated wth market 
ntegraton to dfferent degrees; the smple way to mtgate ths knd of bas s to use the 
lagged explanatory varables. The treatment of these two papers was ncomplete. Ba (2004) 
consdered only the lagged tax-plus-profit rato and Poncet 2004 consdered only the lagged 
rate of unemployment and the share of the publc sector n total consumpton.
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4 Theoretcally, a hgher tax-plus-profit rato could be the result of, rather than the motve for, 
local protectonsm, so Ba (2004) used lagged tax-plus-profit ratos to mtgate ths type of 
endogenety bas.
5 some of the lterature chooses 1992, when deng Xaopng toured southern chna, as the start 
pont of the new stage of reform. consderng the executon tme of polces, however, we thnk 
1994 s the better dvson standard.
6 There are three forms of relatve prce n emprcal studes of the ceberg model. The other 
two forms are the drect prce rato between two places,  kjtkit /PP , and the logarthm of prce 
rato,  )/PLn(PQ kjtkitkijt = . The man mprovement n the second form s that the estmator of the 
ndependent varable s ndependent of the unt of measurement. Furthermore, a logarthm 
can mtgate the dsturbance of heteroskedastcty and skewng (Wooldrdge 2003). detals 
of the relatve prce forms are ntroduced by Parsley and We (1996, 2001a, 2001b).
7 The earlest data for hanan, chongqng and Tbet began n 1988, 1997 and 1999 respectvely. 
Before 1987, statstcs for Guangdong covered hanan. Before 1997, data for schuan ncluded 
chongqng.
8 A formal dscusson s presented n Parsley and We (2001a and 2001b).
9 Alternatvely, Parsley and We (2001a and 2001b) used ols regressons to remove fixed 




ijt QQ  and the resdual was ktkijtkijt QˆQq ∆β−∆= , whch s 
an nexplcable term of ktQ∆ . We can get the same result through these two approaches.
10 in Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials in 50 Years of New China, all data for schuan 
peel off those for chongqng, so schuan’s explanatory varables do not contan the porton 
for chongqng. The dependent varable of schuan, however, comes from the rPi that covered 
chongqng before 1996. We suppose the rPi of one area wll not change much f peelng off 
only a porton of t. For more sample numbers, we keep these 11 components.
11 The data for mports and exports are the values n renmnb transferred by mddle prces for the 
renmnb–Us dollar. The exchange rates were obtaned from China Statistical Yearbooks.
12 in the lterature on economc growth, the government expendture to GdP rato—wth 
expendture for educaton and natonal defence subtracted—s used commonly as the proxy 
of government nterference. But chnese local governments have no statstcs on natonal 
defence, and there s no separate category for educaton—only total numbers of expendture 
for culture, educaton, research and health—so we subtracted the share of expendture for 
culture, educaton, research and health from total government expendture.
13 The study of head et al. 2002 measured the dstance by Area376.0 , where ‘Area’ denoted the 
numercal value of area. The calculaton strategy was based on the assumpton of a unform 
dstrbuton of consumers. We also used ths ndex n regressons, and the conclusons were 
the same as the ones we report.
14 shenzhen s one of the largest ports n chna, but t s close to hong kong, so the dstances 
from provncal captals to hong kong are also the dstances to shenzhen. These data were 
collected from the China Electronic Map for Transportation and Travel (Bejng Tulng software 
ltd). We acknowledge Yu Jn’s help for data collectng.
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Stepping stones to market integration
The role of economc and technologcal 
development zones
Wei Zhang
chna’s Natonal People’s congress passed the enterprse income Tax law of 
the People’s republc of chna n march 2007. Ths new law unfied enterprse 
ncome tax rates appled to domestc and foregn-nvested firms. The passage 
of the new law s part of the chnese government’s efforts to provde a level 
playng field for busness competton between domestc and foregn-nvested 
firms. Ths legslaton s also a sgnficant step towards chna fulfillng ts 
World Trade organzaton (WTo) oblgatons. After a short transtonal perod, 
the changes n tax rates and taxng practce wll end most of the prvleges 
enjoyed by foregn-nvested enterprses located n varous specal economc 
zones (seZs) n chna. Ths attracts broad attenton to the role and the future 
of chna’s seZs.
settng up seZs has been a popular polcy tool for developng and ndustralsed 
countres to mplement ther trade, ndustry and regonal polces. An seZ s an 
area that has economc laws and management systems dfferent from those n 
the rest of the country. The man goals of developng such a zone are to attract 
nward foregn drect nvestment (Fdi), expand exports, ncrease the fiscal 
ncome of foregn exchange, spur local employment and promote development 
of technology. specal polcy ncentves provded to acheve such goals usually 
nclude provson of better nfrastructure, preferental tax treatments, prvleged 
tradng terms and less bureaucratc admnstratve procedures. 
seZs have varous forms. The World export Processng Zones Assocaton 
categorses dfferent zones accordng to ther varous sze, ndustry and 
performance specfics (WePZA 2007). For example, there are some large seZs 
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n the world that cover or are ntegrated wthn an entre cty, or even a whole 
regon; there are also some relatvely small export processng zones wth an 
area less than 1,000 hectares. There are some ndustral parks specalsed n 
certan ndustres, and some hgh-tech parks attractng and supportng firms 
that possess or develop hgh or new technologes. 
The varous forms of seZs have developed very rapdly n the past few 
decades. Accordng to crttle and Aknc (2004), the number of seZs n the 
world ncreased from 80 to 3,000 from the late 1970s to the early 2000s; the 
number of countres that hosted seZs ncreased from about 30 to more than 
120. The value of export goods produced n such zones ncreased from Us$6 
bllon to Us$600 bllon, and the number of people employed wthn the zones 
ncreased from one mllon to 50 mllon. 
snce chna started ts economc reforms n 1978, t has become the country 
that holds the largest number of varous forms of seZs n the world. The first 
seZ n chna was approved n 1979. By the end of 2006, there were 1,568 seZs 
across the country. The total plannng area of seZs was 9,949 square klometres 
(state commsson of development and reform, mnstry of land and Natural 
resources, and mnstry of constructon 2006). 
durng the same perod, the chnese economy also wtnessed the fastest 
growth, compared wth ts own hstory and compared wth the rest of the 
world. 
The phenomenal surge n the number of seZs, concdng wth rapd 
economc growth, has nvted broad attenton from scholars and polcymakers. 
The role of seZs has always been hghly contentous, globally and n chna 
(Aggarwal 2006). Very often, creaton of seZs has been descrbed as one of 
the most powerful engnes drvng chna’s economc growth. on the other 
hand, the pro-seZ polces of the chnese government have also drawn much 
crtcsm, especally because of ther negatve mpacts, such as the msuse of 
arable land, dstorton of the domestc market, expanson of regonal dspartes 
and unfar trade competton n the nternatonal market (cartter 2001; Wel 
1996; Gopalakrshnan 2007).
There are many dfferent forms of seZs n chna. They can be dvded 
nto two man categores: ‘Jingji Tequ’ (specal economc zones: n order to 
dstngush ths specfic form from the general term of seZ, t s specfied 
n ths chapter as chna’s specal economc Zones, hereafter cseZs); and 
‘Kaifaqu’ (economc development Zones, edZs). Wthn the category of the 
edZs, there are Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu (economc and Technologcal development 
Zones, eTdZs), Gaoxin Jishu Kaifaqu (hgh and New Technology development 
Zones, hTdZs), Baoshuiqu (Free Tarff/Trade Zones, FTZs), Chukou Jiagongqu 
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(export Processng Zones, ePZs), Bianjing Jingji Hezuoqu (Bordered economc 
cooperatve Zones, BecZs), and others. 
Ths chapter attempts to explan the hstorcal and specal polcy treatments 
of seZs n chna, to evaluate ther role n promotng natonal economc reform 
and development and to analyse the challenges they are facng n the WTo 
era. Whle the paper presents the general development of varous forms of 
seZs, t wll focus more on eTdZs—n partcular, natonal-level eTdZs. Ths 
s due not only to the lack of research on eTdZs n chna compared wth the 
abundant research lterature on cseZs, but because eTdZs have hugely 
outnumbered seZs and now spread to every provnce, muncpalty and 
autonomous regon. Ths broad geographcal coverage and resultng close 
relatonshps between eTdZs and ther surroundng areas enables them to 
play a very effectve role n ntroducng new management deas, nternatonally 
recognsed busness practces and compettve technologcal nnovatons to 
the rest of the country. 
other forms of edZs are ether small peces of land located wthn eTdZs—
such as ePZs and hTdZs—or zones that enjoy smlar preferental polces to 
those of eTdZs, although they are located n separate locatons, such as TdZs 
and BecZs. 
Creation and development of ETDZs 
eTdZs were an extenson of successful experments wth cseZs. in July 1979, as 
part of a natonal reform plan, the central government decded to establsh four 
cseZs n southern chan state: shenzhen, Zhuha and shantou n Guangdong 
Provnce, and hul (expanded to the whole sland of Xamen n 1984) n Fujan 
Provnce.1 
Wth prvleges such as a much hgher degree of autonomy and a seres of 
favourable treatments n taxaton, nternatonal trade and other aspects, the 
four cseZs quckly stood out from ther surroundng areas and from the rest of 
the country n economc growth, ncreases n employment, surges n Fdi and 
expanson of exports. in less than four years, almost all of the cseZs doubled 
ther GdP (Table 19.1). The development of shenzhen was partcularly stunnng. 
By the end of 1983, shenzhen’s GdP reached 1.3 bllon yuan—about five tmes 
the figure for 1979—and nward Fdi reached hk$2.98 bllon. industral output 
reached 1.66 tmes the total output durng the whole perod from 1949 to 1978; 
and fiscal revenue was 10.9 tmes that of 1978 (Zhao and chen 1984:82).
encouraged by the success of the four cseZs, the central government 
decded to further open 14 ctes n the coastal area whle contnung support 
for the four expermental cseZs.2 Among 10 new polcy ntatves n promotng 
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economc reform and development n the coastal areas, establshng the eTdZs 
has been regarded as the most effectve.
expectatons for the newly establshed eTdZs were ntally very hgh. 
The central government requred the first group of eTdZs to functon as ‘four 
wndows’; that s, a wndow of advanced technology, a wndow of excellent 
management, a wndow of new knowledge and a wndow for the open-door 
polcy. These hgh expectatons reflected the great ambtons of then leaders 
Table 19.1 GDP of five SEZs and national total, 1980–2005 (rmB mllon)
 shenzhen Zhuha shantou Xamen hanan Natonal total share 
       (per cent)
1980 270 261 1,079 640 1,933 454,562 0.92
1981 496 318 1,262 741 2,223 488,946 1.03
1982 826 353 1,416 867 2,886 533,045 1.19
1983 1,312 406 1,340 944 3,112 598,555 1.19
1984 2,342 678 1,740 1,229 3,718 724,375 1.34
1985 3,902 981 2,404 1,836 4,326 904,074 1.49
1986 4,164 1,110 2,836 2,119 4,803 1,027,438 1.46
1987 5,590 1,590 3,865 2,549 5,760 1,205,062 1.61
1988 8,698 2,507 5,714 3,598 7,713 1,503,682 1.88
1989 11,566 3,081 6,547 4,792 9,140 1,700,092 2.07
1990 17,167 4,143 7,245 5,709 10,249 1,871,832 2.38
1991 23,666 6,237 8,958 7,200 12,051 2,182,620 2.66
1992 31,732 10,320 10,910 9,767 18,171 2,693,728 3.00
1993 44,929 13,400 14,862 13,232 25,810 3,526,002 3.18
1994 61,519 15,720 19,719 18,704 33,090 4,810,846 3.09
1995 79,570 18,506 26,203 25,055 36,417 5,981,053 3.11
1996 95,004 20,732 31,366 30,635 38,950 7,014,249 3.09
1997 113,001 23,520 37,352 31,780 40,990 7,765,313 3.18
1998 128,902 26,350 42,318 41,806 43,890 8,302,428 3.41
1999 143,602 28,660 45,459 45,829 47,120 8,818,895 3.52
2000 166,547 33,026 47,698 50,187 51,850 9,800,045 3.56
2001 195,465 36,833 48,438 53,192 55,220 10,806,822 3.60
2002 223,941 40,903 48,978 56,135 58,557 11,909,569 3.60
2003 289,541 47,671 51,976 62,173 65,169 13,517,398 3.82
2004 342,280 55,167 54,768 68,375 72,016 15,958,675 3.71
2005 400,468 63,495 57,397 74,788 79,150 18,395,610 3.67
Sources: data of five seZs before 2000 are from Wang, G., 2004. Research on Sustainable 
Development of China’s Five Special Economic Zones (n chnese), Jngjguanl chubanshe, 
Bejng. After 2000, the data are from the local statstcal yearbooks n each year; natonal data 
are from Natonal Bureau of statstcs, 2006. China Statistical Yearbook, chna statstcal Press, 
Bejng.
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of the reforms to narrow the gaps n technology and economc development 
between chna and the newly ndustralsed states n east Asa. Partcularly, 
they expected eTdZs to play a key role n ntroducng hgh technologes, whch 
was the goal they thought the four cseZs had faled to acheve. 
expectatons, however, appeared unrealstc. The new eTdZs were not 
able to acheve these requrements due to the rgd admnstratve system of 
the local governments, lack of knowledge of nternal busness practces, poor 
nfrastructure and other factors. in 1989, the central government modfied 
the gudng prncple from four wndows to ‘three foc’: focusng on ndustral 
development, utlsaton of Fdi and exports. The key change of the prncples 
was to relax the requrement for ntroducton of hgh and new technologes 
and attractng more foregn nvestment. 
The central government granted the eTdZs most of the preferental polces 
and admnstratve autonomy that the four cseZs had enjoyed (state councl of 
the Prc 1984). Those specal polces ncluded preferental tax rates on foregn-
nvested firms located n eTdZs, a hgh degree of admnstratve autonomy 
from the local government and a more flexble management system for foregn 
trade, land development and bankng servces.
Preferental tax treatment for foregn-nvested enterprses located n 
eTdZs
The ncome tax rate for foregn-nvested enterprses located n eTdZs was 15 
per cent, whle t was 24 per cent n the provnces of Guangdong and Fujan, 
and 30 per cent n the rest of the country. For the foregn-nvested enterprses 
wth terms of operaton of more than 10 years, startng from the first year of 
profit makng, ther ncome tax for the first two years would be exempted and 
that for the next three years would be only 7.5 per cent. if the foregn partner 
of a foregn-nvested enterprse renvested ts profit drectly nto a busness 
n the eTdZ wth a term of operaton of more than five years, t could apply 
for a refund of 40 per cent of the ncome tax pad. if the foregn nvestor used 
ts profit to launch or expand an export-orented or technologcally advanced 
enterprse wth a term of operaton of more than five years, ts ncome tax pad 
would be fully refunded.  
hgher degree of admnstratve autonomy for the eTdZs
The eTdZs were granted power to approve foregn nvestment, manage 
nternatonal trade and make local regulatons. orgnally, any foregn 
nvestment n chna had to be approved by the central government. Under that 
399
Stepping stones to market integration
system, the process of approval was not transparent and the watng perod 
was very long. After the decentralsaton of economc management n the early 
1980s, provncal governments were granted power to approve foregn-nvested 
projects of less than Us$5 mllon. The eTdZs, however, were granted much 
hgher admnstratve autonomy than most provnces. For example, eTdZs n 
shangha and Tanjn were granted power to approve foregn-nvested projects 
up to Us$30 mllon. The governments of provnces and ctes that hosted eTdZs 
also gave some admnstratve powers to the eTdZs n order to accelerate the 
procedure of approvng foregn-nvested firms.
other preferental polces
such polces nclude lower nterest rates for bankng loans, no mport duty for 
nvestment goods, office equpment and other products used wthn the eTdZs. 
Before chna unfied exchange rates n 1994, the eTdZs were also granted a 
certan quota of foregn exchange at the offical exchange rate, whch allowed 
them to mport some consumer goods to make profits to rase captal for 
constructon of nfrastructure. Before 1996, the central government also rebated 
all the tax revenue collected from the firms located n the eTdZs.    
These polcy ncentves have stmulated provncal and local governments’ 
enthusasm for settng up eTdZs n ther areas. in addton to those preferental 
polces gven by the central government, many provncal and local governments 
promsed financal and other support for the eTdZs. Ths ncludes sellng land 
for development at lower than market prces, offerng full rebates of local tax 
and provdng specal treatment n servces ncludng electrcty and water 
supply and telecommuncatons.
The first eTdZ, dalan economc and Technologcal development Zone 
(dalan eTdZ), was approved by the central government n August 1984. snce 
then, thousands of eTdZs have been establshed across the country. The 
development of the eTdZs n chna can be dvded nto three stages: 1984 to 
1988, 1992 to 1996, and 2000 to 2004. 
The perod from 1984 to 1988 was the nfant stage of the eTdZs’ development. 
only 14 eTdZs were approved by the state councl durng ths perod and all 
were concentrated n nne coastal provnces (see Table 19.2). 
most of the first group of eTdZs was bult n remote areas far from the 
man ctes due to concerns about ‘the mpacts of captalsm’. Ths made the 
nvestment envronment extremely harsh. Poor nfrastructure, lack of nvestment 
captal, restrctons on orgnal management systems and a shortfall of talent 
were the man constrants on development at ths stage. 
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The efforts of the newly approved eTdZs n ths perod focused manly 
on nfrastructure constructon, makng connectons wth potental overseas 
nvestors and reformng management systems. These efforts lad a sound 
foundaton for future development, but the nflow of foregn nvestment and 
other economc development were very lmted n ths perod. The eTdZs 
experenced severe stagnaton, partcularly n the perod from 1989 to 1991, 
because of poltcal retrogresson and resultng adverse changes n the 
nternatonal envronment. By the end of 1991, the man economc ndcators 
of the first group of eTdZs were not mpressve at all (Table 19.3). 
The second stage of eTdZs’ development—regarded as the ‘golden perod’—
was from 1992 to 1996. A large number of new eTdZs and other forms of edZs 
were approved, ncludng 18 eTdZs approved by the state councl (Table 19.2). 
durng ths perod, the first group of 14 eTdZs were really takng off. Table 19.3 
Table 19.2 Establishment of economic and technological development 
zones (eTdZs), 1984–2002
Perod Number Approved eTdZs Provnce a
1984–88 14 dalan, Qnhuangdao, Tanjn,  shangha, Tanjn, laonng, hebe, 
  Yanta, Qngdao, lanyungang,  shandong, Jangsu, Zhejang, Fujan,
  Nantong, mnhang, hongqao,  Guangdong (9 provnces)
  caohejng, Nngbo, Fuzhou, 
  Guangzhou, Zhanjang  
1992–93 18 Yngkou, changchun,   Bejng, chongqng, helongjang, 
  shenyang, harbn, Weha,  Jln, hube, Xnjang, hanan
  kunshan, hangzhou, Xaoshan,  (7 provnces)
  Wenzhou, hongqao, dongshan, 
  Guangzhou Nansha, 
  huzhou dayawan, Wuhu, 
  Wuhan, chongqng, 
  Bejng, Urumch  
2000–02 17 hefe, Zhengzhou, X’an,  inner-mongola, shanx, Anhu,
  changsha, chengdu, kunmng,  Jangx, henan, hunan, schuan,
  Gunyang, Nanchang, shhez, Yunnan, Guzhou, shaanx, Qngha,
  Xnng, huhhot, Tayuan,  Nngxa, Gansu, Tbet (14 provnces)
  Nannng, Ynchuan, lanzhou, 
  lasa
a Provnces that were allowed to buld eTdZs for the first tme. 
Source: department of Foregn investment management n mnstry of commerce, 2007. 
National Level Economic and Technological Development Zones Main Economic Indices, Bejng.
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Table 19.3  Economic indicators of the first group of 14 ETDZs, 1991, 
1996 and 2005
 GdP industral import export realsed  Tax  
  output    Fdi revenue
 (rmB mllon) (rmB mllon) (Us$ mllon) (Us$ mllon) (Us$ mllon) (rmB mllon)
1991 5,611.5 14,594.0 1,094.4 1,140.0 1,377.0 790.0
1996 72,590.0 188,786.0 6,127.0 6,419.0 3,832.0 10,145.0
2005 356,285.4 916,384.2 44,231.1 45,308.1 4,662.6 55,134.3
Source: department of Foregn investment management n mnstry of commerce, 2007. 
National Level Economic and Technological Development Zones Main Economic Indices, Bejng.




















































China—Linking Markets for Growth
shows that the man economc ndcators of the first group of eTdZs mproved 
dramatcally. in 1996, ther GdP was 12.9 tmes that n 1991. industral output 
ncreased 12.9 tmes, mports and exports 5.6 tmes, foregn nvestment 2.8 tmes 
and tax revenue 12.8 tmes. many multnatonal corporatons started to enter the 
eTdZs, ncludng motorola, West Pacfic Petrochemcal, P&G and samsung.
The thrd development perod of the eTdZs was from 2000 to 2002. The 
eTdZs had spread quckly to all areas of the country, but the rapd ncrease 
n ths perod followed a very dfferent pattern compared wth the prevous 
two perods n terms of geographc dstrbuton. Newly establshed eTdZs 
were located manly n the central and western areas, n contrast wth the 
prevous geographcal concentraton n coastal areas. Table 19.2 shows that 
all of the newly establshed natonal-level eTdZs were located n the western 
and central areas (Fgure 19.1). As a result, by the end of ths perod, every 
provnce, muncpalty and autonomous regon had at least one natonal-level 
eTdZ. Ths new trend was n accord wth the government’s regonal polcy of 
developng the western area.
By the end of 2002, the number of varous knds of eTdZs n the whole country 
had soared to 6,866; and the plannng area for varous eTdZs reached 38,600 
square klometres. in July 2003, the state councl decded to stop approvng 
new eTdZs and started a naton-wde clean-up and rectficaton of exstng 
eTdZs. Up to the end of 2006, the number of eTdZs was reduced to 1,568, and 
the plannng area was reduced to 9,949 square klometres (Zhu 2007). Among 
the survvng edZs, 222 were approved drectly by the state councl as natonal-
level edZs. They nclude 49 eTdZs, 53 hTdZs, 15 TFZs, 58 ePZs, 14 BecZs and 
33 other zones, such as specal tourst zones and specal logstcal zones. 
Impacts of ETDZs on China’s economic reform and development
The purpose of establshng seZs or eTdZs s to promote economc growth, 
create employment opportuntes, attract Fdi and expand nternatonal trade. 
suffice to say, eTdZs have played a sgnficant role n chna’s economc reform 
and economc growth. 
A drvng force for economc growth
many local governments have regarded eTdZs as an effectve means of 
fosterng a new pont of economc growth wthn ther area. That s part of 
the reason why the number of eTdZs had prolferated to more than 6,000 by 
the end of 2002. The major economc ndcators of 54 natonal-level eTdZs 
(hereafter NeTdZs) demonstrate the sgnficant contrbuton of the zones to 
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chna’s natonal economc growth.3 The economc sze of the 54 NeTdZs s 
estmated to account for about 73 per cent of all edZs and about 86 per cent 
of all 222 NedZs.4 
contnuously hgher GdP growth rates n the NeTdZs compared wth the 
natonal total n the past two decades means constant ncreases of ther GdP 
share n the natonal total. Ths trend mples a drect contrbuton of the eTdZs 
to the country’s economc growth. 
Tables 19.4 and 19.5 show that the share of the 54 NeTdZs n the natonal 
total of GdP reached 4.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent n 2005 and 2006, respectvely. 
Ther growth rates were 24.14 per cent and 24 per cent respectvely—14.2 and 
13.3 percentage ponts hgher than the natonal level. The contrbuton of the 
NeTdZs to the net growth of GdP was 9.7 and 9.69 per cent respectvely. The 
GdP produced n the first group of 14 NeTdZs accounted for about 43.4 per 
cent of that of the total NeTdZs, and ther share n the natonal total GdP was 
1.95 per cent (Table 19.6). 
in addton to the contrbuton from the NeTdZs, the five cseZs have made 
a sgnficant contrbuton to natonal economc growth. Ther share n total 
natonal GdP ncreased from less than 1 per cent n 1980 to 3.7 per cent n 
2005 (Table 19.7).
People could argue that the hgher GdP growth n the NeTdZs and the 
cseZs mght not be due to a creaton effect but a dverson effect. some 
people queston whether the hgh GdP growth of the NeTdZs and the cseZs 
has been realsed at the expense of a slowng of GdP growth n other areas. i 
do not have a complete data set to answer ths queston fully. however, based 
on the data n Tables 4 and 5, wthout the contrbuton from the eTdZs n 2005 
and 2006, the natonal growth rates would stll be very hgh: 8.9 and 9.7 per 
cent respectvely—only about one percentage pont lower n each year than 
they were.
investgaton of the economc structure n the NeTdZs also seems to support 
the creaton argument. Tables 4 and 5 show a clear nternatonal orentaton of 
the NeTdZs’ economes. The expandng speed of nternatonal trade was much 
faster than the growth rates of GdP—a sgnficant sgn of market creaton rather 
than resource dverson. The growth rates of exports were about 36 and 31 per 
cent n 2005 and 2006 respectvely. imports wtnessed smlar rapd growth. 
The two tables also show that the shares of the NeTdZs’ nternatonal trade 
and Fdi n the natonal total were three to four tmes ther share of GdP n the 
natonal total. Ther contrbuton rate to total exports and Fdi n the country 
was as hgh as 17 and 62 per cent respectvely n 2006.
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China—Linking Markets for Growth
A postve factor for mprovng economc qualty
The NeTdZs have not only made great contrbutons to natonal economc 
growth, they have played a postve role n mprovng the qualty of the natonal 
economy. 
There s no absolute measurement for economc qualty. if we use the 
absolute level of technology contaned n producton or products as a 
measurement, compared wth ndustralsed economes, most developng 
economes would be regarded as low-qualty economes. if, however, we take a 
dynamc perspectve and regard the economc qualty as a constantly changng 
varable, t should not be dfficult to measure a process of mprovement n 
economc qualty. 
A smple way to measure the economc qualty of a country s to look at the 
changes n ts nternatonal compettveness, especally ts export share n the 
world total, except for natural resource-ntensve commodtes. Based on ths 
measurement, the share of chna’s exports n the world total was less than 0.9 
per cent n 1980 (World Bank 2005); t ncreased to 7.3 per cent by 2005 (WTo 
2005). BecZs have played a strong role n strengthenng chna’s nternatonal 
compettveness and expandng chna’s share n total world trade. 
We can also look at changes n the economc structure, especally changes 
n the share of hgh-tech ndustres n the whole economy. chna’s state 
commsson of scence and Technology promulgated the High-Tech Products 
Catalogue n 1991, based on nternatonal standards, partcularly the definton 
made by the organsaton for economc co-operaton and development (oecd). 
The catalogue has snce been updated every few years (state commsson of 
scence and Technology 1991). The current catalogue covers manly nformaton 
technology, software, aerospace, optcal, mechancal and electrcal ntegraton, 
bo-medcne and medcal equpment, new materals, new energy and hghly 
efficent energy savngs, envronmental protecton, oceans and space, nuclear 
applcaton technology and modern agrculture.
Accordng to ths definton of hgh-tech products or hgh-tech ndustres, 
the NeTdZs have played an actve role n mprovng chna’s economc qualty 
by ncreasng the number of hgh-tech enterprses n chna and expandng the 
shares of hgh-tech products n producton and exports. 
By the end of 2005, the number of hgh-tech enterprses n the NeTdZs 
reached 3,205—an ncrease of 6.7 per cent on a year-on-year bass. in the 
meantme, employees n hgh-tech enterprses totalled 830,800, accountng for 
20 per cent of all employees n the 54 NeTdZs. 
in 2005, the hgh-tech enterprses realsed ndustral output of 1,086.1 bllon 
yuan, an ncrease of 31.9 per cent from the prevous year, accountng for 46.5 
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per cent of the total. sales revenue of hgh-tech products reached 1,088.8 bllon 
yuan, an ncrease of 24.5 per cent, accountng for 47.1 per cent of the total sales 
revenue of ndustral products n the zones. exports of hgh-tech products n 
the zones reached Us$77.4 bllon, an ncrease of 49.5 per cent, accountng for 
68 per cent of total exports n the zones (Table 19.8).
The surge of hgh-tech enterprses and ther producton, sales and exports 
of hgh-tech products n the NeTdZs has been drven by the nvestment of 
many large multnatonals. Among them, the top 500 busnesses ncreased 
ther nvestment n the eTdZs rapdly n recent years. in 2003, the top 500 had 
nvested n 915 enterprses. Ths number ncreased to 1,308 by the end of 2005, 
an ncrease of 393 n two years—more than 20 per cent of the average annual 
growth rate. 
Table 19.7  Average annual changes in GDP share of five CSEZs in the 
national total, 1980–2005 
Perod  share Anuual ncrease n share 
  (per cent) (percentage pont)






Source: Author’s calculatons based on Table 19.1.
Table 19.8 High-tech enterprises in 54 NETDZs, 2005
  hgh-tech change share 
   (per cent) (per cent)
enterprses  3,205.0 6.6 ..
employment (‘000 persons) 830.8 .. 20.0
industral output (rmB bllon) 1,086.1 31.9 46.5
industral sales (rmB bllon) 1,088.8 24.5 47.1
exports (Us$ bllon)  77.4 49.5 68.0
Source: calculatons based on department of Foregn investment management n mnstry of 
commerce, 2006. Development Report of National Development Zones, 2006, Bejng.
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snce the share of NeTdZs n the natonal economy has become sgnficant 
and s stll growng, mprovements n ndustral qualty n the NeTdZs have been 
an mportant part of mprovements n the natonal economy. in addton, through 
the ndustral lnkages wth enterprses located outsde the NeTdZs, hgh-tech 
enterprses n the NeTdZs help wth the general mprovement of qualty n the 
natonal economy through a spllover of technologes, nternatonal standard 
management and marketng practces, as well as other busness actvtes. 
An effectve catalyst for natonal economc reform
developng NeTdZs has been a major component of chna’s open-door polcy. 
As s well known, such polces have been amed not only at the development 
of chna’s external sectors—ncludng foregn trade and nvestment—they have 
functoned very well as a poneerng experment for many of chna’s domestc 
reform polces. 
many new polces were first expermented wth n the cseZs or the NeTdZs 
before beng adopted as natonal polces and mplemented elsewhere, such 
as smplfyng government approval procedures for foregn nvestment, 
decentralsng the control of trade rghts from the central to local governments, 
lberalsng the labour market and personnel management systems, establshng 
socally pooled penson systems and other nsurance schemes. These polces 
were all mplemented first n the cseZs and the NeTdZs. 
For example, n the early 1980s, to gan government approval to open a jont 
venture or a foregn-owned enterprse n chna, potental foregn nvestors 
had to vst more than 50 government agents, from the local to the provncal 
government, and finally to the central government n Bejng. Ths procedure 
took more than a year—n many cases even longer. it was tme-consumng 
and financally costly, makng most foregn-nvested projects, especally small 
busness projects, mpossble. 
When the central government approved the first group of NeTdZs n the 
coastal areas, t decded to decentralse the approval power to the governments 
of the provnces where the NeTdZs were located. most of the provncal 
governments further passed on the power to the NeTdZs n order to mprove 
foregn nvestment management efficency. The decentralsaton enabled the 
NeTdZs to cut red tape and streamlne the approval process. These polcy 
measures became a key attracton for overseas busnesspeople to nvest n the 
NeTdZs. They also facltated a surge n foregn nvestment n the 1990s. 
Usng a specal zone to experment wth some reform measures was not 
always necessary (madan 1999). The obstacles to mplementng many reform 
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polces at the natonal level n transtonal countres are manly to do wth 
poltcal unwllngness, not economc logc. 
in the case of chna, the socety as whole mght have benefitted more f some 
reform polces could have been mplemented drectly at the natonal level—
such as cuttng red tape n government busness admnstraton, reformng the 
labour market and encouragng prvate busness. reformst leaders dd not want 
to restrct such polcy experments to the cseZs and the eTdZs. instead, the 
experment usually came about as a result of poltcal compromse.
Government agences at the central and local levels dd not want to gve up 
ther powers and rsk losng opportuntes for rent seekng. They found poltcal 
alles among conservatve leaders. At the same tme, although the reformst 
leaders were wllng to adopt much more flexble economc management 
systems, they could not afford to lose poltcal support from the bureaucratc 
system and therefore rsk ther poltcal control of the country. so they chose 
the second best: that s, to let the bureaucrats contnue to exert admnstratve 
power over natonal economc actvtes for a certan perod. At the same tme, 
they could experment wth new polces n lmted areas. 
Ths became a process of creaton of demand for the reform polces. The 
basc poltcal logc was that the success of the new polces expermented 
wth n the cseZs and the NeTdZs caused fierce competton among regons 
to attract foregn nvestment and to develop local economes. Therefore, t 
created new demand n other areas for the popularsaton of such polces; t 
also changed publc vews and ganed poltcal support. 
The cseZs and the NeTdZs ganed huge advantages n economc 
competton because of the mplementaton of many bold reform polces, 
whle most other areas n the country were stll beng restraned by the old 
system. Ther success reduced poltcal obstacles to mplement those polces 
naton-wde. 
Limitation of the ETDZs and new challenges in the WTO era
chna has experenced profound changes n the past three decades. These 
changes occurred not only n ts macroeconomc management system, 
economc strength and structure, but n ts economc and poltcal relatons 
wth the rest of the world. in a changed envronment, the cseZs and the eTdZs 
have started to show some nherent lmtatons. 
Although ther role n promotng natonal economc growth wll contnue for 
a certan perod, the growth rate of the margnal contrbuton to the natonal 
economy wll slow. Ths trend has already appeared n the cseZs’ performances 
n recent years. The GdP share of the five cseZs n the natonal total ncreased 
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rapdly from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, but the growth rate of the GdP 
share started to slow from the mddle 1990s (Fgure 19.2). 
one explanaton for ths trend s that wth mproved nvestment envronments 
naton-wde, the competton to attract nvestment has become ncreasngly 
fierce. Partcularly snce many economc reform polces have already spread to 
the whole country, the orgnal nsttutonal advantages the cseZs and NeTdZs 
enjoyed wll dsappear. 
it seems unlkely that the cseZs and the eTdZs wll contnue to benefit from 
future reform experments. chna has maxmsed the benefits t could have 
receved from a pecemeal reform strategy. The chnese government has tred 
hard to dentfy and solve problems wth easy solutons and the least amount of 
rsk. Now t has to face uphll battles. Future reforms wll focus on the financal 
sector, socal nsurance, ncome dspartes and other mportant economc and 
socal ssues. They wll have to be dealt wth n a more systematc method and 
experments n lmted areas wll smply not work.
in addton to the above-mentoned factors, rapd ncreases n land and 
labour costs n coastal areas wll lmt further growth of eTdZs. All the cseZs 
and most of the eTdZs are located n coastal areas, where populaton ntensty 
s hgh. Therefore, land supply s lmted. rapd ncreases n land prces wll 
drectly ncrease nvestment costs. At the same tme, land prces wll also push 











1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
%







Stepping stones to market integration
housng costs up further, whch wll flow on to lvng and labour costs. 
chna has been a member of the WTo snce december 2001. its WTo 
oblgatons have some mportant drect polcy mplcatons for the cseZs and 
the eTdZs. Wth all the agreements chna sgned when t was admtted nto the 
WTo, two are partcularly relevant to seZs: the Agreement on subsdes and 
countervalng measures (scm), and the Trade related investment measures 
(Trims) Agreement.
Accordng to the scm agreement, f three elements are satsfied at the 
same tme, any nvestment ncentves provded by the government should be 
regarded as subsdes. The three elements are a financal contrbuton by a 
government or any publc bodes; a benefit s conferred; a subsdy specfic to 
an enterprse or ndustry or group of enterprses or ndustres.
The scm agreement also specfies a definton of financal contrbutons. it 
states that any of the followng actons equate to a financal contrbuton
• a drect transfer of funds such as grants, loans and equty nfuson, and 
potental drect transfers of funds or labltes such as loan guarantees
• f revenue otherwse due to government s forgone or not collected, that 
s, fiscal ncentves such as tax credts
• the government provdes goods or servces other than general 
nfrastructure, or purchases goods
• the government carres out one of the above functons through a prvate 
body that would normally be vested n the government.  
All subsdes under the scm agreement are categorsed nto two types: 
prohbted subsdes and actonable subsdes. export subsdy s one of two 
types of prohbted subsdes. 
Accordng to the defintons n the scm agreement, many of the exstng 
preferental treatments for foregn-nvested enterprses n the eTdZs should be 
deemed as subsdes, and are thus nconsstent wth chna’s WTo oblgatons. 
For example, the cseZs and the eTdZs provde several forms of ncentves, 
such as lower enterprse ncome tax rates, exempton from ncome tax for a 
certan perod, further reducton of ncome tax for export-orented enterprses, 
provson of basc servces at a prce lower than market prces, and so on. 
chna’s alleged export subsdy has always been one of the man trade 
dsputes between chna and the Unted states, the european Unon and ts 
other man trade partners. some of the dsputed products are produced n the 
cseZs and the eTdZs.
Beng aware of the nconsstency between ts preferental polces granted to 
varous forms of seZs and ts commtment to ts WTo oblgatons, the chnese 
government has been gradually changng some polces. Passng the new 
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enterprse ncome tax law s a sgnficant step towards elmnatng the de facto 
subsdes to foregn-nvested firms located n cseZs and eTdZs. 
Although facng some lmtatons and challenges, the eTdZs wll have to 
change ther role n the natonal economy n future. suffice to say, after more 
than two decades of development, many eTdZs—n partcular, NeTdZs—have 
bult up a relatvely modern nfrastructure and a sound ndustral foundaton. 
some of them have formed an ndustral cluster wth the characterstcs of 
‘geographc concentratons of nterconnected companes, specalzed supplers, 
servce provders, and assocated nsttutons n a partcular field’ (Porter 1998). 
As ndustral centres n the regons, they wll be able to receve benefits from the 
economy of scale and become self-sustanng and self-enhancng, accordng 
to krugman’s theory of geography and trade (1991).
Conclusion
snce 1979, n order to promote economc growth and develop nternatonal 
economc relatons, the chnese government has set up varous forms of seZs. 
it started wth four seZs n southern chna n 1979, then 14 economc and 
technologcal development zones n the coastal areas n 1984. in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the economc and technologcal zones and other forms of seZs 
flourshed across the country. Now there are 1,568 economc and technologcal 
development zones wth a total plannng area of 9,949 square klometres.
Wth specal preferental treatments n taxaton and other fnancal 
ncentves, as well as a hgher degree of admnstratve autonomy, the varous 
forms of seZs—n partcular, 54 natonal-level eTdZs—have wtnessed rapd 
ncreases n Fdi, nternatonal trade and ndustral producton. They have played 
a sgnficant role n promotng natonal economc growth, mprovng overall 
economc qualty and poneerng economc reform.
There appear to be some lmtatons that wll restran chna’s seZs from 
contnung to grow and expand ther share n the natonal economy wth the 
speed they experenced n the past two decades. Ths s manly because the 
nsttutonal gap between these seZs and the rest of the country has gradually 
narrowed and wll soon dsappear. As a result, they wll not contnue to benefit 
from preferental treatment. realsaton of chna’s WTo oblgatons wll further 
speed up ths process. 
After two decades of development, however, some seZs and eTdZs have 
establshed an advantageous status as regonal ndustral centres. Ths status 
wll enable them to contnue to receve the benefits of the economy of scale 
and to realse self-enhancement n future development. 
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Notes
1 The central government approved the fifth seZ, hanan, n Aprl 1988.
2 The 14 coastal ctes are shangha, Tanjn, dalan, Qnhuangdao, Qngdao, Yanta, lanyungang, 
Nantong, Nngbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjang and Beha.
3 in chna’s offical document, 54 eTdZs nclude 49 eTdZs lsted n Table 19.2 and another five 
edZs, whch enjoy the same preferental polces as the 49 state-level eTdZs: suzhou industral 
Park, hanan Yangpu eTdZ, shangha Jnqao export Processng Zone, Nngbo daxe eTdZ 
and Xamen hacang investment Zone (department of Foregn investment management n 
mnstry of commerce 2006).
4 A complete data set for all 1,568 edZs, or even for 222 state-level edZs, s unavalable. A short 
tme data set for 54 state-level eTdZs s, however, relatvely relable. i have based my analyss 
of the eTdZs on the data of 54 state-level eTdZs.
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chna started ts transton from a planned economy to a market economy at 
the end of 1978. in the past 28 years, chna’s average annual gross domestc 
product (GdP) growth rate was 9.7 per cent and the trade growth rate averaged 
17.2 per cent. chna’s GdP, measured by the offical exchange rate, now ranks 
fourth and, by purchasng power party, second n the world. chna’s trade 
volume s currently the thrd largest n the world and ts foregn reserves, whch 
exceed Us$1.2 trllon, are the largest. 
in the first 12 years of reform, from 1978 to 1990, chna’s GdP grew by 9 per 
cent annually and ts trade volume at 15.4 per cent. durng ths perod, urban 
per capta ncome grew 5.9 per cent annually, whle that of rural areas grew 
at a spectacular rate of 9.9 per cent (Natonal Bureau of statstcs 2002:17, 94, 
148). lvng standards n chna ncreased sgnficantly and dspartes between 
urban and rural areas decreased.
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the reform process was poorly 
understood by the economcs professon and many economsts had lttle 
confidence n chna’s transformaton.1 most economsts beleved that a market 
economy should be based on prvate property rghts—a feature that the chnese 
economy apparently lacked at that tme. chna’s state-owned enterprses were 
not prvatsed; a dual-track resource allocaton system was prevalent, wth state 
plannng stll playng an mportant role alongsde markets n resource allocaton. 
These pessmstc economsts thought that although chna’s economc 
transton was blessed wth benefical ntal condtons,2 the dual-track system 
would soon lead to efficency loss, rent seekng and nsttutonalsed state 
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opportunsm (Balcerowcz 1994; Woo 1993; sachs and Woo 1994, 1997; Qan 
and Xu 1993). some economsts even clamed that, despte ts ntal success, 
chna’s dual-track approach to economc transton would eventually lead the 
economy to a dsastrous collapse (murphy et al. 1992; sachs et al. 2000).
At that tme, most economsts were optmstc about the transton n the 
former sovet Unon and eastern europe due to the fact that those countres 
were followng polcy recommendatons based on the basc prncples of exstng 
modern economcs—that s, neoclasscal economcs.3 The most representatve 
of these polces was the ‘shock therapy’ mplemented n Poland, the czech 
republc and russa. such an approach had three prmary components: prce 
lberalsaton, rapd prvatsaton and macroeconomc stablsaton through 
elmnaton of fiscal deficts (lpton and sachs 1990; Blanchard et al. 1991; 
Boycko et al. 1995). These components are consdered to be the bass of an 
efficent economc system n neoclasscal economcs.
economsts recommendng shock therapy also knew the transton from 
one economc system to another took tme and that t was costly to cast asde 
vested nterests. Nevertheless, they predcted optmstcally that the economes 
would grow after sx months or a year, after an ntal downturn resultng from 
mplementaton of the shock therapy (Brada and kng 1991; korna 1990; lpton 
and sachs 1990; Wles 1995). Accordng to ther arguments, the former sovet 
Unon and eastern europe would soon out-perform chna, even though the 
first two had nsttuted ther reforms much later than chna. chna’s progress 
would be lmted by nconsstences n ts economc system exacerbated by 
ncomplete, dual-track reforms.
As descrbed, however, chna’s average annual GdP and trade contnued 
to grow at hgh rates—10.3 per cent and 15.2 per cent, respectvely, n 1991–
2000—the former at hgher rates than n the early reform perod. inflaton, as 
measured by the retal prce ndex, was 5.5 per cent per annum n the same 
perod (NBs 2006). in the same 10 years, the countres that mplemented shock 
therapy experenced serous nflaton and economc declne. russa’s nflaton 
rate reached 163 per cent per annum, whle Ukrane’s reached 244 per cent per 
annum n 1991–2000. The cumulatve output declne n countres n central and 
southeastern europe and the Baltc states reached 22.6 per cent; n countres 
of the commonwealth of independent states, output fell 50.5 per cent. in 
2000, russa’s GdP was only 64 per cent of what t had been n 1990, whle n 
Poland—the best performng economy n the former sovet Unon and eastern 
europe—GdP ncreased only 44 per cent, compared wth 1990. 
meanwhle, the Gn coefficent of ncome per capta—a measurement of 
ncome dsparty—ncreased from 0.23 n 1987–90 to 0.33 n 1996–98 n countres 
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of central and southeastern europe and the Baltc states, and from 0.28 to 0.46 
n countres of the commonwealth of independent states (World Bank 2002). 
overall, the countres that mplemented shock therapy experenced great 
dfficultes n ther reforms—n contrast wth the optmstc expectatons of 
most economsts. Poland’s economc record s the best among the countres 
of the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, however, t dd not mplement 
shock therapy completely. Although prces n Poland were lberalsed, most of 
ts large state-owned enterprses have yet to be prvatsed (World Bank 1996; 
dabrowsk 2001). 
in the 1990s, the chnese economy dd suffer myrad problems, as predcted 
by those economsts who favoured shock therapy. For example, the state-owned 
enterprse reforms ntated n the early 1980s have yet to be completed. inter-
regonal and urban–rural dspartes ncreased after the declne n the 1980s. 
The financal system remans weak. As noted above, however, chna’s GdP and 
trade contnued to grow. moreover, lvng standards mproved rapdly, especally 
n urban areas. economc development n chna not only promoted the welfare 
of the chnese people, t contrbuted greatly to the world economy. durng the 
east Asan financal crss n 1997–98, the chnese currency (the renmnb) dd 
not deprecate, whch played an mportant role n the quck recovery of the east 
Asan economes from the crss.
chna’s economc transformaton dd not follow the standard polcy 
prescrptons based on exstng modern economcs, and performed outstandngly. 
Those countres that followed the standard polcy recommendatons n ther 
transtons performed poorly. Ths dramatc contrast ndcates that there s 
an nherent lmtaton n establshed modern economcs—represented by 
neoclasscal economcs—n analysng the problems n economc transtons. 
Ths chapter suggests drectons for mprovement of neoclasscal economcs. 
Neoclassical economics, the viability assumption and the 
formation of a planned economy
Theores are used to explan and predct real-world phenomena. if they fal to 
do so, the theores must have some fundamental flaws and should be revsed 
or abandoned (Fredman 1953). exstng neoclasscal economc theores have 
performed reasonably well n explanng what happens n the economes of 
ndustralsed countres, but they have been less successful n explanng what 
happens n transtonal economes and developng countres.
Neoclasscal economcs has a well-known assumpton of ratonalty: gven the 
choces avalable to a decson maker, he or she wll choose what s consdered 
to be the best opton. There s, however, another assumpton—the ‘vablty’ 
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assumpton—that s ncorporated mplctly by neoclasscal economsts n ther 
analyses. The term ‘vablty’ s defined wth respect to the expected profit of a 
firm n an open, compettve market. if a normally managed company s expected 
to earn a socally acceptable normal profit n an open, compettve market, t 
s vable. For a non-vable company, ts establshment or contnung operaton 
s possble only f t receves external subsdes or protecton.4 
By mplctly assumng that all firms are vable n ther analyses, economsts 
wll conclude that a firm that does not earn acceptable profits n an open, 
compettve market must lack normally efficent management. They nfer 
that problems must stem from corporate governance, ncentve mechansms, 
property rghts arrangements or other market nterventon that mpede the firm’s 
management. Problems n corporate governance, property rghts arrangements 
and so on dd exst n socalst economes. Therefore, under the nfluence of 
exstng neoclasscal economc theores, t was beleved that the success 
of state-owned enterprse reforms and the transton to a market economy 
depended on the elmnaton of those factors that mpeded a company’s normal 
management. shock therapy s based on ths theoretcal foundaton.
snce the ncepton of neoclasscal economcs, economsts n ndustralsed 
countres have conducted most theoretcal exploratons. Ther research, 
however, focuses manly on ssues relatng to ndustralsed countres. it s 
reasonable for them to assume that firms are vable, snce—except for those 
n a few sectors—governments n ndustralsed countres rarely provde 
subsdes and other types of support drectly to companes. if a company wth 
normal management s not expected to earn acceptable profits n the market, 
t wll not be set up n the first place. if a non-vable firm s establshed due to 
msleadng nformaton or mstakes n judgment, nvestors wll wthdraw ther 
nvestments and close down the firm. consequently, firms that can survve n 
an open, compettve economy must be vable: that s, they are expected to earn 
acceptable profits under normal management. it s therefore approprate to 
have an mplct vablty assumpton n neoclasscal economcs for analysng 
phenomena n ndustralsed countres.
As argued by ln (2003), however, many firms n transtonal economes and 
developng countres are not vable—that s, they cannot earn acceptable profits 
n an open, compettve market even though ther management s normally 
efficent. The non-vablty of these firms arses from the fact that the sector 
n whch they operate, the products they produce and the technology they use 
n producton are nconsstent wth the economy’s comparatve advantage as 
determned by the factor endowment structure—namely, the relatve abundance 
of labour, captal and natural resources.
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Fgure 20.1 llustrates the dea of vablty n an open, compettve market 
that produces only one product wth two factors: captal and labour. curve ‘i’ 
s an soquant. each pont on the soquant represents a specfic technology 
or combnaton of captal and labour requred to produce a gven amount of 
product.5 The technology represented by ‘A’ s more labour ntensve than that 
represented by ‘B’. in an open, compettve economy, the least-cost technology 
s the best. if ‘c’ s the socost lne n the economy, the adopton of technology 
‘A’ costs the least, whle the adopton of any other technology wll make the 
firm ncur losses n an open, compettve market. For example, f a firm adopts 
the technology represented by ‘B’, t s expected to ncur a loss equvalent to 
the dstance from ‘c’ to c1. market competton wll make firms that adopt 
technologes other than ‘A’ non-vable. Therefore, n an open, compettve 
market wth gven relatve prces of labour and captal, the vablty of a firm 
depends on ts choce of technology. only the firm that chooses the least-cost 
technology s vable.
Whether the economy’s socost lne corresponds wth ‘c’ or ‘d’ depends 
on the economy’s endowment structure. When labour s relatvely abundant 
and captal s relatvely scarce, the socost lne wll have the flatter slope of ‘c’ 
rather than ‘d’. When captal becomes relatvely abundant and labour relatvely 
scarce, the socost lne wll change to somethng lke lne d n Fgure 20.1. 
Therefore, the vablty of a firm n an open, compettve market depends on 
whether ts choce of technology s consstent wth the comparatve advantage 
of the economy’s endowment structure.
Ths concluson can be extended to mult-product and mult-ndustry cases. 
That s, n an open, compettve market, whether a firm s vable depends on 
whether or not ts ndustry, product and technology choces are consstent wth 
the comparatve advantages determned by the economy’s endowment structure.6 
if a firm’s choces are not consstent wth ths condton, t cannot earn acceptable 
profit n an open, compettve market even under normal management and ts 
survval requres government subsdes and/or protecton. 
A good example that llustrates the vablty concept s the agrcultural sector 
n Japan. The majorty of farms n the Japanese agrcultural sector are small and 
owned by ndvdual owners/operators. There are, consequently, no problems 
of property rghts and corporate governance.7 Japan s, however, a country 
endowed wth only lmted arable land and t has no comparatve advantages n 
land-ntensve agrcultural products such as gran. it s also a hgh-wage country 
wth no comparatve advantages n labour-ntensve agrcultural products such 
as vegetables and frut. Although Japan’s agrcultural sector s famous for ts 
delcate, ntensve cultvaton, the survval of Japanese farms reles on hgh 
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levels of government fiscal subsdes and tarff protectons, wthout whch most 
Japanese farms could not survve.8
many state-owned enterprses n transtonal economes face the same 
vablty problems as Japanese farms, due to the fact that these enterprses—
especally large state-owned enterprses—are establshed by governments wth 
the am of competng wth ndustralsed countres n captal and technology-
ntensve sectors, even though ther economes are stll low ncome and captal 
scarce. These strateges clash wth the comparatve advantages of the countres’ 
partcular economes.
in fact, the tradtonal centrally planned systems n socalst economes 
were formed endogenously to support and protect these non-vable heavy 
ndustral firms that were not consstent wth the economy’s comparatve 
advantages.9 socalst countres—ncludng russa and chna—were captal 
scarce, backward, agraran economes before they adopted a centrally planned 
system. in a captal-scarce, agraran, low-ncome country, the establshment of a 
firm n a captal-ntensve heavy ndustry must overcome numerous dfficultes. 
Frst, constructon of the firm takes a long tme. second, the key equpment 
and technologes necessary for the firm must be mported. Thrd, the ntal 
nvestment s dauntngly large. At the same tme, n a low-ncome agraran 
country, the economc surplus from each perod of agrcultural producton s 
very small and scattered wdely and thnly across numerous small rural farms. 
As a result, such an economy has three dstnct characterstcs. 
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Frst, captal s relatvely scarce due to the lack of economc surplus, makng 
market-determned nterest rates extremely hgh. second, exportable goods are 
lmted n varety and quantty. consequently, foregn exchange s scarce and 
market-determned exchange rates are hgh. Thrd, the moblsaton of resources 
for a project that requres large, lump-sum nvestment s dfficult due to the fact 
that the economc surplus s lmted and scattered wdely across the economy. 
The conflcts between the three characterstcs of a low-ncome, agraran 
country and the three characterstcs of nvestng n captal-ntensve heavy 
ndustres n the country requre the government to adopt specal nsttutonal 
arrangements to make such nvestment feasble. 
specfically, to make long-gestaton nvestment projects feasble n chna, 
russa and other socalst countres, governments artfcally depressed 
nterest rates; to lower the costs of mported equpment and technologes, 
governments dstorted exchange rates by artfically overvalung the domestc 
currency; and to moblse enough surplus for the large, lump-sum nvestment 
projects, governments gave the firms monopoles n ther output markets and 
artfically depressed prces of all knds of nputs—ncludng wages—so that 
the firm could accumulate enough surplus for ts own nvestment. As wage 
rates were suppressed, governments were requred to provde workers wth 
low-prce lvng necesstes. The dstortons n nterest rates, foregn exchange 
rates, wage rates, nputs and the prce of necesstes resulted n shortages of 
captal, foregn exchange, raw materals and necesstes. To ensure that these 
scarce resources would be allocated to firms n the prorty sectors, plannng 
and admnstratve allocaton of resources accordng to the state plans were 
requred. Ths was the logc for the emergence of a tradtonal, centrally planned 
system n socalst economes.
Furthermore, f the firms were n prvate hands, the state could not ensure 
that the surpluses moblsed through these dstortons would be nvested 
n heavy ndustres accordng to the state’s plans. Therefore, the firms were 
natonalsed so that the state could drectly control the rghts to nvest the 
surplus. in addton, even though the firms were owned by the state, the state 
could not overcome the problems of nformaton asymmetry and ncentve 
ncompatblty. if company managers had dscretonary powers, moral hazards 
would ensue, resultng n a reducton of the surplus avalable for nvestment. To 
prevent the eroson of the surplus, the government deprved managers of any 
autonomy n nput, output and market decsons and n personnel appontments, 
wage settngs and other manageral dscretons (ln and Tan 1999).
in fact, the varous nsttutonal arrangements—such as dstortons n nterest 
rates, foregn exchange rates, prces of raw materals, wage rates and commodty 
prces, the replacement of the market mechansm wth plan allocaton, and the 
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deprvaton of manageral autonomy—are all endogenous to the fact that the firms 
n the government’s prorty sectors are not vable n an open, compettve market 
(ln et al. 2003). in the jargon of neoclasscal economcs, these arrangements are 
‘second best’. They are requred for the maxmum moblsaton of surpluses n 
dfferent sectors for nvestment n the prorty sectors. Wth such arrangements, 
a backward agraran country such as chna could develop nuclear bombs and 
launch satelltes wthn a short tme. The resource allocaton, however, was 
poor, due to nvestments beng made n non-vable firms. The ncentves for 
workers and managers were low due to the manager’s lack of autonomy and 
the dsconnecton between performance and reward. As a result, the whole 
economy was nefficent.10 moreover, wthout the government’s nterventon, an 
economy wll mport the goods produced n ndustres n whch the economy 
does not have comparatve advantages and export goods n ndustres n whch 
the economy has comparatve advantages. 
Under the comparatve advantage-defyng (cAd) strategy, however, 
mports wll become smaller due to efforts to produce goods that ndustres 
are supposed to mport, and exports wll become smaller due to the fact that 
resources are dverted from ndustres n whch the economy has comparatve 
advantages to ndustres n whch t does not have comparatve advantages. 
Therefore, the trade-dependent rato—measured by the total value of exports 
and mports as a share of GdP—under the cAd strategy wll be much smaller 
than n a country that follows the comparatve advantage-followng (cAF) 
strategy. The case of chna s a good example. The trade-dependent rato n 
1978 was 9.75 per cent. After chna made the transton from the old strategy, 
the rato ncreased to 64.1 per cent n 2005.
most dstortons n the socalst planned economes were formed 
endogenously by the government for the purpose of facltatng the development 
of non-vable firms n sectors that were not consstent wth the economy’s 
comparatve advantages. snce many exstng firms were not vable, t s not 
surprsng that exstng neoclasscal economc theores—wth ther mplct 
vablty assumpton—cannot provde adequate solutons for problems n 
socalst and transtonal economes. if the problem of non-vablty s not 
elmnated, and f the government s unwllng or unable to let the non-
vable firms go bankrupt, elmnatng dstortons and reformng nsttutonal 
arrangements accordng to the exstng neoclasscal economc theores are 
lkely to turn the arrangements from second best to thrd best. Therefore, 
the reforms, at best, wll not acheve the ntended effects and, at worst, wll 
exacerbate the stuaton.
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Neoclassical economics and policies of economic transition
The model of the world we have n our mnds wll shape our understandng of the 
real world (North 2002). exstng neoclasscal economc theores—formulated 
n ndustralsed market economes—have proved that neffectve corporate 
governance, deficent property rghts arrangements and government nterventon 
n resource allocaton are harmful to economc efficency. economsts traned 
n neoclasscal economcs tend to thnk that exstng neoclasscal economc 
theores are approprate models for the analyss of problems n transtonal 
economes when they observe famlar problems n corporate governance, 
property rghts and government nterventon. They fal to see the endogenety 
of these problems to the non-vablty of firms n the government’s development 
strategy. invted by governments n the former sovet Unon and eastern 
europe to desgn ther transton polces, neoclasscal economsts reached 
a remarkable consensus about the need to elmnate the dstortons and 
government nterventon mmedately (summers 1994:252–3).11
The most prevalent reform polcy advce accordng to neoclasscal 
economc theores s the ‘Washngton consensus’, whch calls for strengthenng 
fiscal dscplne, ncreasng publc nvestment n areas wth ‘publc goods’ 
characterstcs to mprove ncome dstrbuton, enlargng the tax base, unfyng 
exchange rates, lberalsng trade, removng foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) 
barrers, prvatsng state-owned enterprses, lftng regulatons on market entry 
and protectng prvate property rghts (Wllamson 1997). The shock therapy 
proposed by economsts for the transtonal economes n the former sovet 
Unon and eastern europe was based on ths Washngton consensus (kolodko 
2001). Therefore, we can understand why, n the 1990s, economsts wth 
neoclasscal tranng were more optmstc about reforms n the former sovet 
Unon and eastern europe, whch mplemented shock therapes, than about 
the pecemeal, gradual, dual-track reform approach beng taken n chna.
Neoclasscal economc theores not only have an mpact on economsts 
workng on ssues related to ndustralsed market economes, they nfluence 
economsts workng on ssues related to other economes. For example, n the 
famous debate on socalsm n the 1930s, economsts such as oscar lange, 
who beleved that the socalst planned economy could acheve the same 
allocaton efficency by smulatng markets, and Fredrch hayek, who beleved 
that the socalst economy was doomed to fal due to nformatonal problems, 
took the vablty of firms n a socalst economy as an mplct assumpton n 
ther analyses.
Neoclasscal economc theores also nfluence economsts lvng n socalst 
countres when they analyse the problems of ther own economes. Janos korna 
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of hungary s one of the most emnent economsts specalsng n socalst 
economes. one of hs most mportant contrbutons s the concept of the 
‘soft-budget constrant’ (korna 1986). in many socalst countres, state-owned 
enterprses sufferng from poor performance can ask for preferental treatment 
and subsdes, whle prvate firms n market economes have no choce but to 
go bankrupt. korna proposed that the soft-budget constrant was the man 
reason for a lack of ncentves to mprove efficency and for the prevalence of 
moral hazards n state-owned enterprses. he attrbutes the exstence of the 
soft-budget constrant to the paternalsm of socalst governments towards 
state-owned enterprses. Therefore, he argued that reform n property rghts 
and the severance of firm–state connectons must be carred out n order to 
elmnate the soft-budget constrant and to promote company efficency. 
in korna’s theoretcal framework, state-owned enterprses are mplctly 
assumed to be vable. however, the soft-budget constrant n socalst economes 
emerges essentally from the vablty problem of state-owned enterprses. 
in an open, compettve market, these firms would not be able to attract 
nvestment n the first place and, f they had nvestment due to msjudgment 
or other reasons, nvestors would not contnue to support ther operatons 
once the msjudgments were clarfied. To establsh these non-vable firms, 
socalst governments must protect and subsdse them. Because of ncentve 
ncompatblty, the managers of state-owned enterprses have ncentves to 
attrbute ther losses to nsufficent government support or protecton, even 
though the losses arse from ncompetent operatons and poor manageral 
dscreton. Because of nformaton asymmetry, governments cannot know 
what levels of protecton and subsdy are adequate. Therefore, governments 
cannot resst the companes’ requests for more support and the companes’ 
budget constrants become soft (ln and Tan 1999). Therefore, the soft-budget 
constrant of state-owned enterprses results essentally from the problem 
of non-vablty rather than from the paternalsm of socalst governments. 
smlarly, even n non-socalst countres, the soft-budget constrant wll exst 
n non-vable firms f the government s responsble for the establshment of 
those firms. The large chaebols n korea are llustratve of ths fact. 
if the vablty problem s the root of the soft-budget constrant, we can 
predct that f the vablty problem s not solved, the soft-budget constrant wll 
not be elmnated, even though the socalst government s overthrown and all 
firms are prvatsed. in fact, that s what happened n the former sovet Unon 
and eastern europe. in these countres, democratcally elected governments 
replaced socalst governments and shock therapy and prvatsaton were 
mplemented, but the soft-budget constrant stll exsted and n many cases 
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ncentves for prvatsed company managers to bargan for more support and 
protecton became sgnficantly hgher than the ncentves for state-owned 
enterprse managers.12 Accordng to the World Bank’s studes, after full-scale 
prvatsaton n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, the subsdes that 
firms receved from governments dd not decrease—n some cases, they even 
ncreased (World Bank 1996, 2002).13 At the same tme, taxaton capactes were 
weakened sgnficantly after shock therapy. Ths, combned wth hgh subsdes 
to companes, led to extremely hgh nflaton n these countres.
it s not only that the shock therapy formulated accordng to neoclasscal 
economc theores dd not work n the former sovet Unon and eastern 
europe, many reform measures based on such theores or on the experences 
of ndustralsed economes created problems n chna.14 The reform of state-
owned enterprses s an example.15 At the begnnng of the reforms n the 
early 1980s, t was beleved that the root of the problems wth state-owned 
enterprses was the lack of autonomy of managers, wth dsconnecton between 
performance and rewards. Therefore, decentralsaton reforms were ntated 
to ncrease manageral autonomy and to allow state-owned enterprses to 
retan a certan share of ther profits to be used at ther own dscreton. These 
measures were effectve n plot experments, but were neffectve when 
they were mplemented naton-wde. emprcal studes found that the reform 
ncreased state-owned enterprses’ productvty but ther profitablty declned 
(ln et al. 2001). 
many scholars thought the dscrepancy arose from the arrangement of 
property rghts because the firms were owned by the state but were operated 
by managers, who were not the owners and dd not have ncentves to ncrease 
returns to the equty owner—the state. Based on ths dagnoss, the reform 
measures, startng n the late 1980s, promoted modern corporate governance 
n state-owned enterprses wth the establshment of boards of drectors and 
supervson boards to delneate clearly the owners’ rghts. A publcly lsted 
company was consdered to have the best corporate governance and property 
rghts arrangements, snce the value of the firm would be evaluated before t 
went publc and, after beng lsted, equty would be held by the state and non-
state nvestors. in addton to montorng by the board of drectors, non-state 
shareholders would have ncentves to montor the company’s management 
and operatons snce they would care about the returns on ther nvestment. 
Nevertheless, n realty, after a few years, the financal performance of the 
majorty of lsted companes dd not dffer from those of non-lsted companes 
(ln 1999). in the begnnng, the poor performance of lsted companes was 
attrbuted to the fact that only small, ndvdual nvestors owned the non-state 
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stocks and these nvestors had lttle ncentve to montor the managers because 
the returns for ther efforts would be neglgble. These small shareholders were 
thought to be nterested n the short-term prce changes n stocks, whch made 
stock-markets hghly speculatve, wth hgh turnover rates and short holdng 
perods. 
in ndustralsed countres, nsttutonal nvestors play an mportant role n 
equty markets. An nsttutonal nvestor has the capacty to hold a substantal 
porton of a lsted company’s shares and thus has greater ncentve to montor the 
nvested company’s management than does an ndvdual nvestor. in addton, 
an nsttutonal nvestor can hre professonals to analyse the lsted companes’ 
reports and operatons. if an nsttutonal nvestor decdes to hold the shares of 
a company, that nvestor s lkely to hold the shares for a long tme. 
chnese researchers thought that the ntroducton of nsttutonal nvestors 
would stablse chna’s stock-markets, so nvestment funds were ntroduced 
n 1998; however, speculaton n the stock-markets dd not stop. makng thngs 
worse, many nvestment funds not only speculated n the stock-market, they 
manpulated stock prces. how could ths happen? The reason les n the 
problem of the non-vablty of these lsted companes. Wthout the ablty to 
earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market, these companes cannot 
afford to dstrbute dvdends to shareholders, whch means that small ndvdual 
shareholders as well as nsttutonal nvestors can profit only through speculaton 
on stock prces. Wth large amounts of money at ther command and a small 
porton of stocks n crculaton for each lsted company,16 nsttutonal nvestors 
resorted to manpulaton of stock prces to make profits (ln 2001, 2004). 
in concluson, for firms to survve n the markets of ndustralsed countres, 
they must be vable. Therefore, vablty s an acceptable mplct assumpton 
n neoclasscal economc theores for explanng phenomena n ndustralsed 
countres. Polcy reforms based on neoclasscal economc theores or the 
experences of ndustralsed countres have faled to acheve ther ntended 
goals n transtonal economes because most firms n transtonal economes 
are not vable. 
The prevalence of the viability problem and the expansion of the 
neoclassical framework
companes’ vablty problems and the resultng nsttutonal arrangements 
not only appear n transtonal economes, they are wdespread n developng 
countres. on seeng the decsve role of ndustralsaton n promotng the 
economc and poltcal powers of ndustralsed countres, many leaders of 
developng countres that acheved ndependence after World War ii attempted 
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to develop advanced ndustral sectors comparable wth those n ndustralsed 
countres aganst ther own comparatve advantages (chenery 1961; krueger 
1992).17 They dd so by ntervenng n factor prces, the financal system, 
nternatonal trade and nvestment—wthout realsng that the ndustral 
structures of ndustralsed countres were determned endogenously by ther 
own partcular factor-endowment structures. Through such efforts, developng 
countres were able to establsh companes n advanced sectors. Those 
companes were not, however, vable n an open, compettve market, and 
government nterventon on prces, resource allocaton and market competton 
were requred to ensure ther survval. such nterventon led nevtably to the 
prevalence of rent seekng and crony captalsm, whch resulted n unequal 
dstrbuton of ncome, low efficency and socal and economc nstablty 
(krueger 1974; ln 2003).18
Ths phenomenon also exsted n some newly ndustralsed economes. 
korea’s stuaton serves as a good llustraton. Tawan has hgher per capta 
ncome than korea, but the chaebols n korea are more technologcally advanced 
and captal ntensve than comparable firms n Tawan.19 durng the east Asan 
financal crss n 1998, Tawan’s foregn exchange rate devalued by only 15 per 
cent and t was the only economy that acheved postve growth n east Asa—
except for manland chna, whch was nsulated from the crss by ts currency 
nconvertblty and control of captal accounts. Tawan grew by 4.5 per cent n 
1997 and 5.7 per cent n 1998, whch was remarkable consderng the terrble 
external envronment at that tme. Tawanese firms manfested themselves as 
beng compettve and vable. The korean economy collapsed durng the east 
Asan financal crss and korea had to borrow heavly from the internatonal 
monetary Fund (imF). After the elmnaton of state protecton and subsdes to 
large firms—n accordance wth the condtons of the imF’s rescue package—20 
out of 30 korean chaebols went bankrupt, whch showed that these firms were 
not vable and could not survve wthout government protecton.
in market economes, the protectve measures provded to non-vable 
firms are smlar to those n socalst economes: depresson of nterest rates, 
admnstratve allocaton of bank loans to provde cheap funds to non-vable 
firms and establshment of varous mport barrers to prevent competton 
from ndustralsed countres. The protected firms are n sectors that clash 
wth the economy’s comparatve advantages and produce lttle economc 
surplus. The firms, consstent wth the economy’s comparatve advantages, 
face dscrmnaton and eventually experence dfficultes. As a result, the 
funds that could be moblsed for development purposes dry up. if external 
borrowng s not allowed—as was the case n inda, Pakstan and most socalst 
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countres—economes stagnate. if external borrowng by firms or governments 
s permtted—as n latn Amerca, korea, Thaland and indonesa before the 
east Asan financal crss—debt crses ensue (krueger 1992).
When debt crses occur, countres have to seek rescue packages from the 
imF under exstng nternatonal financal arrangements. such packages usually 
come wth condtons, requrng a seres of reforms and structural adjustments 
n the recpent countres. The concept of such condtons s tself based on 
the Washngton consensus, whch requres that macro-polcy dstortons be 
corrected, that governments cease nterventon n banks and companes and that 
corporate governance be mproved. The Washngton consensus—reflectng the 
basc prncples of neoclasscal economc theores—mplctly assumes that firms 
are vable. Therefore, the condtons am to elmnate protecton and subsdes 
wthout any attempt to solve the companes’ vablty problems. if non-vable firms 
consttute only a small share of the economy—as s the case n Bolva—shock 
therapy s possble and growth can resume quckly when ncreases n efficency 
offset the shock of bankruptcy suffered by non-vable companes n the wake 
of Washngton consensus measures. if, however, non-vable firms consttute a 
large share of the economy—as s the case n transtonal economes—shock 
therapy would lead to an ‘l’ curve rather than a ‘J’ curve n the pattern of GdP 
growth after mplementng the therapy (ln 1998).20
snce the exstence of non-vable firms s a common realty n socalst, 
transtonal and developng economes, t s napproprate to assume mplctly 
that companes are vable n the analyss of the economc problems n these 
economes and to formulate reform polces based on such assumptons and 
analyses. Problems of vablty should be taken nto consderaton n analysng 
economc development and transton.
on reflecton, neoclasscal economcs has been enrched through a process 
of abandonng unrealstc and mplct assumptons. The basc framework 
of neoclasscal economcs was lad down n Alfred marshall’s Principles of 
Economics n 1890. Among others, marshall’s framework had several mplct 
assumptons, ncludng perfect nformaton, zero transacton costs and the 
vablty of firms n an open, compettve market. 
economc theores are nstruments to help people explan what has been 
observed and to predct what wll happen. Accordng to Fredman (1953), the 
acceptablty of a theory depends not on whether the assumptons of the 
theory are realstc, but on whether the mplcatons drawn from the theory 
are consstent wth emprcal observatons. marshall’s framework s very 
powerful n explanng and predctng a number of economc phenomena n 
market economes. For example, when the prces of certan products ncrease, 
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purchases of those products wll generally declne. The assumptons n 
marshall’s framework, however, also lmt ts explanatory power on certan 
ssues. For example, under the assumpton of perfect nformaton and zero 
transacton costs, there wll be only one prce for a product n a compettve 
market, allowng lttle room for prce dfferentaton. 
one of the man contrbutons by George stgler at the Unversty of 
chcago was to abandon the mplct assumpton of perfect nformaton and to 
ntroduce the concept of ncomplete nformaton nto economcs, wth the added 
consderatons of the value of nformaton and the cost of nformaton collecton 
and processng. hs contrbuton makes nformaton an mportant varable n 
modern economc analyss. other economsts—such as Joseph stgltz, George 
Akerlof and mchael spence—further emphassed that not only s nformaton 
ncomplete, t s often dstrbuted asymmetrcally among producers, consumers, 
prncples and agents. Furthermore, accordng to marshall’s framework, 
resource allocaton by markets s the most efficent opton. knowng ths, t s 
dfficult to explan why there are firms operatng n accordance wth non-market 
allocaton mechansms. ronald coarse contrbuted to neoclasscal economcs 
by abandonng the zero transacton cost assumpton and ntatng research 
on contracts, property rghts and non-market nsttutons.
economc theores are lke maps. A map s not the real world; t s a 
convenent tool to help us understand the surroundng envronment and what 
wll be seen n dfferent drectons. maps, by nature, must be smplfied, but f 
some mportant landmarks are gnored or ncorrect, the maps wll mslead us. 
When we dscover mstakes n a map, and smlarly n a theory, correctons must 
be made. due to the prevalence of vablty problems n socalst economes, 
transtonal economes and developng countres, the mplct assumpton of 
vablty should be relaxed n analysng the economc problems and desgnng 
polces to solve problems n these economes. Transton and reform polces 
should be desgned accordng to the understandng that many firms are 
not vable. The success of transton and reform depends on the creaton of 
condtons that make non-vable firms vable, n leu of followng shock therapy 
and Washngton consensus reforms uncondtonally.
in addton, the objectve pursued n natonal development must be 
reformulated. Tradtonally, poltcal leaders, economsts and the socal élte n 
developng countres amed to develop advanced technologes and ndustres 
smlar to those of the most ndustralsed countres wthn the shortest 
tme. The structures of ndustry and technology that are consstent wth an 
economy’s comparatve advantages are, however, determned endogenously 
by the economy’s exstng factor endowment structure. ignorng the exstng 
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dfferences between ts own endowment structure and that of ndustralsed 
countres, the government n a developng country often tres hard wth 
good ntentons to develop the same ndustres and technologes as those n 
ndustralsed countres. in effect, the government’s efforts make companes n 
the prorty sectors non-vable because they lack the ablty to survve n open, 
compettve markets. Therefore, the government has to subsdse and protect 
these companes through prce dstortons, nterventon n resource allocaton, 
and so on. rent seekng, the soft budget constrant, macroeconomc nstablty, 
ncome dspartes, stagnaton and crses are the consequences of the 
government’s development attempts n spte of the ntal good ntentons. 
Based on the concept of vablty, the objectve of natonal economc 
development should be to upgrade the economy’s endowment structure. Wth 
such upgradng, companes n open, compettve markets wll upgrade ther 
ndustral, product and technologcal levels accordngly n order to ensure 
ther compettveness n the market (ln 2003). snce the endowment of land 
(and natural resources) n a country can be treated as gven, the upgradng of 
the endowment structure means an ncrease n the amount of captal to each 
worker. captal comes from the accumulaton of economc surplus. To upgrade 
the endowment structure rapdly, a maxmum economc surplus should be 
produced n each perod, and a large proporton of ths surplus should be saved 
for captal accumulaton. if a country develops ts ndustres, technologes and 
products along the lnes of ts exstng comparatve advantages, ts economy 
wll be most productve, produce the maxmum possble surpluses, create 
the hghest possble returns to captal and have the hghest ncentve to save. 
consequently, the upgradng of the factor endowment structure n the economy 
wll proceed at ts maxmum speed. companes’ decsons wll be based on 
product prces and producton costs, but not on the factor endowment structure 
n the economy. Therefore, the government should mantan openness and 
sufficent competton n the market so that the prce structure wll reflect the 
relatve abundance of the factor endowment structure.21
Viability and economic transition
companes n heavy ndustres prortsed by the government n tradtonal 
centrally planned economes are not vable n open, compettve markets. The 
objectve of the transton from a tradtonal centrally planned economy s to 
establsh an open, compettve market economy. in the process of transton, 
however, the vablty problem of those firms n the sectors nconsstent wth 
the economy’s comparatve advantages turns from mplct to explct. Whether 
the transton wll be stable and successful depends very much on how the 
vablty problem s solved.
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Non-vable firms cannot survve n open, compettve markets wthout 
government subsdes or protecton. The shock therapy adopted n the former 
sovet Unon and eastern europe attempted to elmnate all dstortons and 
government nterventon smultaneously, or n a short perod. if mplemented 
forcefully, shock therapy nevtably led to large-scale bankruptcy and 
unemployment, thus promptng economc collapse and socal nstablty. 
such results are, understandably, not acceptable to a functonng government. 
consequently, many governments n the former sovet Unon and eastern 
europe had to find ways to provde protecton or subsdes contnuously to a 
large number of non-vable firms, resultng n the embarrassng stuaton of 
shock wthout therapy (Galbrath 2002).
chna has adopted a gradual, pecemeal, dual-track approach snce ts 
transton started n 1979: on one hand, the chnese government has relaxed 
ts strct control of resource allocaton and has allowed new entres to sectors 
n whch the economy has comparatve advantages; on the other hand, the 
government has contnued to provde protecton and support to firms n 
tradtonal sectors to buffer them aganst the threat of bankruptcy, whle takng 
measures to reform them. The first track enhanced the efficency of resource 
allocaton, created a new stream of resources and resulted n rapd economc 
growth and trade expanson. The second track prevented the collapse of the 
economy durng the transton process. Ths dual-track approach has mantaned 
socal and economc stablty, acheved dynamc growth and ensured the 
transton has been a Pareto or kaldor mprovement (ln et al. 1996).
chna’s transton towards a market economy depends, however, on a 
final soluton to the vablty problem of firms n tradtonal sectors. snce the 
vablty problem s not yet solved, the chnese government has been requred 
to contnue ts nterventon n markets n order to protect or subsdse non-
vable firms—and such nterventon comes wth consequences. For example, 
along wth chna’s rapd economc growth n the transton process, the share 
of non-performng loans n the four bg state-owned commercal banks has 
ncreased sharply, corrupton s wdespread and regonal ncome dspartes are 
wdenng. To a large extent, these problems arse from the fact that state-owned 
enterprses stll depend on government subsdes and protecton to survve. 
After 1983, the form of chnese government support to state-owned enterprses 
changed from drect fiscal appropraton to offerng low-nterest loans from the 
four state banks. Untl now, more than 70 per cent of loans from the four state 
banks went to state-owned enterprses, but due to ther poor performance, 
many state-owned enterprses have been unable to repay the loans. Therefore, 
the banks have accumulated large amounts of non-performng loans. 
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The government also lmts the market entry of prvate nterests nto certan 
sectors to gve state-owned enterprses n those sectors a monopoly poston. 
Therefore, rent seekng to obtan preferental loans or market-entry lcences 
s prevalent among state-owned and non-state-owned enterprses, addng to 
wdespread corrupton. in addton to subsdsng state-owned enterprses, 
the government artfically depressed the prces of agrcultural products and 
mnerals under the tradtonal plannng system. such prce dstorton has 
contnued snce the reforms as a means to subsdse the non-vable state-
owned enterprses. 
The comparatve advantages of eastern chna le n manufacturng 
ndustres; those of central chna le n agrculture; and those of western chna 
le n mnerals and natural resources. snce the reforms began, the eastern 
regon has made huge progress n the development of manufacturng ndustres 
by takng advantage of the superor geographcal and market condtons and has 
ncreased substantally mports of low-prced agrcultural and mneral products 
from the central and western regons. in essence, the relatvely poor central 
and western regons have been subsdsng the development of the relatvely 
rch eastern, ndustral regon. regonal dspartes are wdenng as a result. 
if the vablty problem of state-owned enterprses s solved, there wll be no 
reason to contnue subsdsaton and protecton through low-nterest loans, 
monopolstc practces and the depresson of prces for agrcultural and raw 
materals. The remanng dstortons and government nterventon can then be 
elmnated (ln et al. 2001).22
The vablty problem of state-owned enterprses can be solved accordng to 
four dfferent strateges, dependng on the nature of the state-owned enterprses’ 
outputs (ln et al. 2001). The first group ncludes manly the defence-related 
state-owned enterprses, whose producton—whch s captal and technology 
ntensve—runs aganst chna’s comparatve advantages, but whose outputs 
are essental for natonal securty. For ths group of state-owned enterprses, 
drect fiscal appropraton s necessary for ther survval and the government 
should drectly montor ther producton and operaton. it s reasonable to expect 
that there are only a few state-owned enterprses n ths category. 
The second group also requres ntensve captal and technologcal 
nputs for ther producton, but ther outputs are not senstve to natonal 
securty and they have large domestc markets. examples of ths category 
are the telecommuncatons and automoble ndustres. For ths category, the 
government can adopt a ‘market-for-captal’ approach to gan access to captal 
from nternatonal markets and remove the adverse mpact of the domestc 
endowment structure on these firms’ vablty. There are two ways to acheve ths 
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goal: one s to encourage state-owned enterprses to go publc on nternatonal 
equty markets; the second s to set up jont ventures wth foregn companes 
and gan drect access to foregn technologes and captal. chna moble, chna 
Telecom and chna Petroleum have followed the first approach and many 
automoble makers n chna have followed the jont-venture approach. 
The thrd category of state-owned enterprses has lmted domestc markets 
for ther products and thus ths group cannot adopt the market-for-captal 
approach. The way for them to solve the vablty ssue s to make use of ther 
engneerng and manageral capactes and to shft ther producton to labour-
ntensve products, whch have large domestc markets and are also consstent 
wth chna’s comparatve advantages. The most famous example of a firm 
followng ths approach s the colour-televson maker changhong. Ths firm 
used to produce old-style mltary radar. After swtchng to the producton of 
colour televsons, the firm has domnated the chnese market and s very 
compettve n the nternatonal market. most state-owned enterprses have 
advantages n engneerng and manageral personnel. if they are gven the 
opportunty to shft ther producton lnes to labour-ntensve products, many 
of them can become vable. The fourth group conssts of non-vable firms that 
lack engneerng capacty and are thus unable to shft ther producton to new 
markets. These state-owned enterprses should be allowed to go bankrupt. 
After the vablty problem of the exstng firms s solved, whether or not a 
firm can earn acceptable profits n an open, compettve market becomes the 
responsblty of the firm’s managers. The performance of a firm wll depend 
on the corporate governance, ncentve mechansms and other factors—as 
dentfed n neoclasscal economcs. The government wll no longer be 
responsble for a firm’s performance. only then can the reform of nsttutons 
that are nherted from the tradtonal centrally planned system, wth the 
functons of subsdsng and protectng state-owned enterprses, be carred out 
thoroughly and the transton from a planned economy to a market economy 
be completed.
Conclusion
in ths chapter, i have shown that modern neoclasscal economcs dd not play 
a drect role n helpng chna’s formulaton of successful transton polces to a 
market economy and that those countres that followed transton polces based 
on modern neoclasscal economcs performed poorly n the process. The reason 
for the falure of neoclasscal economcs to provde useful polcy gudance for 
transton s because ts current framework, begnnng wth marshall, mplctly 
assumes that a company exstng n the market s vable: that s, the company 
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s expected to earn a socally acceptable profit n an open, compettve market 
as long as t s under normal management. Wth ths mplct assumpton, the 
focus of economc research has been on the problems of corporate governance, 
the compettve envronment, the arrangement of property rghts and other 
factors that can obstruct a firm’s normal management. 
many firms n transtonal economes and developng countres are, however, 
not vable because, due to ther governments’ ambtous development strateges, 
they are n sectors that are nconsstent wth ther economes’ comparatve 
advantages. in an open, compettve market, these firms, even under normally 
efficent management, wll not be able to earn acceptable profits. To set up 
these firms and to mantan ther contnuous operaton, governments provde 
them wth protecton and subsdes through prce dstorton, lmtatons on 
market competton, admnstratve allocaton of all knds of resources, and 
so on. The results of such nterventon are nadequate competton, lack of 
effectve corporate governance, rent seekng, dspartes n ncome dstrbuton, 
nefficent resource allocaton and, qute possbly, economc crss. 
Under the rubrc of exstng neoclasscal economc theores, when 
desgnng polces for economc transton or crss management, economsts 
and government officals are lkely to focus on strengthenng property rghts, 
mprovng corporate governance, removng government nterventon n resource 
allocaton, and so on, to mprove the efficency of the market. They are not 
aware of the fact that such market-mpedng dstortons and nterventons are, 
n fact, endogenous to a company’s vablty problem. When a majorty of the 
companes n an economy are non-vable, the mplementaton of these reform 
and transtonal polces sometmes leads to an awkward stuaton of shock 
wthout therapy, as n the former sovet Unon and eastern europe, and the lost 
decades n other developng countres (easterly 2001; ln and lu 2004). 
snce many exstng companes n socalst centrally planned economes, 
transtonal economes and developng countres are not vable, t s necessary to 
relax the mplct vablty assumpton n neoclasscal economcs when applyng 
the neoclasscal approach to study the problems n those economes. The 
explct consderaton of the vablty problem wll enrch neoclasscal economcs 
and help to define the economc functons of governments n developng 
countres, preventng them from adoptng cAd development strateges to set up 
non-vable firms and enablng them to acheve convergence wth ndustralsed 
natons n an expedent manner (ln 2003).
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Notes
1 There were also economsts who held chna’s reform n hgh regard. They nclude Jefferson 
and rawsk 1995; mcknnon 1994; mcmllan and Naughton 1992; Naughton 1995; sngh 1991; 
harrold 1992; Perkns 1992; and murrell 1991, 1992.
2 The ntal condtons that have been regarded as benefical to chna’s transton nclude hgh 
proportons of cheap rural labour, low socal securty subsdes, a large populaton of overseas 
chnese and a relatvely decentralsed economy, whch helped to acheve some short-term 
progress.
3 The crtque n ths chapter s on the exstng economc theores, whch assume mplctly that 
the exstng firms n a market are vable, rather than on the neoclasscal economc approach, 
whch assumes that a decson maker s ratonal: that s, he or she wll make a choce consdered 
to be the best among hs or her avalable choces. i owe ths clarficaton to Gary Becker.
4 The term vablty was ntroduced formally n ln and Tan 1999. The most comprehensve 
analyss of ths concept can be found n ln 2003. 
5 The curve can be consdered as the envelope of all dfferent knds of technologes that can 
be used to produce the product.
6 For detaled dscussons of a firm’s vablty ssues n a mult-good and mult-sector context, see 
ln 2003. The term vablty refers only to whether a firm’s choces of technology and product are 
consstent wth comparatve advantage determned by the economy’s endowment structure. 
it s noteworthy that a vable firm mght not be profitable f ts management s poor.
7 The problem of corporate governance s due to the separaton of ownershp and control that 
leads to ncentve ncompatblty and nformaton asymmetry between owners and managers. 
if the same person s owner and manager of a firm, there wll be no problems of ncentve 
ncompatblty, nformaton asymmetry and moral hazard.
8 The prce of rce n Japan s about eght tmes that n the nternatonal market. Japan’s deflaton 
has lasted for more than a decade, snce 1991. The formaton of the Free Trade Area of the 
Assocaton of south east Asan Natons (AseAN) Plus Three—ncludng Japan, korea and 
chna—stands to ncrease Japan’s exports and Fdi and wll help Japan get out of ts current 
deflaton. chna proposed the AseAN Plus Three Free Trade Area n 2001, but Japan’s response 
was hestant due to ts need to protect ts agrcultural sector.
9 on the logc of the formaton of a tradtonal plannng system n socalst countres, see ln 
et al. 2003.
10 For efficency ndcators for chna before the transton, see ln et al. 2003:chapter 3. For a 
detaled study of efficency n the former sovet Unon, see desa 1990.
11 certanly, there were exceptons. For example, murrell 1991 questoned the power of the 
neoclasscal paradgm to explan the dfferences n the economc performance of market 
and centrally planned economes and the approprateness of usng neoclasscal economcs 
to underpn the reform of centrally planned economes.
12 Before the ntroducton of shock therapy, firms were state owned and managers were cvl 
servants of the state. The subsdes they receved from the government could not fall nto 
ther own pockets wthout the managers facng the possblty of corrupton charges. After 
prvatsaton, however, government subsdes could be channelled nto the legal ncomes of 
managers. Thus, the ncentve to push for subsdes and preferental treatment ncreased and 
the problem of the soft-budget constrant became all the more serous.
13 Accordng to emprcal research, some firms ncreased ther efficency after prvatsaton, but 
others dd not (lavgne 1995:175; djankov and murrell 2002). in my judgment, the key les n 
whether or not the firm was vable before prvatsaton. if t was, then efficency would ncrease 
after prvatsaton; f t was not, such firms would experence a decrease n efficency. After 
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seeng that prvatsaton dd not help solve the soft-budget constrant or mprove efficency, 
many economsts realsed the mportance of mprovng corporate finance and market 
competton. As former chef economst of the european Bank and Vce-Presdent and chef 
economst of the World Bank, Ncolas stern, commented, ‘[G]ood corporate governance of 
publc firms and sound competton polcy are at least as essental for recovery as prvatzaton 
and lberalzaton’ (stern 1996:8). Poland’s former Frst deputy Premer and mnster of Fnance, 
Grzegorz kolodko (2000:ch.4), holds the same opnon. The fact that many shareholdng 
companes n chna dd not show sgnficant dfferences n ther financal ndcators from 
non-lsted companes after five years of beng lsted shows, however, that f the problem of 
vablty goes unresolved, good corporate governance and sufficent market competton wll 
not come about unless bankruptcy s permtted (ln and Tan 1999; ln et al. 2003).
14 snce 1978, when chna ntated ts reforms, the two most sgnficant changes—summarsed 
by deng Xaopng as the two ‘unexpected results’—were the success of the household 
responsblty system (ln 1992) and the remarkable growth of townshp and vllage firms 
(ln and Yang 2001). These reforms were not desgned by reformers ex ante, but adopted by 
peasants spontaneously n practce.
15 regardng academc debates and polcy measures on state-owned enterprse reform, see ln 
et al. 2001.
16 in chna, about only 25 per cent of the total stock of a lsted company was ssued to non-state 
nvestors and could be traded n the stock-markets. The other 75 per cent was stll owned by 
the state and could not be traded n the stock-market. Among the 1,200 or so lsted companes, 
only a few have dstrbuted dvdends to stockholders (ln 1999). 
17 The vew of former indan Prme mnster Jawaharlal Nehru s most representatve of ths. in 
1938, before inda’s ndependence, he was the Presdent of inda’s state Plannng commsson. 
he wrote: ‘[i]n the context of the modern world, no country can be poltcally and economcally 
ndependent, even wthn the framework of nternatonal nterdependence, unless t s hghly 
ndustralzed and has developed ts power resources to the utmost. Nor can t acheve or 
mantan hgh standards of lvng and lqudate poverty wthout the ad of modern technology 
n almost every sphere of lfe’ (Nehru 1946:413, quoted n srnvasan 1994:155–6).
18 such tendences characterse inda and latn Amerca. on inda, see swamy 1994. on latn 
Amerca, see cardoso and helwege 1992.
19 Take the nformaton technology (iT) sector as an example. Tawanese firms, such as Tsmc, 
manly do orgnal equpment manufacture (oem), whle korea’s samsung and hyunda 
electroncs carry out ndependent research and development and product nnovaton. 
For a comparatve study of iT development strateges n Tawan and korea, see ln 2000. 
Furthermore, n the automoble ndustry, korea produces complete cars, whle Tawan s 
renowned only for parts producton.
20 The dfference n the shares of non-vable firms n the economy mght explan why the shock 
therapy recommended by sachs succeeded n Bolva but not n the former sovet Unon and 
eastern european economes. Bolva s a poor, small economy and the resources that the 
government could moblse to subsdse the non-vable firms were small. Therefore, the share 
of non-vable firms n the economy must also be relatvely small. stgltz 1998 also questoned 
the unversal applcablty of the Washngton consensus, but dd not consder the possble 
mpact of non-vable firms n developng and transtonal economes and ther lmtatons on 
polcy choces.
21 in a developng country, the government can also use an ndustral polcy to assst firms’ 
upgradng of technology, product and ndustry n respondng to change n the economy’s 
endowment structure by provdng relevant nformaton, coordnatng requred nvestments 
and compensatng for externaltes of nnovaton. The ndustry promoted by the ndustral 
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polcy should, however, be consstent wth the comparatve advantages of the new endowment 
structure and, as such, the firms are vable n an open, compettve market (ln 2003).
22 Besdes the vablty problem, state-owned enterprses n chna have a problem of socal 
burdens. Before the economc transton, the nvestment n heavy ndustry provded lmted 
employment opportuntes. The government was responsble for urban employment and 
usually assgned several workers to a job, resultng n labour redundancy n state-owned 
enterprses. The workers also receved low wages, whch were enough only for coverng 
current consumpton. Before the transton, state-owned enterprses remtted all ther revenue 
to the government, and the government used fiscal appropraton to cover state-owned 
enterprses’ wages, the pensons of retred workers and other expendture. Therefore, the labour 
redundancy and penson expendture were not burdens on the state-owned enterprses. After 
the reforms, state-owned enterprses started to be responsble for ther workers’ wages and 
retrement pensons. The newly establshed town and vllage enterprses, jont ventures and 
other non-state firms are n sectors that are consstent wth chna’s comparatve advantage 
and they do not have the problem of labour redundancy and unfunded pensons for retred 
workers. i call the ssue arsng from the vablty problem of the state-owned enterprses 
the ‘strategc burden’ and the addtonal cost arsng from labour redundancy and penson 
expendture the state-owned enterprses’ ‘socal burden’. Together, they consttute the state-
owned enterprses’ ‘polcy burdens’. As long as these polcy burdens exst, the government 
s responsble for the firms’ losses and the soft-budget constrant cannot be elmnated (ln 
and Tan 1999). There s a consensus n chna about the necessty for and the way to elmnate 
socal burdens. Therefore, the remanng ssue s how to solve the strategc burden.
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